In Tallinn, the BSPC Standing Committee gathered to discuss cooperation with partner organisations CBSS and HELCOM, threats to the Baltic Sea both in cyber security and in ecological terms as well as the circular economy. The Standing Committee furthermore discussed the work of the upcoming year as well as the budget. The participants also deliberated on how to restructure the organisation to enhance its effectiveness in the future, among others, through a rotation system for the presidency.
More than 35 participants, representatives and delegations of the European Parliament, the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Estonia, the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM), experts on Circular Economy and on Cyber Security and the BSPC members from the Åland Islands, the Baltic Assembly, Denmark, Estonia, the German Bundestag, Finland, Hamburg, Latvia, Lithuania, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Norway, Poland, Schleswig-Holstein and Sweden participated in the meeting.
Introduction
BSPC President Alfons Röblom opened the meeting in the Estonian parliament building. As the first event of Åland’s presidency, he promised they would work tirelessly on strengthening the Baltic Sea as the region’s lifeline, as the current BSPC Strategy and Programme said. Mr Röblom had already represented the BSPC at the Baltic Assembly, the Benelux Parliament, and the Nordic Council.
Presentations
Mr Tõnis Nirk, Ambassador-at-Large for Baltic Sea Cooperation in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Estonia, and Chairman of the CBSS Committee of Senior Officials
Mr Tõnis Nirk said that the CBSS, as a unique platform, was ideally suited to discussing foreign policy issues among the like-minded countries of the Baltic Sea region. Russian aggression, especially hybrid threats, threatened all of Europe. Estonia had been targeted several times, with damages sustained by the critical infrastructure. The June CBSS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting had been dedicated to this issue.
Under the Estonian presidency, the CBSS would continue its strong support for Ukraine, Ambassador Nirk went on, focusing on civil protection, anti-trafficking, border guard cooperation, and youth protection. But they could learn from Ukraine about societal resilience in a crisis. In practical cooperation, Estonia was focused on strengthening resilience and sustainability, in particular, raising crisis awareness, developing early warning systems, effective child protection policies, and anti-trafficking. Building on the German and Finnish presidencies, Estonia would pursue establishing green corridors for shipping in the region and was preparing to create a digital twin of the Baltic Sea. Youth involvement was also high on the agenda. Cooperation with organisations like the BSPC was crucial, in particular on topics where each partner had their own strengths.
Mr Mikko Polvinen asked about concrete actions by the CBSS against the Russian shadow fleet. He furthermore highlighted the Finnish programme Singing Heritage Roots as a way of bolstering culture in the region.
Ambassador Nirk acknowledged the difficulties in dealing with these vessels in international waters. Voluntary inspections were one measure taken by Estonian authorities, but coordinated regional actions were still being elaborated. Regarding the mentioned Finnish programme Singing Heritage Roots, Mr Nirk referred to the Baltic Region Heritage Committee.
Mr Johannes Schraps inquired on plans for a Heads of Government and the Ministerial meeting and the cooperation with the parliamentary dimension.
While there were no plans for the former, Ambassador Nirk said the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting would be held on 14 – 15 May 2025 in Tallinn. He promised to look into the parliamentary cooperation.
Given the increased security challenges in the Baltic Sea region and the current priority focus on security and safety, BSPC Secretary General Bodo Bahr asked about the balance between security needs and sustainability goals.
Mr Nirk pointed to the CBSS’s three long-term priorities: safety and security, prosperity, and regional identity. Geopolitics had forced resources to be primarily directed towards the first priority.
Mr Bodo Bahr was interested in further cooperation between the CBSS and HELCOM on sea-dumped munitions.
Mr Johannes Schraps suggested that, as the environment ministers were responsible for sea-dumped munitions in most countries, a CBSS Ministerial Meeting of these departments might be helpful. He also wondered about possible focal shifts with the new heading of the CBSS Secretariat.
Ambassador Nirk appreciated HELCOM’s work, which should be the focus. He underlined that HELCOM was the competent leader regarding dumped munitions while the CBSS supported their efforts through network building. The new Director General of the Secretariat was very experienced in both the CBSS and security issues, so the transition was very smooth.
Ms Mayri Tiido, Circular Economy expert
Ms Mayri Tiido focused mostly on capacity building, interpreting for ministries what the circular economy would mean for them. She noted that some believed the circular economy was about sorting waste and retrieving, say, metals for reuse. But it was a wider concern. There are two principles of the circular economy: First, it had to be considered whether solutions would decrease the demand for raw materials; second, a reduction in waste generation had to be looked at. This could be achieved through measures such as the sharing economy – e.g., car sharing –, maintaining and repairing items but also refurbishing. Energy-demanding recycling should be one of the last options because reuse consumes far fewer resources. Furthermore, some products had been designed to never be disassembled or repaired. As such, for the circular economy, different designs were needed that enabled them to stay in circulation. Ms Tiido stressed her view that all companies should think about how to be less dependent on virgin raw materials and generate less waste.
She mentioned examples: At the Nordic Circular Summit two weeks later, the Baltic Circular Hotspot would be launched for more cooperation between various organisations. She presented a cardboard alternative from textile waste for packaging, reusable up to twenty times. It could also be recycled. The Estonian company was aiming at luxury packaging but also e-commerce. Unfortunately, a similar strategy had failed with another product recently. Another example was related to Estonia deriving its energy primarily from oil shale: A company was working on a pilot factory to retrieve calcium carbonate and iron from oil shale ashes. This was promising because the current production of calcium carbonate was environmentally harmful, so alternatives were prized by, e.g., the paint industry. There were 600 million tonnes of such ashes available, she added. A third example was a company offering lifecycle services to other enterprises and organisations to enhance the circular use of electronic devices, among others, through repair and refurbishment. They were looking to make reused devices the first choice in many respects. Furthermore, she spoke about a Circular Economy Centre in Tallinn featuring various repair rooms, such as for bicycles or sewing machines. In cross-border cooperation, the bottle deposit system in Estonia and Latvia had been joined despite considerable challenges, as well as that of Latvia and Lithuania.
Ms Kristina Herbst asked for details about the deposits.
Ms Tiido confirmed that it was about collecting cans and bottles, to her understanding by unifying the barcodes. She could return an Estonian bottle in Latvia and receive her deposit back.
Mr Henrik Møller pointed to the problem that some 40 % of goods coming through Antwerp harbour were cheap Chinese products that were hard to recycle or refurbish. With better cooperation not only in the Baltic Sea region but across Europe, their entry into the market should be made more difficult.
Ms Tiido agreed, noting the problems of the consumer society. The circular economy was about reducing the extraction of materials and keeping those already extracted in circulation. She noted that CFC gases had been outlawed decades earlier because of their environmental harm and believed that, similarly, products that did not fit current prescriptions should be regulated rather than allowed anything in a free market.
Mr Johannes Schraps appreciated the best practice examples. He asked if the EU’s Waste Framework Directive from more than a decade before was still sufficient or in what places steps forward should be taken.
Ms Tiido mentioned the EU’s five-year Circular Economy Action Plan, which was in its second iteration. Its focal areas guided funding, such as in textiles or construction. She called the current linear economy a race to the bottom, always looking for the cheapest option. A circular economy would be about bringing back jobs intensive in human labour, such as repairs. According to her experience and research, the market would never regulate itself towards a circular economy.
Ms Merle Maigre, Senior Cyber Security Expert at the e-Governance Academy
Ms Merle Maigre said she would discuss the values of cyber capacity building, the possible threats in the Baltic Sea region, and possible responses.
Through cyber capacity building, neighbouring countries such as Ukraine or Moldova could be influenced. Since 2002, the Estonian non-profit e-Governance Academy has served as an implementor of various national development projects in the digital transformation across the globe. For instance, they were advising the Ukrainian government in the digital transformation and cyber security. Ms Maigre underlined that cyber security had to be at the core of the digital transformation, from inception to delivery. The Academy advised on policy, helped draft and consulted on cyber security legislation and institution building. In technical areas, they assisted partners in building critical information infrastructure, protection, risk management; they also provided cyber security hardware, software, and licenses as well as training to build governmental cyber capacities. All of that was financed by donor money, from the EU and other international or bilateral aid agencies. Currently, her team was active in Moldova, in the Western Balkans, in Ukraine, in Georgia, and soon in Central Asia.
Cyber security should not be treated as a separate issue, Ms Maigre said, but rather as an enabler of the various digital society functions. It should support and enhance other state priorities, e.g., foreign policy, security, economy, and defence. Digital dividends were only possible when the digital infrastructure was reliable. Just as important was defending the fundamental online rights and freedoms. She saw Estonia as an example of scoring highly in both respects. Information sharing was a crucial aspect, and she urged the parliamentarians to demand more briefings on cyber threats. The more this was done, the more people became aware of cyber threats. Ms Maigre clarified that fundamental online rights and freedoms, benefiting people, trust, collaborative efforts, transparencies, protection reflected the values of liberal democracies.
Moving on to geopolitical threats, she acknowledged the recent rise in strategic cyber operations. China clearly posed a global risk, not least because all Chinese companies were connected to the state and party. The Chinese government had developed a growing system of hacking outlets and data brokers. The most notable recent case had been an operation that, since 2021, had penetrated information technology companies and organisations as well as attempting to access water grid companies. It had only been revealed in February 2024 that sleeper code had been deposited which could have been activated in the case of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Ms Maigre underlined that, with the globalisation of trade, attacks on US companies also affected the Baltic Sea region. Cyber espionage was another aspect of Chinese strategy. She noted an Estonian warning about Chinese technology involved in such manoeuvres; as a result, all such technology might have to be abandoned one day. One example was the Chinese monopoly on solar panels which might prove another trap in the transition from fossil fuel to renewable energies.
As for the vast swathe of Russian threats, she focused on several security agencies raising the alarm on Russian contacts to organised crime. The latter were carrying out cyber attacks combined with physical surveillance and sabotage. In May of that year, Europol had arrested members of such a gang from Poland and Ukraine, the leader a Russian national who was still at large in his country. Russia’s cyber war in Ukraine had proved to be an extension of military conflict. Aside from Ukraine’s own defences, international companies like Microsoft had also played a successful role in that regard. Yet dependence on private service providers carried its own risks. Thus, Ms Maigre recommended keeping the potential drawbacks in mind when using these companies in geopolitical conflicts.
As for response measures, much like personal responsibility in recycling, she underlined the importance of real-time exercises of cyber threats. Parliaments had the resources to organise such simulations to better understand the implications. The e-Governance Agency organised technical simulations as well as those targeting the administrative/legislative level. In September 2022, the Nordic foreign ministers had taken part in a discussion-based strategic exercise, testing their role and options during a cyber attack. Ms Maigre believed similar exercises to be very useful to better understand what was needed as well as possible.
BSPC President Alfons Röblom wondered if the good guys might ever be stronger than the bad guys.
Ms Maigre was afraid this would never happen. In security, one had to keep running to stand still. However, constantly staying up to date, training the respective staff, investing in people and money to keep systems secure gave them a fighting chance.
Mr Johannes Schraps noted examples of companies hit by digital ransom attacks. With the dynamic development of the field, it often seemed overwhelming. That also applied to politics. He asked about how to reach that balance between security and personal freedom.
Ms Maigre divided the possible measures into individual, organisational, and national/state measures. At the individual level, she recommended basic cyber hygiene practices, such as two-factor authentication or VPN connections. Organisations should be responsible for their own network security and have cyber security intertwined with general management. She felt that companies that had been attacked should share their findings rather than hide what had happened. That was very useful information. At the national level, it was about coordinating and encouraging private-public partnerships, having the political will to ensure that the national cyber defence was up to date as well as concrete ownership of the tasks.
Mr Johannes Schraps wondered how they could be proactive rather than reactive.
Ms Maigre said that pre-emptive measures – such as cyber hygiene or information exchange – were combined with responsive ones in cyber security.
Mr Rüdiger Strempel, HELCOM Executive Secretary
Mr Rüdiger Strempel sketched out the history and structure of HELCOM, encompassing the 10 Contracting Parties – the EU and the nine countries around the Baltic Sea – as well as the secretariat as the executive branch, the Helsinki Commission as the policymakers, and the eight working and three expert groups providing the scientific information. Over 200 recommendations – not legally binding – had been adopted over the past 50 years, some of them still in effect. The broader picture was covered by action plans, in particular the 2022 Baltic Sea Action Plan. Monitoring was implemented through thematic and holistic assessments. He pointed out that, due to Russia being one of the Contracting Parties, a so-called strategic pause had been enacted. This meant that all official meetings had been postponed, so that the remaining Contracting Parties met informally.
The HELCOM vision was a good environmental status of the Baltic Sea which was still a long way off. This had been proven by the latest holistic assessment from the preceding year. In addition to eutrophication, pollution, and other factors, climate change was warming the Baltic Sea region twice as much as the rest of the world. Transformative changes across all sectors, countries, and stakeholders were needed.
Despite this bleak outlook, Mr Strempel highlighted two good points: Firstly, their ecosystem knowledge and the respective policies had developed substantially. In particular, it was now clear that measures to reduce the pressure on the Baltic Sea did work – if they were implemented. These centred around the 2022 Baltic Sea Action Plan which featured 199 actions, some of which had already been put into place while others were still in that process. Ownership for each action by at least one HELCOM body was assured. Their achievement was measured by specific criteria.
Mr Strempel moved on to fisheries and shipping which were part of so-called sea-based pressures. HELCOM and the IMO cooperated on shipping in the Baltic Sea region. That had brought about sharper regulations for ships entering the Baltic Sea. 69 of the Baltic Sea Action Plan’s actions dealt with maritime issues, such as sewage inlets and wastewater disposal. The Russian shadow fleet posed a new problem in this regard. He went on to speak about annual exercises to deal with oil spills, simulated by popcorn, and twice-annual aerial surveillance exercises. Due to this cooperation, there had not been major incidents in the Baltic Sea for a long time. Submerged munitions were a topic HELCOM had been dealing with since 1993. Unfortunately, the situation – and the shells – was deteriorating. With 300,000 tonnes of conventional munitions and 40,000 tonnes of chemical munitions in the German part of the Baltic Sea alone, the threat would have to be mitigated quickly. There was no time left to lose to address it. HELCOM had two related actions in its Baltic Sea Action Plan and was involved in three projects working on this issue. Although fisheries was not directly in HELCOM’s remit, they were cooperating in implementing ecosystem-based fisheries management, reducing by-catch, and other issues.
Looking forward, Lithuania was currently chairing HELCOM. Its priorities were to strengthen HELCOM’s role in geopolitical challenges, balancing the Blue Economy with environmental protection, and involving the public in decision-making. Aside from taking part in the UN Ocean Decade Conference and the Our Oceans Conference, HELCOM had celebrated its 50th anniversary in April 2024. He highlighted the conference Sustainable Agriculture for a Healthy Baltic Sea, noting that agriculture was a primary source of eutrophication. In the coming year, a Baltic Stakeholder Conference would deal with hazardous substances because these had recently been found to prove an equal threat as eutrophication.
Ms Hanna Westerén asked what the parliamentarians could do about the Russian shadow fleet.
Mr Strempel said that one litre of oil could contaminate 1 million litres of water. This illustrated the magnitude of the existing shipping, now exacerbated by a fleet of dubious technical states. To counter the ecological risk, it had to be assessed, and preparations were needed should an incident occur. HELCOM was not currently involved.
Considering the wide range of tasks HELCOM was pursuing and the mentioned 199 actions featured in the current 2022 Baltic Sea Action Plan Mr Bodo Bahr inquired which had the highest priority to be implemented.
Mr Strempel felt that all of the actions in the Baltic Sea Action Plan were vital. However, he pointed out that eutrophication was still a massive issue for the Baltic Sea and related to climate change, biodiversity, and pollution. Hazardous substances had recently been upgraded to a greater threat than had previously been understood. He added plastic pollution as an increasing problem. What mattered most, though, was a strong, iron-clad political will to tackle all of these concerns. That also included the funding for these actions, which currently was looking precarious.
In the second part of the session, the Standing Committee engaged in an in-depth review of several ongoing BSPC matters. This included an assessment and follow-up of the 33rd Annual Conference and the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum, updates on the work of the BSPC Working Group on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, and Connectivity (ESSRC), which will hold its next meeting in Bergen, Norway, from 24 to 26 November 2024, and the activities of BSPC rapporteurs. Additionally, the Committee discussed the BSPC Strategy and Work Programme for 2024-2025, initial plans for the 34th BSPC in Mariehamn from 24-26 August 2025, and considerations for implementing a rotational system for BSPC presidencies.
Further topics included advancing previous decisions about a working group to develop a future structure to ensure greater organisational independence for the BSPC and establish a long-term structural solution for the Secretariat. The Standing Committee also reviewed plans for modernising the BSPC website and made firm decisions on budgetary matters.