Safety in the Baltic Sea Region was the central theme of this year’s Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference under the Danish Presidency. More than 150 participants attended this year’s annual conference in Helsingør. Standing together for defence was the core issue to be deepened in the first session.
The BSPC’s annual conference opened with introductions on the region’s history and the BSPC’s activities in the past year. The first session dealt intensively with defence matters, arguing for greater coordination and integration in the physical, cyber, and cognitive domains to fend off hybrid attacks. Russian disinformation and sabotage, as well as their efforts to pull African countries into their influence, were also considered.
Introduction
BSPC President Henrik Møller said it was a privilege to welcome the participants to the 33rd Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference in Helsingør – or Elsinore, as the locals said. He declared the conference open.
Opening Speech by Mr Søren Gade, Speaker of the Danish Parliament
Mr Gade, in his turn, welcomed the participants of both the conference and the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum, pointing out the central location of Helsingør in the Baltic Sea region. He reflected on the Øresund Strait’s history, from fierce battles to a major rescue operation of Jewish refugees in 1943. In the present day, Russia’s brutal attack on Ukraine had proved a turning point for Europe, breaking all principles in a rules-based international order. The BSPC had terminated its cooperation with the Russian side. Mr Gade underlined his condemnation against the Russian aggression over the past two and a half years. The democratic nations had to stand shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine because their fight was the other nations’ fight as well.
After Russia’s withdrawal from Baltic Sea institutions, it was all the more important for the remaining neighbours to cooperate even more closely, such as in the BSPC but also in the EU and NATO. He was pleased that Finland and Sweden had now joined the military alliance, reinforcing the deterrence. The theme of this year’s BSPC conference was Safety and Security in the Baltic Sea Region, noting its timeliness with regard to recent incidents destabilising the energy supply. Sabotage and cyber attacks on the power grid, Internet cables, and digital systems never seemed to end. Although the damage had been fixed, the attacks had achieved their goal of increasing uncertainty in the population and provoke division in the West’s relationship with Russia.
The Baltic Sea region was key in Europe, in terms of climate change amelioration, maritime ecosystem restoration as well as energy and safety. Democracy was under attack in the digital space. It was crucial to learn from each other. That particularly included the young people from the Youth Forum.
Mr Gade wished the participants a successful conference, highlighting the BSPC’s great value for the parliaments of the region.
Opening Speech by BSPC President Henrik Møller
President Møller said that this conference represented the culmination of one year of hard work, cooperation, and continuation of vital traditions underlining their commitment to the prosperity, security, and sustainability of the democratic Baltic Sea region. In a complex landscape, they had navigated challenges and opportunities. They had engaged in critical dialogue. In key meetings in the autumn of 2023, they had set the outline of the year ahead in their collective action. In particular, he highlighted their participation in the Conference of Presidents of Parliament in Europe with important conversations, especially with the president of the Ukrainian parliament. During the Nordic Council and Baltic Assembly sessions, commonalities had been deepened, but contacts beyond the region – for instance with the Scottish parliament – had been forged. That reflected the growing importance of regional cooperation. In June 2024, the BSPC had taken part in the meeting of the Benelux countries, engaging in deep conversations about port security. Progress had been charted in environmental protection, energy security, and regional defence cooperation. The president stressed that the democratic Baltic Sea region was a leader in addressing some of the most pressing issues of the time.
Visits of the Rail Baltica and Fehmarnbelt Tunnel construction sites had granted a deep, practical look at the region’s most significant infrastructure projects in the east and west. A study visit to the Finnish eastern border had provided insight into the situation. President Møller highlighted the exemplary work of the BSPC Working Group on Energy Supply, Security, and Resilience. They had fostered dialogue and proposed innovative solutions to ensure the resilience, sustainability, and security of the energy infrastructure. The Standing Committee meetings had dealt intensively with critical infrastructure and deepened their links with the EU Commission, HELCOM, and the CBSS regarding climate, security, and environmental protection. He noted this year’s Conference Resolution would focus on improving infrastructure, enhancing military mobility, and increasing cooperation among democratic Baltic Sea countries.
He outlined the line-up of the conference, from defence, energy supply security over safety in the Baltic Sea region to climate initiatives. Mr Møller welcomed the young representatives of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum, highlighting their participation in the BSPC’s work. The BSPC president reflected that the need for unity, courage, and an unwavering commitment to the values was as powerful as it had been when he had mentioned it at the last conference. As much as had been achieved over the past twelve months, more had yet to be accomplished.
First Session: Defence Cooperation
Co-chair Johannes Schraps opened the first political debate by pointing out how much the political landscape had undergone significant changes in recent years, largely driven by external factors, especially Russia’s increasing military activities. He introduced the first speaker, the former Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Pekka Haavisto, underlining his unparalleled expertise in foreign policy, crisis management, and environmental issues.
Speech by Mr Pekka Haavisto, former Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr Haavisto explained that his country had a 1,300-kilometer border with Russia. This had led Finland to develop a concept of “total defence,” enveloping civil society and private companies in their planning. In his view, this concept should be enhanced and expanded. Yet he conceded that recent thinking about warfare may have been mistaken – namely that battles of the kind that had characterised World War II were no longer realistic. Instead, cyber wars, information wars, or hybrid wars would take their place. Now, they were coming to realise that these were actually new layers stacked on top of the conventional layers of conflict. This meant that the democratic security had to be constructed based on all these types of risks. Furthermore, Baltic Sea security had to build on the local institutions – particularly the EU and NATO. Mr Haavisto conceded that Finland was disappointed in the joint security responses not being planned and exercised by the EU. He hoped that the upcoming EU Commission would take these efforts more seriously. Those calling the Baltic Sea now a “NATO lake,” he cautioned that Russia retained considerable influence. Both sides were dependent on Baltic Sea traffic and could exert heavy pressure on their opposition.
He further saw serious shortcomings in the defence industry, as highlighted by efforts to train Ukrainian soldiers in modern equipment. Interoperability, standardisation, and harmonisation were missing. These had to be implemented – raising the urgent question of doing so in the EU, adding e.g., the UK and Norway, or should this be handled in the trans-Atlantic context. Moreover, politicians had to be aware of the population’s willingness to continue supporting these investments – what kind of military equipment and where to slash the budget. Maritime surveillance was critical, in light of the Nord Stream and Balticconnector incidents. Here, Finland and Sweden – with its high-tech submarine fleet – could be vital. Finally, Mr Haavisto addressed environmental concerns – ranging from dumped ammunitions and gas pipelines to shipborne transport of gas and other hazardous substances. In that respect, the energy transition was equally crucial. He saw much to do in the Baltic context.
BSPC Vice-President Schraps introduced the next speaker, Mr Jarosław Wałęsa, currently member of the Polish parliament, previously in the European parliament, working on fisheries, environmental issues, international trade and the broader concerns of the Baltic Sea region. He had also been the head of the Polish delegation to the BSPC until recently.
Speech by Mr Jarosław Wałęsa, MP Polish parliament
Mr Wałęsa referenced Mr Haavisto’s disappointment over the response of the European Union. Mr Wałęsa himself was disappointed in the European inability to form a united response since the Balkans in the 1990s. There was a long road yet ahead of them to forge a fruitful coalition that was meaningful and cost-effective. Since the Russian attack on Ukraine, the conversation had changed fundamentally from what had been spoken about but five years earlier. He hoped the new understanding would transform into that meaningful coalition.
For Poland, the Baltic Sea was their immediate neighbourhood and thus vitally important. Its geostrategic importance had increased dramatically, making regional cooperation essential. Mr Wałęsa hoped that this would also transform the way politicians spoke to their constituents, to relate to them why it was important to pay their money to fund a war in Ukraine. Peace was nowhere in sight, and it would be a long, costly process. He was convinced that with democratic support, Ukraine would stand. Yet the recent gap in US support had underlined the dependency on these supplies, making it all the more urgent that the support be upheld. At the same time, Mr Wałęsa warned his listeners not to ignore the presence of other Russian assets in the region, pointing to Kaliningrad and the country’s maritime activities. Russia could still threaten any of the Baltic Sea countries at short notice. It could target critical infrastructure, such as undersea pipelines. He further pointed to a wave of Russian hybrid attacks, disrupting GPS signals, deliberately violating airspace, sabotage, artificially created migration flows as well as cyber attacks.
However, Russia had – very inadvertently – managed to convince Finland and Sweden to join NATO. Mr Wałęsa noted that these country’s accession also reinforced the positions in the high north as well as the Euro-Atlantic region. Yet the Baltic Sea becoming a NATO-dominated basin was not just an opportunity but also a challenge as Russia sought to destabilise the entire region. Poland welcomed the recent initiative of the Finnish presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States to better coordinate the common positions and responses. He called on NATO to stay focused on its collective security. It had to continue to deny any aggression, be it hybrid or military, from the territory of Russia, Belarus, or elsewhere. A persistent presence of allied forces on the eastern flank was crucial. Sustainable peace in Europe was only possible by supporting Ukraine and eventually bringing it into NATO.
He cautioned that Russia sought to build a new security order at the expense of Europe. This meant that all of their nations had to implement a new strategic approach against Russia. Mr Wałęsa underlined that, beyond the immediate conflict, they shared values as democracies, they respected the rules of international law. He was concerned that worries in the population would make the upcoming months difficult. Yet it was urgent to decide matters, such as what types of ammunition and weapons to manufacture and where to do so.
BSPC President Møller presented Mr Flemming Splidsboel, a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) working in particular on international security in Eastern Europe and Russia.
Speech by Mr Flemming Splidsboel, senior researcher, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Mr Splidsboel started by stating two uncomfortable truths: One was that the conflict with Russia would continue for a long time. The other was that, unless something new was introduced, they would have to accept that Ukraine might lose this war. This had to be kept in mind in discussions about public spending to support the country. In the latter stages of the summer, Ukraine had been given freer reign to act, such as on Russian territory. Mr Splidsboel stressed that this was one such new element.
The war – conflict with the West – had become the raison d’être of the Russian regime, infusing every aspect of Russian society. Everything in the country was politicised, down to such aspects as music festivals. He underlined the massive change since the start of the war, having become semi-totalitarian and perhaps fully fascist. The meta-narrative of the past two decades blamed all of Russia’s problems on the West. That narrative had mushroomed across the entire society in the last two years, so much so that Mr Splidsboel doubted Putin’s regime would survive without that conflict.
Since 2014 and even more so since 2022, Russia had expanded its interests, for instance, in the high north. They have also needled the West with such actions as moving missiles – possibly carrying nuclear warheads – into the Kaliningrad oblast and withdrawing them, raising questions about what such signals meant. Aside from the focus on direct military threats, hybrid warfare also had to be addressed. To Mr Splidsboel as a researcher, hybrid warfare meant the deliberate mix of kinetic and non-kinetic effects. Here, he mentioned the physical domain – usually the arena of kinetic effects –, the cyber domain, and the cognitive domain – such as disinformation. Russians were quite creative in making use of these domains and exploiting Western vulnerabilities. Thus, the West also had to cooperate in defending against these non-kinetic threats. In that, he noted that the Danish government was establishing a new ministry to bring together all of these domains together on the national level. With respect to earlier criticism of the European Union, Mr Splidsboel said that the EU had established several rather effective standards against some non-kinetic attacks. In his view, the West should turn to the EU for these and to NATO for the kinetic assaults.
Something else that had to be prepared for was how to deal with Russia once the war would end. The situation might be akin to the Cold War in addressing a dysfunctional regime. He predicted that the last European empire – Russia – would collapse at some point in the near future, with tremendous consequences for everybody. He was aware that this discussion might seem premature, yet they had to be ready for that eventuality.
Political Debate
Ms Lene Westgard Halle said that she was grateful every morning looking into her young daughter’s eyes, as well as for the peace they enjoyed. Her grandparents had not been so lucky. Their region had lived longer with war than it had with peace. Conflict, war, and hard work had marked the Baltic Sea region’s history. Peace was not a given. It was easy to hate, but the countries represented at this conference had chosen not to. They had decided to stand together. Yet peace had to be fought for, just as democracy had to be defended. Therefore, different ideologies had to be put aside to cooperate ever more closely in that defence.
The West was at war on two fronts – one, in the east, was against a mangy and shabby bear flexing its ancient muscles invading another nation. Rather than strength, this showed weakness and insecurity. The other battle was to preserve democracy, ensuring that their children would enjoy the rights of the present. The Internet, the Russian troll factories, the fake profiles, the manufactured conflicts on social media – all of that happened right at this time within the West’s national borders. They had to wake up. As such, she called on the political right and left not to be polarised. Democracies had to embrace diversity and accept that not everyone was the same, yet they had to continue talking to each other. If they stood together, Putin’s strategy of Divide and Conquer would fail. All of them shared values, despite other differences. As a conservative Christian, she appreciated diversity which provided different perspectives.
Cooperation had to be deepened ever further. They had to lock arms to ensure that Europe was not going to go back, to show that it was stronger.
Mr Andris Kulbergs noted that he had worked with Russia, representing a Dutch company, since 2013, until the day of the invasion. In 2014, right after the annexation of Crimea, walking through Moscow, he had realised that this would end very badly. He had witnessed the change in society, epitomised by returning Stalin – who had slaughtered so many Russians – as a legend to revere. They should have realised back then what was happening, and they should have acted back then. The comforts of normality, of trade, of relations, had been deceiving. The Baltic States had always cautioned their western partners and now could proclaim, “We told you so.” Now, though, they were advising on how to act in the future. Mr Kulbergs did not see how there could be a return to normal after what was happening in Ukraine. Another mistake was not giving all-out support to Ukraine in the first year of the war to win quickly. Over time, the bigger foe was gaining the advantage, and there was indeed a possibility that Ukraine could lose the war. He warned that dragging out the war even further would mean that eventually, the Ukrainians would no longer be the ones fighting but the citizens of Western nations.
Mr Kulbergs noted that he was a newcomer to politics and at first had been unsure of the role of the BSPC. But the war had proven how vital this forum was in relaying information and urgency to the parliaments. As chair of the BSPC working group on energy security, he knew that all of them understood they were in this together. Yet the working group had also been shown the shortcomings, such as the lack of a hub of information to inform all the involved countries but more importantly the lack of a policy how to deal with hybrid attacks. In that, he mentioned the attack on the Balticconnector by a Chinese supposed merchant vessel dragging its anchor across the undersea cables. Not having a policy to respond directly was dangerous, Mr Kulbergs cautioned. Furthermore, the working group had learned that the upcoming winter would be the most vulnerable to a cyber attack against energy.
He reminded his colleagues that the Baltic Sea countries – especially the Baltics, Poland, and Finland – were the border nations to Russia. They had to support each other in their defence efforts. To allow the Italians and French to safely enjoy their croissants, the border would have to be defended. That was not a national concern but one of the EU as a whole. Mr Kulbergs mentioned an Estonian calculation that Ukraine could win the war if every European provided seven euros.
Mr Lars Christian Brask understood Mr Haavisto and Mr Wałęsa to have said that the EU had failed. He asked them how exactly this should be ameliorated. Of Mr Splidsboel, he asked how the threat of nuclear war could be addressed.
Ms Claudia Müller zeroed in on the cognitive domain mentioned by Mr Splidsboel. Society’s acceptance of security measures was crucial to both their security and whether they would succeed in helping Ukraine win the war, i.e., to retain their integrity. Yet she was aware of the elephant in the room, namely how Germany had acted prior to 2022. She endorsed the changes to the country’s policy since then, highlighting the Bundeswehr battalion now stationed in Lithuania. This was part of Germany’s commitment to ensure their neighbours’ security. Returning to the cognitive domain, she worried that they did not fully understand what this meant. First of all, they had to understand the long-term work that Russia had conducted on the West’s people and societies, spreading misinformation – lies – undermining the acceptance of their institutions, their way of life, and diversity. As an example, she pointed to a Russian decree making immigration easier for those who shared Russian values and beliefs – in other words, rejecting Western and/or democratic values. Russia painted itself as the antithesis to modern society, claiming that democracies would fall. This had to be fought. Secondly, people did not understand the interdependencies. Regarding energy, regarding security, these were not just national concerns. To be secure, the neighbours had to be secure. Ms Müller believed that this had to be said more often, to make people understand it better. Without European security, even large countries would be destabilised. The lies that had been spread were a fundamental danger; democracies had to rely on the truth.
Mr Splidsboel first addressed the question about nuclear war. They had to be mentally prepared for that eventuality. He himself did not fear it, even though the Russian side liked to wield the threat of nuclear war as a cudgel. The USA had prepared for that – both tactical and strategic warheads – and communicated to Russia that their use would lead to a US response. A plan for the EU would have to be drawn up, even if it should rest in a drawer somewhere. He also quoted President Zelenskyy from his recent speech on Ukraine’s Day of Independence that there were no more red lines. Putin had fooled the West long enough that there were red lines that must not be crossed. As for the cognitive domain, he agreed that it was not yet quite understood. Moreover, they needed to comprehend that even if there was peace in Ukraine, the conflict with the West would continue. Russia would continue its disinformation campaigns. That was the new normal, he underlined. Aside from Russia, disinformation also came increasingly from China, from the Islamic State, and other actors. A dynamic approach to these challenges was required.
Mr Wałęsa underlined that he was a strong believer in the European project. He saw the need for greater integration, that the EU was an ever-changing entity. One crisis followed the other, and they were learning from each crisis. After all, nobody had ever tried a project like the EU, so it was obvious that mistakes would be made. However, greater integration needed institutional and treaty changes – a very difficult task few member states appreciated. Yet without these changes, the EU was not set up to respond to these crises. He welcomed the European Commission’s proposal of a European Defence position. On the whole though, Mr Wałęsa remained pessimistic about accomplishing in the current institutional framework what would be possible otherwise. Their efforts clearly had to be coordinated to get as much bang from their euro as possible. In that, he suggested – not for the first time – a distribution of production types since not every country had to manufacture ammunition. It would be cost-effective to have specialisations. But there was one thing that could be done, even though it would be a tall order for the Ukrainians. Even though the country was caught up in a brutal war, their democratic institutions had to be fortified as well as their anti-corruption courts. With the military and financial support, the West had to insist on these measures as well. The endgame had to be a democratic sovereign Ukraine within the European Union. Returning to his pessimistic outlook, he picked the idea of a European army as an example. Time and time again, the topic was raised, never to gain any traction. To his regret, he did not believe it would happen during his lifetime. Nonetheless, they should strive for a powerful European defence force, yet for a long time, they would be dependent on the US through NATO. That, in turn, raised the question of what would happen in the USA in November with the presidential elections. Mr Wałęsa then insisted that he still believed they would emerge victorious from the present crisis.
Mr Haavisto commented that his grandfather had left school at 17 to help the region of Karelia and its people gain their freedom. When returning, he said that he had been more eager to bring freedom than the locals were to achieve it. Considering the long history of the Baltic Sea region and Russia, they had to keep this in mind. Next, he noted that Ms Müller’s contribution had made him think of Russia’s relation with developing countries, such as Burkina Faso or Chad. The West had used to have very good relations with these countries in northern Africa, but now they were switching their allegiance. More generally, he cautioned to be more critical of incoming information. For instance, people tended to believe every bad thing claimed about Russia because it fit their idea of the country. Notably, most of that was even true, yet it was received uncritically. Understanding the big picture was vital, especially in wartime. Finally, as for improving European defence, he saw a Commissioner for Defence as a step in the right direction. Mr Haavisto underlined that he did not entirely condemn the EU’s response: After all, the European Union had been the first to aid Ukraine. Yet he called for exercises to train for the eventuality that one of their member countries was under attack. NATO was running such exercises, but the EU was not.
Prof Jānis Vucāns said he was taking the floor because of Mr Wałęsa calling for the opinion of the Baltic States. He noted that the matter of defence and security had been on the BSPC’s agenda since at least 2014, just after the Russian occupation of Crimea. The discussion had been very difficult because the Russian state duma and several regional parliaments had also been full members of the BSPC. Belarus had applied for observer status to the BSPC. What had changed in the present was that all BSPC member states were also part of NATO. Discussions in the Baltic Assembly had yielded that, in addition to NATO, a regional approach was also necessary. He further noted the Baltic countries’ gratitude to NATO, especially to the UK, to Canada, to Germany, for their multinational forward presence battle groups stationed in the Baltics. This provided stability, enhancing the people’s trust in NATO.
He commented further that the Standing Committee had discussed establishing a rotational principle for the BSPC presidency. The morning of this day, Prof Vucāns had read a proposal by BSPC Secretary General Bodo Bahr that, from 2026, the BSPC presidency could be held by the country holding the CBSS presidency. He saw a connection to the kinetic and non-kinetic activities as the former were mainly implemented by governments, but the non-kinetic – the non-physical – effort had to be implemented by people, by parliaments. He pointed to the debates about the Baltic countries reaching the 2 % budget goal for defence set by NATO; acceptance had come only once the people realised that it was better to pay and have NATO troops in place in case their big bad neighbour would attack.
Prof Vucāns went on to note the importance of the topics discussed by the BSPC and included in their resolution. Given his long history with the organisation, he knew that they could influence their governments to closer cooperation. And that was their task.
Mr Wałęsa felt strength from the discussion today. Every speaker had said that they were unified and had to stay together. They had to spend more on their defence and improve their coordination efforts. Yet he admitted some discomfort when there was no disagreement. He was sure there were differences of opinion – and that was part of their job: Butting heads until they came up with better solutions to benefit all of them. His concluding message was a heartfelt thank-you to everyone for understanding the situation.
Mr Splidsboel repeated that the Russian empire would collapse, presenting the Baltic Sea region with tremendous challenges but also opportunities. They would be uniquely positioned to play a positive role. For example, Belarus would inevitably change after this collapse. They had to be prepared for that, yet he took comfort in knowing that the Baltic Sea region already was quite ready.
Mr Haavisto did not wish to sound too pessimistic, but history taught that all empires would collapse one day. He was concerned over the developments in Belarus, considering their many democratic activists, and yet the country had floated into Russian control. He remembered a 2019 visit to Belarus during which the ruler Lukashenko had said that his country wanted to be one of the Nordic states. Yet at a suggestion to increase democracy, Lukashenko replied that they did not wish to be that Nordic. Still, to Mr Haavisto, the episode underlined that the Belarusian people were close to the Baltic Sea region. Therefore, even during this conflict, they should maintain contact with the country and help it into a brighter future.