Front page of the BSPC Resolution adopted in Mariehamn, 26 August 2025

Conference ResolutionAdopted by the 34th Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC)Mariehamn, Åland Islands, 26 August 20251The participants, elected representatives from theParliament of DenmarkParliament of EstoniaParliament of FinlandParliament of the Federal Republic of GermanyParliament of IcelandParliament of LatviaParliament of LithuaniaParliament of NorwayParliament of PolandParliament of SwedenParliament of ÅlandParliament of the Hanseatic City of BremenParliament of Faroe IslandsParliament of the Free and Hanseatic City of HamburgParliament of GreenlandParliament of Mecklenburg -VorpommernParliamen t of Schleswig -HolsteinBaltic AssemblyEuropean ParliamentNordic Council,assembling in Mariehamn, Åland Islands , on 26 August 202 5 express strong and unconditional support for the people of Greenland and theirinalienable right to decide over their own country and future, a fundamental andinviolable principle of international law ; acknowledge the intensifying geopolitical, ecological, and socio -economicchallenges in the Baltic Sea Region, requiring renewed commitment to multilateralcooperation, democratic resilience, and sustainable development; welcome the 2025 CBSS Ministerial Declaration adopted in Vihula, Estonia;https://cbss.org/ministerialdeclaration2025 as well as the 2025 VASAB MinisterialTallinn Declaration on Spatial Resilience ( https://vasab.org/wp -content/uploads/2025/07/VASAB_Ministerial_Tallinn _Declaration_on_Spatial_Resilience.pdf ) underlining the shared priorities of democratic cohesion, societal resilience, andstrengthened regional security in line with the objectives of the BSPC; reaffirm their steadfast commitment to the sovereignty, ind ependence, andterritorial integrity of Ukraine; support the efforts of Ukraine to become a member of the EU; express their deep concern over recent hybrid attacks and acts of sabotage againstunder water infrastructure, the intensification of shadow fleet operations, and thegrowing risk posed by outdated and uninsured commercial ships operating in theBaltic Sea;2 recognise the progress made in intergovernmental coordination, including themeetings of NA TO Heads of State and Government in Helsinki (14 January 2025 ),the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of CriticalUndersea Infrastructure in the Baltic Sea (16 May 2025), the Joint Declarationconcerning Baltic Sea Security (5 Ju ne 2025) and the NATO Summit in The Hague(24–26 June 2025); underline, in light of the progress achieved th rough the Helsinki Summit on14 January 2025 and its follow -up initiatives, the validity of the BSPC’s repeatedcalls for an institutionalised summit -level dialogue among the democratic Heads ofGovernment of the Baltic Sea Region; recall, in view of this year’s evolving geopolitical developments, that democracy,the rule of law, ecological sustainability and human rights constitute fundamentaland non -negotiable core values of the BSPC; reiterate the need to protect vulnerable groups: protect the rights and ensure thesafety of refugees, ethnic minorities, LGBTQ people, women, children, the elderlyand other vulnerable groups who are particula rly at risk in times of war andthreatened by intolerant attitudes , and d efend sexual and reproductive autonomyand respect the right to reproductive health; emphasi se the critical importance of effective diplomacy , also between parliaments ,as a cornerstone of stability, conflict prevention, and sustainable cooperation ; emphasise with utmost clarity that international cooperation – including amongpartners within a shared framework of collective defence – must be based on theprinciples of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic governance, andfull respec t for international law; emphasise the fundamental importance of cooperation between democraticinstitutions, the private sector and civil society in safeguarding freedom, stability,and prosperity in the Baltic Sea Region ; note with interest the ambitions of the recently presented EU Ocean Pact and thefocus to coordinate and enhance implementation of all ocean -related policies toimprove the protection and restoration of ocean health; welcom e, in particular , the Ocean Pact ’s specific and urgent priority to address thepoor status of the Baltic Sea , to hold a high -level event , and to strengthen thecooperation with existing regional bodies such as HELCOM; recogni se that the decline of Baltic Sea fish stocks is a threat to th e ecosystem,coastal communities ’ livelihoods , and all Baltic Sea countries ’ food security and foodsovereignty; commend the strong involvement of youth voices, exemplified by the Baltic SeaParliamentary Youth Forum (BSPYF) as well as other youth institutions activelyengaged across the Baltic Sea Region; support, uphold and strengthen Baltic Sea Region cultural and educational ties, co -operation and projects as foundations of our identity and cornerstones of ourcommon values;3 call on the Governments in the Baltic Sea Region, the CBSS, and the EURegarding Geopolitical Challenges – Safeguarding Democracy andStability in the Baltic Sea Region to1. Reaffirm their unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty andterritorial integrity and maintain a unified stance against Russia’s continuedaggression, occupation, and violations of international law, including in the Balticmaritime domain.2. Increase collective deterrence and preparedness against hybrid threats,including sabotage of critical maritime infrastructure, cyberattacks, andinformation manipulation, by improving threat analysis, institutional resilience ,and joint rapid response capacities.3. Underline the importance of actively pursuing peaceful solutions andupholding non -military measures for security in the Baltic Sea region — such asdiplomacy, international law, and cooperative regimes — even amid increasingmilitary investments and strategic defence efforts.4. Ensure that i ncreased defence and security cooperation , as required bythe geopolitical situation, is carried out with full respect for international legalregimes , such as the demilitarisation and neutralisation of the Åland Islands.5. Strengthen coordination between national security strategies anddemocratic safeguards , ensuring that responses to emerging security threatsfully respect the rule of law, fundamental rights , and parliamentary oversightwhile reaffirming the importance of free and independent media, transparentelectoral processes, and effective counter -disinformation measures as well asencouraging continued efforts to further enhance these essential pillars ofdemocratic resilience across the Baltic Sea Region . Enhance the involvement ofnon-governm ental organisations (NGOs), citizens' initiatives, and democraticwatchdogs in monitoring, early warning, and public communication mechanismsrelated to hybrid threats, cyber disinformation, and crisis management asbuilding trust and public legitimacy in crisis responses, echoing the EESC OpinionSOC/812’s call for structured cooperation between public institutions and NGO s.Intensify efforts across the Baltic Sea Region to counter disinformation, promotedigital literacy and secure free and pluralistic me dia. The BSPC supports thedevelopment of a European Democracy Shield and encourages joint initiativesbetween national parliaments, media actors, and civil society to increase societalresilience against hybrid threats.6. Expand cooperation with NATO and the EU to ensure sustained protectionof undersea infrastructure, maritime supply routes and vulnerable offshoreinstallations, including pipelines, cables, and wind farms; support and reinforceexisting NATO maritime security operations, such as Operation Baltic Sentry andCommander Task Force Baltic (CTF Baltic) .7. Deepen integration of European security policy and defence industry toensure the efficient use of resources. Support NATO’s ongoing efforts tostrengthen maritime security in the Baltic Sea, i ncluding enhanced operationsagainst the shadow fleet, the development of real -time hybrid threat responsecapabilities, and the establishment of permanent maritime monitoring throughjoint NATO –EU deployments.4 8. Promote the institutionalisation of a long-term NATO maritime securitymission in the Baltic Sea , building on current operational frameworks to createa permanent regional presence to deter hybrid and conventional threats .9. Ensure structured parliamentary participation in regional securityarchitecture , including in relevant NATO and EU forums on maritime security,critical infrastructure protection, and cyber defence; support the activeinvolvement of the BSPC in this dialogue .10. Strengthen CBSS and EU engagement in resilience -building, includ ingthrough enhanced political and financial support for projects under the EuropeanDefense Fund (EDF), the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), and the PermanentStructured Cooperation (PESCO) framework, as well as through multi -levelcooperation and the co ntribution of various organizations, including, amongothers, the ongoing work of ministers responsible for spatial planning anddevelopment with VASAB (Vision and Strategies around the Baltic Sea) toimprove territorial resilience in the Baltic Sea region ; jointly advocating foradequate EU funding for these programmes and supporting community -ledinitiatives, local social infrastructure, and the active participation of civil societyin relevant projects under the EDF, CEF, and PESCO .11. Strengthen the implementation of international maritime law in light ofemerging threats to ensure faster and more coordinated responses to futureincidents affecting the Baltic Sea, including through closer cooperation with theInternational Maritime Orga nization (IMO).12. Contribute to the alignment of national and EU maritime law and itsimplementation with the evolving threat landscape, ensuring consistentdefinitions of sabotage, criminal accountability for infrastructure attacks, andcoordinated prosecu tion frameworks.13. Ensure accountability for shadow fleet operations and expand sanctionsmechanisms targeting insurers, flag states pursuing unlawful activities, andlogistical operators enabling unlawful and environmentally hazardous Russiantanker traffic; consider the creation of Baltic Sea prohibited zones for uninsuredtankers and vessels violating sanctions regimes .Regarding Energy and Environmental Resilience and Protection of CriticalInfrastructure in the Baltic Sea Region to14. Ensure the well -being of all citizens in the Baltic Sea Region throughcoordinated action and shared commitment to human security, including civilpreparedness for climate -related emergencies and hybrid threats , including riskcommunication, participatory climate planning, and civil society engagement inpreparedness strategies. Take collective leadership in preparing society for theconsequences of a potential +4 °C global temperature rise by 2100, bymandating climate risk assessments in all public investments, stress -testingcritical infrastructure, enhancing local adaptive capacities, and scaling up best -practice solutions to protect ecosystems, food systems, and public health acrossthe region. And foster community -based adaptation and resilience networks,especially in rural, coastal, and marginalised areas, ensuring bottom -upcontributions to climate security and social preparedness.15. Coordinated and swift implementation of existing concepts such asEUMSS : Fully implement existing concepts such a s the EU’s Maritime SecurityStrategy, before developing new frameworks, in order to promote resilience and5 counter threats in the Baltic Sea Region, and elaborate a comprehensive strategyin the form of well -coordinated, detailed, region -wide framework to enhance theresilience of energy supplies, transport and communications networks. Thisstrategy must integrate threat -specific resilience planning and align with bothnational initiatives and existing EU/NATO frameworks for protecting criticalinfrastruct ure in the Baltic Sea region, and it must integrate lessons learned fromUkraine's experience in energy and critical infrastructure protection underwartime conditions. Call on the governments in the democratic Baltic Sea regionto ensure the development o f a draft version of such a regional strategy by March2026.16. Strengthening maritime domain awareness, surveillance capabilitiesand legal frameworks in the Baltic Sea and centralis ing responsibilitiesacross the Baltic Sea region :Central coordination and surveillance mechanismsPromote a centralised coordination mechanism within the Baltic Sea Region toaddress maritime threats proactively. This mechanism should focus on earlydetection, rapid response, and the prevention of criminal activities, drawi ng onexisting cross -national cooperation frameworks and aiming for alignment withNATO initiatives. Support and advocate the timely implementation of the BalticSea CUI Hub as a central means to strengthen maritime domain awareness andsurveillance, ensur ing close cooperation with existing civilian and militarystructures.Advanced maritime surveillance technologiesPromote the creation of a cooperative framework for the joint use anddevelopment of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles (drones) and otheradvanced maritime surveillance technologies. Modelled on initiatives such asthose being tested in Denmark, this approach should enhance persistent andresource -efficient situational awareness and the protection of criticalinfrastructure, with coord ination of operations and data analysis conducted alsoby civilian authorities or existing civilian -led maritime centres. Develop and applyautomated monitoring systems, including satellite surveillance, AI -poweredanomaly detection, and sonar -based detect ion of underwater activities, andintegrate these where appropriate into cooperative frameworks for advancedmaritime surveillance technologies.Data -sharing and CISE integrationAdvocate for real -time data -sharing agreements between Baltic Sea states ,encourage actions pursuing collaborative maritime security which are fullyaligned with NATO regional plans, coast guards, and infrastructure operators;expand the implementation of CISE to all relevant partners in the Baltic Seabasin; and establish a c ontinuous, secure data -flow between maritime authoritiesin the region.Legal harmonisation and accountabilityHarmonise existing legal frameworks among democratic Baltic Sea states – inparticular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) andthe Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MoU) – to criminalise intentionaldisruptions to critical s ubsea infrastructure, ensuring sanctions and legalaccountability, and promote their common, standardised and legally compliantinterpretation and implementation. Ensure that attacks on critical infrastructureare effectively prosecuted and avoid duplicati on of structures and legal norms.Develop a joint operational protocol for responding to sabotage and hybridattacks, including coordination between military, law enforcement, andemergency response actors.6Rapid response mechanismCall for the establis hment of a Baltic Sea Rapid Response Mechanism (BSRRM)to ensure that joint naval and coast guard teams can react to suspected sabotagewithin hours.Digital resilience and open -source infrastructureWith regard to digital real -time connectivity, jointl y fund and sustain open -sourcetechnology by launching a funding initiative focused on securing and advancingopen-source digital infrastructure essential to the Baltic Sea region’s connectivityand resilience. This could include setting up a regional fund to sustain and protectshared digital tools critical to maintaining cybersecurity and information integrity.Call on government s in the democratic Baltic Sea region to ensure thepreparation of a detailed proposal for the establishment of this fund by Mar ch2026.17. Coordinated Action Against the Russian and other Shadow Fleets: Ensurethat states and the private sector, irrespective of their nationality, that supportand contribute to unlawful and environmentally hazardous shadow fleetoperations aimed at circumventing sanctions, are held into account. Expand EUsanctions to include flag states, logistics providers, insurers, and other operatorsfacilitating shadow fleet operations. Enforce port inspections and tracking ofRussian -linked tankers to ensure f ull transparency of cargo and destinations.Establish criteria for coastal state enforcement measures against tankers thatare deemed to represent acute threats to maritime safety or the marineenvironment. Develop a joint Baltic Sea -wide approach within t he EU, IMO andother institutions, to clarify and develop the legal regime that applies to shippingoperations and other major safety risks associated with the shadow fleet, suchas distortion of GPS, AIS and other signals of critical importance for the sa fetyof navigation in the exclusive economic zones in the Baltic Sea and beyond.18. Resilience and Redundancy of Energy and Communication Networks: TheGovernments in the Baltic Sea Region, the CBSS, and the EU must undertakethe following actions to enhance resilience and redundancy in energy andcommunication networks, with implementation to commence immediately andtarget significant progress by 2030 : Establish a Baltic Sea Critical InfrastructureResilience Fund, co -financed by the EU and regional governments, to upgradeenergy and communication networks; jointly propose the creation of a suitableEU co -financing mechanism. Invest in strengthening fibre -optic and power gridinterconnections between democratic Baltic Sea states . Strengthen cyberresilience and intrusion detection systems for all undersea infrastructure .19. Strengthening NATO and EU Coordination on Baltic Sea Security : Support and reinforce NATO’s existing maritime security operations in theBaltic Sea, including enhanced Vigilance Balt ic Sentry, coordinated by theGerman Navy’s Commander Task Force Baltic (CTF Baltic) Headquarters inRostock. Advocate for the institutionalisation of a long -term NATO maritime securitymission in the Baltic Sea . Enhance EU -NATO cooperation by integratin g NATO maritime security effortswith:o The EU’s PESCO projects on maritime security,o EMSA’s initiatives on surveillance and hybrid threats,o The EU’s Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and European Defence Fund(EDF). Expand joint NATO -EU exercises focused on protecting offshore wind farms,pipelines, undersea cables, and critical coastal infrastructure, ensuring7 integration of hybrid threat scenarios. Strengthen political and parliamentaryengagement, including BSPC participation.20. Research in the field of sustainability, energy and transport innovation:Continue support for research in long -term energy solutions and innovativemaritime mobility as well as in international law and security policy, ensuringproper financing and making EU funding accessible f or all democratic Baltic SeaStates including the possibility of joint applications and encourage the formationof research consortia of Baltic Sea Region actors to jointly participate in relevantEU funding calls.21. Establishment of Regional Repair Capabil ities for Critical MaritimeInfrastructure: Rapid implementation of the measures set out in the EU ActionPlan on Cable Security (“Joint Communication on strengthening the safety andresilience of submarine cables”). Develop a coordinated Baltic Sea mechan ism torepair damaged undersea infrastructure rapidly. Provide shared storage ofessential spare parts and tools, and deploy multipurpose repair vessels. Ensurejoint contingency protocols and shared technical standards for cross -borderinterventions . Support information exchange and cooperation, with particularemphasis on diplomatic activities in relation to third countries, in order tohighlight the non -European dimension of this problem.22. Creation of a Baltic Sea Infrastructure Resilience Forum for Cross -Sectoral Exchange: Establish a standing Baltic Sea Infrastructure ResilienceForum to bring together public authorities, private operators, researchinstitutions, and civil protection actors. Facilitate best -practice exchange oninfrastructure clima te and ecological resilience and emergency risk managementacross sectors. Include regular simulation -based training for resilience to hybridand climate -induced disruptions.23. Development of a Baltic Sea Cyber Crisis Simulation Framework : Establisha recurring, multinational cyber crisis simulation framework focused on criticalmaritime infrastructure in the Baltic Sea Region. Engage public institutions(defence, energy, coast guard) and private stakeholders (grid operators,maritime companies). Utilise digital twins and scenario planning tools to createjoint standard operating procedures.24. Promote structured cooperation between private offshore actors –such asenergy companies –and national defence authorities to safeguard criticalinfrastructure and r egional security; where needed, develop legislation tofacilitate and regulate such collaboration in light of emerging threats in the BalticSea.25. Promotion of Multi -Use Design Standards for Critical Infrastructure :Introduce democratic Baltic Sea States -wide technical guidelines and planningincentives for the multi -use design of infrastructure assets. Promote cross -functionality of infrastructure (e.g., fibre -optic + power cables, transport + datacorridors).Incentivise public -private innovation projects on dual -purpose infrastructure.26. Enhancing Digital Resilience in Rural and Peripheral Areas of the BalticSea Region : Launch dedicated EU and national programmes to upgrade digitalinfrastructure in rural and island regions. Expand secure satellite and underwaterconnectivity (e.g. LoRaWAN, redundant cabling, 5G/6G backbones). Promotetransnational connectivity resilience. Support the development of inclusiveinfrastructure initiatives to guarantee , for example , that public tr ansport,broadband access, and smart mobility solutions reach marginalised people, low -income communities and rural area s.827. Integration of Environmental Risk into Maritime Security Strategy:Mandate environmental risk assessments (e.g. dredging impact, no ise), includingrisks from oil spills, hazardous chemicals, and other noxious substances as anintegral part of Baltic Sea maritime security planning. Incorporate environmentalrisk indicators into hybrid threat monitoring. Promote the development of dual-use detection technologies for both environmental and security incidents .Regarding Energy Se curity, Sustainability , and Youth Participation in theBaltic Sea Region (BSPYF)28. Strengthening Prevention and Preparedness in Civil Protection : Promotecloser networking regarding conflict and disaster situations to enhance resilience,such as during pandemics like COVID -19. Support the exchange of civilprotection forces, for example , healthcare professionals, to ensure a rapid andunbureaucratic response in emergencies. Expand pharmaceutical industries toensure independence and availability of essential medical resources.29. Strengthening energy infrastructure through modernisation andpartnerships :• Enhance the security and resilience of energy infrastructure by investing inthe research and modernisation of outdated systems.• Cooperate with the private sector and regional strategic partners, whilecomplementing existing NATO initiativ es.• Advocat e conditional energy subsidies alongside dedicated national energy -efficiency programmes to alleviate energy poverty and reduce householdenergy costs.30. Mapping vulnerabilities and advancing rapid response to maritime risks :• Strengthen the resilience of maritime critical infrastructure by identifying themost vulnerable areas through comprehensive mapping.• Conduct joint risk assessments, coordinated training, and real -timeinformation exchange between public and private sectors for rapid andeffective threat response.31. Advancing the phase -out of fossil fuels and modernising regional energysystems :• Accelerate the phase -out of fossil fuels in regional energy consumption, withinthe framework of existing EU policies on moving away from fossil fuels (e.g.Fit for 55, RED III) , prioritising the phase -out of non -European sources, firstand foremost from the Russian Federation.• Invest in sustainable energy solutions and modernise the regional power gridwith smarter storage and distribution .32. Ensuring a just energy transition that leaves no one behind :• Lower energy prices, strengthen trust in public institutions , and support fragilecommunities.• Provide targeted support and reskilling opportunities for those at risk of jobloss due to the gre en transition.• Insist that the transition to a low -carbon economy be guided by climate justice— ensuring vulnerable households receive support and no community is leftbehind in the green transition.33. Promote youth participation in energy: Integrate youth perspectives inregional energy policy by establishing National Youth Advisory Bodies under the9 Ministries of Energy (or equivalent). Ensure these bodies receive influence andcross-parliamentary recognition throughout the Baltic Sea Region .34. Empower young people through green education and sectorengagement: Promote access to green education and foster opportunities foryouth in the energy sector. Encourage exchange programmes, life -long learninginitiatives, internships and mentorship schemes in the clean energy industry.Encourage the development of targeted programmes to support mental healthservices, and create job opportunities in emerging industries for young people ina non -discriminatory manner.Regarding a Sustainable Baltic Sea – Marine Ecosystems, Fisheries,Climate, and Green Shipping to35. Strengthen the implementation of the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan ,particularly in the fields of eutrophication mitigation, marine biodiversityrestoration, and pollution control, and ensure alignment with EU and regionalenvironmental legislation.36. Urgently develop a recovery plan for the Baltic Sea fish stocks where biomassis outside of safe biological limits to safeguard ecosystem functionality and foodsecurity .37. Strive to designate bottom trawl -free zones in the Baltic to protectvulnerable benthic ecosystems and enable long -term restoration of marinebiodiversity, wherever this is justified by conservation objectives set for theseecosystems.38. Ensure that the precautionary principle governs all targeted fishing forfishmeal production, prioritising ecosystem resilience and food systemsustainability.39. Systematically integrate climate adaptation and biodiversitypreservation into maritime spatial planning, fisheries management, and coastaldevelopment strategies.40. Reinforce the scientific foundations and governance capacities of marineecosystem monitoring, including through full support to HELCOM’s updatedindicator systems and assessment cycles.41. Advance coordinated nutrient reduction policies and promote sustainableagricultural practices that enable climate -resilient food systems while reducingrunoff into the Baltic Sea.42. Ensure the preservation of the environment and nature if undertakingseabed mining .43. Support the establishment and digitalisation of Marine Protected Areas(MPAs) , including improved connectivity and ecosystem -based management;increase transboundary cooperation to protect migratory species and sharedhabitats.44. Promote the integration of marine digital twins for real -time decision -making and long -term ecosystem forecasting, as recommended in the 2025CBSS Baseline Report on Marine Digital Twins and Green Corridors , which should10 take place within the f ramework of existing EU initiatives such as Horizon Europe,Copernicus and EU Mission: Ocean .45. Expand investment and cooperation on Green Shipping Corridors ,particularly along core Baltic trade routes; ensure regulatory clarity, public -private collaboration and technological neutrality in corridor development .46. Promote a modal shift to sea and rail transport by directing investmenttowards intermodal infrastructure in underdeveloped parts of the Baltic Searegion. Strengthen clean ferry -based fr eight through targeted economicincentives, ensuring coherence with EU climate and transport policy frameworks.47. Champion digital innovation in the Baltic Sea region by positioning it as aglobal testbed for smart port ecosystems. Promote the development anddeployment of digital twins and advanced data systems to enhance efficiency,reduce emissions, and strengthen resilience. Encourage cross -border datasharing and collaborative innovation initiatives to accelerate the digital transitionin maritime infrastructure.48. Enhance port infrastructure and connectivity , including investments inshore -side electricity, smart logistics, circular economy practices, and hinterlandtransport links.49. Recognise and mitigate environmental risks associated with shadowfleet activity , mandate environmental risk assessments as part of maritimesecurity and hybrid threat monitoring .50. Support environmentally safe and timely clearance of sea -dumpedmunitions , including through EU Horizon Europe funds, with special attention toecological integrity, marine safety , and transboundary coordination.51. Ensure alignment between HELCOM, EU and IMO regulatory frameworks ,avoiding regula tory fragmentation while enabling flexible, region -specificimplementation pathways.52. Support youth participation in marine policy and sustainability education;expand civic science initiatives and biodiversity literacy in schools, in line withBSPYF recom mendations.Regarding a Coherent and Secure Bioeconomy in the Baltic Sea Region to53. Ensure coherence between bioeconomy, circular economy , biodiversitypreservation and climate policy by embedding national and regionalbioeconomy strategies in integrated policy frameworks that align environmentalprotection, food security, energy transition, and industrial transformation.54. Support the transition from pilot initiatives to large -scale deployment byenabling innovations to move from “lab to fab”, through SME -friendly incentivestructures, accelerated permitting processes, and predictable regulatoryenvironments.55. Avoid global spillover effects by ensuring that growing biomass demand doesnot lead to ecological degradation or social harm in third countries; uphold strictsustainability criteria and transparency in bioresource supply chains, includingunder the EU Renewable Energy Directive.11 56. Recognise and invest in underutilised feedstocks , such as municipalbiowaste, agricultural residues, marine biomass and industrial side -streams, toavoid land -use conflicts and support circular regional economies. Affirming thatbioeconomy investments should prioriti se the creation of secure jobs in coastaland rural areas, including support for small -scale fisheries and agriculturalenterprises.57. Promote regional dialogue through a structured interparliamentary process inthe Baltic Sea Region, aimed at improving coherence, knowledge sharing andcommon standards in bioeconomy governance.58. Integrate considerations of security and strategic autonomy intobioeconomy policymaking by promoting bio -based alternatives in critical sectors,such as packaging, chemicals and automotive supply chains, reducin gdependence on imported fossil or mineral resources.59. Embed coherence monitoring in parliamentary oversight mechanisms bydeveloping indicators and tools to assess the balance between food, feed, energyand material use, and ensure that legislative and bu dgetary decisions areinformed by holistic, long -term sustainability considerations.60. Promote aquatic -based bioeconomic innovation with dedicated researchand funding for resource development, i.e. seaweed cultivation, sustainableaquaculture, and blue biotechnology .61. Ensure that future EU bioeconomy frameworks take into accountregional ecological sensitivity , value -chain potential , and stakeholderengagement, particularly in macro -regions such as the Baltic Sea Region .Furthermore, the Conference decides to62. Establish a two-year Working Group on Strengthening Cyber andInformation Resilience to Promote Democracy – based on the decisions ofthe BSPC Standing Committee - to submit a first report at the 3 5th BSPC and63. Welcome with gratitude the Parliament of Schleswig -Holstein ’s offer to hostthe 35th Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference in the Hanseatic City ofLübeck from 30 August to 1 September 2026 .