The 33^rd Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference Helsingør – 25-27 August 2024

Compilation of Statements Available Here: The Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) – gathered in Helsingør – unanimously passed on 27 August 2024 the following 33 rd BSPC resolution: In keeping with a long-standing tradition, national and regional governments across the Baltic Sea Region have submitted their official responses to the 33 rd BSPC Resolution , adopted unanimously at the 33 rd Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference in Helsingør on 27 August 2024 . Once again, the Standing Committee expresses its sincere appreciation for the governments’ commitment to reviewing and supporting the BSPC’s calls for action. Their contributions reflect a broad spectrum of initiatives, policies, and measures that align with the shared goals of the 33 rd Resolution – which focused on advancing democratic resilience, maritime security, critical infrastructure protection, climate neutrality, and sustainable development in the region. The compilation of statements offers valuable insight into ongoing governmental efforts, providing a unique overview of regional and national activities in response to the parliamentary recommendations. These statements serve not only as a reference for monitoring progress but also as a catalyst for further parliamentary engagement and intergovernmental cooperation. The publication, now available for download, encompasses contributions from: Åland, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hamburg, Latvia, Lithuania, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Norway, Poland, Schleswig-Holstein, and Sweden. 📌 For reference: Materials and Outcomes of the 33 rd BSPC Conference – Helsingør 2024

The full report from the 33 rd Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC in Helsingør, Denmark, is now available on the BSPC website . The compilation can be downloaded her e and on the 33 rd conference webpage . The report comprehensively reviews the three-day conference, which focused on “Safety in the Baltic Sea Region.” It includes speeches and contributions from high-ranking speakers, such as the Speaker of the Danish Parliament, Søren Gade, BSPC President Henrik Møller, parliamentarians, ministers, and other regional experts. The publication is complemented by a rich collection of photographs capturing the event’s vibrant discussions and key moments. The image collection also documents the reception at Kronborg Castle , where the Danish King honoured the conference as a distinguished guest. Key topics addressed include: • Defence cooperation and strengthening regional security, • Measures for energy security and the protection of critical infrastructure, • Environmental and climate initiatives , and • Enhancing collaboration among democratic Baltic Sea countries . The report highlights the importance of the BSPC as a central platform for dialogue among parliamentarians and stakeholders across the Baltic Sea region. Explore the report to access the full content and learn more about the outcomes of this pivotal conference.

BSPC Observer on HELCOM, Ms Beate Schlupp, First Vice-President of the State Parliament of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, has released her 2023-2024 Report on HELCOM-related developments and activities. The comprehensive report details the BSPC’s observer activities at the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM) during 2023-2024. This report highlights the continued dedication of the BSPC to environmental protection and sustainability in the Baltic Sea region, emphasising the strong collaboration between the BSPC and HELCOM. Over the past year, significant progress has been made in implementing key recommendations from HELCOM, with governments demonstrating a renewed commitment to addressing the pressing environmental challenges. The report notes that HELCOM’s third holistic assessment (HOLAS 3) has provided invaluable insights into the state of the Baltic Sea, revealing both areas of concern and encouraging signs of improvement where protective measures have been effectively applied. The BSPC has been an active supporter of HELCOM’s initiatives, particularly in the areas of combating marine pollution, enhancing biodiversity, and addressing the issue of sea-dumped munitions. This cooperation has been vital in ensuring that legislative actions are aligned with the environmental goals set out in the updated Baltic Sea Action Plan. As we were celebrating this year the 50 th anniversary of HELCOM, the BSPC reaffirmed its commitment to fostering a healthy and resilient Baltic Sea ecosystem. The full Report can be downloaded here and on the Rapporteur’s webpage . We invite you to read the full report and join us in supporting these critical efforts.

The second day of the BSPC conference began with addresses from international partners, reinforcing their cooperation. The BSPC Working Group’s interim report on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, and Connectivity was presented, along with reports by the BSPC Rapporteurs on Integrated Maritime Policy, Migration and Integration as well as Sea-Dumped Munitions. The fourth session dealt with climate change, assessing once more the situation and charting what had to be implemented. Finally, the presidency was transferred from Denmark to Åland. Addresses by Representatives of other Parliamentary Assemblies, International Guests, and BSPC Observer Organisations Benelux Parliaments Mr Hendrik-Jan Talsma, head of the delegation of the Netherlands Parliament, thanked the BSPC for inviting a delegation from the Benelux parliaments to this extraordinary event. He pointed to the historical ties between their nations, although they had not always been as peaceful, friendly, and cooperative as in the present. What the Baltic Sea meant for the states around its shores, the North Sea did for Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. It was an economic and strategic artery for these countries. Security played an increasingly vital role here as well, with a growing number of Russian military and scientific vessels passing coastlines, data cables, wind farms, and gas pipelines. Of course, the right of free passage – mare liberum – had to be respected. Escorting non-NATO ships had become a regular task for the North Sea states while arrangements to protect wind farms against drone deployment had been made. Yet for the necessary investments in defence, resources were needed: software for better detection and monitoring, camera surveillance, drones, and more stringent public-private security plans. This was only possible through efficient cooperation. On 25 October 2024, the Netherlands parliament would host a conference on this subject. Mr Talsma extended an invitation to a BSPC delegation. He called on his audience to stand together in the face of the increasing tensions. CBSS, Estonian Presidency Mr Tõnis Nirk, Ambassador-at-Large for Baltic Sea Cooperation, Chairman of the CBSS Committee of Senior Officials, introduced the main priorities of the Estonian presidency. They built on the achievements of their predecessors, continuing to stress the political dialogue. The recent Ministerial Meeting in Porvoo had reaffirmed support for Ukraine, noting the change in the security landscape after the Russian attack, particularly in hybrid threats from Russia and Belarus. The three long-term priorities of the CBSS remained highly topical: a safe and secure, sustainable and prosperous region, and a regional identity. The main focus of the Estonian presidency would be on strengthening resilience and sustainability. Furthermore, the support for and with Ukraine would be continued and reinforced. Thirdly, well-focused and mutually beneficial cooperation with the other regional formats – highlighting the BSPC – was crucial for the CBSS. Regarding the long-term priorities, he said that, for a safe and secure region, the CBSS would concentrate on civil protection, child protection, and anti-trafficking. For a sustainable and prosperous region, work would continue on the green corridors through the Baltic Sea. In a new Estonian initiative, the CBSS would work on creating a “digital twin” of the Baltic Sea. For regional identity, cultural heritage and several important projects were at the forefront. Youth involvement also continued its vital part in the CBSS, such as the CBSS Summer University in Tallinn in mid-July. The CBSS had appointed a new director general of the secretariat. Mr Nirk acknowledged the predecessor’s, Ambassador Poznański, tremendous work over the past four years. Dr Lindström would take over the position a few days later. In Porvoo, ministers had decided on a review of the CBSS to provide recommendations for the future. He expected results to be available by the time Poland would take over the presidency in the coming year. CBSS, Secretariat Ambassador Grzegorz Poznański, outgoing director general of the CBSS secretariat, said that Baltic Sea cooperation showed the multi-level governance of the region. Parliamentarians, governments but also regions, cities, and other organisations were playing a vital role in moving all of them forward. A good old tradition of the region was to find solutions for problems they encountered. This went back to the assemblies in the Nordic countries and Germany called thing which were forerunners of the parliaments of the present day. The Slavic precursors led to the modern word sejm and cognates. Russia had experimented with similar ideas in the Novgorod Republic in the late medieval period – but it had been literally butchered by Czar Ivan the Terrible. For the ambassador, this early end of the council concept was a likely explanation why no common ground had been found with Russia since. He had been proud to represent the Baltic Sea region for four years since it was an example to the world. Other regions seeking to establish similar cooperations were looking to the Baltic Sea as a role model, such as the countries around the Red Sea. In the multi-level governance, they turned to politicians when needed, at other times to cities or regions. Ambassador Poznański was also glad that the Baltic Sea region was doing the most to support Ukraine, on every level. Furthermore, he highlighted the close collaboration with Ukraine – sharing ideas but also learning from the country’s painful experience. Democratic values and pragmatism, awareness of threats and opportunities, cooperation – all of that had allowed the Baltic Sea region to flourish in the past and would continue to do so. Baltic Sea NGO Network Mr Jens William Grav, coordinator, reflected that the last time he had been at this venue in 2009, the Nord Stream pipeline as well as nuclear power had been discussed. Some things changed; others stayed the same. He went on to explain that the purpose of the Baltic Sea NGO Network was to bring NGOs from different countries and fields together and influence democratic decision-making in the region as well as raising awareness for the work of NGOs. People-by-people contact and human rights issues had been a focus of their efforts. While the Network had used to have platforms in every country of the region, recently, the ones in Finland and in Iceland had been shut down. Some of the platforms were coordinators for some of the EU macro strategy’s priority areas such as Sweden for education and Poland for tourism. He underlined that civil society was important for the development of the Baltic Sea region. In the Nordic tradition, democracy started in NGOs in which boards were elected. That experience was taken to other democratic institutions, such as political parties. As for the Network’s partnership with the BSPC, Mr Grav said that discussions were ongoing to establish an event like the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum to bring the whole of society into the BSPC’s discussion. He stressed that every part of society was needed in the region’s development. Status Report from the Working Group and Reports by BSPC Rapporteurs Session chair Kim Aas noted his pride on the high-level recommendations elaborated by the working group after just one year. Interim Report of the Working Group on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, and Connectivity Working group chair Andris Kulbergs believed they had achieved great success after just one year, having gathered practical experience and having learned from each other. In retrospect, Russian gas had been a sedative – so comfortable and easy for citizens and business that there had been no drive to develop renewables. None had wanted to realise that the gas had been a weapon. But since the Russian attack on Ukraine, that had become obvious – especially in the effect on inflation. Latvia had experienced 22 % inflation, forcing government to spend a great deal of money to support citizens and industry. In effect, they were paying for the mistake they had made before. This applied to other European countries as well. Now, industry was looking for alternative energy sources, such as German chemical and manufacturing enterprises. Yet Europe had shown resilience in a way Russia had not anticipated. There was much yet to do, though. At a meeting in Riga, the working group had visited a Soviet-era hydro plant which allowed Latvia to be among the greenest energy suppliers in Europe. Rail Baltica was a vital project as Soviet infrastructure had been deliberately laid out east-west, and now the north-south dimension was being developed as a project across the Baltic Sea region. Mr Kulbergs noted the military aspect as the Ukrainian railway helped the country sustain its war effort. Furthermore, Rail Baltica also served as energy and digital infrastructure, reinforcing security. In March 2024, the working group had gone to Helsinki. The hybrid threat centre opened their eyes to how poorly they had been dealing with propaganda, how slow information was versus disinformation. Politicians needed to make sure they had the truth rather than fall prey to propaganda themselves. Furthermore, the energy sector would be vulnerable in the coming winter. Mr Kulbergs related an example from January 2024 when the Nordics’ energy grid had been overtaxed when renewables had failed, stressing the need for reliable base energy and better interconnectivity among the countries. He called on his fellow politicians not to let national pride prevent such interconnections. The working group had also implemented a survey among the Baltic Sea nations on consumption, energy productivity, and connectivity plans. He believed all of them were seriously underestimating the future demand of electricity. Among other aspects, he pointed to vehicle transport and heating moving to electric power driving that increase. There was also the growth of AI: At an extracurricular meeting in Finland, at the LUMI supercomputer data centre, they learned that the centre expended 15 megawatts in the present but expected that number to balloon to 300 megawatts in five years. This made base power even more crucial. Mr Kulbergs remarked that Sweden and Poland were now heavily investing in nuclear power. These approaches had to be synchronised across the region. He called on everybody to work together, to ensure there would be no further vulnerabilities to Russian attacks. That also included protecting the crucial infrastructure in the Baltic Sea as well as digital firewalls and defending from hybrid propaganda threats. Co-chair Eka von Kalben announced that the reports of the BSPC Rapporteurs were to follow. She informed the conference that all the reports were available for download on the BSPC website, including those not orally represented in this session. Report by Mr Jörgen Pettersson, BSPC Rapporteur for Integrated Maritime Policy Mr Pettersson called the men and women at sea the unsung heroes of their time, making sure that people’s basic needs were covered. Everything needed for living was delivered by sea. Aside from unpredictable natural forces, they were facing regulation, competition, policies, and more created by humans. 15 % of global shipping occurred in the Baltic Sea, with 2000 ships constantly present. He noted that his report covered three large policy areas: The future fuels/engines and the ETS trading system – first in the world – would bring major implications across the board, affecting infrastructure, maritime spatial planning, and technologies. The Russian shadow fleet posed a significant challenge to global maritime authorities and regulators. Some 400 tankers were not registered or mis-registered and operating below the radar with ship-to-ship transfers, AIS manipulation, very complex ownership structures, alternative finance and insurances, disguised routes. They represented economic strategic aggression and geopolitical instability. The integrated maritime policy provided notions on how to tackle such matters. The goal was a sustainable and competitive future for the maritime sector because of its importance for life. As such, he was looking to further good cooperation to achieve these ambitious goals. Report by Ms Carola Veit, BSPC Rapporteur for Migration and Integration Ms Veit noted that migration and integration remained at the top of the political agenda, as evidenced by the recent European elections. Europe was still experiencing the largest refugee movement since the end of World War II. She highlighted the BSPC resolution paragraphs 4, 6, and 8, namely, integrating migrants and vulnerable groups into the labour market with regard to social sustainability and the support for Ukraine. Secondly, the challenges of migration, hybrid warfare, and border control were increasingly intermingled. The UN Refugee Agency had recorded some 6.5 million refugees from Ukraine globally by July 2024, all but half a million in Europe. Yet there had been more than 117 million refugees worldwide in 2023. EuroStat stated that, relative to their size, Chechia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia had accepted the most Ukrainian refugees. But all members of the BSPC were confronted with the task of integration. The German Institute for Employment’s research showed the labour market integration by Ukrainians, with Lithuania showing the highest employment rate at 57 %, followed by Denmark at 53 %, and Poland at 48 %. Below 20 % were Finland, Norway, and Romania. The two different approaches here were language first and work first. To some degree, they explained this variance, trading speed for sustainability. Thus, despite the currently low numbers, the study recommended Norway as a role model, offering a part-time 6-12-month program so that Ukrainians could work at the same time. A Hamburg model for underage migrants combined vocational training with language classes, with 53 % of participants moving on to further education or employment. Two policy decisions in Latvia and Estonia underlined the importance of language skills for integration: Latvia would discontinue Russian as a mandatory second language in its state education from 2026, aiming to provide a wider selection of second languages. From 2029, Estonian would be the only instruction language in that country. Ms Veit presented four policy decisions also tackling hybrid attacks and border tensions. Finland was seeking to implement pushbacks at its border to Russia, despite legal concerns. Finland and Lithuania had to deal with Russia unilaterally redrawing Baltic Sea borders to sow confusion. Sweden was implementing a “snitch” law so that contacts with undocumented workers would be reported to the authorities, over opposition from municipalities, trade unions, civil society groups. Germany had re-introduced temporary border checks as a reaction to more than 260,000 unauthorised border crossings in 2023. Refugees were increasingly reduced to an instrument of hybrid warfare by Russia. Parliamentarians had to strike a balance between fighting against hybrid threats and defending democratic values. A strong democracy was the best protection against disinformation. Yet they had to remember that their aging societies needed people. Migration should be seen as one key to the future of the Baltic Sea region and Europe. Presentation by Ms Anna Kassautzki, BSPC Rapporteur on Sea-Dumped Munitions Ms Kassautzki cautioned that, amidst the current threats, the mistakes of the past should not be forgotten. After the World Wars, some 400,000 tonnes of conventional and 40,000 tonnes of chemical warheads had been dumped onto the bottom of the Baltic Sea. She noted that the first number was likely vastly underestimated. The ammunition was corroding, its contents polluting the sea water. Since the Baltic Sea waters were more stationary than in other seas, so were the harmful substances. One well-researched example near Kiel showed mussels and 25 % of the caught fish being heavily affected. For too long, the problem beneath the sea was out of sight, out of mind. Not only the BSPC had been seeking to bring it to the surface but also the CBSS, HELCOM, and other organisations. Scientists were using AI to supplement real data so as to find munition dump sites. The EU sought to coordinate scientific action and data sharing with the Commission, the CBSS, and HELCOM. They wanted to develop tools and technologies for a campaign to clear the Baltic Sea from dumped munitions. Combined with the planned German mobile platform, this could be a gamechanger. Finding, retrieving, and destroying the munitions on the spot above the waterline would be the most efficient way without further damaging the ecosystem. Unfortunately, progress was not as fast as it should be. As such, her report from the previous year was still up to date. Yet the process had to be accelerated – Ms Kassautzki underlined that there was not much time left to implement it. She called for the close cooperation between the major entities and the strong support from the parliamentary side. In particular, the governments had to find a funding mechanism so they could clean up the mess of generations before. Fourth Session: Climate Initiatives Session chair Jarosław Wałęsa explained that the BSPC’s previous working group had dealt with Climate Change and Biodiversity, completing its work the previous year. The present session would continue to deepen understanding and discussion of this crucial topic. Presentation by Ms Eva Jensen, European Environment Agency Ms Jensen noted that security was the framework around the climate agenda in the coming policy cycle in the EU institutions, much like the BSPC conference. Her agency provided knowledge and data to policymakers. As for climate change specifically, she explained that Earth had already warmed by the 1.5 °C target specified in the Paris Agreement. That this would inevitably be exceeded spoke to the urgency of these efforts. Extrapolating current trends foresaw a rise by 7 °C at the end of the 21 st century – it was hard to see how human society could adapt to that. Fortunately, the widespread efforts would likely lower that excess warming. Her agency had published the first ever comprehensive risk assessment on climate risks in Europe in the spring of 2024. The clear message was that Europe was not ready and required much more resilience. Surprisingly to many, Europe was warming at twice the global average. 1.5 °C for the world did not mean the same number for Europe. Extreme heat, drought, wildfires, flooding were the result. In 2022, these events had cost 52 billion euros in damages. In the report, 32 major climate risks had been identified, in five categories: economy and finance, health, food, infrastructure, and info systems. Of those, 21 risks required urgent action. These included food production in southern Europe – e.g., crop failures, droughts –, houses collapsing in floods, and ocean ecosystems. The report also presented outlooks for individual regions. Baltic Sea warming, for example, accelerated oxygen depletion, creating more dead zones, as well as promoting algae blooms. Moving on to EU actions, Ms Jensen mentioned the Green Deal, underlining that it was not restricted to the current Commission but would be continued by the incoming team. The goal was to reduce greenhouse gases by 55 % in Europe through the largest policy package in the EU, via carbon pricing etc. Estimates for future emissions based on the currently enacted and planned measures predicted an overshoot of the 2030 target. Yet Ms Jensen saw them going in the right direction, although more effort was needed. The reduction achieved so far had been primarily driven by the energy transition: Renewable energies had doubled since 2005, to 23 %. Without them, there would be 17 % more emissions. However, these efforts would have to be tripled to reach the 2030 goal. Further contributors included less fossil fuel and electric vehicles. The biggest challenges to further reducing emissions were forest sinks, increased harvesting, and negative impacts from climate disturbances. In a warmer climate, more CO 2 was being emitted. She cautioned that climate change would not stop in 2030, so that politics would have to continue the process. Climate change was everywhere in the political guidelines for the coming five years, but it was wrapped up in the questions of how to be secure, competitive, and how to implement a fair and just transition. Presentation by Prof Jette Bredahl Jacobsen, Vice-Chair for the European Scientific Board on Climate Change Ms Jacobsen noted that her institute had been launched two years before. They were an independent advisory body, discussing European climate policy and providing guidance on how to reach the climate goals. One area had been the implementation of the Green Deal; the other concerned the 2030 goal as only a stepping stone to the 2050 target of being carbon neutral or even negative. Action was needed right away. In June 2023, the Board released a report on what Europe could and should contribute to the global efforts of meeting the Paris Agreement’s aim. The maximum reduction that was feasible amounted up to 95 %. The question was what a fair share for Europe amounted to, and by all the criteria they had considered, that number exceeded what was possible. Ms Jacobsen remarked that there was a range of political priorities to enact the various pathways to a 90-95 % reduction by 2040: One was demand-side – e.g., people eating a more climate-friendly diet, less energy-consuming transport patterns –, while another pathway dealt with more renewable energy, and a spread of pathways mixing these approaches. All of them, though, had to be enacted across all sectors and policy areas. Their second report detailed that all the various efforts had to be accelerated in order to hit these targets. She agreed that climate change was one of several priorities that sometimes collided with each other. The board had gone through each sector along with cross-cutting aspects, ending up with 13 recommendations sorted by urgency to achieve the 2030 targets. At the same time, this was also about preparing the path to 2050. Ms Jacobsen stressed that 2050 was not very far off. The earlier measures were implemented, the less expensive they would be – especially in light of how long it took to put policies into place. Presentation by Prof Stiig Markager, Aarhus University Prof Markager opened by saying that he had been working on the science of the Baltic Sea for the past 30 years and was, among others, in various HELCOM expert groups. The ecosystem in the western part of the Baltic Sea had totally collapsed, i.e., several major components had been reduced to such a low level that they no longer functioned. As an example, he juxtaposed two photos of the same fishing boat: In the shot from the 1980s, the deck was overflowing with caught fish, while around 2020, there were only few and small cod in a much smaller catch. The cod population in the western Baltic Sea, he underlined, had collapsed completely. As a result, all fishery – commercial and recreational – had been banned. Recreational also meant a tourist attraction and source of income that had vanished. The same applied to other major fish species, such as herring or flounders. He showed the image of a healthy sea bottom, with white sand, no mud, vegetation – the habitat for fish food as well as shelter to hide from seals and other predators. In the western Baltic Sea, the sea floor was muddy, covered by filamentous algae. This was no home for a small fish to grow and the primary reason for the population collapse. In deeper regions of the sea, elementary sulphur crystallised from the poison gas H 2 S meeting oxygen, forming a net-like structure. Below that, only H 2 S-producing microbes survived. This was caused by artificial fertiliser – a huge boon to mankind, banishing hunger and making the European population on average 30 cm taller. However, spilled into the sea, it caused an immense growth of unicellular organisms. With sufficient nitrogen available, their number could double every day. This showed the impact of nitrogen on marine life – eel grass had vanished, fish species had shrunk, clear water had turned murky. Phosphorus also contributed to that effect. In 1995, about one million tonnes per year of nitrogen had entered the Baltic Sea. For the next fifteen years, the input had gone down by 15 %. In the present day, about 860,000 tonnes were still coming into the sea each year. HELCOM’s goal was a decrease by 7 %, yet that would not be enough for the Baltic Sea to regain a good status. Much more was needed. At a reduction of 20 %, a good status would be reached after 400 years. At 50 %, the good status could be achieved after 100 years. Prof Markager acknowledged that they would not see a clean Baltic Sea in their lifetime, but that only meant they had to do as much as they could right away. Industrial agricultural practices were the source of both nitrogen and phosphorus, although the latter also washed out with wastewater. That output needed to be reduced. Presenting a picture of Danish agriculture, he remarked that nothing was left for nature; even a stream that had once meandered through the landscape was now a channel. Nutrients were carried straight into the sea. To change that, a Danish Green Deal had been achieved in June 2024, with the government, agricultural organisations, and NGOs agreeing to return 15 % of the arable land in Denmark to nature, mainly wetlands but also forests. His analysis – and that of the respective Danish advisory body – was that this number had to be at least doubled. Yet it was a good step forward. Prof Markager assumed this was the same for all the countries in the BSPC. As for sewage, he pointed to a new treatment plant nearby, with a nitrogen output of 2 milligrams/litre – 5 to 8 times less than the standard in Europe. This proved that sewage treatment could be improved significantly. A similar reduction was possible for phosphorus. The technology was there, but politicians were lagging behind. The trick, the professor noted, was having the plant underground, allowing more stable temperatures year-round. His recommendation to politicians was that in particular the nitrogen but also the phosphorus input into the Baltic Sea had to be reduced. Land in a 2-kilometre range around streams and by the coasts should not be farmed. Aside from the previously mentioned measures, fossil fuels had to be eliminated, and all other pressures – such as overfishing – had to be lessened. Debate Ms Anna Kassautzki pointed to the preceding BSPC Working Group on Climate Change and Biodiversity, noting the long involvement of the BSPC in these matters. The advantage of the BSPC was that one learned about best practices in other countries, such as the wetlands established at river estuaries in Åland, slowing down the nutrient flow. She underlined that it was known what should be done, such as ecosystem-based fishery, rewetting peatlands, or planting seagrass. It was the task not just of the Baltic Sea countries but of Europe and humanity to leave the Baltic Sea in a state that the next generation could live with. Ms Tove Elise Madland said she was the chair of the Nordic Council Committee for a Sustainable Region. She appreciated the work of the presenters. Mr Staffan Eklöf reflected on climate actions. Efficiency in carbon dioxide per euro and carbon dioxide reduction per consequences for economy and people should be more focused on. They should look for the most efficient actions. In its 2023 report The Changing Landscape of Global Emissions, the International Energy Agency wrote that China’s total output had risen to exceed that of all the advanced economies, India had surpassed the EU to become the third-largest emitter. Countries in developing Asia now accounted for half of global emissions, up from a quarter in 2000. Mr Eklöf stressed that the reality of emissions had changed, but the perception of the role of Europe had not. While this certainly did not absolve the EU from climate actions, measures had to take into account what was happening in Asia, especially China and India. He called for imaginative, outside-the-box ideas. In addition, national reviews of the effectiveness of climate measures had to look at the impact on global emissions. Mr Eklöf said decisions should be based on mathematics to succeed, not just what felt right. Mr Stanisław Kostulski from the Youth Forum remarked that at this year’s HELCOM anniversary event, it had become clear that they had all the knowledge and tools to combat climate change. Yet governments refused to act. One crisis should not be sacrificed to deal with another crisis. He called on every person, especially youths, to be involved in decision-making processes. If climate measures failed, he was blaming politics. Ms Pola Zabuska from the Youth Forum said that there was a lot of promotion and awareness raising around climate change. Yet they could not reach a significant share of society who did not see the need for climate measures. She wondered what realistic actions could be taken by the public and private sectors to convey the urgency of the climate situation to the most sceptical people. Ms Jensen appreciated the support at this conference. As for the global impact, she said that the EU regulations were based on thorough economic impact assessments, seeking an economically efficient approach to their measures. The EU also participated in global negotiations, with a strong focus on the emissions in the rest of the world. Prof Jacobsen agreed that a just transition could not succeed without public support. A first step was to thoroughly examine the consequences, crucially dispelling myths but also arranging for appropriate compensation measures. Furthermore, she confirmed that the key problem of climate change was that it was a global challenge. What mattered was what was implemented collectively. Yet the EU was an important player on the world stage and could, for one thing, show how to curtail emissions. In addition, EU and US politicians had to engage more actively in international efforts. Prof Markager struck a more positive tone after his rather dark presentation. The ecosystem in the middle of the Baltic Sea would take a very long time to recover, but the coastal regions – which people frequented heavily – could see improvements much faster, within a few decades of declining nutrient inputs. In small regions, improvements could manifest within a year and spread out from there. These could be witnessed not only within lifetimes but also within political careers. Secondly, there were so many synergies between climate change, biodiversity and eutrophication and the state of the marine environment. All of this came down to managing the landscape. Planting eel grass was no use in an oxygen-free dead zone. Reducing fishery was too late after the fish had gone. So, the landscapes had to include more nature, increasing biodiversity, improving drinking water quality, and adding recreational values. Wetlands acted as filters for nutrients while they and forests served as carbon sinks. Closing Session The conference unanimously adopted changes to the Rules of Procedure, regarding new appointments to positions in the BSPC. President Henrik Møller thanked the Drafting Committee and the delegations for their excellent work in putting together the 33 rd resolution of the BSPC to the governments of the Baltic Sea region. The conference unanimously adopted the resolution. The president hoped that the governments would implement the BSPC’s calls and contribute to a better future. He also offered his gratitude to the Youth Forum for their contributions to the resolution. He had been honoured to serve as the BSPC’s president for a year. Now, he passed the baton to Mr Alfons Röblom from Åland as his successors. New BSPC president Alfons Röblom saw it as an honour and a privilege to embark on the next chapter of the BSPC under Åland’s presidency. He outlined three central themes for the coming year. The Baltic Sea – Our Lifeline concerned the increasing strain to the region’s economies, traditions, and identities. Åland would prioritise initiatives to protect and restore the health of the Baltic Sea as well as support cross-border efforts on pollution, marine biodiversity, and sustainable fisheries. Cooperation was about strengthening the ever more important collaboration in the region, with the EU, and international bodies. Åland would foster dialogue, share best practices, and promote partnerships for innovation and resilience. In the Baltic Sea region, Security and Sustainability were always linked. Åland would focus on cybersecurity, hybrid threats, and the militarisation of maritime zones while advocating for policies on renewable energy, greenhouse gas emissions, and resilience in the communities against climate change. President Röblom thanked the Danish parliament and outgoing president Møller for their tireless efforts. He reminded the conference that the Baltic Sea was more than a geographical feature – it was a shared resource, a common heritage, and a symbol of their interconnectedness. Now, BSPC Vice President Henrik Møller thanked BSPC Secretary General Bodo Bahr and also the secretariat for their hard work in making the conference possible. The conference applauded with long standing ovations as he honoured Bodo Bahr’s highly committed work as ‘Mr BSPC’ and emphasised that it had been a pleasure to work with him. He also appreciated the contributions and support of Mr Johannes Schraps, who shared with him his experience as former BSPC President and of now-president Alfons Röblom. Furthermore, Mr Møller thanked the youths for inspiring the conference. He was also deeply grateful to the organisers and managers from the Danish Folketinget for their highly dedicated work and support, particularly Peder Pedersen and Joan Ólavsdóttir. He closed the conference by citing the last words of Hamlet: “And the rest is silence.”

On the afternoon of the first day of the BSPC’s annual conference, the recommendations from the BSPC’s Parliamentary Youth Forum were presented. After that, the conference dealt with the security of the energy supply, engaging in a vibrant discussion with Sweden’s Minister for Civil Defence and a researcher from the Royal Danish Defence College. Topics included the Nordic Total Defence concept, hybrid attacks, and European autonomous energy production. In its session on safety in the Baltic Sea, the Danish Ministers of Defence and of Foreign Affairs spoke about the geopolitical and military challenges of the present day, pointing among other things to the Russian shadow fleet of oil tankers and the need to reinforce European defence capabilities. Second Session: Recommendations from the BSPC Parliamentary Youth Forum Chair Carola Veit welcomed the guests to this important session which would also feature the recommendations of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum. Co-chair Himanshu Gulati highlighted the value of young people’s involvement, especially in the pressing matters of the day: Energy Security and Resilience; Sustainable Energy Independence; and Youth Engagement in Energy Policy. They had developed recommendations on each which their representatives would introduce to the conference. On Energy Security and Resilience: Ms Nagham Jaghoub, Chair of the Vestfold Youth Council from Norway Ms Jaghoub said that their first recommendation was to enhance the resilience and security of the energy in research and development of outdated systems hand in hand with the private sector as well as partners supplementing the existing NATO initiatives. Secondly, the resilience of maritime crucial infrastructure should be strengthened by identifying the most vulnerable areas through comprehensive mapping, including joint risk assessments, coordinated trading, and real-time information sharing between public and private sectors for rapid, effective threat response. On Sustainable Energy Independence: Ms Justina Ramonaitytė-Jemeljanovaitė, former board member of ReGeneration2030, from Lithuania living in Denmark Ms Ramonaitytė-Jemeljanovaitė noted the importance of having young people’s voice heard, being at the adults’ rather than the kids’ table. Their first proposal regarded regional energy consumption, suggesting accelerating the full phase-out of fossil fuels, starting with non-EU sources, especially the Russian Federation; allocate resources towards sustainable energy; rethink the regional power grid, prioritising its modernisation and smart optimisation in storage and distribution. Secondly, they called to prioritise a just transition by working together to lower energy prices, build trust in institutions, and support fragile communities. Additionally, it was crucial to provide strong support for those whose jobs might be at risk due to the green transition by reskilling them, ensuring that no-one was left behind on the path to a more sustainable future. On Youth Engagement in Energy Policy: Ms Sarah Vestergaard, Danish Youth Council Ms Vestergaard noted that this topic was very close to the heart of the young people. She added that 76 % of Danish youths had been politically engaged in 2023, compared to 72 % of the rest of the population. Yet democratic confidence was lower among young people. On the other hand, those active in youth organisations had a higher confidence level – highlighting the value of democratic engagement and volunteer work. Thus, the forum asked decisionmakers to support youth organisations, giving young people the opportunity to voice their opinions, educate them, and provide opportunities to learn from industry. Firstly, they called for youth perspectives to be integrated into regional energy policies. Youth organisations should be given a permanent place in decision-making processes in the Baltic Sea region, e.g., by establishing formal structures. Secondly, access to green education should be promoted, and energy companies should be encouraged to provide opportunities for young people, e.g., by integrating sustainable energy topics into existing programmes, enabling exchange programmes, and fostering lifelong learning on relevant topics. Ms Vestergaard went on to thank the BSPC for giving the young people this opportunity to take part. Considering how diligently the previous year’s recommendations had been incorporated into the BSPC’s resolution, she further thanked them for not just listening but acting. Debate Mr Johannes Schraps regretted that the processes in the BSPC and its member parliaments prevented the recommendations from being integrated into the present year’s resolution. Even though it would take a year from these recommendations entering the 2025 resolution, he underlined that they would be brought to the governments with the pressure of 20 national and regional parliaments and parliamentary organisations. He urged his colleagues and the youths to review the governmental responses to the resolutions, always delivered in spring, to see what progress had been made. Energy Supply Security Session chair Andris Kulbergs noted that he was also the chairman of the BSPC’s current working group on this very important topic. He reflected how much it had been neglected in recent years – such as relying on cheap Russian gas for too long. The lesson was that gas had served as a weapon and using it had delayed investments into green energy. Moreover, it had driven a wedge into society, and it had played a significant role in inflation. Consequently, energy supply security had been recognised as vital and of strategic importance. Co-chair Staffan Eklöf introduced the first speaker: Mr Carl-Oskar Bohlin, Swedish Minister for Civil Defence. With a background in law, he had worked extensively on issues of public safety and national security. Presentation by Mr Carl-Oskar Bohlin, Swedish Minister for Civil Defence Mr Bohlin began by interrogating resilience in a broader light. The Baltic Sea region did not only share geography but also the same political outlook. As they were now all part of NATO, they could together tackle the most dire security situation since the end of World War II. To prepare for armed conflict, an all-society approach to resilience was necessary to handle new threat vectors that could reach directly into civil society. In that respect, he spoke of Sweden currently revitalising its Total Defence concept, originally devised during the Cold War on how the entire society should resist in the case of an armed attack. Resilience and robustness had to be implemented in every societal sector, so that defence could be supported by all of society. A role model was Ukraine which had met Total War with Total Resistance. Fundamentally, all of Ukrainian society had been put on a war footing. In a modern society, security of supply in general had become pivotal. The minister noted as an example that energy supply lines had been weaponised by Russia. For Sweden, the first line of defence was not to be critically dependent on countries with a different security outlook, on their adversaries. This had to apply for the EU as a whole. Secondly, he called for more agility in the industrial base of every country. During the pandemic, whole sectors had been taken out, while direly needed medical equipment had grown scarce. Then, industries had organically shifted their production to fill those gaps. Sweden was establishing better public-private cooperation to more quickly facilitate this transformation. Thirdly, stockpiles in critical sectors – e.g., raw materials – as well as more robustness and redundancy were necessary. The autumn of 2022 had shown how fragile the European energy system was – a thankfully mild winter prevented a disaster. Yet, Mr Bohlin underlined, hope was not a strategy. Sweden was reinforcing its energy system’s robustness. Investing in the security of supply was a contribution to security in a more and more multipolar world. In Sweden’s view, this was an integral part of the country’s defence posture and thus their contribution to NATO deterrence. Mr Kulbergs remarked that one lesson was that by running away from the Russian bear, one should not run into the claws of the Chinese tiger. He went on to introduce a leading researcher at the Royal Danish Defence College, Mr Rasmus Dahlberg. His area of expertise was disaster management and civil protection, particularly in the context of the Nordic countries. Presentation by Mr Rasmus Dahlberg, Researcher, Royal Danish Defence College Mr Dahlberg stressed that he was not speaking as a representative of his college. There had not been a tradition of research in societal defence in Denmark. But the country was forging ahead and was expected to establish a ministry of preparedness in the near future. His research project Resector was exploring the processes and effects of the COVID pandemic which some described as the great dress rehearsal. Their systems had been tested under severe stress – but not to the point of breakdown. Resector was looking at the principle of sectorial responsibility. The idea was particularly strong in the Nordic countries, namely that the responsibility in peace time remained with the companies in crisis or war times. Quoting a Danish professor, Mr Dahlberg spoke of the “crisis society” – it had become the new normal. Crisis management and preparedness had to be reconceived as did policies and organisations. He saw steps taken in this field, such as Sweden’s Total Defence concept, the EU’s efforts for increased resilience and information security, and NATO’s renewed interest in resilience as deterrence. The latter had been a strong focus in the 1950s, that the military could not fight well without strong, whole societies supporting them. Even so, the national state was still the primary crisis manager, as COVID had shown that the EU was too slow to react at appropriate speed. His project was considering sector responsibility as an example of how the whole society could and should adapt to preparedness and crisis management. Energy supply and security fit very well. With regard to pipelines, seabed security had become a hot topic within NATO. For instance, an average pipeline passed through six or seven utterly different legal regimes from one end to the other. In the last three decades, efficiency and cost-effectiveness had been the goals rather than including security. Yet hybrid threats were deliberately targeting overlaps, gaps, and uncertainties – oftentimes, these were questions of who was responsible. Mr Dahlberg admitted that this kept him awake at night. While he did not know who had blown up the Nord Stream pipeline, it was surely no coincidence it had happened in the legal nightmare zone right outside Danish and Swedish territorial waters, namely, the EEC. Sector responsibility had to be revised to ensure it did not become responsibility avoidance. New policies, new administrative structures were needed – along with supernational superstructures. Most importantly, nation states had to learn from each experience and adapt. Mr Kulbergs remarked that he had attended an OECD meeting. There, he had learned that after effectively switching away from Russian gas, new dependencies had arisen. 82 % of windmill parts came from China and 98 % of solar panels. 78 % of electric mobility depended on China. As such, he wondered if they were now leaping into the claws of the Chinese tiger, especially with the energy transition. Furthermore, even if all this equipment was in place, there were still the cables. One estimate mentioned 28,000 kilometres of cables that would have to be installed. Yet only 6,000 were available as they had relied on Russia – now sanctioned – and Ukraine – now bombed. Minister Bohlin compared the situation to a diver with an oxygen hose. The dependency was the same, as gas and oxygen could be turned off overnight. That was the most critical of all energy dependencies. The dependency on components was like the diver relying on the manufacturer of the hose – it was critical but not as much of a vulnerability. On the other hand, he agreed that this could not be maintained long-term since that dependency could be exploited as a bargaining chip. Thus, reliable energy chains had to be established for Europe in the long term. He underlined that they all supported the energy transition, but it had to be implemented in a sustainable matter – not only in terms of how resources were used but also from a security point of view. More plannable energy production, with greater control of the supply chain, was needed. Therefore, Sweden was welcoming every new green and carbon-neutral energy source. This expressly included nuclear power plants. To his knowledge, Sweden had seventeen out of thirty listed critical rare earth materials, putting on them the responsibility of making these available not only to themselves but also to their partners. Mr Dahlberg agreed. It did not make sense to exchange one weaponised dependency for another. The problem in his view was that people still deeply believed in globalisation and did not want to wake up to the harsh reality that they were playing an entirely different ball game now. One outcome of the COVID crisis was the critical supply agency established in Denmark in the autumn of 2022. As good advice as they provided, they did not have a mandate. This led him back to the superstructure he’d spoken about earlier – less about cooperation and more about command. A mandate had to be given to someone to determine if an action, for instance, went against the short-term economic interest but was of great importance in the long run. Mr Marc Timmer from Schleswig-Holstein appreciated Denmark in taking the right action after the oil crisis of the 1970s by fostering renewable energy not only in the electricity but also the heating sector. By comparison, the last energy crisis had cost the German economy some 5 – 7 % of GDP. As such, it was very important to implement a new energy system, as Germany was seeking to do. By nature, renewable energies were volatile, so that a reserve baseline power source was needed. He expected that to be hydrogen by 2040 or 2045. Mr Dahlberg in turn appreciated Denmark being praised. He added that the country, under pressure from NATO after the 1956 Suez crisis, had implemented oil supply security. The companies were told they could either come up with a plan of their own, or the government would legislate this into existence. Industry complied, and that structure was still in place. Mr Dahlberg argued that they should look for best practice examples from the Cold War period when all of society had been included. Since the Fall of the Iron Curtain, privatisation had been the rule. Many of the important entities that had used to be government-owned were now in private hands, some even owned by foreign entities. Mr Elias Arndt from the youth forum said that Germany was especially good in making up new words. “Krisenmodus” – crisis mode – meant that people, especially youths, were tired of the constant crisis. He asked how the experts thought the public could be brought along in developing good solutions for the future. Minister Bohlin agreed that the engagement of the whole society was the one X factor in crisis management. He took Ukraine as an example, noting that few people had taken the people’s enormous willingness to resist into account. In the days after the Russian attack on 24 February 2022, many had expected Ukraine to fall quickly. The Ukrainians, though, had a newfound confidence in their institutions and leadership reinforced by strategic communication from the top. Mr Bohlin saw this as resonating with threats further down the severity scale. Forums dispelling disinformation and polarisation were one vital approach, as was the direct communication to the populace on their obligations in the crisis. People rose to the occasion if they clearly understood what was to do. This was what Sweden was seeking to do – communicating their Total Defence duties to every citizen between 16 and 70. A special information campaign was targeting those about to turn 16 to bring them up to date. At the same time, a brochure was sent to every Swedish household, providing an overview of how to take care of oneself and how to contribute in the event of a crisis. This kind of transparency made people reflect on what was possible. Mr Dahlberg commented that Denmark was only implementing part of Sweden’s efforts and that six years late. Their version of the brochure had become available in June of the present year, rather than being distributed. The narrative before had been that Denmark was so different from Sweden or Norway that no lessons from there could be applied. However, he agreed that it was immensely important to get the population onboard. Surveys had shown an increase in interest as well as good will from the citizens towards these measures. The majority of the people wanted to be part of the Total Defence concept because it provided agency. He expected the next step to be the integration of the private sector into the new social defence 2.0 concept in Denmark. After that, civil society organisations would be considered. Ms Bryndis Haraldsdóttir, President of the Nordic Council, said that the Council was very eager in more cooperation in defence and security. She wondered if the experts thought that the Nordic nations were sufficient in screening investments in critical infrastructure or if they should harmonise their policies among each other. In light of being at the BSPC, she added if that should be expanded to the whole region. Minister Bohlin could not argue for other nations, but Sweden had moved the goalposts by belatedly introducing a screening mechanism in the preceding autumn. A holistic approach to security and a better control of infrastructure necessitated such a mechanism. Mr Dahlberg commented that he had attended a discussion on that very topic a few weeks earlier in Norway. The Nordic countries had a good history of cooperation, such as HELCOM and now NATO. He further called for more investment in societal research. Mr Marius Nilsson saw fossil energy still dominating 85 % of the energy supply. Despite billions of euros being spent, there was little change. In his view, all energy transition policies had weaknesses. On the one hand, the European research institute claimed that the German economy was crumbling over energy prices while in Norway, Germany was being hailed as the frontrunner in climate policies. His question was whether the experts saw a reality check and reorientation of the policies. Mr Bohlin did not wish to step on anyone’s feet, but he felt that the full realisation had not yet hit. In his view, one could not be carbon-neutral and energy-independent without nuclear power. He saw the matter as this easy. Otherwise, LNG would be dominant, and these often came from countries they wanted to be less dependent upon. Furthermore, LNG still produced greenhouse gas emissions. Betting on hydrogen was dubious since there was an energy loss of about 50 – 60 % in the process. Using hydrogen as a decarboniser in industrial processes would always be a more efficient choice than as an intermittent energy storage. The price and inefficiency made hydrogen unrealistic. Mr Johannes Schraps commented that there were quite diverse points of view on energy sources among the member states of the BSPC. This debate kept coming up in the Standing Committee and the working groups. Moving on, he focused on the statement about a constant crisis. Older people in his constituency kept reminding him that there had been crisis upon crisis in the past as well, such as the 1980s. As such, Mr Schraps wondered if the heavily interconnected world made the current situation seem more extraordinary. Coming back to energy supply security, he noted that this was a sensitive topic. At the Standing Committee in the preceding autumn, Tobias Liebetrau, a scientist from the University of Copenhagen, had spoken about the increasing necessity of protecting critical infrastructure. On the one hand, security work had to be confidential to a degree, but on the other hand, the public needed to be kept informed. As an example, he spoke about German weapons deliveries to Ukraine. At first, only authorized members of parliament could learn about these. But, as it had seemed to the public that the country was not delivering anything, the government started to release the lists. Yet that, in turn, allowed the Russians to see the inventories transferred to Ukraine and prepare for those. Mr Dahlberg picked up on the “crisis society” term, noting that this idea had to be combatted. He likened this to terrorism at the start of the 2000s. If they had all stayed at home rather than going to concerts or taking the train, the terrorists would not have killed anybody – but they would still have won. They had to fight hybrid threats with the core values of liberal democracies and not securitise everything. They must not create divisions in society and use scapegoats. But people asked why the same hybrid attacks were not directed against the adversaries. The answer, Mr Dahlberg noted, was that they would not work as well against autocratic states as against open democratic societies. Their openness was a vulnerability, yet that was what they had to use in their defence. This led to paradoxes in transparency. In the long period of peace, they had grown used to publishing high-resolution maps of infrastructure so that fishermen did not accidentally drop their anchors on it. Historically, navigational charts had been classified until the mid-19 th century. All of this, he placed on a spectrum from “Doing nothing” at one end and “Doing way too much” on the other. In a constant conversation in their open democratic forums, they had to seek the middle ground. Minister Bohlin said that in the perceived constant crisis, it was useful to look at the frame of reference. No Western country was sending their young men to the front, no Western European country was being bombed every day. Most of Europe had not experienced a real crisis in more than 70 years. The rules-based democracy had created an unprecedented era of peace and calm. This had not been the norm before. If they wanted to keep things from getting worse, they had to stand with Ukraine, they had to fight against those who were seeking to dismantle the liberal rules-based world order. Mr Kulbergs spoke about a new EU policy to support each other in civil defence and how each state was coordinating measures in case of natural disasters, and the like. Ukraine needed many fighters, medical support, food and water deliveries. Yet the respective EU policy did not provide for a potential war. One of the aspects was refugee flows; he pointed to the Suwałki corridor that could be shut down quickly. As such, he suggested that the BSPC should develop a concept for how they could cooperate in the case of war, since the EU did not have such a policy. Minister Bohlin replied that Finland had already brought forth a motion on this topic, supported by Sweden and other countries. Specifically, this was about ramping up the EU’s capabilities in working through civil crises more profoundly than before. This included revamping civil protection mechanisms to better cope with long-term crises. He added that one of the deliverables from the NATO Washington summit concerned incorporating and better aligning civil and military planning. Mr Dahlberg remarked that translating the Finnish security concept to the EU would be a good development. He was currently writing a report on NATO resilience requirements and objectives vis-à-vis the EU directives; cooperation – also at staff level – was rapidly increasing. So, Europe-wide provisions were likely forthcoming, yet he underlined that the national states would continue to be the practical crisis managers. Mr Jens Schneider had read that up to this point, several Russian vessels had delivered LNG to Spain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands in the EU as well as to Turkey, China, and Taiwan. His constituents had complained that supposedly, no business was done with Russia on gas. He wondered how he could explain the situation. Mr Bohlin could not speak for the countries in question but urged everyone to stop their critical dependency on Russia – not just in gas but also, for instance, fertilisers. The gas and oil dependency had, for a large part, been dissolved, although some still had to be severed. Mr Dahlberg conceded that there would always be loopholes and actors willing to exploit these. Again, he underlined that open democratic debate was needed to counter attempts to divide the Western population. Good common frameworks had to be in place and acted upon. Furthermore, exploiting such loopholes could also be driven by malicious foreign actors; this new agenda also had to be opposed. Mr Eklöf saw current society structured around peacetime, with economic efficiency as the leading goal. Gearing that structure to the new situation would cost money. That might be easy at this time, but people quickly forgot. Also keeping in mind that popular support was crucial in implementing these changes, he asked how that could be assured in the long term. Mr Bohlin stressed that this was the most difficult concern, bar none. All of them had enjoyed the peace dividend; here he pointed to Francis Fukuyama’s book on The End of History from 1992. He found it ironic that he, as a member of that “forever peace” generation, had to rebuild what the Cold War generation had dismantled after the fall of the Soviet Union. The minister underlined that they had to look at the long-term horizon. They would not see the world return to what it had been before 2022, before 2014, or before 2008. The paradox of defence spending was that the more was spent, the more people complained about the high costs, and the more politicians were willing to determine their deterrence good enough. Often enough, reality would show this was not the case. Minister Bohlin quoted Ukraine President Zelenskyy at the Munich Security Conference telling the audience that they needed to get ready because they were not. There was no looking away from this issue. Mr Dahlberg pointed to the preparedness paradox in research. This problem arose because the return on investment was often invisible. The things that did not happen were difficult to campaign on. As such, he believed that the narrative had to change from preparedness as cost to preparedness as investment – as an insurance policy. It was a fundamental element of societal security. Societal cohesion was vital. He cautioned that preparedness as a cost could not compete with other positions because of the invisible benefits. Mr Eklöf commented that an exciting project in Sweden dealt with producing fertiliser domestically. Yet agriculture also faced the problem that its machines could not be run efficiently on electricity. Biogas produced on the farm might be a solution. All in all, he did not think fossil fuels could be replaced in agriculture in the next 20 years. Mr Dahlberg reiterated that a strategy for the whole of society had to be in place; otherwise, one could always defer responsibility to somebody else. During the Cold War, NATO civil wartime agencies focused heavily on food production. Afterwards, it had diluted into the market’s responsibility. Now, they had the huge task of regaining control, defining responsibilities and mandates. But that had to be done: A plan had to be drawn up for every part of society. Mr Bohlin agreed that food production was vital for resilience and the ability to resist. The key factor was to ensure that the agricultural sector was already competitive in peacetime. Thus, it was important not to swamp farmers with unnecessary regulations trying to drive them into the energy transition – and thus driving some of them out of business. He conceded that this was a very fine balance to strike. As for specifically the fuel question, he saw bio diesel as part of this, as was biogas and electrification. Yet fossil fuels should indeed not be ruled out too early to keep agriculture competitive and powerful for when it would be badly needed. Third Session: Safety in the Baltic Sea Session chair Bryndís Haraldsdóttir said that the Baltic Sea was not just a crucial artery of communication and commerce but also of geopolitical importance. Russia’s unprovoked attack and environmental threats had underlined the need for cooperative planning. She introduced the first speaker, Mr Troels Poulsen, as having been instrumental in shaping Denmark’s defence strategy amidst the evolving security landscape of the Baltic region. Presentation by Mr Troels Lund Poulsen, Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Denmark Mr Poulsen noted Denmark’s particular responsibility for the Baltic Sea security. He highlighted the historic bond with the Baltic nations. Furthermore, he appreciated the BSPC’s role in strengthening the ties between the Baltic Sea countries. The threat from Russia was real, and he promised it would not be neglected. Finland and Sweden joining NATO had sent a clear signal to Russia, with all democratic Baltic Sea countries now part of the military alliance. He further pointed to NATO’s strong military deterrence in the Baltic states and all eastern allies. Denmark would be posting a permanent troop placement in Latvia the following autumn. The Danish intelligence service stated Russia would deter NATO member states from military activities close to the latter’s borders. Furthermore, they expected Russian challenges to NATO countries below the Article 5 threshold, such as Russian harassment in addition to the hybrid threats from the country. This made it necessary to support the defence in the present and also invest in the future. Denmark was now meeting the NATO 2 % goal on an enduring basis, after a long debate. A spring investment plan included fast-track plans for a heavy brigade, ground-based air defence systems, and anti-submarine capabilities. Military support to Ukraine had been stepped up. Along with the other Baltic Sea countries, Minister Poulsen had also signed a letter of intent to assist the Baltic States with sea mines. In defence, all of them had to do even more in the coming years. Ms Haraldsdóttir introduced Mr Lars Løkke Rasmussen, the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, known for being a strong advocate for Denmark’s active role in global diplomacy, particularly within the Nordic and Baltic regions. Presentation by Mr Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Denmark Mr Rasmussen said that all their nations shared a geographical similarity, i.e., bordering on the Baltic Sea. Rising geopolitical tensions made cooperation more vital than ever. For the first time in 500 years, all the Nordic countries were now part of the same defence alliance. But it was the first time in history that this applied to all the democratic Baltic Sea countries – a true milestone. He applauded the parliamentarians who had worked tirelessly to achieve this. With hybrid attacks, Russia was testing the West’s threshold and its response. Effective defence required strong alliances and measures as Russia would continue to adjust its tactics. He assured his audience that none of that would deter them from their support for Ukraine. The British historian Mark Galleoti had recently said that the Cold War had been more stable than the current period. The rules had been somewhat clear while the present day felt more like the uncertain time right after the end of World War II when the rules had not been well defined. Mr Rasmussen saw the same uncertainty, noting the resulting security risks. The Baltic Sea region would see major investments in the near future, including offshore wind farms, new pipeline connections, and nuclear power plants. Their interconnected energy grid would improve the security of supply but also widen the region’s vulnerability to attacks, in particular hybrid assaults. Another risk was the Russian shadow fleet of oil tankers seeking to circumvent the price cap on Russian oil, to finance the Russian war machine. An accident with just one fully loaded tanker could cause severe pollution to the seas and the coastlines. In opposing this fleet, Denmark was cooperating with all European partners. He was pleased by EU sanctions against 27 ships, limiting their ability to operate. The partners had to remain vigilant, ensuring that any further measures could be implemented and remain legally sound. The overall target of all of these attacks was to undermine state authority, creating uncertainty in the population. This raised questions such as how to respond to power failures without causing fear, whether they were resilient enough, or whether they were ready to defend their nations. In all that, they could learn from the Baltic States. In closing, he underlined that he wanted a clean and safe Baltic Sea for his grandchildren. While they had long looked to the USA for security, it was now time for Europeans to contribute more to trans-Atlantic safety. Debate Mr Saku Nikkanen also underlined the necessity of standing together in these trying times. He was gravely concerned about the Russian shadow fleet and welcomed Denmark’s efforts to curtail the Russian oil tankers. The ships’ average age was more than thirty years, and they were in a poor state, posing a significant threat to the Baltic Sea environment. He called on the BSPC to take a unified stance on banning the Russian shadow tankers from the Baltic Sea. Mr Pauli Aalto-Setälä saw Russia’s war of aggression as having fundamentally changed the security situation in all dimensions. Finland’s foreign committee had covered, among others, Russian attempts to redefine the zones in the Gulf of Finland, damage to underwater infrastructure, and GPS interference in Finland and surrounding areas. Additional measures were still needed to secure the area. Vigilance was needed along with preparedness to counter the unrestrained aggression of the Russian Federation. Their cooperation had to be deepened and reinforced. In particular, they had to focus on supply chain security. For Finland, a safe and secure sea transport was crucial and thus central to their resilience. Finally, he pointed out that environmental cooperation with Russia had diminished since the outbreak of the war, also pointing to the shadow fleet. This had to be addressed, not only for their security but also the environmental health of the Baltic State. He tagged on that they should all support Ukraine. Mr Himanshu Gulati described the BSPC – and the Baltic Sea – as binding nations together. Unfortunately, in history, the region had been the meeting point of democratic nations and those with other intents. The invasion of Ukraine had reminded them that the sea of opportunities could also bring challenges. Representing Norway, he noted that their ample energy production facilities in the North Sea had seen suspicious activity recently. Considering these and other hybrid threats, he asked the ministers if they believed the measures in the Baltic Sea were sufficient. Ms Oddný G. Harðardóttir said their countries had to be on the alert in security and defence. Yet they had to do anything to negotiate peace in conflicts. She asked Mr Rasmussen what he considered the best path forward and to prevent war. Mr Kaarel Taimla, Estonia, from the youth forum commented that during the Cold War, dissenters could find themselves sent to a gulag. Yet even the US put tens of thousands of their citizens of Japanese descent into internment camps after the attack on Pearl Harbor. History taught that democracies could overreact. But in the present, they could not afford to either over- or underreact. This applied to ethnic Russians living especially in the Baltic states. In that regard, he also pointed to pro-Russian demonstrations all over Europe. He wondered how to deal with people of severely different opinions. He asked everybody to deal not only with the physical threats but also the disinformation spread among the people. Mr Tobias Olling Mørup, Denmark, from the youth forum highlighted that the former Belgian minister of foreign affairs, Mr Mark Eyskens, had described Europe in 1991 as an economic giant, political dwarf, and literary worm. In the present, Mr Mörup thought that Europe had failed politically to prevent the war and was militarily not able to end the war. He asked if the politicians shared the same view as Mr Eyskens and how to secure the Baltic Sea and Europe fast enough from the Russian threat. Mr Johannes Schraps remarked that the countries around the North Sea had entered a cooperation for the protection of their infrastructure. The BSPC resolution of this conference would call for a closer security cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. He asked for the ministers’ input. Furthermore, as outgoing vice-president of the BSPC, he appreciated the ministers taking part in this session as well as that the CBSS had taken the parliamentary dimension of the Baltic Sea cooperation into account. Ms Claudia Müller referred to Minister Rasmussen’s comment about rules being established after World War II. Back then, the world was split up into spheres of influence, without the people having a say in the matter. Those living in the unfree countries saw the Baltic Sea as a border – dividing them – yet also as a beacon of hope. She wondered how they could make sure that the Baltic Sea would never again be a sea of division but would always unite them. Minister Poulsen viewed it as vital for the democratic countries of Europe to stick together in their support of Ukraine in the long run. He noted Denmark’s donation of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. Secondly, they had to help Ukraine establish a strong defence industry of their own. Thus, he called on countries to invest more in Ukrainian defence companies. That would also speed up the military provisions. Thirdly, a more long-lasting plan was needed for the defence of the Baltic countries. Furthermore, there should be more joint exercises. He additionally called for democratic European countries to jointly purchase military equipment. Rather than focusing on their own need, nations could do more for the joint defence. Here, he underlined that they should show wisdom in what to spend their money on. At the same time, they should share best practices on how to fight against hybrid warfare. Fourthly, regarding disinformation and public awareness, there had to be an open and direct discussion with the voters on the possible outcome of Russia gaining more territory – namely, highlighting the dangers this would inherently create for the rest of Europe. Minister Rasmussen replied to Mr Gulati’s question if the current defence measures were enough with a clear “No”. The good thing, though, was that now the BSPC countries were now together in their goals, not least with all of them having joined NATO. He also stressed the importance of dialogue on all levels, which expressly included the parliamentary dimension noted by Mr Schraps. Reflecting Ms Harðardóttir’s question on how to prevent war, he believed they should learn a lesson from history. That lesson was to continue to stick together and be steadfast in their support for Ukraine. He stressed that they were in a crucial period of history. He was proud that Denmark was the top supporter of Ukraine per capita and fourth in total numbers. The latter, though, was worrying, given that Denmark was such a small country. He called on everybody to step up. They could not afford to allow Putin to win the war and create uncertainty for generations to come. Picking up on Mr Mörup quoting the former Belgian minister, Mr Rasmussen saw value in that statement. Whoever would move into the White House, Europe had to do more to stand on their own feet. They had to build a European pillar in the NATO framework and increase their defence industry’s capacity. In that, he appreciated Ms von der Leyen’s re-election as head of the European Commission. He assured his audience that Denmark in their presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2025 would continue this agenda for a more competitive Europe, a stronger bridge between NATO and Europe. In conclusion, cooperation was the only way forward.

Safety in the Baltic Sea Region was the central theme of this year’s Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference under the Danish Presidency. More than 150 participants attended this year’s annual conference in Helsingør. Standing together for defence was the core issue to be deepened in the first session. The BSPC’s annual conference opened with introductions on the region’s history and the BSPC’s activities in the past year. The first session dealt intensively with defence matters, arguing for greater coordination and integration in the physical, cyber, and cognitive domains to fend off hybrid attacks. Russian disinformation and sabotage, as well as their efforts to pull African countries into their influence, were also considered. Introduction BSPC President Henrik Møller said it was a privilege to welcome the participants to the 33 rd Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference in Helsingør – or Elsinore, as the locals said. He declared the conference open. Opening Speech by Mr Søren Gade, Speaker of the Danish Parliament Mr Gade, in his turn, welcomed the participants of both the conference and the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum, pointing out the central location of Helsingør in the Baltic Sea region. He reflected on the Øresund Strait’s history, from fierce battles to a major rescue operation of Jewish refugees in 1943. In the present day, Russia’s brutal attack on Ukraine had proved a turning point for Europe, breaking all principles in a rules-based international order. The BSPC had terminated its cooperation with the Russian side. Mr Gade underlined his condemnation against the Russian aggression over the past two and a half years. The democratic nations had to stand shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine because their fight was the other nations’ fight as well. After Russia’s withdrawal from Baltic Sea institutions, it was all the more important for the remaining neighbours to cooperate even more closely, such as in the BSPC but also in the EU and NATO. He was pleased that Finland and Sweden had now joined the military alliance, reinforcing the deterrence. The theme of this year’s BSPC conference was Safety and Security in the Baltic Sea Region, noting its timeliness with regard to recent incidents destabilising the energy supply. Sabotage and cyber attacks on the power grid, Internet cables, and digital systems never seemed to end. Although the damage had been fixed, the attacks had achieved their goal of increasing uncertainty in the population and provoke division in the West’s relationship with Russia. The Baltic Sea region was key in Europe, in terms of climate change amelioration, maritime ecosystem restoration as well as energy and safety. Democracy was under attack in the digital space. It was crucial to learn from each other. That particularly included the young people from the Youth Forum. Mr Gade wished the participants a successful conference, highlighting the BSPC’s great value for the parliaments of the region. Opening Speech by BSPC President Henrik Møller President Møller said that this conference represented the culmination of one year of hard work, cooperation, and continuation of vital traditions underlining their commitment to the prosperity, security, and sustainability of the democratic Baltic Sea region. In a complex landscape, they had navigated challenges and opportunities. They had engaged in critical dialogue. In key meetings in the autumn of 2023, they had set the outline of the year ahead in their collective action. In particular, he highlighted their participation in the Conference of Presidents of Parliament in Europe with important conversations, especially with the president of the Ukrainian parliament. During the Nordic Council and Baltic Assembly sessions, commonalities had been deepened, but contacts beyond the region – for instance with the Scottish parliament – had been forged. That reflected the growing importance of regional cooperation. In June 2024, the BSPC had taken part in the meeting of the Benelux countries, engaging in deep conversations about port security. Progress had been charted in environmental protection, energy security, and regional defence cooperation. The president stressed that the democratic Baltic Sea region was a leader in addressing some of the most pressing issues of the time. Visits of the Rail Baltica and Fehmarnbelt Tunnel construction sites had granted a deep, practical look at the region’s most significant infrastructure projects in the east and west. A study visit to the Finnish eastern border had provided insight into the situation. President Møller highlighted the exemplary work of the BSPC Working Group on Energy Supply, Security, and Resilience. They had fostered dialogue and proposed innovative solutions to ensure the resilience, sustainability, and security of the energy infrastructure. The Standing Committee meetings had dealt intensively with critical infrastructure and deepened their links with the EU Commission, HELCOM, and the CBSS regarding climate, security, and environmental protection. He noted this year’s Conference Resolution would focus on improving infrastructure, enhancing military mobility, and increasing cooperation among democratic Baltic Sea countries. He outlined the line-up of the conference, from defence, energy supply security over safety in the Baltic Sea region to climate initiatives. Mr Møller welcomed the young representatives of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum, highlighting their participation in the BSPC’s work. The BSPC president reflected that the need for unity, courage, and an unwavering commitment to the values was as powerful as it had been when he had mentioned it at the last conference. As much as had been achieved over the past twelve months, more had yet to be accomplished. First Session: Defence Cooperation Co-chair Johannes Schraps opened the first political debate by pointing out how much the political landscape had undergone significant changes in recent years, largely driven by external factors, especially Russia’s increasing military activities. He introduced the first speaker, the former Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Pekka Haavisto, underlining his unparalleled expertise in foreign policy, crisis management, and environmental issues. Speech by Mr Pekka Haavisto, former Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Haavisto explained that his country had a 1,300-kilometer border with Russia. This had led Finland to develop a concept of “total defence,” enveloping civil society and private companies in their planning. In his view, this concept should be enhanced and expanded. Yet he conceded that recent thinking about warfare may have been mistaken – namely that battles of the kind that had characterised World War II were no longer realistic. Instead, cyber wars, information wars, or hybrid wars would take their place. Now, they were coming to realise that these were actually new layers stacked on top of the conventional layers of conflict. This meant that the democratic security had to be constructed based on all these types of risks. Furthermore, Baltic Sea security had to build on the local institutions – particularly the EU and NATO. Mr Haavisto conceded that Finland was disappointed in the joint security responses not being planned and exercised by the EU. He hoped that the upcoming EU Commission would take these efforts more seriously. Those calling the Baltic Sea now a “NATO lake,” he cautioned that Russia retained considerable influence. Both sides were dependent on Baltic Sea traffic and could exert heavy pressure on their opposition. He further saw serious shortcomings in the defence industry, as highlighted by efforts to train Ukrainian soldiers in modern equipment. Interoperability, standardisation, and harmonisation were missing. These had to be implemented – raising the urgent question of doing so in the EU, adding e.g., the UK and Norway, or should this be handled in the trans-Atlantic context. Moreover, politicians had to be aware of the population’s willingness to continue supporting these investments – what kind of military equipment and where to slash the budget. Maritime surveillance was critical, in light of the Nord Stream and Balticconnector incidents. Here, Finland and Sweden – with its high-tech submarine fleet – could be vital. Finally, Mr Haavisto addressed environmental concerns – ranging from dumped ammunitions and gas pipelines to shipborne transport of gas and other hazardous substances. In that respect, the energy transition was equally crucial. He saw much to do in the Baltic context. BSPC Vice-President Schraps introduced the next speaker, Mr Jarosław Wałęsa, currently member of the Polish parliament, previously in the European parliament, working on fisheries, environmental issues, international trade and the broader concerns of the Baltic Sea region. He had also been the head of the Polish delegation to the BSPC until recently. Speech by Mr Jarosław Wałęsa, MP Polish parliament Mr Wałęsa referenced Mr Haavisto’s disappointment over the response of the European Union. Mr Wałęsa himself was disappointed in the European inability to form a united response since the Balkans in the 1990s. There was a long road yet ahead of them to forge a fruitful coalition that was meaningful and cost-effective. Since the Russian attack on Ukraine, the conversation had changed fundamentally from what had been spoken about but five years earlier. He hoped the new understanding would transform into that meaningful coalition. For Poland, the Baltic Sea was their immediate neighbourhood and thus vitally important. Its geostrategic importance had increased dramatically, making regional cooperation essential. Mr Wałęsa hoped that this would also transform the way politicians spoke to their constituents, to relate to them why it was important to pay their money to fund a war in Ukraine. Peace was nowhere in sight, and it would be a long, costly process. He was convinced that with democratic support, Ukraine would stand. Yet the recent gap in US support had underlined the dependency on these supplies, making it all the more urgent that the support be upheld. At the same time, Mr Wałęsa warned his listeners not to ignore the presence of other Russian assets in the region, pointing to Kaliningrad and the country’s maritime activities. Russia could still threaten any of the Baltic Sea countries at short notice. It could target critical infrastructure, such as undersea pipelines. He further pointed to a wave of Russian hybrid attacks, disrupting GPS signals, deliberately violating airspace, sabotage, artificially created migration flows as well as cyber attacks. However, Russia had – very inadvertently – managed to convince Finland and Sweden to join NATO. Mr Wałęsa noted that these country’s accession also reinforced the positions in the high north as well as the Euro-Atlantic region. Yet the Baltic Sea becoming a NATO-dominated basin was not just an opportunity but also a challenge as Russia sought to destabilise the entire region. Poland welcomed the recent initiative of the Finnish presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States to better coordinate the common positions and responses. He called on NATO to stay focused on its collective security. It had to continue to deny any aggression, be it hybrid or military, from the territory of Russia, Belarus, or elsewhere. A persistent presence of allied forces on the eastern flank was crucial. Sustainable peace in Europe was only possible by supporting Ukraine and eventually bringing it into NATO. He cautioned that Russia sought to build a new security order at the expense of Europe. This meant that all of their nations had to implement a new strategic approach against Russia. Mr Wałęsa underlined that, beyond the immediate conflict, they shared values as democracies, they respected the rules of international law. He was concerned that worries in the population would make the upcoming months difficult. Yet it was urgent to decide matters, such as what types of ammunition and weapons to manufacture and where to do so. BSPC President Møller presented Mr Flemming Splidsboel, a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) working in particular on international security in Eastern Europe and Russia. Speech by Mr Flemming Splidsboel, senior researcher, Danish Institute for Inter­national Studies (DIIS) Mr Splidsboel started by stating two uncomfortable truths: One was that the conflict with Russia would continue for a long time. The other was that, unless something new was introduced, they would have to accept that Ukraine might lose this war. This had to be kept in mind in discussions about public spending to support the country. In the latter stages of the summer, Ukraine had been given freer reign to act, such as on Russian territory. Mr Splidsboel stressed that this was one such new element. The war – conflict with the West – had become the raison d’être of the Russian regime, infusing every aspect of Russian society. Everything in the country was politicised, down to such aspects as music festivals. He underlined the massive change since the start of the war, having become semi-totalitarian and perhaps fully fascist. The meta-narrative of the past two decades blamed all of Russia’s problems on the West. That narrative had mushroomed across the entire society in the last two years, so much so that Mr Splidsboel doubted Putin’s regime would survive without that conflict. Since 2014 and even more so since 2022, Russia had expanded its interests, for instance, in the high north. They have also needled the West with such actions as moving missiles – possibly carrying nuclear warheads – into the Kaliningrad oblast and withdrawing them, raising questions about what such signals meant. Aside from the focus on direct military threats, hybrid warfare also had to be addressed. To Mr Splidsboel as a researcher, hybrid warfare meant the deliberate mix of kinetic and non-kinetic effects. Here, he mentioned the physical domain – usually the arena of kinetic effects –, the cyber domain, and the cognitive domain – such as disinformation. Russians were quite creative in making use of these domains and exploiting Western vulnerabilities. Thus, the West also had to cooperate in defending against these non-kinetic threats. In that, he noted that the Danish government was establishing a new ministry to bring together all of these domains together on the national level. With respect to earlier criticism of the European Union, Mr Splidsboel said that the EU had established several rather effective standards against some non-kinetic attacks. In his view, the West should turn to the EU for these and to NATO for the kinetic assaults. Something else that had to be prepared for was how to deal with Russia once the war would end. The situation might be akin to the Cold War in addressing a dysfunctional regime. He predicted that the last European empire – Russia – would collapse at some point in the near future, with tremendous consequences for everybody. He was aware that this discussion might seem premature, yet they had to be ready for that eventuality. Political Debate Ms Lene Westgard Halle said that she was grateful every morning looking into her young daughter’s eyes, as well as for the peace they enjoyed. Her grandparents had not been so lucky. Their region had lived longer with war than it had with peace. Conflict, war, and hard work had marked the Baltic Sea region’s history. Peace was not a given. It was easy to hate, but the countries represented at this conference had chosen not to. They had decided to stand together. Yet peace had to be fought for, just as democracy had to be defended. Therefore, different ideologies had to be put aside to cooperate ever more closely in that defence. The West was at war on two fronts – one, in the east, was against a mangy and shabby bear flexing its ancient muscles invading another nation. Rather than strength, this showed weakness and insecurity. The other battle was to preserve democracy, ensuring that their children would enjoy the rights of the present. The Internet, the Russian troll factories, the fake profiles, the manufactured conflicts on social media – all of that happened right at this time within the West’s national borders. They had to wake up. As such, she called on the political right and left not to be polarised. Democracies had to embrace diversity and accept that not everyone was the same, yet they had to continue talking to each other. If they stood together, Putin’s strategy of Divide and Conquer would fail. All of them shared values, despite other differences. As a conservative Christian, she appreciated diversity which provided different perspectives. Cooperation had to be deepened ever further. They had to lock arms to ensure that Europe was not going to go back, to show that it was stronger. Mr Andris Kulbergs noted that he had worked with Russia, representing a Dutch company, since 2013, until the day of the invasion. In 2014, right after the annexation of Crimea, walking through Moscow, he had realised that this would end very badly. He had witnessed the change in society, epitomised by returning Stalin – who had slaughtered so many Russians – as a legend to revere. They should have realised back then what was happening, and they should have acted back then. The comforts of normality, of trade, of relations, had been deceiving. The Baltic States had always cautioned their western partners and now could proclaim, “We told you so.” Now, though, they were advising on how to act in the future. Mr Kulbergs did not see how there could be a return to normal after what was happening in Ukraine. Another mistake was not giving all-out support to Ukraine in the first year of the war to win quickly. Over time, the bigger foe was gaining the advantage, and there was indeed a possibility that Ukraine could lose the war. He warned that dragging out the war even further would mean that eventually, the Ukrainians would no longer be the ones fighting but the citizens of Western nations. Mr Kulbergs noted that he was a newcomer to politics and at first had been unsure of the role of the BSPC. But the war had proven how vital this forum was in relaying information and urgency to the parliaments. As chair of the BSPC working group on energy security, he knew that all of them understood they were in this together. Yet the working group had also been shown the shortcomings, such as the lack of a hub of information to inform all the involved countries but more importantly the lack of a policy how to deal with hybrid attacks. In that, he mentioned the attack on the Balticconnector by a Chinese supposed merchant vessel dragging its anchor across the undersea cables. Not having a policy to respond directly was dangerous, Mr Kulbergs cautioned. Furthermore, the working group had learned that the upcoming winter would be the most vulnerable to a cyber attack against energy. He reminded his colleagues that the Baltic Sea countries – especially the Baltics, Poland, and Finland – were the border nations to Russia. They had to support each other in their defence efforts. To allow the Italians and French to safely enjoy their croissants, the border would have to be defended. That was not a national concern but one of the EU as a whole. Mr Kulbergs mentioned an Estonian calculation that Ukraine could win the war if every European provided seven euros. Mr Lars Christian Brask understood Mr Haavisto and Mr Wałęsa to have said that the EU had failed. He asked them how exactly this should be ameliorated. Of Mr Splidsboel, he asked how the threat of nuclear war could be addressed. Ms Claudia Müller zeroed in on the cognitive domain mentioned by Mr Splidsboel. Society’s acceptance of security measures was crucial to both their security and whether they would succeed in helping Ukraine win the war, i.e., to retain their integrity. Yet she was aware of the elephant in the room, namely how Germany had acted prior to 2022. She endorsed the changes to the country’s policy since then, highlighting the Bundeswehr battalion now stationed in Lithuania. This was part of Germany’s commitment to ensure their neighbours’ security. Returning to the cognitive domain, she worried that they did not fully understand what this meant. First of all, they had to understand the long-term work that Russia had conducted on the West’s people and societies, spreading misinformation – lies – undermining the acceptance of their institutions, their way of life, and diversity. As an example, she pointed to a Russian decree making immigration easier for those who shared Russian values and beliefs – in other words, rejecting Western and/or democratic values. Russia painted itself as the antithesis to modern society, claiming that democracies would fall. This had to be fought. Secondly, people did not understand the interdependencies. Regarding energy, regarding security, these were not just national concerns. To be secure, the neighbours had to be secure. Ms Müller believed that this had to be said more often, to make people understand it better. Without European security, even large countries would be destabilised. The lies that had been spread were a fundamental danger; democracies had to rely on the truth. Mr Splidsboel first addressed the question about nuclear war. They had to be mentally prepared for that eventuality. He himself did not fear it, even though the Russian side liked to wield the threat of nuclear war as a cudgel. The USA had prepared for that – both tactical and strategic warheads – and communicated to Russia that their use would lead to a US response. A plan for the EU would have to be drawn up, even if it should rest in a drawer somewhere. He also quoted President Zelenskyy from his recent speech on Ukraine’s Day of Independence that there were no more red lines. Putin had fooled the West long enough that there were red lines that must not be crossed. As for the cognitive domain, he agreed that it was not yet quite understood. Moreover, they needed to comprehend that even if there was peace in Ukraine, the conflict with the West would continue. Russia would continue its disinformation campaigns. That was the new normal, he underlined. Aside from Russia, disinformation also came increasingly from China, from the Islamic State, and other actors. A dynamic approach to these challenges was required. Mr Wałęsa underlined that he was a strong believer in the European project. He saw the need for greater integration, that the EU was an ever-changing entity. One crisis followed the other, and they were learning from each crisis. After all, nobody had ever tried a project like the EU, so it was obvious that mistakes would be made. However, greater integration needed institutional and treaty changes – a very difficult task few member states appreciated. Yet without these changes, the EU was not set up to respond to these crises. He welcomed the European Commission’s proposal of a European Defence position. On the whole though, Mr Wałęsa remained pessimistic about accomplishing in the current institutional framework what would be possible otherwise. Their efforts clearly had to be coordinated to get as much bang from their euro as possible. In that, he suggested – not for the first time – a distribution of production types since not every country had to manufacture ammunition. It would be cost-effective to have specialisations. But there was one thing that could be done, even though it would be a tall order for the Ukrainians. Even though the country was caught up in a brutal war, their democratic institutions had to be fortified as well as their anti-corruption courts. With the military and financial support, the West had to insist on these measures as well. The endgame had to be a democratic sovereign Ukraine within the European Union. Returning to his pessimistic outlook, he picked the idea of a European army as an example. Time and time again, the topic was raised, never to gain any traction. To his regret, he did not believe it would happen during his lifetime. Nonetheless, they should strive for a powerful European defence force, yet for a long time, they would be dependent on the US through NATO. That, in turn, raised the question of what would happen in the USA in November with the presidential elections. Mr Wałęsa then insisted that he still believed they would emerge victorious from the present crisis. Mr Haavisto commented that his grandfather had left school at 17 to help the region of Karelia and its people gain their freedom. When returning, he said that he had been more eager to bring freedom than the locals were to achieve it. Considering the long history of the Baltic Sea region and Russia, they had to keep this in mind. Next, he noted that Ms Müller’s contribution had made him think of Russia’s relation with developing countries, such as Burkina Faso or Chad. The West had used to have very good relations with these countries in northern Africa, but now they were switching their allegiance. More generally, he cautioned to be more critical of incoming information. For instance, people tended to believe every bad thing claimed about Russia because it fit their idea of the country. Notably, most of that was even true, yet it was received uncritically. Understanding the big picture was vital, especially in wartime. Finally, as for improving European defence, he saw a Commissioner for Defence as a step in the right direction. Mr Haavisto underlined that he did not entirely condemn the EU’s response: After all, the European Union had been the first to aid Ukraine. Yet he called for exercises to train for the eventuality that one of their member countries was under attack. NATO was running such exercises, but the EU was not. Prof Jānis Vucāns said he was taking the floor because of Mr Wałęsa calling for the opinion of the Baltic States. He noted that the matter of defence and security had been on the BSPC’s agenda since at least 2014, just after the Russian occupation of Crimea. The discussion had been very difficult because the Russian state duma and several regional parliaments had also been full members of the BSPC. Belarus had applied for observer status to the BSPC. What had changed in the present was that all BSPC member states were also part of NATO. Discussions in the Baltic Assembly had yielded that, in addition to NATO, a regional approach was also necessary. He further noted the Baltic countries’ gratitude to NATO, especially to the UK, to Canada, to Germany, for their multinational forward presence battle groups stationed in the Baltics. This provided stability, enhancing the people’s trust in NATO. He commented further that the Standing Committee had discussed establishing a rotational principle for the BSPC presidency. The morning of this day, Prof Vucāns had read a proposal by BSPC Secretary General Bodo Bahr that, from 2026, the BSPC presidency could be held by the country holding the CBSS presidency. He saw a connection to the kinetic and non-kinetic activities as the former were mainly implemented by governments, but the non-kinetic – the non-physical – effort had to be implemented by people, by parliaments. He pointed to the debates about the Baltic countries reaching the 2 % budget goal for defence set by NATO; acceptance had come only once the people realised that it was better to pay and have NATO troops in place in case their big bad neighbour would attack. Prof Vucāns went on to note the importance of the topics discussed by the BSPC and included in their resolution. Given his long history with the organisation, he knew that they could influence their governments to closer cooperation. And that was their task. Mr Wałęsa felt strength from the discussion today. Every speaker had said that they were unified and had to stay together. They had to spend more on their defence and improve their coordination efforts. Yet he admitted some discomfort when there was no disagreement. He was sure there were differences of opinion – and that was part of their job: Butting heads until they came up with better solutions to benefit all of them. His concluding message was a heartfelt thank-you to everyone for understanding the situation. Mr Splidsboel repeated that the Russian empire would collapse, presenting the Baltic Sea region with tremendous challenges but also opportunities. They would be uniquely positioned to play a positive role. For example, Belarus would inevitably change after this collapse. They had to be prepared for that, yet he took comfort in knowing that the Baltic Sea region already was quite ready. Mr Haavisto did not wish to sound too pessimistic, but history taught that all empires would collapse one day. He was concerned over the developments in Belarus, considering their many democratic activists, and yet the country had floated into Russian control. He remembered a 2019 visit to Belarus during which the ruler Lukashenko had said that his country wanted to be one of the Nordic states. Yet at a suggestion to increase democracy, Lukashenko replied that they did not wish to be that Nordic. Still, to Mr Haavisto, the episode underlined that the Belarusian people were close to the Baltic Sea region. Therefore, even during this conflict, they should maintain contact with the country and help it into a brighter future.