Standing Committee

Representatives of all national and regional parliaments of the Baltic Sea region, the European Parliament, the Baltic Assembly, and the Nordic Council attended — a clear expression of unity and the continued relevance of interparliamentary cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region. Kristina Herbst opened the meeting by thanking the Åland Islands for hosting the 34th BSPC in Mariehamn, noting that the conference had provided important momentum for the political work now being taken forward. She stressed the central role of parliamentary dialogue in safeguarding democratic resilience, regional stability and cross-border trust: “Cooperation among our parliaments is not a formality — it is a necessity. The Baltic Sea region faces shared challenges, and only together can we find the solutions our citizens expect.” Delegates in Kiel discussed the follow-up to the 34th BSPC, the Presidency’s strategic priorities for 2025–2026, and the ongoing work in the BSPC Working Group and Rapporteurships. They exchanged views on key regional issues, including the future of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) based on the recent Wise Persons Report. The discussions reflected the breadth of the regional agenda and the BSPC’s role as a platform for long-term parliamentary coordination. In light of current developments, the Standing Committee agreed today to issue a joint statement under the title ‘Nothing About Ukraine Without Ukraine. The Statement reaffirms the BSPC’s unwavering solidarity with Ukraine and underlines that any international initiative must respect Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. It stresses that no proposal or negotiation format may be pursued without Ukraine’s consent or at the expense of its security and freedom. Kristina Herbst emphasised: “Our message from Kiel is clear: Ukraine decides its future. As our Statement states, Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity are inviolable. Any path to peace must be anchored in international law — and must strengthen Ukraine rather than reward aggression.” Delegates stressed that Ukraine’s defence remains directly linked to the security and democratic resilience of the entire Baltic Sea region and expressed deep respect for the determination of the Ukrainian people in defending shared democratic values. The Presidency also presented the upcoming 35th BSPC, to be held in Lübeck from 30 August to 1 September 2026 — the first time since 1998 that Schleswig-Holstein will host the annual Conference. Delegates welcomed the choice of venue and the Presidency’s intention to make Lübeck a central forum for political dialogue in the region. In her concluding remarks, Kristina Herbst thanked all delegations for their constructive engagement and emphasised the value of the intensive political exchange during the Kiel meeting. The Standing Committee will reconvene in early March 2026 in Brussels to continue its work under the Schleswig-Holstein Presidency.

The BSPC Standing Committee gathered in the European Parliament in Brussels to look into the European Commission’s recent achievements in the bioeconomy, fishery and oceans, shipping and response, and the ongoing threat of hybrid and cyber-attacks. Representatives of the European Parliament, particularly the Vice-Presidents of the European Parliament, Ms Christel Schaldemose and Mr Roberts Zīle , former EU Commissioner MEP Virginijus Sinkevičius and MEP Rasa Juknevičienė,the European Commission, namely EU Commissioner Mr Costas Kadis, representatives of the GD Environment, HELCOM, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and NATO discussed the current challenges in Europe, former and current main activities of the EU Commission regarding the Ocean Policy, shipping and response as well as benefits of the bioeconomy for the Baltic Sea Region. Further preparations were made for the annual conference in Mariehamn on 24-26 August. More than 40 participants, representatives and delegations of the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM) and the BSPC members from the Åland Islands, the Baltic Assembly, the European Parliament, Denmark, Estonia, the German Bundestag, Finland, Hamburg, Latvia, Lithuania, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the Nordic Council, Norway, Poland, Schleswig-Holstein and Sweden participated in the meeting. Introduction BSPC President Alfons Röblom welcomed the Standing Committee to the traditional winter meeting at the European Parliament in Brussels. Welcome Word by Mr Roberts Zīle , the Vice-President of the European Parliament, responsible for the Baltic/Nordic/Arctic countries, including the Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, the Barents Parliamentary Conference, the Northern Dimension Parliamentary Forum, the Nordic Council and the West Nordic Council Current Challenges in Europe and the Future of Europe Mr Zīle stressed that, amidst all the changes, security remained a top priority on which decisive action was required for the survival of the region as a democratic and prosperous area. He acknowledged the threat of the Russian shadow fleet and other vessels in the Baltic Sea. In light of the recent US-Russian agreement to talk about Ukraine without European involvement, Mr Zīle said that strong action was needed. He then pointed to the upcoming presentations which would highlight further important areas. President Röblom noted that his homeland of Åland was called the “Islands of Peace”, underlining that the world needed more examples of peace. Presentations Presentation on Recent accomplishments and future plans in the Baltic Sea area by Former Commissioner, MEP Virginijus Sinkevičius, European Parliament Mr Virginijus Sinkevičius saw the importance of the Baltic Sea on the rise in recent years, propelled not least by challenges requiring pan-European solutions, such as Brexit and the pandemic. He regretted the poor condition of the Baltic Sea, lauding the work of HELCOM in improving this. The greatest achievement of the first von der Leyen Commission had been overhauling the energy situation, pointing to the Baltic States integrating into the European power grid, the European Wind Power Charter, and Greece joining the Three Seas Initiative. In environmental concerns, he stressed the Baltic Initiative bringing together all the environment and agriculture ministers from the Baltic Sea states. But clearing the Baltic Sea of the dumped munitions posing a dire threat was also high on the agenda. With the geopolitical situation changing every day, he said that much of what they would hear at this meeting would have seemed science fiction five years ago but was the reality they had to cope with. The Baltic Sea would be the front to withstand imperial ambitions and defend the international rules of law established after World War II. Security was a paramount concern. Already in 2022, the EU had adopted a coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure, driven by the sabotage on the Nord Stream pipeline. He underlined that security also included the fragile environment of the Baltic Sea, which could affect nations dependent on the sea. In 2025, NATO would launch the Baltic Sentry Initiative to enhance its military presence. The various, increasing acts of sabotage were usually carried out by the Russian shadow fleet. In addition, the fleet was circumventing sanctions and in such poor conditions as to pose a constant ecological threat. Monitoring was therefore vital. Mr Sinkevičius considered the Baltic Sea effectively a second theatre of the Russian war against the West. Meetings like this of the BSPC Standing Committee were vital to better understand the situation and align positions—much like the impromptu meeting of European heads of state in Paris on that same day. With more and more doubt cast on the transatlantic relationship, emboldening Russia, the Baltic Sea region would likely remain the front between imperialism and the free democratic world. Mr Sinkevičius summarised that the security situation had heightened attention paid to the region, and the countries around the Baltic Sea had to understand they were on the front line and had to ensure their future was solely in their own hands, cooperating in economy, energy independence, defence, and the environment. Secretary General Bodo Bahr emphasised the significance of these concerns, which had been at the core of BSPC discussions for more than a year. Underlining the severe risk posed by a potential oil spill from a Russian shadow fleet tanker, he recalled the critical achievements of BSPC and HELCOM in preventing large-scale environmental disasters in the Baltic Sea. Through close collaboration and concerted efforts, both organisations had successfully initiated far-reaching, legally binding international measures 25 years ago. The implementation of these regulations has, to date, effectively prevented a major tanker accident in the Baltic Sea despite a continuous increase in maritime traffic. However, he stressed that the current situation had drastically elevated the likelihood of such an accident. The risk level was now higher than ever, with a large-scale tanker disaster in the Baltic Sea becoming an increasingly real and imminent possibility. Should one of these ageing supertankers spill 100,000 litres of oil into the Baltic Sea, every litre of the Baltic Sea water would be contaminated 4,600 times. The catastrophic consequences would be almost unimaginable, with entire coastal economies facing devastation. The tourism industry in affected regions, for instance, could be completely wiped out for the next decade. He further noted that the January NATO Baltic Sea heads of state meeting had made significant progress in addressing this urgent issue. He questioned how preventive measures could be prioritised and saw the necessity of an enhanced role of the European Parliament in contributing to effective solutions. Reinforcing preventive frameworks, expanding surveillance mechanisms, and fostering deeper international cooperation were imperative to mitigating the risk of an environmental catastrophe in the region. Mr Sinkevičius replied that putting more shadow fleet ships on the sanction list was critical since that would forbid them from entering and going to port in the Baltic Sea. Preventing disasters and sabotage meant protecting communities and was cheaper than monitoring and cleaning up. In addition, the shadow fleet was evading sanctions to funnel money into Russia to fuel its war machine. Mr Sinkevičius warned that Russia’s ambitions likely extended beyond Ukraine to the Baltic States and other democratic nations in the Baltic Sea region. Presentation on How embracing the bioeconomy could benefit the Baltic Sea region by Mr Aurel Ciobanu-Dordea, Director for Circular Economy, DG ENVI, European Commission Mr Ciobanu-Dordea stated that the Bioeconomy Initiative was still being elaborated by the European Commission. He stressed that the EU had to think more competitively, as part of strengthening its resilience in the geopolitical situation. The current bioeconomy initiative from 2018 has focused mainly on research and innovation. Its successor initiative – set to be adopted at the end of 2025 – was now in the responsibility of the Commissioner for the Environment. The bioeconomy had to move from pioneering work into the mainstream, boosting its manufacturing and market benefits, much like the circular economy. With input from research, agriculture, biodiversity, and industrial policy fields as well as many economic stakeholders, the first important building block dealt with creating a sustainable source for bioeconomy production while avoiding conflicts with food and energy (biomass) production. 59 % of the biomass production in the EU was devoted to energy. So, a system of traffic lights should alleviate the permanent quarrels about the protection of nature as well as agriculture concerning biomass, establishing priority uses and rules to promote the intertwined growth of food, energy, and resource production. Mr Ciobanu-Dordea recommended using lesser-known sources, such as the municipal organic waste fraction, as well as organic wastes from agriculture and industrial processes, such as wood. Their usage would further reduce the aforementioned conflicts. The second vital building block was identifying the principal demand areas. Only packaging was presently targeted. A planned regulation could target biowaste plastics. Yet the bioeconomy was much larger and should extend beyond alternatives to hazardous chemical substances: It might yield alternatives to critical raw materials. In general, the market opportunities from a strategic perspective had to be pinpointed to offer business incentives. Mr Ciobanu-Dordea moved to the third building block as the possible incentives aside from legally mandatory requirements, the former stimulating innovation and scaling up production. The fourth building block was the global dimension of the bioeconomic policies in the EU. As one of the world’s largest interconnected markets, the EU was a coveted partner for bioeconomy champions such as Brazil, Canada, and Thailand. European policies had to reflect the EU’s domestic interests, creating a policy inspiring the EU’s trade policies as well. Finally, he noted that aquaculture and green production in the sea were also factors in scaling up production from the laboratory to the factory. Mr Staffan Eklöf remarked that genetically modified organisms might reduce said conflicts, creating additional alternatives. Most Swedish parties considered genetic modification a central tool to make the bioeconomy successful. He asked whether this was reflected in the European Commission. Mr Ciobanu-Dordea did not believe this relevant for the bioeconomy strategy but for the upcoming European Biotechnology Act. This hotly debated issue fell into the Health Commissioner’s purview. Ms Delara Burkhardt , a member of the EU Parliament Environmental Commission, underlined that coherence was vital, appreciating that Mr Ciobanu-Dordea had reflected this. To avoid the greater use of biomass in the EU having spillover effects on the global south, she stressed that the bioeconomy needed to take a comprehensive and fully sustainable approach. Mr Ciobanu-Dordea confirmed that his side was aware of this issue and were working on a coherent concept. At the end of the year, they would publish their results. Presentation on the current Commission’s ocean policy, fisheries and the Oceans Pact by Commissioner for Fisheries and Oceans, Mr Costas Kadis, European Commission EU Commissioner Mr Costas Kadis assured the Standing Committee that it was a top priority for the Commission to address the multiple challenges in the Baltic Sea. Reflection, dialogue, and understanding every aspect was critical for good policies, wherefore he would host Fisheries and Oceans Dialogues, Youth Dialogues, and Implementation Dialogues. Visiting coastal communities would provide direct feedback. This would feed into the 2040 Vision for a resilient, competitive, and sustainable fisheries and aquaculture sector, based on a wide range of studies and the EU’s own CFP evaluation. The latter would take into account economic, health, and social sustainability. The poor state of the Baltic Sea was affecting coastal communities, shrinking fish stocks – some had collapsed, e.g., cod and western herring, while others were fragile, such as Bothnian herring. System recovery would be slow and lengthy, but inaction was not an option, Mr Kadis warned. Collaboration was crucial. The existing fisheries had to be protected, and strict adherence to regulations was needed to equally protect the remaining stocks. He noted that a conference on the Baltic Sea was to be organised as soon as possible, with the remit to review the implementation progress of already taken decisions and the Baltic Sea’s multiple challenges, in particular the decline of biodiversity. Maritime security was just as important in the Baltic Sea, especially through the shadow fleet. Monitoring the marine infrastructure and environment was vital. Crucial here was the Common Information Sharing Environment for the Maritime Domain, enabling real-time information exchange between both civilian and military maritime authorities. The EU was strengthening efforts to protect undersea cables through enhanced information sharing, new detection technologies, and undersea repair capabilities. The Commission was also seeking to clear the vast dumped munitions from the Baltic Sea, providing more than 24 million euros in funding for the coastal state over the past decade to assess risks and map contaminated areas. In the spring of 2025, a new project – funded at 5.6 million euros – would develop new technologies for munition removal. In the Ocean Agenda, Mr Kadis pointed to the European Oceans Pact, envisioning a holistic and coherent ocean policy approach. The Pact’s five strategic objectives were ensuring a healthy and productive ocean with good biodiversity, boosting the EU economy, consolidating the EU Marine Framework, reinforcing international ocean governance, and developing resilience for coastal communities. Knowledge and best practice sharing were also vital. He considered awareness, commitment, and shared responsibility crucial for achieving their goals. The Pact would be announced at the 2026 Oceans Conference. The Commission’s main priorities for 2025 included the ratification of the BBNG Agreement and further shaping the international platform for ocean sustainability (IPOS). Mr Staffan Eklöf noted that the BSPC had called for lower fishing quotas in its latest resolution, asking the Commissioner about the current status. Mr Kadis conceded that misreporting on fishing was affecting the scientific advice on which the quota decisions were based. Yet scientific advice would continue to be at the heart of these decisions. Ms Sabrina Repp wished to strengthen the participation and collaboration of the regions in the Baltic Sea, noting the importance of Interreg to rural and coastal areas. Mr Kadis replied that Interreg was not in his portfolio. However, synergies with other Commissioners were being pursued to support remote coastal and island communities. This would lead to initiatives in the near future. Mr Een Eesmaa wondered about the Commission’s analysis of the Gulf Stream, here in respect to a threat to the eel population. Mr Kadis was aware of the fragility of the eel population, noting conservation efforts in some involved countries. He offered to send more information. Mr Bahr asked for concrete reflections about enhancing ocean governance to strengthen infrastructure resilience in cooperation with, e.g., NATO. He further wondered about possible changes to the law to allow interventions in critical situations. Mr Kadis said that the general approach had been announced in December 2024. Measures on security, defence, environment, and other aspects had been proposed by Commissioners. Mr Kadis had proposed increased monitoring, including undersea drones. Discussions about these proposals were ongoing internally, with the goal of a holistic approach. Presentation on HELCOM, Shipping and Response by Mr Rüdiger Strempel, Executive Secretary of the Helsinki Commission Mr Strempel began by citing the HELCOM Vision of a healthy Baltic Sea environment with diverse biological components functioning in balance, resulting in a good ecological status and supporting a wide range of sustainable and social activities. The Baltic Sea was a young but fragile ecosystem; in its current composition, it was younger than the pyramids of Giza. HELCOM estimated that there were some 50,000 ships entering or leaving the Baltic Sea annually, with at least 1,500 large vessels on the sea at any time. This made shipping of considerable concern to HELCOM. As vital as shipping was, it carried problems such as anti-fouling paint, sewage or operational discharges, airborne emissions, underwater noise, and oil discharges – deliberate or not. One of the thematic segments of the Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP) was dedicated to sea-based activities, such as shipping. Two of the eight HELCOM Working Groups, Maritime and Response, were dealing with this issue. Mr Strempel noted that, due to its international nature, shipping was primarily regulated through the IMO. Still, HELCOM was proactive in amending IMO regulations in their implementation, such as sewage and navigational safety. As such, HELCOM was the voice of the Baltic Sea countries within the IMO. Regarding response coordination, the Helsinki Convention obliged keeping the necessary equipment available and conducting regular exercises on sea and on land. There was also a HELCOM manual on response to marine pollution, detailing cooperation coordination, operational procedures, cooperation harmonisation, financial arrangements and the like that HELCOM was handling. The manual covered spills at sea, on shore as well as oiled wildlife. The most recent surveillance report had been published in August 2024, showing that the number of observed spills had steadily declined, with most of them very small. 24 % were mineral oil, 76 % other types, such as fish oil, greywater, or novel fuels. The latter were problematic as there was little knowledge on how to best combat such spills. Furthermore, HELCOM was working on risk assessments, the so-called BRISK Analysis, covering 2009-2012. The follow-up project BRISK 2 had recently been launched, with EU funding, covering 2025-2026. It was aimed at enhancing disaster prevention and preparedness, focusing on a multi-hazard approach at sea and on land. This also included the shadow fleet. On the busy Baltic Sea, with narrow shipping lanes and an increasing large number of vessels, the under-insured shadow fleet was in poor repair, the ship ownership unclear. The massive risk posed by the fleet also included the oft-neglected one of ship-to-ship transfers of e.g., oil. Respective recommendations were currently being overhauled. Mr Strempel noted that HELCOM was presently under Lithuanian chairmanship. Its first priority was to strengthen HELCOM’s role in geopolitical challenges. The shadow fleet, a product of these challenges, on the one hand undercut sanctions. That was far outside HELCOM’s remit. The massive environmental impact, on the other hand, very much was within. Mr Strempel opined that HELCOM should be better involved in the various formats dealing with the shadow fleet, in particular the NBA+ activities, since HELCOM handled preventative and remediation efforts. Finally, he noted that HELCOM’s social media presence had switched from X/Twitter to Bluesky. Presentation on Addressing the EU’s vulnerabilities to cyber and hybrid attacks, strengthening resilience, and bolstering the EU-NATO partnership by Mr Jukka Savolainen, a Director in the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats Mr Jukka Savolainen focused on the recent maritime incidents, started by the Nord Stream sabotage. Unfortunately, the facts ended with the pipeline having been cut, while a narrative blaming Ukraine had spread, even as Russia claimed the USA were responsible. These narratives were negatively affecting public opinion. In October 2023, the Balticconnector gas pipeline had been severed. The vessel in question, which had hailed from China, had been identified, thus ending conspiracy theories. In November 2024, the Yi Ping 3 had cut telecommunication cables between Finland and Germany as well as between Sweden and Lithuania. Over Christmas 2024, the Eagle S had cut several cables, including a power supply from Finland to Estonia, and was stopped by Finnish authorities in the act of severing another line. Mr Savolainen stressed that this had been the first time a ship had been impounded, allowing a thorough investigation. Since then, another ship had been temporarily impounded by Swedish authorities after attacking a cable. The countries around the Baltic Sea were vulnerable in various respects. He noted that publishing the cable locations made sense since most sea captains were keen to avoid them. Yet a single ship could cause serious harm to society, in particular in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea. As for the probability of these incidents being accidents, Mr Savolainen noted that nothing like this had happened in the past three or four decades in Finnish waters. With that, he countered so-called expert statements claiming that 40 % of severed cables were due to anchor accidents. Yet none of the circumstances of those accidents applied to the Baltic Sea, such as heavy oceanic winds or little known cable locations. In his view, these incidents were clearly deliberate. In the aftermath of the Eagle S incident, the Baltic Sea states and NATO had come together to launch a new operation, Baltic Sentry. Yet within a week, newspapers like the Washington Post were quoting unnamed European intelligence agents that all the incidents had been accidents. Mr Savolainen condemned these reports as misinformation for two reasons, the first being the high improbability and the second that the intelligence services would not undermine their governments right after Baltic Sentry having been started. The head of the Finnish intelligence service had gone on record that deliberate action could not be excluded. Mr Savolainen believed that the purpose of these attacks had been to refine the methods and to test the Western response. The actual target would be the North Sea where incidents could black out vast areas, both in electricity and gas supply. Mr Algirdas Razauskas asked if a ship entering the Baltic Sea would have to pass through national waters and could thus be boarded if suspicions had been raised. Mr Savolainen answered that this was the case. Entering from the Atlantic, a vessel would have to go through at least Danish or Swedish territorial waters. However, one of the main principles of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) was the Freedom of Navigation which guaranteed so-called transit passage through territorial waters from and to international waters. This was granted to all ships, even military vessels and aircraft. As such, there was no right to intervene in the Danish Strait. President Röblom asked if there were any initiatives to change or amend the UNCLOS to enable interventions in suspicious cases. In particular, he wondered if the BSPC could support such initiatives. Mr Savolainen was aware of such aspirations from the environmental point of view. This was worth trying, not least to curtail the Russian avoidance of sanctions. Yet he warned that any serious blockade of the shadow fleet would be interpreted as an act of war by Russia. Therefore, a single country could not enact such a blockade. Instead, it had to be coalition-wide – across the EU or NATO. Actually changing the UNCLOS would take tens of years to negotiate. Yet international law was conditional, he noted, so that justifications for stopping ships could be found by legal experts. One such clause had been applied by Finland in the case of the Eagle S , for instance, because it had been the target of the attack. Mr Strempel noted that measures of this kind were beyond HELCOM. Working Groups and Rapporteurs The president noted that the next meetings of the Working Group on Energy Security, Self-Sustainability, Resilience, and Connectivity (ESSRC) would be in Stockholm in March 2025 and in Tallinn in May 2025. Mr Staffan Eklöf said the Stockholm meeting would focus on connections, transportation, and security, with visits to the Royal Institute of Technology regarding self-driving vehicles, to a company building electric vessels, and to the Swedish Coast Guard about maritime infrastructure monitoring. At the meeting proper, presentations would deal with security, the electric grid as well as the Swedish energy agency and government. Prof Jānis Vucāns noted that the Baltic Assembly would be represented by the working group chairman, Mr Andris Kulbergs, and a representative from each Baltic country. The meeting in Tallinn was still being prepared so that the programme would be presented at the Stockholm meeting. As a new working group would be formed at the annual conference, Prof Vucāns provided more information about the proposal from the Baltic Assembly about Strengthening the Cyber and Information Resilience of the Democratic Baltic Sea Region. He remarked that digital technologies had become the backbone of their political and social systems. They provided greater connections and efficiency. However, disinformation and cyber attacks have proved a tremendous challenge, spreading mistrust that could destabilise societies. This demanded a strategic and comprehensive response, to be elaborated in this new working group, building on findings of the current working group. Another focal point would be artificial intelligence and digital rights. Furthermore, the Baltic Assembly nominated Mr Meelis Kiili from the Estonian parliament as chairman, given his extensive experience in this field. Mr Henrik Møller agreed that this context posed a severe threat to democracy and thus approved of the proposal. The meeting agreed to forward the proposal to the annual conference. BSPC Presidency after 2026/Rotation Principle President Röblom noted the preliminary approval of instituting a rotation principle by the Standing Committee in Tallinn to introduce greater stability. The Secretariat had refined the suggested schedule to avoid election cycles and international obligations. Flexibility was built so that each presidency could exchange its position with the preceding or succeeding presidency if necessary. Mr Bahr informed the meeting that the Iceland delegation was still in the process of obtaining their parliament’s approval to take over the BSPC presidency. All the delegations present agreed to the current proposal for a rotation procedure, aiming to result in a final decision by the Standing Committee at its June meeting and approval by the Annual Conference in Mariehamn. BSPC Budget and Financial Planning BSPC President Alfons Röblom laid out the key points from the 2024 budget. Expenditures slightly exceeded income, well within the approved framework, maintaining a healthy reserve of € 213,442. For 2025, the Standing Committee meetings and Working Group sessions would remain core budgetary priorities; additional resources allocated to the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum (BSPYF) and the BSPC communication strategy. Secretary General Bodo Bahr reflected on the budget’s background and details, noting that the overspend was within the approved budget flexibility, covering the travel costs of the BSPYF youth participants. The reserves would guarantee operational stability for one year, even in unforeseen circumstances. The budget management had been successfully transferred from Mecklenburg-Vorpommern to Schleswig-Holstein. The Standing Committee unanimously agreed to the financial report for 2024 and confirmed the previous agreement on the budget plan proposal for 2025. The Current Geopolitical Situation and its Impact on the Baltic Sea Region BSPC President Röblom gave a brief overview of recent developments, such as the new European Commission and Parliament terms, changes in transatlantic relations, and the ongoing shift in the threat landscape. Incentive contribution by MEP Rasa Juknevičienė Ms Rasa Juknevičienė hoped that future historians would not write about the present day like the 1930s and 1940s. Yet, one had to be prepared for the worst in order to avoid the worst. Well-founded warnings had to be heeded, like those of the eastern countries against cooperation with Russia. The most crucial action these days was uniting in support for Ukraine, even without the USA. Too much time had been wasted talking and worrying, and the situation had worsened. She noted that Putin was representing a new totalitarian ideology with ambitions far beyond Ukraine. Unfortunately, the same values had now risen to the top of the USA. Ms Juknevičienė considered this a fight between autocracies and democracies, in which she saw the democratic side failing. She highlighted President Zelenskyy’s speech at the Munich Security Conference as that of a great European leader. One question was whether NATO still existed. She stressed that it was a delusion Western states would have a secure little corner of the world amid the expansive forces of the new fascism. Mr Henrik Møller referenced the US president’s demand to purchase Greenland from Denmark and how that had affected the debate in the country. He further noted the increasing expansionist ideas from the US president, extending to Mexico, Canada, Panama, and most recently, the Gaza Strip. This debate would continue, but in dealing with the US, more cautious language might be better advised. As for the BSPC making a statement on the situation, he proposed to wait until after the elections in Greenland on 11 March to learn of their position. Ms Kristina Herbst agreed that President Zelenskyy’s speech was highly praised. Yet she wondered if there could be a path forward together in light of countries such as Hungary. Ms Juknevičienė maintained hope, such as that the far right would not win the German elections. Action was needed. She also underlined the importance of Greenland and the Arctic. She expected greater seriousness in matters of defence, pointing to a calculation that an EU citizen had only paid the equivalent of 1 ½ cups of coffee to support Ukraine. She compared it to Russia spending 10 % of its GDP on its armed forces while Europe was not even reaching 2 %. They could not wait for Hungary or Slovakia to change their minds. Action had to be taken right away to defend Europe, in every respect, also e.g., banking. Yet, without the US, Europe was very weak. She called the continent hostages of decades of US dependence. Mr Mikko Polvinen commented on US Vice President Vance’s remark that Europe and the US no longer shared values. Mr Polvinen found this quite dangerous. He also noted that Musk’s X was promoting those parties sharing the current US regime’s values. He asked about Ms Juknevičienė’s opinion regarding these value differences. Furthermore, he said that people and companies were moving away from regions bordering Russia, such as his home region. He wondered if the EU’s MFF was a tool to help in this matter. Ms Juknevičienė did not believe the Vance speech was about values. It had been only in support of the far-right AfD in Germany. He was adopting Russian narratives. In addition, the only time Article 5 of NATO had been invoked had been to help the USA. Yet the US were now threatening to cancel their solidarity with Europe. She quoted famous historian Timothy Snyder, who had written on Bluesky that everybody had been asking him to decode Vance’s speech at the Security Conference. Snyder had explained that “free speech” to Vance meant letting Musk run elections, and “democracy” meant letting Russia run elections. 2025 was about what Europeans did, not what Americans said. As for regions bordering and threatened by Russia, she said it was the European Union’s task to help these. Yet the economy was not the only thing that mattered, she warned. She remarked that in the recent European elections, the former East Germany had shown on the electoral map their strong support for the AfD. The influence of social media was an important topic. She worried that artificial intelligence would be the primary topic of upcoming elections. Prof Jānis Vucāns noted that the Baltic states had begun their decoupling from the Soviet Union in the Gorbachev era but had only completed it two weeks earlier by integrating their power grid into the European network. He further noted to ongoing transit of goods through the Baltics into Europe. That flow had to be stopped for good to ensure that Russia would receive no money. In light of the new US regime, Europe had to guarantee its autonomy. Prof Vucāns also touched upon Russia-bordering regimes and a lack of investment there, highlighting the influence there from Russian media affecting the minds and values. Economic investments meant shoring up their values as being part of Europe. Another point was financing military production, which was still being run on peacetime parameters. Solutions were needed, and the BSPC was a forum to initiate and reinforce these discussions. Preparation for the 34 th BSPC Annual Conference and Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum in Mariehamn President Röblom explained that the conference theme—“The Baltic Sea—Our Lifeline: Cooperation, Security, and Sustainability”—reflected the BSPC work of the past year. The draft programme focused on core maritime challenges, security and hybrid threats, energy security, and intergenerational dialogue. High-profile speakers had been invited. Prof Jānis Vucāns said that the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum (BSPYF) had proven a very important component. He noted a quite active representative from the Baltic delegations keen to take part in the forum. Ms Sabrina Repp explained that she had been part of the BSPYF in 2023, an experience she highly valued. Now a European parliamentarian, she very much wanted to be involved in this year’s forum. Mr Röblom noted the engagement and underlined the forum’s importance. The exact practical implementation will be discussed in the near future with the CBSS and Regeneration 2030. Other Matters In the follow-up to the 33 rd BSPC Resolution, BSPC President Alfons Röblom informed the Standing Committee that the state parliaments of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Schleswig-Holstein had formally debated and approved the resolution. The goal remained to receive the governmental statements by 15 April 2025. Ms Anita Kucharska-Dziedzic announced that the Polish region of West Pomerania was planning to apply for observer status in the BSPC. She noted that the regional parliament was already active in several supraregional organisations. Mr Himanshu Gulati lauded the representatives from the European Parliament taking part in the meeting for their interesting contributions. BSPC President Alfons Röblom thanked all distinguished speakers for their valuable contributions, the excellent support from the hosts at the European Parliament, all who have been involved in preparing this meeting for their dedicated efforts, namely Secretary General Bodo Bahr for his planning, intensive efforts and engagement in preparing and managing this meeting and all delegations for their engagement and insights and ongoing productive conversation during the further programme. —— Evening Discussions at the BSPC Standing Committee Meeting in Brussels As the formal proceedings of the BSPC Standing Committee meeting concluded, participants gathered for an evening of in-depth discussions, reflecting on the pressing themes of the day. Against the backdrop of the European Parliament’s twelfth-floor venue, offering a panoramic view of Brussels, speakers engaged in an intense exchange of ideas on geopolitical security, cooperation, and resilience in the Baltic Sea region. Vice-President of the European Parliament, Ms Christel Schaldemose , extended a warm welcome to all attendees, underlining the significance of cross-border cooperation in these unprecedented times and emphasising that collaboration among like-minded nations was now more critical than ever. She assured participants that their discussions would play an essential role in strengthening regional security and stability. Acknowledging the setting, she invited participants to appreciate the exceptional view from the venue, though she highlighted that the evening’s focus should remain on fostering a meaningful dialogue. BSPC President Alfons Röblom then took the floor, introducing Ambassador Jean-Charles Ellermann-Kingombe, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Innovation, Hybrid, and Cyber. He expressed his gratitude for the Ambassador’s presence, particularly in light of his unavailability earlier in the day due to unforeseen commitments. He underscored the relevance of the Ambassador’s expertise in NATO’s cyber and hybrid security measures, particularly as they pertain to the Baltic Sea region. Röblom reiterated the BSPC’s long-standing emphasis on enhancing regional cooperation within NATO, particularly following the accession of Finland and Sweden. He referenced the Helsingør resolution, which outlined key policy recommendations for governments regarding NATO’s role in safeguarding the region. Among these, he stressed the need for integrating maritime surveillance, strengthening regional defence mechanisms, and enhancing NATO’s presence in the Baltic Sea. He concluded by inviting Ambassador Ellermann-Kingombe to share his insights on the evolving security landscape. Addressing the gathering, Ambassador Jean-Charles Ellermann-Kingombe provided a strategic overview of NATO’s current approach to hybrid and cyber threats, emphasising that recent years had witnessed a sharp increase in hostile activities—both in frequency and intensity. He highlighted that hybrid warfare tactics had evolved significantly, encompassing acts of sabotage, cyberattacks, and disruptions to critical infrastructure. He warned against viewing such incidents in isolation, as they formed part of broader strategic efforts to destabilise NATO member states. He further noted that Russia’s military doctrine specifically incorporated hybrid threats as an early-stage tactic to weaken adversaries before escalating to more direct confrontations. The Ambassador elaborated on NATO’s forthcoming hybrid strategy, set to be unveiled at the Hague Summit in June. He underscored the need to shift from a purely defensive posture to a proactive deterrence strategy, aimed at reducing the likelihood of hybrid threats materialising in the first place. Central to this approach was the enhancement of situational awareness, with a greater emphasis on identifying patterns and trends rather than reacting to isolated incidents. NATO, he stated, was committed to intensifying its presence in the Baltic Sea through the newly launched Baltic Sentry initiative, which involved an increased deployment of naval and aerial assets for real-time surveillance and rapid response capabilities. A crucial aspect of NATO’s evolving strategy, the Ambassador explained, was the integration of asymmetric responses to hybrid threats. Given the constraints imposed by international legal frameworks and NATO’s commitment to upholding democratic values, traditional military retaliation was often not feasible. Instead, NATO sought to impose costs on adversaries through non-conventional means, such as increased military deployments, economic sanctions, and targeted cyber operations. He noted that recent incidents in the Baltic Sea, including the sabotage of undersea infrastructure, had demonstrated the urgent need for better coordination between NATO, the EU, and private sector stakeholders. Enhanced cooperation, particularly with private entities that manage critical infrastructure, would be essential in strengthening resilience against future threats. Ambassador Ellermann-Kingombe concluded by stressing that hybrid threats could not be countered solely through military means. A comprehensive, multi-faceted approach was required—one that combined cybersecurity measures, intelligence sharing, economic countermeasures, and strategic communication. He urged parliamentarians to play an active role in shaping policies that would bolster national and regional resilience, advocating for enhanced legislative frameworks to address emerging security challenges. The evening’s discussions provided an invaluable platform for an open and candid exchange of views , reinforcing the BSPC’s commitment to fostering cooperation in the face of evolving security threats. The insights shared during the session would undoubtedly inform ongoing deliberations within both NATO and the Baltic Sea parliamentary community as they worked towards a more secure and resilient region. More photos of the Standing Committee can be viewed at the following link: Standing Committee of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference – Multimedia Centre

In Tallinn, the BSPC Standing Committee gathered to discuss cooperation with partner organisations CBSS and HELCOM, threats to the Baltic Sea both in cyber security and in ecological terms as well as the circular economy. The Standing Committee furthermore discussed the work of the upcoming year as well as the budget. The participants also deliberated on how to restructure the organisation to enhance its effectiveness in the future, among others, through a rotation system for the presidency. More than 35 participants, representatives and delegations of the European Parliament, the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Estonia, the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM), experts on Circular Economy and on Cyber Security and the BSPC members from the Åland Islands, the Baltic Assembly, Denmark, Estonia, the German Bundestag, Finland, Hamburg, Latvia, Lithuania, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Norway, Poland, Schleswig-Holstein and Sweden participated in the meeting. Introduction BSPC President Alfons Röblom opened the meeting in the Estonian parliament building. As the first event of Åland’s presidency, he promised they would work tirelessly on strengthening the Baltic Sea as the region’s lifeline, as the current BSPC Strategy and Programme said. Mr Röblom had already represented the BSPC at the Baltic Assembly, the Benelux Parliament, and the Nordic Council. Presentations Mr Tõnis Nirk, Ambassador-at-Large for Baltic Sea Cooperation in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Estonia, and Chairman of the CBSS Committee of Senior Officials Mr Tõnis Nirk said that the CBSS, as a unique platform, was ideally suited to discussing foreign policy issues among the like-minded countries of the Baltic Sea region. Russian aggression, especially hybrid threats, threatened all of Europe. Estonia had been targeted several times, with damages sustained by the critical infrastructure. The June CBSS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting had been dedicated to this issue. Under the Estonian presidency, the CBSS would continue its strong support for Ukraine, Ambassador Nirk went on, focusing on civil protection, anti-trafficking, border guard cooperation, and youth protection. But they could learn from Ukraine about societal resilience in a crisis. In practical cooperation, Estonia was focused on strengthening resilience and sustainability, in particular, raising crisis awareness, developing early warning systems, effective child protection policies, and anti-trafficking. Building on the German and Finnish presidencies, Estonia would pursue establishing green corridors for shipping in the region and was preparing to create a digital twin of the Baltic Sea. Youth involvement was also high on the agenda. Cooperation with organisations like the BSPC was crucial, in particular on topics where each partner had their own strengths. Mr Mikko Polvinen asked about concrete actions by the CBSS against the Russian shadow fleet. He furthermore highlighted the Finnish programme Singing Heritage Roots as a way of bolstering culture in the region. Ambassador Nirk acknowledged the difficulties in dealing with these vessels in international waters. Voluntary inspections were one measure taken by Estonian authorities, but coordinated regional actions were still being elaborated. Regarding the mentioned Finnish programme Singing Heritage Roots, Mr Nirk referred to the Baltic Region Heritage Committee. Mr Johannes Schraps inquired on plans for a Heads of Government and the Ministerial meeting and the cooperation with the parliamentary dimension. While there were no plans for the former, Ambassador Nirk said the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting would be held on 14 – 15 May 2025 in Tallinn. He promised to look into the parliamentary cooperation. Given the increased security challenges in the Baltic Sea region and the current priority focus on security and safety, BSPC Secretary General Bodo Bahr asked about the balance between security needs and sustainability goals. Mr Nirk pointed to the CBSS’s three long-term priorities: safety and security, prosperity, and regional identity. Geopolitics had forced resources to be primarily directed towards the first priority. Mr Bodo Bahr was interested in further cooperation between the CBSS and HELCOM on sea-dumped munitions. Mr Johannes Schraps suggested that, as the environment ministers were responsible for sea-dumped munitions in most countries, a CBSS Ministerial Meeting of these departments might be helpful. He also wondered about possible focal shifts with the new heading of the CBSS Secretariat. Ambassador Nirk appreciated HELCOM’s work, which should be the focus. He underlined that HELCOM was the competent leader regarding dumped munitions while the CBSS supported their efforts through network building. The new Director General of the Secretariat was very experienced in both the CBSS and security issues, so the transition was very smooth. Ms Mayri Tiido, Circular Economy expert (Link to the presentation) Ms Mayri Tiido focused mostly on capacity building, interpreting for ministries what the circular economy would mean for them. She noted that some believed the circular economy was about sorting waste and retrieving, say, metals for reuse. But it was a wider concern. There are two principles of the circular economy: First, it had to be considered whether solutions would decrease the demand for raw materials; second, a reduction in waste generation had to be looked at. This could be achieved through measures such as the sharing economy – e.g., car sharing –, maintaining and repairing items but also refurbishing. Energy-demanding recycling should be one of the last options because reuse consumes far fewer resources. Furthermore, some products had been designed to never be disassembled or repaired. As such, for the circular economy, different designs were needed that enabled them to stay in circulation. Ms Tiido stressed her view that all companies should think about how to be less dependent on virgin raw materials and generate less waste. She mentioned examples: At the Nordic Circular Summit two weeks later, the Baltic Circular Hotspot would be launched for more cooperation between various organisations. She presented a cardboard alternative from textile waste for packaging, reusable up to twenty times. It could also be recycled. The Estonian company was aiming at luxury packaging but also e-commerce. Unfortunately, a similar strategy had failed with another product recently. Another example was related to Estonia deriving its energy primarily from oil shale: A company was working on a pilot factory to retrieve calcium carbonate and iron from oil shale ashes. This was promising because the current production of calcium carbonate was environmentally harmful, so alternatives were prized by, e.g., the paint industry. There were 600 million tonnes of such ashes available, she added. A third example was a company offering lifecycle services to other enterprises and organisations to enhance the circular use of electronic devices, among others, through repair and refurbishment. They were looking to make reused devices the first choice in many respects. Furthermore, she spoke about a Circular Economy Centre in Tallinn featuring various repair rooms, such as for bicycles or sewing machines. In cross-border cooperation, the bottle deposit system in Estonia and Latvia had been joined despite considerable challenges, as well as that of Latvia and Lithuania. Ms Kristina Herbst asked for details about the deposits. Ms Tiido confirmed that it was about collecting cans and bottles, to her understanding by unifying the barcodes. She could return an Estonian bottle in Latvia and receive her deposit back. Mr Henrik Møller pointed to the problem that some 40 % of goods coming through Antwerp harbour were cheap Chinese products that were hard to recycle or refurbish. With better cooperation not only in the Baltic Sea region but across Europe, their entry into the market should be made more difficult. Ms Tiido agreed, noting the problems of the consumer society. The circular economy was about reducing the extraction of materials and keeping those already extracted in circulation. She noted that CFC gases had been outlawed decades earlier because of their environmental harm and believed that, similarly, products that did not fit current prescriptions should be regulated rather than allowed anything in a free market. Mr Johannes Schraps appreciated the best practice examples. He asked if the EU’s Waste Framework Directive from more than a decade before was still sufficient or in what places steps forward should be taken. Ms Tiido mentioned the EU’s five-year Circular Economy Action Plan, which was in its second iteration. Its focal areas guided funding, such as in textiles or construction. She called the current linear economy a race to the bottom, always looking for the cheapest option. A circular economy would be about bringing back jobs intensive in human labour, such as repairs. According to her experience and research, the market would never regulate itself towards a circular economy. Ms Merle Maigre, Senior Cyber Security Expert at the e-Governance Academy Ms Merle Maigre said she would discuss the values of cyber capacity building, the possible threats in the Baltic Sea region, and possible responses. Through cyber capacity building, neighbouring countries such as Ukraine or Moldova could be influenced. Since 2002, the Estonian non-profit e-Governance Academy has served as an implementor of various national development projects in the digital transformation across the globe. For instance, they were advising the Ukrainian government in the digital transformation and cyber security. Ms Maigre underlined that cyber security had to be at the core of the digital transformation, from inception to delivery. The Academy advised on policy, helped draft and consulted on cyber security legislation and institution building. In technical areas, they assisted partners in building critical information infrastructure, protection, risk management; they also provided cyber security hardware, software, and licenses as well as training to build governmental cyber capacities. All of that was financed by donor money, from the EU and other international or bilateral aid agencies. Currently, her team was active in Moldova, in the Western Balkans, in Ukraine, in Georgia, and soon in Central Asia. Cyber security should not be treated as a separate issue, Ms Maigre said, but rather as an enabler of the various digital society functions. It should support and enhance other state priorities, e.g., foreign policy, security, economy, and defence. Digital dividends were only possible when the digital infrastructure was reliable. Just as important was defending the fundamental online rights and freedoms. She saw Estonia as an example of scoring highly in both respects. Information sharing was a crucial aspect, and she urged the parliamentarians to demand more briefings on cyber threats. The more this was done, the more people became aware of cyber threats. Ms Maigre clarified that fundamental online rights and freedoms, benefiting people, trust, collaborative efforts, transparencies, protection reflected the values of liberal democracies. Moving on to geopolitical threats, she acknowledged the recent rise in strategic cyber operations. China clearly posed a global risk, not least because all Chinese companies were connected to the state and party. The Chinese government had developed a growing system of hacking outlets and data brokers. The most notable recent case had been an operation that, since 2021, had penetrated information technology companies and organisations as well as attempting to access water grid companies. It had only been revealed in February 2024 that sleeper code had been deposited which could have been activated in the case of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Ms Maigre underlined that, with the globalisation of trade, attacks on US companies also affected the Baltic Sea region. Cyber espionage was another aspect of Chinese strategy. She noted an Estonian warning about Chinese technology involved in such manoeuvres; as a result, all such technology might have to be abandoned one day. One example was the Chinese monopoly on solar panels which might prove another trap in the transition from fossil fuel to renewable energies. As for the vast swathe of Russian threats, she focused on several security agencies raising the alarm on Russian contacts to organised crime. The latter were carrying out cyber attacks combined with physical surveillance and sabotage. In May of that year, Europol had arrested members of such a gang from Poland and Ukraine, the leader a Russian national who was still at large in his country. Russia’s cyber war in Ukraine had proved to be an extension of military conflict. Aside from Ukraine’s own defences, international companies like Microsoft had also played a successful role in that regard. Yet dependence on private service providers carried its own risks. Thus, Ms Maigre recommended keeping the potential drawbacks in mind when using these companies in geopolitical conflicts. As for response measures, much like personal responsibility in recycling, she underlined the importance of real-time exercises of cyber threats. Parliaments had the resources to organise such simulations to better understand the implications. The e-Governance Agency organised technical simulations as well as those targeting the administrative/legislative level. In September 2022, the Nordic foreign ministers had taken part in a discussion-based strategic exercise, testing their role and options during a cyber attack. Ms Maigre believed similar exercises to be very useful to better understand what was needed as well as possible. BSPC President Alfons Röblom wondered if the good guys might ever be stronger than the bad guys. Ms Maigre was afraid this would never happen. In security, one had to keep running to stand still. However, constantly staying up to date, training the respective staff, investing in people and money to keep systems secure gave them a fighting chance. Mr Johannes Schraps noted examples of companies hit by digital ransom attacks. With the dynamic development of the field, it often seemed overwhelming. That also applied to politics. He asked about how to reach that balance between security and personal freedom. Ms Maigre divided the possible measures into individual, organisational, and national/state measures. At the individual level, she recommended basic cyber hygiene practices, such as two-factor authentication or VPN connections. Organisations should be responsible for their own network security and have cyber security intertwined with general management. She felt that companies that had been attacked should share their findings rather than hide what had happened. That was very useful information. At the national level, it was about coordinating and encouraging private-public partnerships, having the political will to ensure that the national cyber defence was up to date as well as concrete ownership of the tasks. Mr Johannes Schraps wondered how they could be proactive rather than reactive. Ms Maigre said that pre-emptive measures – such as cyber hygiene or information exchange – were combined with responsive ones in cyber security. Mr Rüdiger Strempel, HELCOM Executive Secretary Mr Rüdiger Strempel sketched out the history and structure of HELCOM, encompassing the 10 Contracting Parties – the EU and the nine countries around the Baltic Sea – as well as the secretariat as the executive branch, the Helsinki Commission as the policymakers, and the eight working and three expert groups providing the scientific information. Over 200 recommendations – not legally binding – had been adopted over the past 50 years, some of them still in effect. The broader picture was covered by action plans, in particular the 2022 Baltic Sea Action Plan. Monitoring was implemented through thematic and holistic assessments. He pointed out that, due to Russia being one of the Contracting Parties, a so-called strategic pause had been enacted. This meant that all official meetings had been postponed, so that the remaining Contracting Parties met informally. The HELCOM vision was a good environmental status of the Baltic Sea which was still a long way off. This had been proven by the latest holistic assessment from the preceding year. In addition to eutrophication, pollution, and other factors, climate change was warming the Baltic Sea region twice as much as the rest of the world. Transformative changes across all sectors, countries, and stakeholders were needed. Despite this bleak outlook, Mr Strempel highlighted two good points: Firstly, their ecosystem knowledge and the respective policies had developed substantially. In particular, it was now clear that measures to reduce the pressure on the Baltic Sea did work – if they were implemented. These centred around the 2022 Baltic Sea Action Plan which featured 199 actions, some of which had already been put into place while others were still in that process. Ownership for each action by at least one HELCOM body was assured. Their achievement was measured by specific criteria. Mr Strempel moved on to fisheries and shipping which were part of so-called sea-based pressures. HELCOM and the IMO cooperated on shipping in the Baltic Sea region. That had brought about sharper regulations for ships entering the Baltic Sea. 69 of the Baltic Sea Action Plan’s actions dealt with maritime issues, such as sewage inlets and wastewater disposal. The Russian shadow fleet posed a new problem in this regard. He went on to speak about annual exercises to deal with oil spills, simulated by popcorn, and twice-annual aerial surveillance exercises. Due to this cooperation, there had not been major incidents in the Baltic Sea for a long time. Submerged munitions were a topic HELCOM had been dealing with since 1993. Unfortunately, the situation – and the shells – was deteriorating. With 300,000 tonnes of conventional munitions and 40,000 tonnes of chemical munitions in the German part of the Baltic Sea alone, the threat would have to be mitigated quickly. There was no time left to lose to address it. HELCOM had two related actions in its Baltic Sea Action Plan and was involved in three projects working on this issue. Although fisheries was not directly in HELCOM’s remit, they were cooperating in implementing ecosystem-based fisheries management, reducing by-catch, and other issues. Looking forward, Lithuania was currently chairing HELCOM. Its priorities were to strengthen HELCOM’s role in geopolitical challenges, balancing the Blue Economy with environmental protection, and involving the public in decision-making. Aside from taking part in the UN Ocean Decade Conference and the Our Oceans Conference, HELCOM had celebrated its 50 th anniversary in April 2024. He highlighted the conference Sustainable Agriculture for a Healthy Baltic Sea, noting that agriculture was a primary source of eutrophication. In the coming year, a Baltic Stakeholder Conference would deal with hazardous substances because these had recently been found to prove an equal threat as eutrophication. Ms Hanna Westerén asked what the parliamentarians could do about the Russian shadow fleet. Mr Strempel said that one litre of oil could contaminate 1 million litres of water. This illustrated the magnitude of the existing shipping, now exacerbated by a fleet of dubious technical states. To counter the ecological risk, it had to be assessed, and preparations were needed should an incident occur. HELCOM was not currently involved. Considering the wide range of tasks HELCOM was pursuing and the mentioned 199 actions featured in the current 2022 Baltic Sea Action Plan Mr Bodo Bahr inquired which had the highest priority to be implemented. Mr Strempel felt that all of the actions in the Baltic Sea Action Plan were vital. However, he pointed out that eutrophication was still a massive issue for the Baltic Sea and related to climate change, biodiversity, and pollution. Hazardous substances had recently been upgraded to a greater threat than had previously been understood. He added plastic pollution as an increasing problem. What mattered most, though, was a strong, iron-clad political will to tackle all of these concerns. That also included the funding for these actions, which currently was looking precarious. In the second part of the session, the Standing Committee engaged in an in-depth review of several ongoing BSPC matters. This included an assessment and follow-up of the 33 rd Annual Conference and the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum, updates on the work of the BSPC Working Group on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, and Connectivity (ESSRC), which will hold its next meeting in Bergen, Norway, from 24 to 26 November 2024, and the activities of BSPC rapporteurs. Additionally, the Committee discussed the BSPC Strategy and Work Programme for 2024-2025, initial plans for the 34 th BSPC in Mariehamn from 24-26 August 2025, and considerations for implementing a rotational system for BSPC presidencies. Further topics included advancing previous decisions about a working group to develop a future structure to ensure greater organisational independence for the BSPC and establish a long-term structural solution for the Secretariat. The Standing Committee also reviewed plans for modernising the BSPC website and made firm decisions on budgetary matters.

On 10 June 2024, the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) Standing Committee convened in Copenhagen for a critical meeting marked by important discussions that will influence the future of the organisation. Originally planned to be held in the Faroe Islands, the meeting was relocated to Copenhagen due to unforeseen circumstances related to a public strike in the Faroe Islands. More than 30 participants, representatives and delegations of the BSPC members from the Åland Islands, the Baltic Assembly, Denmark, the German Bundestag, Finland, Hamburg, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the Nordic Council, Norway, Poland, Schleswig-Holstein and Sweden participated in the meeting. Opening Remarks BSPC President Henrik Møller opened the meeting by welcoming the participants to the Danish Parliament and noting the unique situation surrounding the meeting’s relocation. He highlighted the significance of addressing the ongoing challenges, particularly the increasing brutalisation observed during the European election campaign and the need for stronger democracies and social cohesion. Key Discussions and Decisions Follow-up on the 32 nd BSPC Resolution: President Møller reported on the responses received from various governments regarding the implementation of the 32 nd BSPC Resolution, with statements published on the BSPC website. https://www.bspc.net/statements-of-the-governments-in-the-baltic-sea-region-to-the-32 nd -bspc-resolution/ Working Groups and Reports: Energy Security, Self-sustainability, Resilience, and Connectivity (ESSRC) : The committee reviewed the progress of the ESSRC Working Group, which had held significant meetings in Helsinki and Greifswald. The group’s recommendations have been incorporated into the draft of the 33 rd BSPC resolution. Sea-Dumped Ammunitions : Rapporteur Anna Kassautzki provided an update on efforts in Germany to address the issue of sea-dumped ammunitions, including the construction of a prototype mobile platform for retrieval and disposal. SC members whovisited Finland’s eastern border underlined the importance of the visit, particularly under security aspects, and provided insights into the results of their conversations and conclusions. BSPC Secretariat: A significant portion of the meeting focused on discussing the future accommodation configuration of the BSPC Secretariat. And related questions. After a thorough discussion, the deliberations focused on a compromise solution that includes a transition period. The deliberations will be continued. Upcoming BSPC Events: The 33 rd BSPC Annual Conference and the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum (BSPYF) will be held in Helsingør from August 25-27, 2024. The conference will feature distinguished speakers, including Danish and Swedish government officials, and will culminate in a reception at Castle Kronborg. Conclusion The meeting in Copenhagen underlined the BSPC’s resilience and commitment to addressing critical regional issues, even in the face of unexpected challenges. The negotiations were characterised by efforts to secure an ongoing high level of BSPC work in the further future and, by that, ensure the continuity and effectiveness of the BSPC’s work in promoting cooperation and security in the democratic Baltic Sea region. The BSPC looks forward to the upcoming annual conference in Helsingør, where important current fundamental challenges with a particular focus on the safety of the democratic Baltic Sea region will be further explored.

Parliamentarians of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference from Finland, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden visited in Finland the EU’s eastern border of the Baltic Sea Region. This visit emphasised the need for a comprehensive approach to security, readiness, cooperation, and countering hybrid threats at local, national, and regional levels within the Baltic Sea region. On 29 April 2024, at the Vartius Border Station in Kuhmo, the participants witnessed firsthand the operational complexities of managing the EU’s external border. The Finnish Border Guard showcased a proactive strategy for safeguarding national borders, underlining the importance of regional cooperation to combat geopolitical threats effectively. This visit highlighted the crucial role of the Finnish Border Guard in ensuring border security and its cooperation with regional entities to address potential threats. The next day, 30 April 2024, the participants visited the Kainuu Brigade, where they gained insight into its role in readiness and training personnel for the defence of Finland’s northern parts. The brigade’s efforts in forming units equipped for comprehensive defence were underscored, showcasing the importance of preparedness and training in maintaining national security. Reflecting on the visit, parliamentarians stressed that the EU’s eastern border in the Baltic Sea Region must be secured against hybrid warfare, as exemplified by the orchestrated influx of refugees, as well as against all military threats. The parliamentarians emphasised the urgent need for a joint and coordinated border defence approach, highlighting the shared responsibility to defend the EU’s eastern borders. They called for heightened awareness, stronger focus, and enhanced cooperation among all democratic states of the Baltic Sea Region and the European Union, especially in light of Russia’s ongoing aggression and increasing threats. Given recent geopolitical developments, the parliamentarians underscored that governments must prioritise developing a coordinated strategy to protect common borders, societies, and infrastructures more effectively. They stressed that the European Union should consider eastern border security a priority and allocate necessary resources to bolster cooperation and readiness within the Baltic Sea region. In this context, the EU Commission President’s announcement during her visit to Lappeenranta, Finland, on 19 April 2024, to support Finland with 230 million euros and operational assistance from Frontex, including border guards and surveillance equipment, was widely welcomed. The parliamentarians view this as an essential step toward reinforcing the region’s security, urging immediate implementation. This visit complemented the detailed deliberations of the BSPC Working Group on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, Resilience, and Connectivity (WG ESSRC) held on March 18, 2024, in Helsinki. These discussions focused on protecting critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, especially in the energy sector. Insights from this visit are intended to inform the BSPC Standing Committee during its meeting in June 2024, allowing for deeper engagement with the issues at hand. Moreover, the parliamentarians plan to incorporate findings from this visit into the upcoming Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference under the Danish Presidency, scheduled for August 25-27, 2024, in Helsingør. The theme “Safety in the Baltic Sea Region” will take centre stage, where the defence will also be a crucial topic of discussion. Highlights from Oulu and Kuhmo Welcome Speech by Mr Ari Alatossava, Mayor of Oulu The study visit began on 28 April in Oulu, where Mayor Ari Alatossava welcomed the attendees, highlighting Oulu as the largest urban centre in Northern Scandinavia with a significant technological hub, notably Nokia. The city’s efforts to diversify its focus with investments in various sectors, aiming to build a promising future for its citizens, were emphasised. Oulu has been selected as the European Capital of Culture in 2026, reflecting its ongoing commitment to cultural and technological development. Presentation on 6G by Mr. Matti Latva-aho, University of Oulu Mr. Matti Latva-aho of the University of Oulu presented the 6G Flagship project, shedding light on the future of wireless connectivity and the strategic collaborative efforts in 6G research. The project’s objectives, including resilience, security, and digital inclusion, were discussed. The research agendas are aligned with global collaboration to ensure Europe’s strategic advantage in next-generation technologies. Environmental Insights by Ms. Satu Maaria Karjalainen and Ms. Anna-Kaisa Ronkanen Ms. Satu Maaria Karjalainen and Ms. Anna-Kaisa Ronkanen from the Finnish Environment Institute highlighted the ecological importance and challenges of the Bay of Bothnia, emphasising the need for sustainable land use and cross-border cooperation. Their insights into the state of the bay and ongoing projects underscored the critical efforts required to preserve this unique ecosystem. Visit to the LUMI Supercomputer at the CSC Data Center in Kajaani Following their environmental insights session, the group transferred to Kajaani to visit the LUMI Supercomputer at the CSC Data Center. LUMI (Large Unified Modern Infrastructure) is a petascale supercomputer and, as of January 2023, the fastest supercomputer in Europe. Hosted at the CSC Data Center, LUMI exemplifies cutting-edge technology and sustainability in supercomputing. During the visit, Mikko Kertuulo explained that the LUMI Data Center is a brownfield solution utilising approximately 10 MW of power. Notably, LUMI achieves a high Power Usage Effectiveness (PUE) value, indicating optimal energy consumption. The heat generated by LUMI is fed into the city’s heating system, showcasing an impressive energy reutilization factor, which even allows the centre to achieve a carbon-negative status. Mikko Kertuulo highlighted key elements essential for data centre sites, including electricity stability, heat reuse capability, connectivity, and ecosystem support. An undersea connectivity project is underway to link Finland with the USA and Japan, enhancing global connectivity. LUMI is operated by a consortium of eleven countries with a total budget of 200 million euros. It supports various applications such as climate research, data science, plasma physics, and life sciences; 20% of its capacity is dedicated to industrial applications. The supercomputer aids in developing AI models and simulations, reinforcing its role in technological innovation and industry support. Moving Forward During the visit’s open discussions, participants underscored the importance of coordinated efforts at both the national and EU levels. The initiative to create a document outlining a unified strategy for handling eastern borders and related security issues was proposed, highlighting the need for shared responsibilities and collective action against hybrid and military threats. The parliamentarians agreed on the necessity of political advocacy to ensure these insights influence broader European legislative and strategic frameworks. Concrete actions and closer cooperation are imperative to protect the Baltic Sea region’s security and stability, reinforcing the values of shared responsibility and collective effort in the face of evolving threats. This visit has set a collaborative framework for future engagements, aiming to enhance security, readiness, and cooperation among the Baltic Sea states and the broader European community. With ongoing geopolitical shifts, the BSPC remains committed to fostering a united and proactive defence strategy for the region.

With a focus on recent developments in energy security and ocean policy and it’s impact on climate change The BSPC Standing Committee met in the European Parliament in Brussels to learn more about the current situation and the activities of their partner organisations, the CBSS and HELCOM. Representatives of the European Parliament and European Commission spoke about the current challenges in Europe, energy security, and ocean conservation. Further preparations were made for the annual conference in Helsingør on 25-27 August and the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum while considerations were given to a BSPC Standing Committee Study visit to investigate the security situation at the eastern Finnish boarder line as an urgent topic of interest. More than 40 participants, representatives and delegations of the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM) and the BSPC members from the Åland Islands, the Baltic Assembly, the European Parliament, Denmark, Estonia, the German Bundestag, Finland, Hamburg, Latvia, Lithuania, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the Nordic Council, Norway, Poland, Schleswig-Holstein and Sweden participated in the meeting. Introduction BSPC President Henrik Møller welcomed the Standing Committee to the European Parliament in Brussels. Opening Remarks by Mr Andreas Schwab , Chairman of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Northern Cooperation and for relations with Switzerland and Norway and to the EU-Iceland Joint Parliamentary Committee and the European Economic Area (EEA) Joint Parliamentary Committee Mr Schwab pointed out that Baltic Sea cooperation might never have been as influential as it was in the present, stressing the unity of the nations. Given the ongoing security issues in Europe, he approved of the Danish BSPC presidency having chosen Safety in the Baltic Sea Region as their main topic, along with energy security, defence, and climate change. The security of the region and Europe hinged on the outcome of the war Ukraine had been fighting for more than two years against Russian aggression. BSPC President Møller underlined the importance of continuing the support for Ukraine in its defence of Western democracies for as long as it would take. He cherished the fact that Sweden was now approved to join NATO, which, in the words of Jens Stoltenberg, would make all of them stronger and safer. Lasting unity and solidarity – between countries but also governments and their people – were more important than ever. Under various aspects, 2024 was becoming the test year for democracies. One such testbed would be the upcoming European Parliament elections. This was important not least because issues such as climate change could only be resolved in an international and global context, with the European Parliament as a major player. BSPC Vice-President Johannes Schraps voiced his hope that in the coming term, the European Parliament would play a stronger role in its membership of the BSPC, reinforcing its part in Baltic Sea cooperation. Presentations Current Challenges in Europe and the Future of Europe Mr Martin Hojsik , Vice-President of the European Parliament Mr Hojsik appreciated Mr Schraps’ call for a greater commitment to the BSPC, not just from the European Parliament delegation but all of them. Historically, the Baltic Sea had been an abode of cooperation but also of division. With the Russian aggression since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, a split had once again occurred, profoundly affecting the security situation in the region. He echoed the appreciation for Sweden about to join NATO. Europe had to be able to defend itself as well as support Ukraine in defending their territorial integrity and freedom. Indeed, 2024 would be a crucial year for democracy. For him, one of the gravest concerns was that Russia was not only fighting directly but also waging a hybrid war seeking to destabilise the democratic countries from within. The other priorities of the Danish BSPC presidency, energy security and climate change, were also major issues in the European Parliament. Renewable energies were vital for the continent’s security as well, after having been so reliant on Russian gas. He highlighted Latvia’s transition to being able to run on 100 % renewable energy, at least for a while. Mr Hojsik hoped for even greater commitment to Baltic Sea cooperation. BSPC President Møller asked about the establishment of a European military. EP Vice-President Hojsik saw closer collaboration than ever before in security in the future as Europe was realizing the necessity to defend itself. The EU and NATO collaboration had to be reinforced. Joint purchasing of arms across countries would save money and ensure better coordination of the militaries. Mr Schraps thanked Mr Hojsik for his call for more European Parliament engagement and assured him that the BSPC delegations would also encourage EP candidates from their countries to be active in Baltic cooperation. Energy Security on the Way to Climate Neutrality Ms Paula Pinho , European Commission, GD Energy, the Director for Just Transition, Consumers, Energy Efficiency, and Innovation Ms Pinho agreed with Mr Hojsik that the energy security and the clean transition were two sides of the same coin. Renewable energies replacing fossil fuels was the way forward to an autonomous Europe, although greater efficiency and energy saving were also vital. She pointed to the RePower EU plan to strengthen the continent’s security of supply by reducing the dependence on Russian gas, by diversifying supply sources, and by accelerating the energy transition to reach climate neutrality by 2050. Ms Pinho highlighted the effective bans on Russian gas imports by Baltic and other countries as part of the Baltic Sea region’s transition – ironically accelerated by Russia’s actions. Between the summer of 2022 and the end of 2023, gas consumption had been reduced by 18 % in the EU, exceeding the voluntary 15 % goal. That morning, the Energy Council had endorsed further reduction of gas demand. Diversification had also been exemplified by the Baltic Sea region through a range of sources including Norway or as LNG from the US but also shared usage of infrastructure across the region, e.g., flexible floating storage regasification units. The regulatory framework TEN-E had pushed forward a number of relevant infrastructure projects, such as the gas connection between Poland and Lithuania, further integrating the Baltic states and Finland into the European energy market. The Baltic Sea region benefited from competition and diversified supply sources. At the same time, the importance of back-up supply lines had recently been highlighted. The Baltic electricity market had also been coupled with the Nordic market, another key step in the integration of all EU member states. This Baltic Synchronisation Project was still ongoing to fully integrate the Baltic states, aiming for early 2025. As for renewables, Ms Pinho pointed out that 2023 had been the first year that electricity had been produced more by renewable energy than fossil fuels. The potential of offshore renewable energy was particularly high in the Baltic Sea region. The decarbonisation of the energy market was proceeding well. However, the protection of critical infrastructure was of paramount importance, as evidenced by the damage to the Baltic interconnector or the disruption of the Estland tube. Legislation such as the Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities from 2023 or the Directive on Measures for a High Common Level of Cyber-Security across the Union were key pieces of solidifying EU security. President Møller pointed to the upcoming meeting of the BSPC Working Group on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, Resilience, and Connectivity two weeks later in Helsinki which would deepen a number of those concerns. In light of Ms Pinho’s comments about diversified sources and types of energy, Mr Staffan Eklöf raised the recently built nuclear reactor project in northern Finland which had stabilised the energy supply for Sweden as well. As such, he wondered about the Commission’s view on how nuclear power could be integrated in this transition. Ms Pinho replied that the Commission considered nuclear power part of the energy mix and the prerogative of member states to choose their own supplies, although the Commission was highly encouraging non-fossil energy sources. Prof Jānis Vucāns referenced the infrastructure security concerns, wondering about the financial tools that could protect this infrastructure. Ms Pinho noted that some stress tests were currently being run to determine opportunities for improved cyber protection. In that respect, additional funding was being discussed. Mr Johannes Schraps approved of Ms Pinho’s overview of what had already been achieved while he also appreciated the challenges still to be overcome. He asked about priorities in ensuring that all EU countries had sufficient numbers of connections. Ms Pinho said that there were two work streams here: One was the expansion of renewable energy as domestic energy sources. Yet gas could not be phased out quickly, and she highlighted the diversification of sources through new infrastructure projects over the past two years. The Commission continued to analyse where infrastructure could be reinforced or added. She underlined that they were already working on ensuring the energy supply for the next winter. Mr Alfons Röblom from Åland noted the recent explosion of interest in offshore wind farms. He asked if the Commission could provide guidance to smaller states and communities, such as best practice examples or on investment. Ms Pinho noted the high-level group BEMEP as an example of a forum identifying and sharing best practices. The Commission also provided guidance on offshore energy facilities. Ms Anna Kassautzki pointed to a German tech fund for open source software development for infrastructure and cybersecurity. She asked if a European equivalent, crossing borders, was being developed. Ms Pinho said that the directives she mentioned before also addressed the software aspect of cybersecurity. They were also intended to promote training in the respective skills. Secretary General Bodo Bahr stressed that by far the major CO 2 emitters in the world were China, the USA, and India. He wondered how the progress of the Baltic Sea region and Europe as a whole could influence these countries to curtail their emissions. Ms Pinho concurred since the countries in question represented more than 50 % of greenhouse gas emissions while the EU produced 9 %. One example of the EU’s influence was the global pledge by 130 countries at the latest COP to double energy efficiency by 2030 and tripling renewable energy capacity. This pledge had been initiated by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Decarbonisation was no longer just a European journey but a global one. President Møller added that Denmark had a minuscule share of global emissions, but the Danish solutions could impact the world, noting a green partnership with India. Progress Report from the Council of the Baltic Sea States Ambassador Helena Tuuri , Chair of the Committee of Senior Officials of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Ambassador for Baltic Sea Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland Ms Tuuri listed the three cross-cutting themes of the Finnish CBSS presidency: overall societal security, crisis preparedness, and resilience. The CBSS was strictly divided in the political level and practical cooperation. The latter made up the major task of the organisation across several ministries. The Russian war of aggression had deeply changed and modernised the CBSS, renewing the working group level and concentrating the practical work on a safe and secure region – one of the fundamental priorities of the organisation. Ms Tuuri noted that member states had become more interested and invested in this work. A recent innovation was the youth forum which was also contributing to the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea region as well as cooperating with the BSPC in their own youth forum. A youth ministerial meeting – focused on the activation of young people in elections – would accompany the foreign ministers’ meeting. The latter, looking into resilience and such geopolitically influenced topics, was still being prepared by the Finnish delegation. Mr Bodo Bahr noted the BSPC’s recommendation for the CBSS to return to head of governments’ meetings alternating with the foreign ministers’ meetings. He wondered about any progress in this regard. Ms Tuuri said there had been a few conversations but no concrete achievements. Mr Johannes Schraps was glad that democratic cooperation in the Baltic Sea region had been reinforced and was no longer seen as just a bridge to Russia. He cherished the CBSS secretariat’s work in youth participation. Mr Staffan Eklöf appreciated the practical side of the CBSS, such as working on solutions to the horrors of human trafficking. He wondered if more topics would be opened up in that approach. Ms Tuuri regretted that was not the case at this time. Progress Report on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Oceans and the Current Main Activities of the EU Commission regarding the Ocean Policy with a Particular View to the Baltic Sea Ms Veronica Manfredi , European Commission, GD Environment, the Director for Zero Pollution Ms Manfredi remarked that the biodiversity crisis had not spared the Baltic Sea where pollution was still ever-present as was eutrophication. Together with pressure from shipping, vital socio-economic activities were affected, in particular the fishery sector. Here, she noted that even if all fishing were to stop at this moment, rebuilding the fish stocks would take several decades. Thus, a holistic approach beyond just fishing quotas was needed, also targeting aforementioned issues such as eutrophication. The Commissioner had organised two Our Baltic ministerial conferences, leading to significant developments. Overall, the implementation was advancing rather well. Efforts on improving marine biodiversity and reducing pollution had progressed far; eutrophication, though, needed more work. Commitments on a sustainable economy were still at an early stage. At the European level, implementation was going well, too, especially thanks to the Green Deal. She was proud of four achievements in particular: Between 2022 and 2023, EU-wide limits for marine litter, seabed loss, and other water noise had been enacted. In January 2024, new European rules supplementing the urban wastewater directive had been adopted, strengthening nutrient standards and treatment of nitrogen and phosphorus. At the regional level, in 2021, HELCOM had updated the Baltic Sea Action Plan with more than 200 measures aimed to achieve a good environmental status of the Baltic Sea. At the national level, all Baltic Sea member states had complemented the other measures with their own initiatives to reduce plastic pollution. Nonetheless, it was clear that more still had to be done. The focus in revamping efforts should be on eutrophication as this was suffocating the sea and marine life. Ms Manfredi highlighted efforts to save the harbour porpoise. Fishing impacts had to be reduced. She also spoke on sea-dumped munitions, a favoured topic of the BSPC: Some 50,000 tonnes of conventional and chemical weapons were estimated to be on the bottom of the Baltic Sea, posing a danger to human and marine life as well as to economic development. Offshore wind farms, undersea cables and pipelines as well as their security increased the odds of encountering these munitions. The Commission had been working on a holistic approach since 2019, inventorying the extent of the munitions in the Baltic Sea as well as funding projects such as DAIMON I to develop appropriate, environmentally friendly tools and technologies to tackle this matter. Today, it was known that these munitions already heavily affected marine biology. At a 2023 meeting, further commitments had been agreed upon, strengthening all regional forums as well as comprehensive mapping and risk assessment. Priorities for coordinated action would be set by 2027. Meanwhile, relevant financial options for funding retrieval measures would be explored. The Commission had allocated 2 million euros for this purpose. Ms Anna Kassautzki , BSPC Rapporteur on Sea-Dumped Munitions, appreciated the topic being on the Commission’s agenda. Rather than 50,000 tonnes, her information was that there were 400,000 tonnes of conventional munitions and 40,000 of chemical ordinance in the Baltic Sea. She underlined the BSPC’s goal of having these munitions removed within the coming twenty years, also in light of the Baltic Sea’s slow water exchange, worsening the impact on the local ecosystem. Moving on, she noted that the rules on state aid were hindrances to her state transforming their fishery fleet to a sustainable model. She wondered if changes might be implemented in the future. Ms Manfredi underlined the current EU call for developing the highly complex technology needed for munitions retrieval and disposal. Regarding the fishery question, she was not aware of any such plans, yet pointed to a financial tool of the EU that might be of help. Mr Alfons Röblom wondered about the Commission’s view on deep-sea mining as its effect on the ecosystem was not fully explored. Ms Manfredi answered that the permission process echoed that on land, i.e., that sufficient understanding of the risk had to be provided. In deep-sea mining, the Commission called for maximum caution. Mr Staffan Eklöf asked how the Commission decided which resources to allocate for which desired outcome as well as how conflicting goals were tackled, such as offshore wind farms being built on bio-intensive shallows. Ms Manfredi replied that the political priorities were set by the president of the Commission, to be validated by the European parliament and the EU heads of state. One such priority was the Green Deal. She noted that major environmental risk assessments were required before such placements were chosen so that – in an ideal world – no such permit should be granted and irreparable damage avoided. Mr Johannes Schraps applauded the fact that directors like Ms Manfredi were well-versed in the fields the BSPC had been working on and encouraged the Commission to launch more initiatives which would receive the BSPC’s support. He asked about the Commission’s current stance on CO 2 storage. Ms Manfredi agreed the high importance of such marine storage which was likely to play a greater role than land-based restored nature. Secretary General Bahr noted that the member governments of the BSPC provided overviews on their implementation of the BSPC resolution’s demands. He suggested a similar statement, on topics such as sea-dumped ammunition or biodiversity, from the EU Commission. Prof Jānis Vucāns saw the problem of local fishing was often hampered by too little information, sometimes because of lacking cooperation across scientific institutions in various regions. He also asked about fish farms and marine laboratories to investigate the effects of wind farms. Ms Manfredi was glad that all the Commission’s work was based on scientific advice, noting that scientific communities were moving closer and closer together, especially in fishery. Here, she highlighted HELCOM. For offshore wind farms, the Commission was aiming for win-win situations for all sides which could also include connected fish farms and targeted fishing permits as well as tourism. “Being smart by design” was her headline for these activities. HELCOM Update 2023, 2024 – and beyond Mr Rüdiger Strempel , Executive Secretary of the Helsinki Commission Mr Strempel noted that HELCOM was all about the Baltic Sea – a unique and vulnerable sea with a huge catchment area quadrupling the sea area itself. HELCOM had ten contracting parties, including Russia and the European Union. He underlined that HELCOM was science-based, referring to the expert groups feeding scientific information to the – currently eight – working groups, structured around the Secretariat and the meetings of the Heads of Delegations. Based on the Helsinki Convention, HELCOM issued recommendations to governments, which, though not legally binding, were generally implemented. Action plans and projects – in particular the Baltic Sea Action Plan at the heart of the organisation’s activities – addressed the bigger picture. Monitoring and assessments reviewed the progress made. The geopolitical changes since 2022 had necessitated a so-called strategic pause, postponing all official HELCOM meetings, with informal consultations of the other nine Contracting Partners (H9) taking their place. Due to the unanimity requirement, decisions taken by the H9 were communicated to Russia through the Secretariat by means of a written procedure. Russia’s willingness to cooperate on this basis had decreased over time. He moved on to the third HELCOM holistic assessment of 2023, detailing the state of the Baltic Sea, providing decision-makers with the state of the environment during the period assessed, as well as information on the spatial variation, trends in development over time, the distribution of pressures, and the effects of enacted measures. Unfortunately, there had been scant overall progress in the review period from 2016 – 2021. However, regional measures were seen to have a beneficial effect on the marine environment of the Baltic Sea. Mr Strempel pointed to HELCOM’s central roadmap towards a healthy status of the Baltic Sea, the2021 Baltic Sea Action Plan (2021 BSAP), focusing on a healthy ecosystem, hazardous substances and litter, sustainable sea-based activities, and eutrophication. Overarching topics interacting with those focuses comprised climate change, financing, knowledge exchange, and monitoring, among others. The 2021 Baltic Sea Action Plan’s 199 actions each had individual target years for implementation, specific criteria to assess said implementation, and ownership had been assigned to certain HELCOM bodies. Mr Strempel highlighted the HELCOM Explorer on their website, allowing real-time tracking of progress in implementing the 2021 BSAP for any visitor. Other tools HELCOM had developed included the Climate Change Fact Sheet – detailing current scientific understanding, the Science Agenda, and a regional roadmap for maritime spatial planning. As for the present activities, the Baltic Sea Action Plan would continue to be implemented. In 2023, HELCOM had restructured its working groups and completed its third holistic assessment. That assessment had also shown that hazardous substances appeared to be equally significant as eutrophication as a major problem in the Baltic Sea, which HELCOM would address with greater vigour. A few days before, the annual Baltic Stakeholder Conference had been held in Helsinki, dedicated to Protect Baltic, a biodiversity-related project and the biggest projtc HELCOM had ever engaged in. In April, the Informal Consultation Meeting of the Helsinki Commission would be held in Riga, followed back to back by the Ministerial Meeting on the Baltic Sea Marine Environment. In conjunction with that, HELCOM would celebrate its 50 th anniversary, also in Riga. Mr Strempel stressed HELCOM’s cooperation with partner organisations, such as the BSPC, and a number of regional and global frameworks, including the EU and the CBSS. He mentioned that HELCOM was currently chaired by Latvia, which would hand over to Lithuania in July 2024. Latvia’s priorities were maintaining HELCOM as an effective and well-functioning organisation, the implementation of the Baltic Sea Action Plan as well as strengthening the role of regional cooperation. The priorities of Lithuania were still being defined and would likely be announced at the upcoming ministerial meeting in April 2024. In the future, the work on the Baltic Sea Action Plan with its goal of 2030 would continue while the fourth holistic assessment was being prepared. Mr Enn Eesmaa asked if HELCOM had considered the possible effects of the Gulf Stream changing or ceasing to exist. Mr Strempel pointed to HELCOM’s Climate Change Fact Sheet which also scientifically investigated future impacts, although no changes to the Gulf Stream were included here. Ms Anna Kassautzki regretted that pressing security concerns had reduced the focus on the issue of sea-dumped ammunitions, wondering if that could be pushed to the fore at the meeting with environmental ministers in the autumn. Mr Strempel still saw sea-dumped ammunition as a firm part of the agenda, having gained momentum in the past couple of years. It was also part of the Baltic Sea Action Plan. While it might not be central to the public discussion, the munitions were still at the forefront of HELCOM’s efforts. Mr Mikko Polvinen inquired about the contacts to Russia. Mr Strempel considered the effect of the Russian war of aggression on HELCOM to be more institutional rather than environmental. He referred back to the strategic pause on the political level taken by the organisation. Some technical and scientific data, though, had been provided by Russia, although he could not foretell if or for how long this would continue. It was impossible to tell if Russia was implementing the Baltic Sea Action Plan. Future Accommodation of the BSPC Secretariat and Related Questions The BSPC had discussed finding a new accommodation for the BSPC Secretariat for a long time, mulling over a number of options with various pros and cons. Ms Kristina Herbst , President of the Parliament of Schleswig-Holstein, submitted the offer to take on these tasks. From the 2025 budget on, the parliament could take over the budgetary functions from the state parliament of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern as well as serve as an employer for the Secretary General and an assistant. Ms Herbst deepened two alternatives. Schleswig-Holstein was offering to provide these services for five years, with an option to negotiate an extension if needed. President Møller remarked that the previously explored options had proven more complicated than expected. Prof Jānis Vucāns maintained that at some point in the future, the BSPC would have to become an officially registered international organisation with a headquarters of their own. BSPC President Henrik Møller , Mr Alfons Röblom , Ms Kristina Herbst , Prof Jānis Vucāns , Mr Johannes Schraps , Ms Carola Veit, Mr Staffan Eklöf and Mr Bodo Bahr further considered this matter. BSPC President Møller noted that this discussion would be resumed at the upcoming meeting on the Faroe islands, envisioning a decision to be taken in Helsingør in August. Possible Joint Meetings of the BSPC with other parliamentary assemblies President Møller reviewed the situation and development since the Standing Committee meeting in Maribo. He noted the letter from the BSPC member organisation Baltic Assembly stating their position regarding the current situation unequivocally. Mr Johannes Schraps, Mr Staffan Eklöf, Mr Andrius Kupčinskas, Ms Carola Veit pointed out their current view on the situation. The meeting underlined it’s decision from November not to pursue joint meetings with other parliamentary organisations if an apparent and sufficient distancing from the aggressor is not fulfilled. President Møller said that this discussion would be continued at the next meeting on the Faroe Islands. Various Matters President Møller remarked that the first meeting in Riga of the Working Group on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, Resilience, and Connectivity (ESSRC) had been quite interesting and voiced his hope for the next meeting in Helsinki to be equally fruitful. Ms Anna Kassautzki , Rapporteur on Sea-Dumped Munitions, was pleased that the European Commission was still focused on this topic since the national discussion in Germany had been dominated by questions of the Russian war against Ukraine. She called on her colleagues to expedite the governmental response to this topic. Furthermore, she said that she would continue her cooperation with the CBSS and HELCOM to remove the ammunition from the Baltic Sea in the next 19 years. Mr Alfons Röblom , the new head of the Åland delegation, was appointed Vice-President of the BSPC, as a precursor to serving as President of the BSPC during the Åland BSPC Presidency 2024 – 2025. The Standing Committee approved the budget report for the preceding year and the budget for 2024. Mr Mikko Polvinen suggested an informal meeting of the Standing Committee in the near future in his home country. He noted that Finland had the longest land border with Russia, citing the rise of hybrid attacks in recent times, including the push of migrants into democratic countries. As such, he asked for the Standing Committee to more deeply investigate the security situation of the Baltic Sea region. Part of that was to learn from the Baltic states how they had handled similar events. Further photos are available under the following link.: https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/photoset/p_EP-165505A