The BSPC Standing Committee gathered in the European Parliament in Brussels to look into the European Commission’s recent achievements in the bioeconomy, fishery and oceans, shipping and response, and the ongoing threat of hybrid and cyber-attacks.
Representatives of the European Parliament, particularly the Vice-Presidents of the European Parliament, Ms Christel Schaldemose and Mr Roberts Zīle , former EU Commissioner MEP Virginijus Sinkevičius and MEP Rasa Juknevičienė,the European Commission, namely EU Commissioner Mr Costas Kadis, representatives of the GD Environment, HELCOM, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and NATO discussed the current challenges in Europe, former and current main activities of the EU Commission regarding the Ocean Policy, shipping and response as well as benefits of the bioeconomy for the Baltic Sea Region.
Further preparations were made for the annual conference in Mariehamn on 24-26 August.
More than 40 participants, representatives and delegations of the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM) and the BSPC members from the Åland Islands, the Baltic Assembly, the European Parliament, Denmark, Estonia, the German Bundestag, Finland, Hamburg, Latvia, Lithuania, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the Nordic Council, Norway, Poland, Schleswig-Holstein and Sweden participated in the meeting.
Introduction
BSPC President Alfons Röblom welcomed the Standing Committee to the traditional winter meeting at the European Parliament in Brussels.
Welcome Word by Mr Roberts Zīle, the Vice-President of the European Parliament, responsible for the Baltic/Nordic/Arctic countries, including the Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, the Barents Parliamentary Conference, the Northern Dimension Parliamentary Forum, the Nordic Council and the West Nordic Council
Current Challenges in Europe and the Future of Europe
Mr Zīle stressed that, amidst all the changes, security remained a top priority on which decisive action was required for the survival of the region as a democratic and prosperous area. He acknowledged the threat of the Russian shadow fleet and other vessels in the Baltic Sea. In light of the recent US-Russian agreement to talk about Ukraine without European involvement, Mr Zīle said that strong action was needed. He then pointed to the upcoming presentations which would highlight further important areas.
President Röblom noted that his homeland of Åland was called the “Islands of Peace”, underlining that the world needed more examples of peace.
Presentations
Presentation on Recent accomplishments and future plans in the Baltic Sea area by Former Commissioner, MEP Virginijus Sinkevičius, European Parliament
Mr Virginijus Sinkevičius saw the importance of the Baltic Sea on the rise in recent years, propelled not least by challenges requiring pan-European solutions, such as Brexit and the pandemic. He regretted the poor condition of the Baltic Sea, lauding the work of HELCOM in improving this. The greatest achievement of the first von der Leyen Commission had been overhauling the energy situation, pointing to the Baltic States integrating into the European power grid, the European Wind Power Charter, and Greece joining the Three Seas Initiative. In environmental concerns, he stressed the Baltic Initiative bringing together all the environment and agriculture ministers from the Baltic Sea states. But clearing the Baltic Sea of the dumped munitions posing a dire threat was also high on the agenda.
With the geopolitical situation changing every day, he said that much of what they would hear at this meeting would have seemed science fiction five years ago but was the reality they had to cope with. The Baltic Sea would be the front to withstand imperial ambitions and defend the international rules of law established after World War II. Security was a paramount concern. Already in 2022, the EU had adopted a coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure, driven by the sabotage on the Nord Stream pipeline. He underlined that security also included the fragile environment of the Baltic Sea, which could affect nations dependent on the sea. In 2025, NATO would launch the Baltic Sentry Initiative to enhance its military presence. The various, increasing acts of sabotage were usually carried out by the Russian shadow fleet. In addition, the fleet was circumventing sanctions and in such poor conditions as to pose a constant ecological threat. Monitoring was therefore vital.
Mr Sinkevičius considered the Baltic Sea effectively a second theatre of the Russian war against the West. Meetings like this of the BSPC Standing Committee were vital to better understand the situation and align positions—much like the impromptu meeting of European heads of state in Paris on that same day. With more and more doubt cast on the transatlantic relationship, emboldening Russia, the Baltic Sea region would likely remain the front between imperialism and the free democratic world.
Mr Sinkevičius summarised that the security situation had heightened attention paid to the region, and the countries around the Baltic Sea had to understand they were on the front line and had to ensure their future was solely in their own hands, cooperating in economy, energy independence, defence, and the environment.
Secretary General Bodo Bahr emphasised the significance of these concerns, which had been at the core of BSPC discussions for more than a year. Underlining the severe risk posed by a potential oil spill from a Russian shadow fleet tanker, he recalled the critical achievements of BSPC and HELCOM in preventing large-scale environmental disasters in the Baltic Sea. Through close collaboration and concerted efforts, both organisations had successfully initiated far-reaching, legally binding international measures 25 years ago. The implementation of these regulations has, to date, effectively prevented a major tanker accident in the Baltic Sea despite a continuous increase in maritime traffic. However, he stressed that the current situation had drastically elevated the likelihood of such an accident. The risk level was now higher than ever, with a large-scale tanker disaster in the Baltic Sea becoming an increasingly real and imminent possibility. Should one of these ageing supertankers spill 100,000 litres of oil into the Baltic Sea, every litre of the Baltic Sea water would be contaminated 4,600 times. The catastrophic consequences would be almost unimaginable, with entire coastal economies facing devastation. The tourism industry in affected regions, for instance, could be completely wiped out for the next decade. He further noted that the January NATO Baltic Sea heads of state meeting had made significant progress in addressing this urgent issue. He questioned how preventive measures could be prioritised and saw the necessity of an enhanced role of the European Parliament in contributing to effective solutions. Reinforcing preventive frameworks, expanding surveillance mechanisms, and fostering deeper international cooperation were imperative to mitigating the risk of an environmental catastrophe in the region.
Mr Sinkevičius replied that putting more shadow fleet ships on the sanction list was critical since that would forbid them from entering and going to port in the Baltic Sea. Preventing disasters and sabotage meant protecting communities and was cheaper than monitoring and cleaning up. In addition, the shadow fleet was evading sanctions to funnel money into Russia to fuel its war machine. Mr Sinkevičius warned that Russia’s ambitions likely extended beyond Ukraine to the Baltic States and other democratic nations in the Baltic Sea region.
Presentation on How embracing the bioeconomy could benefit the Baltic Sea region by Mr Aurel Ciobanu-Dordea, Director for Circular Economy, DG ENVI, European Commission
Mr Ciobanu-Dordea stated that the Bioeconomy Initiative was still being elaborated by the European Commission. He stressed that the EU had to think more competitively, as part of strengthening its resilience in the geopolitical situation. The current bioeconomy initiative from 2018 has focused mainly on research and innovation. Its successor initiative – set to be adopted at the end of 2025 – was now in the responsibility of the Commissioner for the Environment. The bioeconomy had to move from pioneering work into the mainstream, boosting its manufacturing and market benefits, much like the circular economy.
With input from research, agriculture, biodiversity, and industrial policy fields as well as many economic stakeholders, the first important building block dealt with creating a sustainable source for bioeconomy production while avoiding conflicts with food and energy (biomass) production. 59 % of the biomass production in the EU was devoted to energy. So, a system of traffic lights should alleviate the permanent quarrels about the protection of nature as well as agriculture concerning biomass, establishing priority uses and rules to promote the intertwined growth of food, energy, and resource production. Mr Ciobanu-Dordea recommended using lesser-known sources, such as the municipal organic waste fraction, as well as organic wastes from agriculture and industrial processes, such as wood. Their usage would further reduce the aforementioned conflicts.
The second vital building block was identifying the principal demand areas. Only packaging was presently targeted. A planned regulation could target biowaste plastics. Yet the bioeconomy was much larger and should extend beyond alternatives to hazardous chemical substances: It might yield alternatives to critical raw materials. In general, the market opportunities from a strategic perspective had to be pinpointed to offer business incentives.
Mr Ciobanu-Dordea moved to the third building block as the possible incentives aside from legally mandatory requirements, the former stimulating innovation and scaling up production. The fourth building block was the global dimension of the bioeconomic policies in the EU. As one of the world’s largest interconnected markets, the EU was a coveted partner for bioeconomy champions such as Brazil, Canada, and Thailand. European policies had to reflect the EU’s domestic interests, creating a policy inspiring the EU’s trade policies as well. Finally, he noted that aquaculture and green production in the sea were also factors in scaling up production from the laboratory to the factory.
Mr Staffan Eklöf remarked that genetically modified organisms might reduce said conflicts, creating additional alternatives. Most Swedish parties considered genetic modification a central tool to make the bioeconomy successful. He asked whether this was reflected in the European Commission.
Mr Ciobanu-Dordea did not believe this relevant for the bioeconomy strategy but for the upcoming European Biotechnology Act. This hotly debated issue fell into the Health Commissioner’s purview.
Ms Delara Burkhardt, a member of the EU Parliament Environmental Commission, underlined that coherence was vital, appreciating that Mr Ciobanu-Dordea had reflected this. To avoid the greater use of biomass in the EU having spillover effects on the global south, she stressed that the bioeconomy needed to take a comprehensive and fully sustainable approach.
Mr Ciobanu-Dordea confirmed that his side was aware of this issue and were working on a coherent concept. At the end of the year, they would publish their results.
Presentation on the current Commission’s ocean policy, fisheries and the Oceans Pact by Commissioner for Fisheries and Oceans, Mr Costas Kadis, European Commission
EU Commissioner Mr Costas Kadis assured the Standing Committee that it was a top priority for the Commission to address the multiple challenges in the Baltic Sea. Reflection, dialogue, and understanding every aspect was critical for good policies, wherefore he would host Fisheries and Oceans Dialogues, Youth Dialogues, and Implementation Dialogues. Visiting coastal communities would provide direct feedback. This would feed into the 2040 Vision for a resilient, competitive, and sustainable fisheries and aquaculture sector, based on a wide range of studies and the EU’s own CFP evaluation. The latter would take into account economic, health, and social sustainability.
The poor state of the Baltic Sea was affecting coastal communities, shrinking fish stocks – some had collapsed, e.g., cod and western herring, while others were fragile, such as Bothnian herring. System recovery would be slow and lengthy, but inaction was not an option, Mr Kadis warned. Collaboration was crucial. The existing fisheries had to be protected, and strict adherence to regulations was needed to equally protect the remaining stocks. He noted that a conference on the Baltic Sea was to be organised as soon as possible, with the remit to review the implementation progress of already taken decisions and the Baltic Sea’s multiple challenges, in particular the decline of biodiversity.
Maritime security was just as important in the Baltic Sea, especially through the shadow fleet. Monitoring the marine infrastructure and environment was vital. Crucial here was the Common Information Sharing Environment for the Maritime Domain, enabling real-time information exchange between both civilian and military maritime authorities. The EU was strengthening efforts to protect undersea cables through enhanced information sharing, new detection technologies, and undersea repair capabilities. The Commission was also seeking to clear the vast dumped munitions from the Baltic Sea, providing more than 24 million euros in funding for the coastal state over the past decade to assess risks and map contaminated areas. In the spring of 2025, a new project – funded at 5.6 million euros – would develop new technologies for munition removal.
In the Ocean Agenda, Mr Kadis pointed to the European Oceans Pact, envisioning a holistic and coherent ocean policy approach. The Pact’s five strategic objectives were ensuring a healthy and productive ocean with good biodiversity, boosting the EU economy, consolidating the EU Marine Framework, reinforcing international ocean governance, and developing resilience for coastal communities. Knowledge and best practice sharing were also vital. He considered awareness, commitment, and shared responsibility crucial for achieving their goals. The Pact would be announced at the 2026 Oceans Conference. The Commission’s main priorities for 2025 included the ratification of the BBNG Agreement and further shaping the international platform for ocean sustainability (IPOS).
Mr Staffan Eklöf noted that the BSPC had called for lower fishing quotas in its latest resolution, asking the Commissioner about the current status. Mr Kadis conceded that misreporting on fishing was affecting the scientific advice on which the quota decisions were based. Yet scientific advice would continue to be at the heart of these decisions.
Ms Sabrina Repp wished to strengthen the participation and collaboration of the regions in the Baltic Sea, noting the importance of Interreg to rural and coastal areas. Mr Kadis replied that Interreg was not in his portfolio. However, synergies with other Commissioners were being pursued to support remote coastal and island communities. This would lead to initiatives in the near future.
Mr Een Eesmaa wondered about the Commission’s analysis of the Gulf Stream, here in respect to a threat to the eel population. Mr Kadis was aware of the fragility of the eel population, noting conservation efforts in some involved countries. He offered to send more information.
Mr Bahr asked for concrete reflections about enhancing ocean governance to strengthen infrastructure resilience in cooperation with, e.g., NATO. He further wondered about possible changes to the law to allow interventions in critical situations. Mr Kadis said that the general approach had been announced in December 2024. Measures on security, defence, environment, and other aspects had been proposed by Commissioners. Mr Kadis had proposed increased monitoring, including undersea drones. Discussions about these proposals were ongoing internally, with the goal of a holistic approach.
Mr Strempel began by citing the HELCOM Vision of a healthy Baltic Sea environment with diverse biological components functioning in balance, resulting in a good ecological status and supporting a wide range of sustainable and social activities. The Baltic Sea was a young but fragile ecosystem; in its current composition, it was younger than the pyramids of Giza. HELCOM estimated that there were some 50,000 ships entering or leaving the Baltic Sea annually, with at least 1,500 large vessels on the sea at any time. This made shipping of considerable concern to HELCOM.
As vital as shipping was, it carried problems such as anti-fouling paint, sewage or operational discharges, airborne emissions, underwater noise, and oil discharges – deliberate or not. One of the thematic segments of the Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP) was dedicated to sea-based activities, such as shipping. Two of the eight HELCOM Working Groups, Maritime and Response, were dealing with this issue. Mr Strempel noted that, due to its international nature, shipping was primarily regulated through the IMO. Still, HELCOM was proactive in amending IMO regulations in their implementation, such as sewage and navigational safety. As such, HELCOM was the voice of the Baltic Sea countries within the IMO.
Regarding response coordination, the Helsinki Convention obliged keeping the necessary equipment available and conducting regular exercises on sea and on land. There was also a HELCOM manual on response to marine pollution, detailing cooperation coordination, operational procedures, cooperation harmonisation, financial arrangements and the like that HELCOM was handling. The manual covered spills at sea, on shore as well as oiled wildlife.
The most recent surveillance report had been published in August 2024, showing that the number of observed spills had steadily declined, with most of them very small. 24 % were mineral oil, 76 % other types, such as fish oil, greywater, or novel fuels. The latter were problematic as there was little knowledge on how to best combat such spills. Furthermore, HELCOM was working on risk assessments, the so-called BRISK Analysis, covering 2009-2012. The follow-up project BRISK 2 had recently been launched, with EU funding, covering 2025-2026. It was aimed at enhancing disaster prevention and preparedness, focusing on a multi-hazard approach at sea and on land. This also included the shadow fleet.
On the busy Baltic Sea, with narrow shipping lanes and an increasing large number of vessels, the under-insured shadow fleet was in poor repair, the ship ownership unclear. The massive risk posed by the fleet also included the oft-neglected one of ship-to-ship transfers of e.g., oil. Respective recommendations were currently being overhauled.
Mr Strempel noted that HELCOM was presently under Lithuanian chairmanship. Its first priority was to strengthen HELCOM’s role in geopolitical challenges. The shadow fleet, a product of these challenges, on the one hand undercut sanctions. That was far outside HELCOM’s remit. The massive environmental impact, on the other hand, very much was within. Mr Strempel opined that HELCOM should be better involved in the various formats dealing with the shadow fleet, in particular the NBA+ activities, since HELCOM handled preventative and remediation efforts. Finally, he noted that HELCOM’s social media presence had switched from X/Twitter to Bluesky.
Presentation on Addressing the EU’s vulnerabilities to cyber and hybrid attacks, strengthening resilience, and bolstering the EU-NATO partnership by Mr Jukka Savolainen, a Director in the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats
Mr Jukka Savolainen focused on the recent maritime incidents, started by the Nord Stream sabotage. Unfortunately, the facts ended with the pipeline having been cut, while a narrative blaming Ukraine had spread, even as Russia claimed the USA were responsible. These narratives were negatively affecting public opinion. In October 2023, the Balticconnector gas pipeline had been severed. The vessel in question, which had hailed from China, had been identified, thus ending conspiracy theories. In November 2024, the Yi Ping 3 had cut telecommunication cables between Finland and Germany as well as between Sweden and Lithuania. Over Christmas 2024, the Eagle S had cut several cables, including a power supply from Finland to Estonia, and was stopped by Finnish authorities in the act of severing another line. Mr Savolainen stressed that this had been the first time a ship had been impounded, allowing a thorough investigation. Since then, another ship had been temporarily impounded by Swedish authorities after attacking a cable.
The countries around the Baltic Sea were vulnerable in various respects. He noted that publishing the cable locations made sense since most sea captains were keen to avoid them. Yet a single ship could cause serious harm to society, in particular in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea. As for the probability of these incidents being accidents, Mr Savolainen noted that nothing like this had happened in the past three or four decades in Finnish waters. With that, he countered so-called expert statements claiming that 40 % of severed cables were due to anchor accidents. Yet none of the circumstances of those accidents applied to the Baltic Sea, such as heavy oceanic winds or little known cable locations. In his view, these incidents were clearly deliberate. In the aftermath of the Eagle S incident, the Baltic Sea states and NATO had come together to launch a new operation, Baltic Sentry. Yet within a week, newspapers like the Washington Post were quoting unnamed European intelligence agents that all the incidents had been accidents. Mr Savolainen condemned these reports as misinformation for two reasons, the first being the high improbability and the second that the intelligence services would not undermine their governments right after Baltic Sentry having been started. The head of the Finnish intelligence service had gone on record that deliberate action could not be excluded.
Mr Savolainen believed that the purpose of these attacks had been to refine the methods and to test the Western response. The actual target would be the North Sea where incidents could black out vast areas, both in electricity and gas supply.
Mr Algirdas Razauskas asked if a ship entering the Baltic Sea would have to pass through national waters and could thus be boarded if suspicions had been raised. Mr Savolainen answered that this was the case. Entering from the Atlantic, a vessel would have to go through at least Danish or Swedish territorial waters. However, one of the main principles of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) was the Freedom of Navigation which guaranteed so-called transit passage through territorial waters from and to international waters. This was granted to all ships, even military vessels and aircraft. As such, there was no right to intervene in the Danish Strait.
President Röblom asked if there were any initiatives to change or amend the UNCLOS to enable interventions in suspicious cases. In particular, he wondered if the BSPC could support such initiatives. Mr Savolainen was aware of such aspirations from the environmental point of view. This was worth trying, not least to curtail the Russian avoidance of sanctions. Yet he warned that any serious blockade of the shadow fleet would be interpreted as an act of war by Russia. Therefore, a single country could not enact such a blockade. Instead, it had to be coalition-wide – across the EU or NATO. Actually changing the UNCLOS would take tens of years to negotiate. Yet international law was conditional, he noted, so that justifications for stopping ships could be found by legal experts. One such clause had been applied by Finland in the case of the Eagle S, for instance, because it had been the target of the attack. Mr Strempel noted that measures of this kind were beyond HELCOM.
Working Groups and Rapporteurs
The president noted that the next meetings of the Working Group on Energy Security, Self-Sustainability, Resilience, and Connectivity (ESSRC) would be in Stockholm in March 2025 and in Tallinn in May 2025. Mr Staffan Eklöf said the Stockholm meeting would focus on connections, transportation, and security, with visits to the Royal Institute of Technology regarding self-driving vehicles, to a company building electric vessels, and to the Swedish Coast Guard about maritime infrastructure monitoring. At the meeting proper, presentations would deal with security, the electric grid as well as the Swedish energy agency and government.
Prof Jānis Vucāns noted that the Baltic Assembly would be represented by the working group chairman, Mr Andris Kulbergs, and a representative from each Baltic country. The meeting in Tallinn was still being prepared so that the programme would be presented at the Stockholm meeting.
As a new working group would be formed at the annual conference, Prof Vucāns provided more information about the proposal from the Baltic Assembly about Strengthening the Cyber and Information Resilience of the Democratic Baltic Sea Region. He remarked that digital technologies had become the backbone of their political and social systems. They provided greater connections and efficiency. However, disinformation and cyber attacks have proved a tremendous challenge, spreading mistrust that could destabilise societies. This demanded a strategic and comprehensive response, to be elaborated in this new working group, building on findings of the current working group. Another focal point would be artificial intelligence and digital rights. Furthermore, the Baltic Assembly nominated Mr Meelis Kiili from the Estonian parliament as chairman, given his extensive experience in this field.
Mr Henrik Møller agreed that this context posed a severe threat to democracy and thus approved of the proposal.
The meeting agreed to forward the proposal to the annual conference.
BSPC Presidency after 2026/Rotation Principle
President Röblom noted the preliminary approval of instituting a rotation principle by the Standing Committee in Tallinn to introduce greater stability. The Secretariat had refined the suggested schedule to avoid election cycles and international obligations. Flexibility was built so that each presidency could exchange its position with the preceding or succeeding presidency if necessary. Mr Bahr informed the meeting that the Iceland delegation was still in the process of obtaining their parliament’s approval to take over the BSPC presidency.
All the delegations present agreed to the current proposal for a rotation procedure, aiming to result in a final decision by the Standing Committee at its June meeting and approval by the Annual Conference in Mariehamn.
BSPC Budget and Financial Planning
BSPC President Alfons Röblom laid out the key points from the 2024 budget. Expenditures slightly exceeded income, well within the approved framework, maintaining a healthy reserve of € 213,442. For 2025, the Standing Committee meetings and Working Group sessions would remain core budgetary priorities; additional resources allocated to the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum (BSPYF) and the BSPC communication strategy.
Secretary General Bodo Bahr reflected on the budget’s background and details, noting that the overspend was within the approved budget flexibility, covering the travel costs of the BSPYF youth participants. The reserves would guarantee operational stability for one year, even in unforeseen circumstances. The budget management had been successfully transferred from Mecklenburg-Vorpommern to Schleswig-Holstein.
The Standing Committee unanimously agreed to the financial report for 2024 and confirmed the previous agreement on the budget plan proposal for 2025.
The Current Geopolitical Situation and its Impact on the Baltic Sea Region
BSPC President Röblom gave a brief overview of recent developments, such as the new European Commission and Parliament terms, changes in transatlantic relations, and the ongoing shift in the threat landscape.
Incentive contribution by MEP Rasa Juknevičienė
Ms Rasa Juknevičienė hoped that future historians would not write about the present day like the 1930s and 1940s. Yet, one had to be prepared for the worst in order to avoid the worst. Well-founded warnings had to be heeded, like those of the eastern countries against cooperation with Russia. The most crucial action these days was uniting in support for Ukraine, even without the USA. Too much time had been wasted talking and worrying, and the situation had worsened. She noted that Putin was representing a new totalitarian ideology with ambitions far beyond Ukraine. Unfortunately, the same values had now risen to the top of the USA. Ms Juknevičienė considered this a fight between autocracies and democracies, in which she saw the democratic side failing. She highlighted President Zelenskyy’s speech at the Munich Security Conference as that of a great European leader. One question was whether NATO still existed. She stressed that it was a delusion Western states would have a secure little corner of the world amid the expansive forces of the new fascism.
Mr Henrik Møller referenced the US president’s demand to purchase Greenland from Denmark and how that had affected the debate in the country. He further noted the increasing expansionist ideas from the US president, extending to Mexico, Canada, Panama, and most recently, the Gaza Strip. This debate would continue, but in dealing with the US, more cautious language might be better advised. As for the BSPC making a statement on the situation, he proposed to wait until after the elections in Greenland on 11 March to learn of their position.
Ms Kristina Herbst agreed that President Zelenskyy’s speech was highly praised. Yet she wondered if there could be a path forward together in light of countries such as Hungary.
Ms Juknevičienė maintained hope, such as that the far right would not win the German elections. Action was needed. She also underlined the importance of Greenland and the Arctic. She expected greater seriousness in matters of defence, pointing to a calculation that an EU citizen had only paid the equivalent of 1 ½ cups of coffee to support Ukraine. She compared it to Russia spending 10 % of its GDP on its armed forces while Europe was not even reaching 2 %. They could not wait for Hungary or Slovakia to change their minds. Action had to be taken right away to defend Europe, in every respect, also e.g., banking. Yet, without the US, Europe was very weak. She called the continent hostages of decades of US dependence.
Mr Mikko Polvinen commented on US Vice President Vance’s remark that Europe and the US no longer shared values. Mr Polvinen found this quite dangerous. He also noted that Musk’s X was promoting those parties sharing the current US regime’s values. He asked about Ms Juknevičienė’s opinion regarding these value differences. Furthermore, he said that people and companies were moving away from regions bordering Russia, such as his home region. He wondered if the EU’s MFF was a tool to help in this matter.
Ms Juknevičienė did not believe the Vance speech was about values. It had been only in support of the far-right AfD in Germany. He was adopting Russian narratives. In addition, the only time Article 5 of NATO had been invoked had been to help the USA. Yet the US were now threatening to cancel their solidarity with Europe. She quoted famous historian Timothy Snyder, who had written on Bluesky that everybody had been asking him to decode Vance’s speech at the Security Conference. Snyder had explained that “free speech” to Vance meant letting Musk run elections, and “democracy” meant letting Russia run elections. 2025 was about what Europeans did, not what Americans said. As for regions bordering and threatened by Russia, she said it was the European Union’s task to help these. Yet the economy was not the only thing that mattered, she warned. She remarked that in the recent European elections, the former East Germany had shown on the electoral map their strong support for the AfD. The influence of social media was an important topic. She worried that artificial intelligence would be the primary topic of upcoming elections.
Prof Jānis Vucāns noted that the Baltic states had begun their decoupling from the Soviet Union in the Gorbachev era but had only completed it two weeks earlier by integrating their power grid into the European network. He further noted to ongoing transit of goods through the Baltics into Europe. That flow had to be stopped for good to ensure that Russia would receive no money. In light of the new US regime, Europe had to guarantee its autonomy. Prof Vucāns also touched upon Russia-bordering regimes and a lack of investment there, highlighting the influence there from Russian media affecting the minds and values. Economic investments meant shoring up their values as being part of Europe. Another point was financing military production, which was still being run on peacetime parameters. Solutions were needed, and the BSPC was a forum to initiate and reinforce these discussions.
Preparation for the 34th BSPC Annual Conference and Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum in Mariehamn
President Röblom explained that the conference theme—“The Baltic Sea—Our Lifeline: Cooperation, Security, and Sustainability”—reflected the BSPC work of the past year. The draft programme focused on core maritime challenges, security and hybrid threats, energy security, and intergenerational dialogue. High-profile speakers had been invited.
Prof Jānis Vucāns said that the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum (BSPYF) had proven a very important component. He noted a quite active representative from the Baltic delegations keen to take part in the forum.
Ms Sabrina Repp explained that she had been part of the BSPYF in 2023, an experience she highly valued. Now a European parliamentarian, she very much wanted to be involved in this year’s forum.
Mr Röblom noted the engagement and underlined the forum’s importance. The exact practical implementation will be discussed in the near future with the CBSS and Regeneration 2030.
Other Matters
In the follow-up to the 33rd BSPC Resolution, BSPC President Alfons Röblom informed the Standing Committee that the state parliaments of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Schleswig-Holstein had formally debated and approved the resolution. The goal remained to receive the governmental statements by 15 April 2025.
Ms Anita Kucharska-Dziedzic announced that the Polish region of West Pomerania was planning to apply for observer status in the BSPC. She noted that the regional parliament was already active in several supraregional organisations.
Mr Himanshu Gulati lauded the representatives from the European Parliament taking part in the meeting for their interesting contributions.
BSPC President Alfons Röblom thanked all distinguished speakers for their valuable contributions, the excellent support from the hosts at the European Parliament, all who have been involved in preparing this meeting for their dedicated efforts, namely Secretary General Bodo Bahr for his planning, intensive efforts and engagement in preparing and managing this meeting and all delegations for their engagement and insights and ongoing productive conversation during the further programme.
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Evening Discussions at the BSPC Standing Committee Meeting in Brussels
As the formal proceedings of the BSPC Standing Committee meeting concluded, participants gathered for an evening of in-depth discussions, reflecting on the pressing themes of the day. Against the backdrop of the European Parliament’s twelfth-floor venue, offering a panoramic view of Brussels, speakers engaged in an intense exchange of ideas on geopolitical security, cooperation, and resilience in the Baltic Sea region.
Vice-President of the European Parliament, Ms Christel Schaldemose, extended a warm welcome to all attendees, underlining the significance of cross-border cooperation in these unprecedented times and emphasising that collaboration among like-minded nations was now more critical than ever. She assured participants that their discussions would play an essential role in strengthening regional security and stability. Acknowledging the setting, she invited participants to appreciate the exceptional view from the venue, though she highlighted that the evening’s focus should remain on fostering a meaningful dialogue.
BSPC President Alfons Röblom then took the floor, introducing Ambassador Jean-Charles Ellermann-Kingombe, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Innovation, Hybrid, and Cyber. He expressed his gratitude for the Ambassador’s presence, particularly in light of his unavailability earlier in the day due to unforeseen commitments. He underscored the relevance of the Ambassador’s expertise in NATO’s cyber and hybrid security measures, particularly as they pertain to the Baltic Sea region. Röblom reiterated the BSPC’s long-standing emphasis on enhancing regional cooperation within NATO, particularly following the accession of Finland and Sweden. He referenced the Helsingør resolution, which outlined key policy recommendations for governments regarding NATO’s role in safeguarding the region. Among these, he stressed the need for integrating maritime surveillance, strengthening regional defence mechanisms, and enhancing NATO’s presence in the Baltic Sea. He concluded by inviting Ambassador Ellermann-Kingombe to share his insights on the evolving security landscape.
Addressing the gathering, Ambassador Jean-Charles Ellermann-Kingombe provided a strategic overview of NATO’s current approach to hybrid and cyber threats, emphasising that recent years had witnessed a sharp increase in hostile activities—both in frequency and intensity. He highlighted that hybrid warfare tactics had evolved significantly, encompassing acts of sabotage, cyberattacks, and disruptions to critical infrastructure. He warned against viewing such incidents in isolation, as they formed part of broader strategic efforts to destabilise NATO member states. He further noted that Russia’s military doctrine specifically incorporated hybrid threats as an early-stage tactic to weaken adversaries before escalating to more direct confrontations.
The Ambassador elaborated on NATO’s forthcoming hybrid strategy, set to be unveiled at the Hague Summit in June. He underscored the need to shift from a purely defensive posture to a proactive deterrence strategy, aimed at reducing the likelihood of hybrid threats materialising in the first place. Central to this approach was the enhancement of situational awareness, with a greater emphasis on identifying patterns and trends rather than reacting to isolated incidents. NATO, he stated, was committed to intensifying its presence in the Baltic Sea through the newly launched Baltic Sentry initiative, which involved an increased deployment of naval and aerial assets for real-time surveillance and rapid response capabilities.
A crucial aspect of NATO’s evolving strategy, the Ambassador explained, was the integration of asymmetric responses to hybrid threats. Given the constraints imposed by international legal frameworks and NATO’s commitment to upholding democratic values, traditional military retaliation was often not feasible. Instead, NATO sought to impose costs on adversaries through non-conventional means, such as increased military deployments, economic sanctions, and targeted cyber operations. He noted that recent incidents in the Baltic Sea, including the sabotage of undersea infrastructure, had demonstrated the urgent need for better coordination between NATO, the EU, and private sector stakeholders. Enhanced cooperation, particularly with private entities that manage critical infrastructure, would be essential in strengthening resilience against future threats.
Ambassador Ellermann-Kingombe concluded by stressing that hybrid threats could not be countered solely through military means. A comprehensive, multi-faceted approach was required—one that combined cybersecurity measures, intelligence sharing, economic countermeasures, and strategic communication. He urged parliamentarians to play an active role in shaping policies that would bolster national and regional resilience, advocating for enhanced legislative frameworks to address emerging security challenges.
The evening’s discussions provided an invaluable platform for an open and candid exchange of views, reinforcing the BSPC’s commitment to fostering cooperation in the face of evolving security threats. The insights shared during the session would undoubtedly inform ongoing deliberations within both NATO and the Baltic Sea parliamentary community as they worked towards a more secure and resilient region.
More photos of the Standing Committee can be viewed at the following link:
Standing Committee of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference – Multimedia Centre