Delegates from twelve Baltic Sea parliaments and regional assemblies met in Szczecin, Poland, for the second session of the BSPC Working Group on Strengthening Cyber and Information Resilience to Promote Democracy (WG SCIRPD). Participants from the Åland Islands, the Baltic Assembly, Estonia, Finland, the Deutscher Bundestag, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Schleswig-Holstein, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the West Pomeranian Regional Parliament joined officials and experts to address hybrid threats, cross-sectoral cooperation, and cyber crisis preparedness.
Working Group Chair Meelis Kiili opened the session by noting that the threat landscape has continued to evolve since the inaugural meeting in Tallinn. Russian hybrid operations in the region have grown more sophisticated, while EU regulatory instruments — including the NIS2 Directive, the Cyber Resilience Act, and the AI Act — are advancing toward national implementation.
The meeting included a visit to Autocomp Management, a Szczecin-based developer of training and simulation systems for defence and civilian sectors. Research and Development Director Roman Haberek presented the company's open-architecture platforms, including tank simulators for the Leopard 2A4 and 2A5 developed in partnership with Krauss-Maffei Wegmann.
Expert presentations covered a range of topics. Mariusz Żabiński of the Institute of Socio-Political Technologies "Kybernetes" outlined a model for countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), calling for accelerated regulatory action, stronger cross-sectoral cooperation, and greater technological sovereignty. Dr Dominika Skoczylas of the University of Szczecin addressed cybersecurity policy as a tool for protecting democratic institutions and the information society. Filip Głowacz of NASK presented an analysis of Russian hybrid operations against Poland, including the role of media in the unintentional amplification of disinformation. Rafał Malujda, a legal expert and ISO-certified auditor, emphasised cyber crisis management — including tabletop exercises and simulation-based training — as a central element of democratic resilience.
Members reviewed recommendations from the Tallinn session, proposed additional topics for the working group's report, and discussed plans for forthcoming meetings. Key conclusions included the need to engage young people in resilience efforts, to develop forward-looking institutional frameworks capable of keeping pace with technological change, to protect critical infrastructure including data cables and energy systems, to address hardware dependencies as part of technological sovereignty, and to ensure continuous assessment of national and EU cybersecurity frameworks.