On the afternoon of the first day of the BSPC’s annual conference, the recommendations from the BSPC’s Parliamentary Youth Forum were presented. After that, the conference dealt with the security of the energy supply, engaging in a vibrant discussion with Sweden’s Minister for Civil Defence and a researcher from the Royal Danish Defence College. Topics included the Nordic Total Defence concept, hybrid attacks, and European autonomous energy production. In its session on safety in the Baltic Sea, the Danish Ministers of Defence and of Foreign Affairs spoke about the geopolitical and military challenges of the present day, pointing among other things to the Russian shadow fleet of oil tankers and the need to reinforce European defence capabilities.
Second Session:
Recommendations from the BSPC Parliamentary Youth Forum
Chair Carola Veit welcomed the guests to this important session which would also feature the recommendations of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum. Co-chair Himanshu Gulati highlighted the value of young people’s involvement, especially in the pressing matters of the day: Energy Security and Resilience; Sustainable Energy Independence; and Youth Engagement in Energy Policy. They had developed recommendations on each which their representatives would introduce to the conference.
On Energy Security and Resilience: Ms Nagham Jaghoub, Chair of the Vestfold Youth Council from Norway
Ms Jaghoub said that their first recommendation was to enhance the resilience and security of the energy in research and development of outdated systems hand in hand with the private sector as well as partners supplementing the existing NATO initiatives. Secondly, the resilience of maritime crucial infrastructure should be strengthened by identifying the most vulnerable areas through comprehensive mapping, including joint risk assessments, coordinated trading, and real-time information sharing between public and private sectors for rapid, effective threat response.
On Sustainable Energy Independence: Ms Justina Ramonaitytė-Jemeljanovaitė, former board member of ReGeneration2030, from Lithuania living in Denmark
Ms Ramonaitytė-Jemeljanovaitė noted the importance of having young people’s voice heard, being at the adults’ rather than the kids’ table. Their first proposal regarded regional energy consumption, suggesting accelerating the full phase-out of fossil fuels, starting with non-EU sources, especially the Russian Federation; allocate resources towards sustainable energy; rethink the regional power grid, prioritising its modernisation and smart optimisation in storage and distribution. Secondly, they called to prioritise a just transition by working together to lower energy prices, build trust in institutions, and support fragile communities. Additionally, it was crucial to provide strong support for those whose jobs might be at risk due to the green transition by reskilling them, ensuring that no-one was left behind on the path to a more sustainable future.
On Youth Engagement in Energy Policy: Ms Sarah Vestergaard, Danish Youth Council
Ms Vestergaard noted that this topic was very close to the heart of the young people. She added that 76 % of Danish youths had been politically engaged in 2023, compared to 72 % of the rest of the population. Yet democratic confidence was lower among young people. On the other hand, those active in youth organisations had a higher confidence level – highlighting the value of democratic engagement and volunteer work. Thus, the forum asked decisionmakers to support youth organisations, giving young people the opportunity to voice their opinions, educate them, and provide opportunities to learn from industry. Firstly, they called for youth perspectives to be integrated into regional energy policies. Youth organisations should be given a permanent place in decision-making processes in the Baltic Sea region, e.g., by establishing formal structures. Secondly, access to green education should be promoted, and energy companies should be encouraged to provide opportunities for young people, e.g., by integrating sustainable energy topics into existing programmes, enabling exchange programmes, and fostering lifelong learning on relevant topics.
Ms Vestergaard went on to thank the BSPC for giving the young people this opportunity to take part. Considering how diligently the previous year’s recommendations had been incorporated into the BSPC’s resolution, she further thanked them for not just listening but acting.
Debate
Mr Johannes Schraps regretted that the processes in the BSPC and its member parliaments prevented the recommendations from being integrated into the present year’s resolution. Even though it would take a year from these recommendations entering the 2025 resolution, he underlined that they would be brought to the governments with the pressure of 20 national and regional parliaments and parliamentary organisations. He urged his colleagues and the youths to review the governmental responses to the resolutions, always delivered in spring, to see what progress had been made.
Energy Supply Security
Session chair Andris Kulbergs noted that he was also the chairman of the BSPC’s current working group on this very important topic. He reflected how much it had been neglected in recent years – such as relying on cheap Russian gas for too long. The lesson was that gas had served as a weapon and using it had delayed investments into green energy. Moreover, it had driven a wedge into society, and it had played a significant role in inflation. Consequently, energy supply security had been recognised as vital and of strategic importance.
Co-chair Staffan Eklöf introduced the first speaker: Mr Carl-Oskar Bohlin, Swedish Minister for Civil Defence. With a background in law, he had worked extensively on issues of public safety and national security.
Presentation by Mr Carl-Oskar Bohlin, Swedish Minister for Civil Defence
Mr Bohlin began by interrogating resilience in a broader light. The Baltic Sea region did not only share geography but also the same political outlook. As they were now all part of NATO, they could together tackle the most dire security situation since the end of World War II. To prepare for armed conflict, an all-society approach to resilience was necessary to handle new threat vectors that could reach directly into civil society. In that respect, he spoke of Sweden currently revitalising its Total Defence concept, originally devised during the Cold War on how the entire society should resist in the case of an armed attack. Resilience and robustness had to be implemented in every societal sector, so that defence could be supported by all of society. A role model was Ukraine which had met Total War with Total Resistance. Fundamentally, all of Ukrainian society had been put on a war footing. In a modern society, security of supply in general had become pivotal. The minister noted as an example that energy supply lines had been weaponised by Russia.
For Sweden, the first line of defence was not to be critically dependent on countries with a different security outlook, on their adversaries. This had to apply for the EU as a whole. Secondly, he called for more agility in the industrial base of every country. During the pandemic, whole sectors had been taken out, while direly needed medical equipment had grown scarce. Then, industries had organically shifted their production to fill those gaps. Sweden was establishing better public-private cooperation to more quickly facilitate this transformation. Thirdly, stockpiles in critical sectors – e.g., raw materials – as well as more robustness and redundancy were necessary. The autumn of 2022 had shown how fragile the European energy system was – a thankfully mild winter prevented a disaster. Yet, Mr Bohlin underlined, hope was not a strategy. Sweden was reinforcing its energy system’s robustness. Investing in the security of supply was a contribution to security in a more and more multipolar world. In Sweden’s view, this was an integral part of the country’s defence posture and thus their contribution to NATO deterrence.
Mr Kulbergs remarked that one lesson was that by running away from the Russian bear, one should not run into the claws of the Chinese tiger. He went on to introduce a leading researcher at the Royal Danish Defence College, Mr Rasmus Dahlberg. His area of expertise was disaster management and civil protection, particularly in the context of the Nordic countries.
Presentation by Mr Rasmus Dahlberg, Researcher, Royal Danish Defence College
Mr Dahlberg stressed that he was not speaking as a representative of his college. There had not been a tradition of research in societal defence in Denmark. But the country was forging ahead and was expected to establish a ministry of preparedness in the near future. His research project Resector was exploring the processes and effects of the COVID pandemic which some described as the great dress rehearsal. Their systems had been tested under severe stress – but not to the point of breakdown. Resector was looking at the principle of sectorial responsibility. The idea was particularly strong in the Nordic countries, namely that the responsibility in peace time remained with the companies in crisis or war times. Quoting a Danish professor, Mr Dahlberg spoke of the “crisis society” – it had become the new normal. Crisis management and preparedness had to be reconceived as did policies and organisations. He saw steps taken in this field, such as Sweden’s Total Defence concept, the EU’s efforts for increased resilience and information security, and NATO’s renewed interest in resilience as deterrence. The latter had been a strong focus in the 1950s, that the military could not fight well without strong, whole societies supporting them. Even so, the national state was still the primary crisis manager, as COVID had shown that the EU was too slow to react at appropriate speed.
His project was considering sector responsibility as an example of how the whole society could and should adapt to preparedness and crisis management. Energy supply and security fit very well. With regard to pipelines, seabed security had become a hot topic within NATO. For instance, an average pipeline passed through six or seven utterly different legal regimes from one end to the other. In the last three decades, efficiency and cost-effectiveness had been the goals rather than including security. Yet hybrid threats were deliberately targeting overlaps, gaps, and uncertainties – oftentimes, these were questions of who was responsible. Mr Dahlberg admitted that this kept him awake at night. While he did not know who had blown up the Nord Stream pipeline, it was surely no coincidence it had happened in the legal nightmare zone right outside Danish and Swedish territorial waters, namely, the EEC.
Sector responsibility had to be revised to ensure it did not become responsibility avoidance. New policies, new administrative structures were needed – along with supernational superstructures. Most importantly, nation states had to learn from each experience and adapt.
Mr Kulbergs remarked that he had attended an OECD meeting. There, he had learned that after effectively switching away from Russian gas, new dependencies had arisen. 82 % of windmill parts came from China and 98 % of solar panels. 78 % of electric mobility depended on China. As such, he wondered if they were now leaping into the claws of the Chinese tiger, especially with the energy transition. Furthermore, even if all this equipment was in place, there were still the cables. One estimate mentioned 28,000 kilometres of cables that would have to be installed. Yet only 6,000 were available as they had relied on Russia – now sanctioned – and Ukraine – now bombed.
Minister Bohlin compared the situation to a diver with an oxygen hose. The dependency was the same, as gas and oxygen could be turned off overnight. That was the most critical of all energy dependencies. The dependency on components was like the diver relying on the manufacturer of the hose – it was critical but not as much of a vulnerability. On the other hand, he agreed that this could not be maintained long-term since that dependency could be exploited as a bargaining chip. Thus, reliable energy chains had to be established for Europe in the long term. He underlined that they all supported the energy transition, but it had to be implemented in a sustainable matter – not only in terms of how resources were used but also from a security point of view. More plannable energy production, with greater control of the supply chain, was needed. Therefore, Sweden was welcoming every new green and carbon-neutral energy source. This expressly included nuclear power plants. To his knowledge, Sweden had seventeen out of thirty listed critical rare earth materials, putting on them the responsibility of making these available not only to themselves but also to their partners.
Mr Dahlberg agreed. It did not make sense to exchange one weaponised dependency for another. The problem in his view was that people still deeply believed in globalisation and did not want to wake up to the harsh reality that they were playing an entirely different ball game now. One outcome of the COVID crisis was the critical supply agency established in Denmark in the autumn of 2022. As good advice as they provided, they did not have a mandate. This led him back to the superstructure he’d spoken about earlier – less about cooperation and more about command. A mandate had to be given to someone to determine if an action, for instance, went against the short-term economic interest but was of great importance in the long run.
Mr Marc Timmer from Schleswig-Holstein appreciated Denmark in taking the right action after the oil crisis of the 1970s by fostering renewable energy not only in the electricity but also the heating sector. By comparison, the last energy crisis had cost the German economy some 5 – 7 % of GDP. As such, it was very important to implement a new energy system, as Germany was seeking to do. By nature, renewable energies were volatile, so that a reserve baseline power source was needed. He expected that to be hydrogen by 2040 or 2045.
Mr Dahlberg in turn appreciated Denmark being praised. He added that the country, under pressure from NATO after the 1956 Suez crisis, had implemented oil supply security. The companies were told they could either come up with a plan of their own, or the government would legislate this into existence. Industry complied, and that structure was still in place. Mr Dahlberg argued that they should look for best practice examples from the Cold War period when all of society had been included. Since the Fall of the Iron Curtain, privatisation had been the rule. Many of the important entities that had used to be government-owned were now in private hands, some even owned by foreign entities.
Mr Elias Arndt from the youth forum said that Germany was especially good in making up new words. “Krisenmodus” – crisis mode – meant that people, especially youths, were tired of the constant crisis. He asked how the experts thought the public could be brought along in developing good solutions for the future.
Minister Bohlin agreed that the engagement of the whole society was the one X factor in crisis management. He took Ukraine as an example, noting that few people had taken the people’s enormous willingness to resist into account. In the days after the Russian attack on 24 February 2022, many had expected Ukraine to fall quickly. The Ukrainians, though, had a newfound confidence in their institutions and leadership reinforced by strategic communication from the top. Mr Bohlin saw this as resonating with threats further down the severity scale. Forums dispelling disinformation and polarisation were one vital approach, as was the direct communication to the populace on their obligations in the crisis. People rose to the occasion if they clearly understood what was to do. This was what Sweden was seeking to do – communicating their Total Defence duties to every citizen between 16 and 70. A special information campaign was targeting those about to turn 16 to bring them up to date. At the same time, a brochure was sent to every Swedish household, providing an overview of how to take care of oneself and how to contribute in the event of a crisis. This kind of transparency made people reflect on what was possible.
Mr Dahlberg commented that Denmark was only implementing part of Sweden’s efforts and that six years late. Their version of the brochure had become available in June of the present year, rather than being distributed. The narrative before had been that Denmark was so different from Sweden or Norway that no lessons from there could be applied. However, he agreed that it was immensely important to get the population onboard. Surveys had shown an increase in interest as well as good will from the citizens towards these measures. The majority of the people wanted to be part of the Total Defence concept because it provided agency. He expected the next step to be the integration of the private sector into the new social defence 2.0 concept in Denmark. After that, civil society organisations would be considered.
Ms Bryndis Haraldsdóttir, President of the Nordic Council, said that the Council was very eager in more cooperation in defence and security. She wondered if the experts thought that the Nordic nations were sufficient in screening investments in critical infrastructure or if they should harmonise their policies among each other. In light of being at the BSPC, she added if that should be expanded to the whole region.
Minister Bohlin could not argue for other nations, but Sweden had moved the goalposts by belatedly introducing a screening mechanism in the preceding autumn. A holistic approach to security and a better control of infrastructure necessitated such a mechanism.
Mr Dahlberg commented that he had attended a discussion on that very topic a few weeks earlier in Norway. The Nordic countries had a good history of cooperation, such as HELCOM and now NATO. He further called for more investment in societal research.
Mr Marius Nilsson saw fossil energy still dominating 85 % of the energy supply. Despite billions of euros being spent, there was little change. In his view, all energy transition policies had weaknesses. On the one hand, the European research institute claimed that the German economy was crumbling over energy prices while in Norway, Germany was being hailed as the frontrunner in climate policies. His question was whether the experts saw a reality check and reorientation of the policies.
Mr Bohlin did not wish to step on anyone’s feet, but he felt that the full realisation had not yet hit. In his view, one could not be carbon-neutral and energy-independent without nuclear power. He saw the matter as this easy. Otherwise, LNG would be dominant, and these often came from countries they wanted to be less dependent upon. Furthermore, LNG still produced greenhouse gas emissions. Betting on hydrogen was dubious since there was an energy loss of about 50 – 60 % in the process. Using hydrogen as a decarboniser in industrial processes would always be a more efficient choice than as an intermittent energy storage. The price and inefficiency made hydrogen unrealistic.
Mr Johannes Schraps commented that there were quite diverse points of view on energy sources among the member states of the BSPC. This debate kept coming up in the Standing Committee and the working groups. Moving on, he focused on the statement about a constant crisis. Older people in his constituency kept reminding him that there had been crisis upon crisis in the past as well, such as the 1980s. As such, Mr Schraps wondered if the heavily interconnected world made the current situation seem more extraordinary. Coming back to energy supply security, he noted that this was a sensitive topic. At the Standing Committee in the preceding autumn, Tobias Liebetrau, a scientist from the University of Copenhagen, had spoken about the increasing necessity of protecting critical infrastructure. On the one hand, security work had to be confidential to a degree, but on the other hand, the public needed to be kept informed. As an example, he spoke about German weapons deliveries to Ukraine. At first, only authorized members of parliament could learn about these. But, as it had seemed to the public that the country was not delivering anything, the government started to release the lists. Yet that, in turn, allowed the Russians to see the inventories transferred to Ukraine and prepare for those.
Mr Dahlberg picked up on the “crisis society” term, noting that this idea had to be combatted. He likened this to terrorism at the start of the 2000s. If they had all stayed at home rather than going to concerts or taking the train, the terrorists would not have killed anybody – but they would still have won. They had to fight hybrid threats with the core values of liberal democracies and not securitise everything. They must not create divisions in society and use scapegoats. But people asked why the same hybrid attacks were not directed against the adversaries. The answer, Mr Dahlberg noted, was that they would not work as well against autocratic states as against open democratic societies. Their openness was a vulnerability, yet that was what they had to use in their defence. This led to paradoxes in transparency. In the long period of peace, they had grown used to publishing high-resolution maps of infrastructure so that fishermen did not accidentally drop their anchors on it. Historically, navigational charts had been classified until the mid-19th century. All of this, he placed on a spectrum from “Doing nothing” at one end and “Doing way too much” on the other. In a constant conversation in their open democratic forums, they had to seek the middle ground.
Minister Bohlin said that in the perceived constant crisis, it was useful to look at the frame of reference. No Western country was sending their young men to the front, no Western European country was being bombed every day. Most of Europe had not experienced a real crisis in more than 70 years. The rules-based democracy had created an unprecedented era of peace and calm. This had not been the norm before. If they wanted to keep things from getting worse, they had to stand with Ukraine, they had to fight against those who were seeking to dismantle the liberal rules-based world order.
Mr Kulbergs spoke about a new EU policy to support each other in civil defence and how each state was coordinating measures in case of natural disasters, and the like. Ukraine needed many fighters, medical support, food and water deliveries. Yet the respective EU policy did not provide for a potential war. One of the aspects was refugee flows; he pointed to the Suwałki corridor that could be shut down quickly. As such, he suggested that the BSPC should develop a concept for how they could cooperate in the case of war, since the EU did not have such a policy.
Minister Bohlin replied that Finland had already brought forth a motion on this topic, supported by Sweden and other countries. Specifically, this was about ramping up the EU’s capabilities in working through civil crises more profoundly than before. This included revamping civil protection mechanisms to better cope with long-term crises. He added that one of the deliverables from the NATO Washington summit concerned incorporating and better aligning civil and military planning.
Mr Dahlberg remarked that translating the Finnish security concept to the EU would be a good development. He was currently writing a report on NATO resilience requirements and objectives vis-à-vis the EU directives; cooperation – also at staff level – was rapidly increasing. So, Europe-wide provisions were likely forthcoming, yet he underlined that the national states would continue to be the practical crisis managers.
Mr Jens Schneider had read that up to this point, several Russian vessels had delivered LNG to Spain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands in the EU as well as to Turkey, China, and Taiwan. His constituents had complained that supposedly, no business was done with Russia on gas. He wondered how he could explain the situation.
Mr Bohlin could not speak for the countries in question but urged everyone to stop their critical dependency on Russia – not just in gas but also, for instance, fertilisers. The gas and oil dependency had, for a large part, been dissolved, although some still had to be severed.
Mr Dahlberg conceded that there would always be loopholes and actors willing to exploit these. Again, he underlined that open democratic debate was needed to counter attempts to divide the Western population. Good common frameworks had to be in place and acted upon. Furthermore, exploiting such loopholes could also be driven by malicious foreign actors; this new agenda also had to be opposed.
Mr Eklöf saw current society structured around peacetime, with economic efficiency as the leading goal. Gearing that structure to the new situation would cost money. That might be easy at this time, but people quickly forgot. Also keeping in mind that popular support was crucial in implementing these changes, he asked how that could be assured in the long term.
Mr Bohlin stressed that this was the most difficult concern, bar none. All of them had enjoyed the peace dividend; here he pointed to Francis Fukuyama’s book on The End of History from 1992. He found it ironic that he, as a member of that “forever peace” generation, had to rebuild what the Cold War generation had dismantled after the fall of the Soviet Union. The minister underlined that they had to look at the long-term horizon. They would not see the world return to what it had been before 2022, before 2014, or before 2008. The paradox of defence spending was that the more was spent, the more people complained about the high costs, and the more politicians were willing to determine their deterrence good enough. Often enough, reality would show this was not the case. Minister Bohlin quoted Ukraine President Zelenskyy at the Munich Security Conference telling the audience that they needed to get ready because they were not. There was no looking away from this issue.
Mr Dahlberg pointed to the preparedness paradox in research. This problem arose because the return on investment was often invisible. The things that did not happen were difficult to campaign on. As such, he believed that the narrative had to change from preparedness as cost to preparedness as investment – as an insurance policy. It was a fundamental element of societal security. Societal cohesion was vital. He cautioned that preparedness as a cost could not compete with other positions because of the invisible benefits.
Mr Eklöf commented that an exciting project in Sweden dealt with producing fertiliser domestically. Yet agriculture also faced the problem that its machines could not be run efficiently on electricity. Biogas produced on the farm might be a solution. All in all, he did not think fossil fuels could be replaced in agriculture in the next 20 years.
Mr Dahlberg reiterated that a strategy for the whole of society had to be in place; otherwise, one could always defer responsibility to somebody else. During the Cold War, NATO civil wartime agencies focused heavily on food production. Afterwards, it had diluted into the market’s responsibility. Now, they had the huge task of regaining control, defining responsibilities and mandates. But that had to be done: A plan had to be drawn up for every part of society.
Mr Bohlin agreed that food production was vital for resilience and the ability to resist. The key factor was to ensure that the agricultural sector was already competitive in peacetime. Thus, it was important not to swamp farmers with unnecessary regulations trying to drive them into the energy transition – and thus driving some of them out of business. He conceded that this was a very fine balance to strike. As for specifically the fuel question, he saw bio diesel as part of this, as was biogas and electrification. Yet fossil fuels should indeed not be ruled out too early to keep agriculture competitive and powerful for when it would be badly needed.
Third Session:
Safety in the Baltic Sea
Session chair Bryndís Haraldsdóttir said that the Baltic Sea was not just a crucial artery of communication and commerce but also of geopolitical importance. Russia’s unprovoked attack and environmental threats had underlined the need for cooperative planning.
She introduced the first speaker, Mr Troels Poulsen, as having been instrumental in shaping Denmark’s defence strategy amidst the evolving security landscape of the Baltic region.
Presentation by Mr Troels Lund Poulsen, Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Defence,
Denmark
Mr Poulsen noted Denmark’s particular responsibility for the Baltic Sea security. He highlighted the historic bond with the Baltic nations. Furthermore, he appreciated the BSPC’s role in strengthening the ties between the Baltic Sea countries. The threat from Russia was real, and he promised it would not be neglected. Finland and Sweden joining NATO had sent a clear signal to Russia, with all democratic Baltic Sea countries now part of the military alliance. He further pointed to NATO’s strong military deterrence in the Baltic states and all eastern allies. Denmark would be posting a permanent troop placement in Latvia the following autumn.
The Danish intelligence service stated Russia would deter NATO member states from military activities close to the latter’s borders. Furthermore, they expected Russian challenges to NATO countries below the Article 5 threshold, such as Russian harassment in addition to the hybrid threats from the country. This made it necessary to support the defence in the present and also invest in the future. Denmark was now meeting the NATO 2 % goal on an enduring basis, after a long debate. A spring investment plan included fast-track plans for a heavy brigade, ground-based air defence systems, and anti-submarine capabilities. Military support to Ukraine had been stepped up. Along with the other Baltic Sea countries, Minister Poulsen had also signed a letter of intent to assist the Baltic States with sea mines. In defence, all of them had to do even more in the coming years.
Ms Haraldsdóttir introduced Mr Lars Løkke Rasmussen, the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, known for being a strong advocate for Denmark’s active role in global diplomacy, particularly within the Nordic and Baltic regions.
Presentation by Mr Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Denmark
Mr Rasmussen said that all their nations shared a geographical similarity, i.e., bordering on the Baltic Sea. Rising geopolitical tensions made cooperation more vital than ever. For the first time in 500 years, all the Nordic countries were now part of the same defence alliance. But it was the first time in history that this applied to all the democratic Baltic Sea countries – a true milestone. He applauded the parliamentarians who had worked tirelessly to achieve this.
With hybrid attacks, Russia was testing the West’s threshold and its response. Effective defence required strong alliances and measures as Russia would continue to adjust its tactics. He assured his audience that none of that would deter them from their support for Ukraine. The British historian Mark Galleoti had recently said that the Cold War had been more stable than the current period. The rules had been somewhat clear while the present day felt more like the uncertain time right after the end of World War II when the rules had not been well defined. Mr Rasmussen saw the same uncertainty, noting the resulting security risks. The Baltic Sea region would see major investments in the near future, including offshore wind farms, new pipeline connections, and nuclear power plants. Their interconnected energy grid would improve the security of supply but also widen the region’s vulnerability to attacks, in particular hybrid assaults. Another risk was the Russian shadow fleet of oil tankers seeking to circumvent the price cap on Russian oil, to finance the Russian war machine. An accident with just one fully loaded tanker could cause severe pollution to the seas and the coastlines. In opposing this fleet, Denmark was cooperating with all European partners. He was pleased by EU sanctions against 27 ships, limiting their ability to operate.
The partners had to remain vigilant, ensuring that any further measures could be implemented and remain legally sound. The overall target of all of these attacks was to undermine state authority, creating uncertainty in the population. This raised questions such as how to respond to power failures without causing fear, whether they were resilient enough, or whether they were ready to defend their nations. In all that, they could learn from the Baltic States.
In closing, he underlined that he wanted a clean and safe Baltic Sea for his grandchildren. While they had long looked to the USA for security, it was now time for Europeans to contribute more to trans-Atlantic safety.
Debate
Mr Saku Nikkanen also underlined the necessity of standing together in these trying times. He was gravely concerned about the Russian shadow fleet and welcomed Denmark’s efforts to curtail the Russian oil tankers. The ships’ average age was more than thirty years, and they were in a poor state, posing a significant threat to the Baltic Sea environment. He called on the BSPC to take a unified stance on banning the Russian shadow tankers from the Baltic Sea.
Mr Pauli Aalto-Setälä saw Russia’s war of aggression as having fundamentally changed the security situation in all dimensions. Finland’s foreign committee had covered, among others, Russian attempts to redefine the zones in the Gulf of Finland, damage to underwater infrastructure, and GPS interference in Finland and surrounding areas. Additional measures were still needed to secure the area. Vigilance was needed along with preparedness to counter the unrestrained aggression of the Russian Federation. Their cooperation had to be deepened and reinforced. In particular, they had to focus on supply chain security. For Finland, a safe and secure sea transport was crucial and thus central to their resilience. Finally, he pointed out that environmental cooperation with Russia had diminished since the outbreak of the war, also pointing to the shadow fleet. This had to be addressed, not only for their security but also the environmental health of the Baltic State. He tagged on that they should all support Ukraine.
Mr Himanshu Gulati described the BSPC – and the Baltic Sea – as binding nations together. Unfortunately, in history, the region had been the meeting point of democratic nations and those with other intents. The invasion of Ukraine had reminded them that the sea of opportunities could also bring challenges. Representing Norway, he noted that their ample energy production facilities in the North Sea had seen suspicious activity recently. Considering these and other hybrid threats, he asked the ministers if they believed the measures in the Baltic Sea were sufficient.
Ms Oddný G. Harðardóttir said their countries had to be on the alert in security and defence. Yet they had to do anything to negotiate peace in conflicts. She asked Mr Rasmussen what he considered the best path forward and to prevent war.
Mr Kaarel Taimla, Estonia, from the youth forum commented that during the Cold War, dissenters could find themselves sent to a gulag. Yet even the US put tens of thousands of their citizens of Japanese descent into internment camps after the attack on Pearl Harbor. History taught that democracies could overreact. But in the present, they could not afford to either over- or underreact. This applied to ethnic Russians living especially in the Baltic states. In that regard, he also pointed to pro-Russian demonstrations all over Europe. He wondered how to deal with people of severely different opinions. He asked everybody to deal not only with the physical threats but also the disinformation spread among the people.
Mr Tobias Olling Mørup, Denmark, from the youth forum highlighted that the former Belgian minister of foreign affairs, Mr Mark Eyskens, had described Europe in 1991 as an economic giant, political dwarf, and literary worm. In the present, Mr Mörup thought that Europe had failed politically to prevent the war and was militarily not able to end the war. He asked if the politicians shared the same view as Mr Eyskens and how to secure the Baltic Sea and Europe fast enough from the Russian threat.
Mr Johannes Schraps remarked that the countries around the North Sea had entered a cooperation for the protection of their infrastructure. The BSPC resolution of this conference would call for a closer security cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. He asked for the ministers’ input. Furthermore, as outgoing vice-president of the BSPC, he appreciated the ministers taking part in this session as well as that the CBSS had taken the parliamentary dimension of the Baltic Sea cooperation into account.
Ms Claudia Müller referred to Minister Rasmussen’s comment about rules being established after World War II. Back then, the world was split up into spheres of influence, without the people having a say in the matter. Those living in the unfree countries saw the Baltic Sea as a border – dividing them – yet also as a beacon of hope. She wondered how they could make sure that the Baltic Sea would never again be a sea of division but would always unite them.
Minister Poulsen viewed it as vital for the democratic countries of Europe to stick together in their support of Ukraine in the long run. He noted Denmark’s donation of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. Secondly, they had to help Ukraine establish a strong defence industry of their own. Thus, he called on countries to invest more in Ukrainian defence companies. That would also speed up the military provisions. Thirdly, a more long-lasting plan was needed for the defence of the Baltic countries. Furthermore, there should be more joint exercises. He additionally called for democratic European countries to jointly purchase military equipment. Rather than focusing on their own need, nations could do more for the joint defence. Here, he underlined that they should show wisdom in what to spend their money on. At the same time, they should share best practices on how to fight against hybrid warfare. Fourthly, regarding disinformation and public awareness, there had to be an open and direct discussion with the voters on the possible outcome of Russia gaining more territory – namely, highlighting the dangers this would inherently create for the rest of Europe.
Minister Rasmussen replied to Mr Gulati’s question if the current defence measures were enough with a clear “No”. The good thing, though, was that now the BSPC countries were now together in their goals, not least with all of them having joined NATO. He also stressed the importance of dialogue on all levels, which expressly included the parliamentary dimension noted by Mr Schraps. Reflecting Ms Harðardóttir’s question on how to prevent war, he believed they should learn a lesson from history. That lesson was to continue to stick together and be steadfast in their support for Ukraine. He stressed that they were in a crucial period of history. He was proud that Denmark was the top supporter of Ukraine per capita and fourth in total numbers. The latter, though, was worrying, given that Denmark was such a small country. He called on everybody to step up. They could not afford to allow Putin to win the war and create uncertainty for generations to come. Picking up on Mr Mörup quoting the former Belgian minister, Mr Rasmussen saw value in that statement. Whoever would move into the White House, Europe had to do more to stand on their own feet. They had to build a European pillar in the NATO framework and increase their defence industry’s capacity. In that, he appreciated Ms von der Leyen’s re-election as head of the European Commission. He assured his audience that Denmark in their presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2025 would continue this agenda for a more competitive Europe, a stronger bridge between NATO and Europe. In conclusion, cooperation was the only way forward.