Speech Adomenas

Page 1:Speech by the President of the Baltic Assembly, Dr Mantas Adoménas,At the 18" Baltic Sea Parliamentary ConferenceI September 2009, NyborgNEW CHALLENGES AND THREATS FOR SECURITY AGENDAFOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION: REGIONAL ANSWERSExcellencies,Ladies and Gentlemen,On behalf of the Baltic Assembly, I am deeply honoured to address this distinguishedaudience of parliamentarians, governmental representatives, and experts of the BalticSea region countries. In my speech, I will focus on new challenges, threats andvulnerabilities to the security agenda of this region. I cannot promise to come up withfinal answers, but I can assure you that I will raise many questions regarding the newsecurity agenda.I think I will not exaggerate by saying that it is our collective wish for the BalticSea, Mare Balticum, to become mare nostrum, “our sea”, as the Romans onceaffectionately called the domesticated Mediterranean: safe, secure and stable regionas the means of integration and peaceful cooperation. Security is the keyword inachieving this our collective goal.Political theorists define security as “a condition without threats”, which meansthe possibility of survival and development for an individual, country, or region.However, security and its provision are not static. The arsenal of threats and themeans for their prevention is most closely related to a country’s internaldevelopment, the state of the international system, changes in its structure, and theinternal dynamics of the system units.Nowadays the concept of security, challenges, threats, and vulnerabilities haschanged significantly. Previously we talked about “hard” security, but today theborders between “hard” and “soft” security have become fuzzy as the concept ofsecurity evolved and security challenges have become global. We face new threatsthat are more diverse, less visible, and less predictable. In addressing new securitythreats and challenges, we sometimes still think in classical security terms, but theconcept of security has changed dramatically by including asymmetrical threats andvulnerabilities such as cybercrimes, climate change, energy security, demographicageing, cultural tensions, social welfare, food safety, and trans-border diseases. SincePage 2:the end of the Cold War, in most EU and NATO countries a wide security concepthas emerged that has added to the narrow military and diplomatic functionseconomic, societal, and environmental dimensions. The economic and financialrecession which started in 2008 also adds a new dimension to the concept of security.Thus the broadened concept of security for the Baltic Sea region has to compriseseveral sectors of security. The first one is a traditional — military and political —security, which is security against threats to political independence (includingmilitary aggression, economic sanctions, influence of foreign intelligence). Thesecond sector includes a country’s internal security (crisis of government,disagreements between political groups). The third is social security (it is threatenedby inequality in society, threats to language, culture, identity). The fourth is economicsecurity (it comprises financial security, employment, energy supply, labour-forcemobility). The fifth is environmental security (pollution, radiation). And the sixth isinformation communications security (threats posed to information development anduse).However, there is no consensus as to what exactly we mean by security or whichthreats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks are most imminent, most probable ormost destructive. Therefore in the context of the Baltic Sea region, it is essential toprepare medium-term forecasts of the situation by selecting issues that are currentlydefining development directions globally and regionally and whose impact will growin the future.Moreover, when talking about the expanded concept of security, we have to bearin mind that it is not the kind of security that can be safeguarded by the help of amodern defence system and a wide range of weapons. It is a multiform security forwhich multi-shaped means and a transnational approach with regional and evenglobal scope are needed. Therefore, what we need to do proactively here, in the BalticSea region, is to find solutions on the regional level for strengthening regionalsecurity.Security situation can be analysed under two aspects: first, presence or absenceof actual threats and vulnerabilities (I will address this aspect later), and secondly, thepreconditions of security — in other words, factors and parameters that eithercontribute to, or endanger, existing security equilibrium.In order to describe conditions security conditions in regional context, fivecriteria or preconditions can be isolated. In order to guarantee regional security andmake regional cooperation work, the following conditions have to be fulfilled:1. Regional actors involved are stable.||||Page 3:2. They are peaceful and have no aggressive intent towards neighbours.3. Actors are predictable and transparent as to their motives4, Relative homogeneity and absence of sharp contrasts in the region.5. Actors share communality of goals: they view cooperation as mutuallybeneficial, value-adding process, rather than a zero-sum game.How has the situation developed in regard to these criteria over the past fewyears?First, stability: we are still a region of stable states; nonetheless, due to theeconomic crisis the condition of the Baltic States especially, and of Iceland to someextent, can be described as somewhat feverish.Second criterion — peacefulness towards neighbours. In this respect situation hasmarkedly deteriorated: one needs to recall last year’s war with Georgia — the firstRussian military action outside its borders after the invasion of Afganistan in 1979, -as well as the 2007 state-orchestrated (or at least state-instigated) cyber-attack onEstonia. No less worrying is the reaction when non-aggressive defence measures ofthe neighbour states are viewed as constituting an act of aggression (as exemplifiedby the reaction to the missile defence shield in Poland and Czech Republic). Itreminds one of Emperor Caligula who, learning that his brother was taking antidoteto protect himself from poisoning, exclaimed: “What?! Antidote against theEmperor?”Third criterion: predictability and transparency of motives. Once again, thiscondition cames into question if we recall isolated instances of using energy supplyor economic sanctions as instruments of political pressure. This makes no economicsense and leads one to wonder whether covert political goals may not pursued byeconomic and energy policies. Likewise President Medvedev’s so-called “Five PointDoctrine” beacons radical unpredictability, but it remains to be seen howconsistently, if at all, it is applied.Fourth criterion: relative homogeneity of the region and absence of sharpcontrasts — is threatened by the current economic crisis. There is a real possibility thatthe effects of global downturn will leave the growth of the East Baltics hampered fora decade, and marked regional economic and social inequalities may ensue.Finally, security objectives cannot be achieved when regional cooperation istreated as a zero-sum game and cooperation processes and formats are exploited toreach unilateral goals. Patterns of economic protectionism and using economy aspolitical tool, asymmetry of energy provision arrangements as well as unwillingnessPage 4:to submit to the same market rules to which EU actors are subject are symptoms ofsuch attitude.Turning to the actual threats, it is worthwhile to recall Donald Rumsfeld’snotorious saying: “There are known knowns. There are things we know that weknow. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we now knowwe don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we do notknow we don’t know.” This provides a very convenient taxonomy of threats andvulnerabilities, of which eleven groups can be isolated.First of all, threats that can be characterised as known knowns, or perhaps, asknown, but so far unmanageable. They are represented primarily through themanifold results of the present crisis.I. Social threatsCrisis leads to increased social instability which in turn leads to:- increased internal instability resulting from economic downturn, such as riotsand mass disaffection. It may be especially disconcerting if fuelled from the outsideand exploited for destabilising purposes by a third power;- increase of labour force migration processes with their attendant human.trafficking & export of organised crime;- also, intensification of brain drain processes — both within, and out of the region— thus reducing prospects for the restoration of competitiveness in some countries;In longer term perspective these processes may lead to:- entrenchment of social (societal) and economic inequalities in the region;- as well as to increase of political volatility, radical politics and (as a result) ofthreats to democracy.II. Civil security threatsCrisis and its concommitant factors catalyses resurgence of organised crime. Wehave recently seen resurgence and emergence of such threats, as:- piracy (new to these waters and, hopefully, episodic, albeit more transparentinvestigation into the recent case ought to be made and the topic of piracy addressedin wider frameworks — and a lot is being done specifically regarding maritime safetyin the Baltic waters — so that piracy neear our shores would remain a remote andepisodic threat);Page 5:- drug trafficking (not new, but on the increase, contributed to by Schengenarrangements);- cyber attacks (novel threat which defined a new category of threats);Some of these forms of organised crime acquire especial virulence whencombined with other threats, for example, if cyber-attacks were combined witheconomic sanctions, or when drug-trafficking sponsors terrorist and disruptiveactivities.III. Economic threatsOf course, the biggest threat is the crisis itself. Alongside it, however, otherthreats result.Crisis exacerbates economic protectionism (or at least provides powerfultemptation):- leads to milk-wars, transport-wars, pig-wars, and rose-wars, as well asincreased political tensions in the region and diminished readiness to adress commonchallenges, as political energy and time are squandered on overcoming differencesand easing tensions;- long standing economic & social disparities may result.These were threats and vulnerabilities whose outlines were changing under theimpact of global (and regional) economic crisis. Other threats and groups of threatscomprise:IV. Energy security:The hoary subject of energy security has been sufficiently addressed in thesecircles and does not need to be gone into. However, it may be worthwhile to reiteratethat the search for instruments to ensure energy security in the Baltic Sea regionshould be based on shared regional concerns, rather than unilateral or bilateralsolutions, and it should lead to genuine integration of energy systems, rather than tocreation of energy islands or to providing of instruments for using energy as a tool ofpolitical pressure ~ the so-called “energy terrorism”.V. Environmental threats:Page 6:- consist primarily in cumulative effects resulting from climate change, but thathas to be measured against rigorous scientific monitoring and modelling, lest we losecompetitive advantages to the wild-goose chase;- if significant climate change impacts take place, the potential for economic (andconsequently social) disruption is high, albeit not unmanageable (and is situated inmore distant future).Another on-going environmental threat is cumulative effect of pollution, harm tothe Baltic Sea eco-system caused by disturbance of chemical as well as conventionalweapons, and decline of environmental standards owing to increased economicpressures as a result of economic downturn.VI. Demographic declineHas been with us so long that this threat is now itself a grey-beard. Demographicdecline places an increasing burden on our countries’ competitiveness andproductivity and risks to strengthen pressures for import of labour force andimmigration, thus raising the spectre of ethnic and racial tensions. It remains a threat,but withdraws to a second plan for a moment in the view of more urgent concerns.On the other hand, family policy solutions that were adopted to address it inLithuania and Latvia, have shown positive results, but are likely to be damaged bythe crisis.Known unknowns:VIL. Terrorist threat: incrementally increasing likelihood in the view of trans-Atlantic engagements and commitments of a number of Baltic Sea region states, butotherwise little change.VIII. Political tensions that will arise in the future due to the competition for theArctic and its natural resources.IX. Pandemic diseases — swine flu disclosed general lack of coordination andregional response.Unknown unknowns (we can only speculate):X. Challenges to democracy linked to incremental process of decline ofdemocratic legitimacy (also decline of national states’ resources to address otherthreats).Page 7:XI. Changing pattern of globalisation — need to find global niche. We are all inneed of new globalisation strategies — albeit we do not know yet what turnglobalisation processes will take.Such is, roughly, the chart of the changing sea-bed of threats and vulnerabilitiesin the Baltic Sea region. The balance of threats has tilted back towards political,social, and economic — it was moving the other way after the end of the Cold War.On the balance, despite my rather gloomy description, there are no immediate large-scale threats.Nevertheless, we must recognise that long-term preconditions and prospects forstability are deteriorating and this is something that our organisation ought to address.Does that mean that there is a need for new institutions? No, I don’t think so. Ithink we have to exploit existing institutions and cooperation formats to their fullcapacity, developing efficient and calibrated regional cooperation models that are fitfor purpose.I maintain that the trans-Atlantic dimension will remain the backbone of securityarchitecture in the Baltic Sea region, and it needs to be strengthen. But alongside andaround it, regional security initiatives based on complementarity of roles and poolingof resources — such as, for example, Stoltenberg plan — ought to be developed, as longas they do not weaken, or create a competing alternative to, trans-Atlanticcooperation.Another key to expanding and deepening security area is the extension of scopeof Baltic Sea cooperation, and thus the involvement of the Eastern Partnershipcountries within the Baltic Sea catchment area should be supported.Ladies and Gentlemen,The Baltic Sea Region countries must be able to define a new security agendaand to elaborate a concrete action plan for dealing with these new vulnerabilities:- First of all, it is necessary to have a target-oriented and very concreteapproach to how we will manage these threats. We must be able to define anew security agenda for the Baltic Sea region which provides the opportunityto concentrate financial, social, and political tools for short-, mid- and long-term actions.- Second, for the new security agenda, the involvement of civil society isextremely important. It is needed to legitimize decisions made by politicians.As an example, I would like to mention the environmental field. Even if therei|'i|||||Page 8:is a perfect legal framework or a perfect penalty system for dealing withenvironmental damage, it will not be effective enough unless we think aboutenvironmental issues on the individuals’ level as well. The third actor thatneeds to be involved in drafting the new security agenda is internationalorganisations.- Third, we should understand that security policy today is facing hugefinancial challenges; it is the most expensive policy in the world. Are we ableto cope with that? One of the solutions to this problem is to develop regionalsecurity strategy based on complementarity of capacities and functions.Distributing of commitments and sharing of resources would make the cost ofsecurity lighter for our societies and our economies.- Fourth, we should understand that open dialogue and open cooperationinstead of confrontation gives us additional capability to meet new securitychallenges and threats.Dear colleagues,The political and economic agendas of our countries are becoming tenser day byday. We are living at a time that is difficult for individuals, countries, regions, and thewhole world. Today’s crisis clearly proves that a single country is not able to solveproblems by itself. The most urgent issue now is to decide what we can do together inorder to get out of the deep economic and, for some countries, social pit, whilesimultaneously re-orienting our economics and promoting the competitiveness of ourcountries. Without it, the growth of the East Baltic may be crippled for a decade bythe current economic crisis and its attendant all-too-likely social upheavals, and theprospect of stable and secure, competitive and sustainable Baltic Sea region may beput on hold indefinitely. Conversely, by overcoming these challenges we willpromote security for our countries and security for the region.We also have to use the framework of the BSPC, of the Council of Baltic SeaStates, as well as other Baltic Se regional organisations to elaborate concrete andpractical answers on how to meet the security challenges outlined above. Ourcooperation process must be faster, we must be more efficient and more flexible, andwe must be ready to respond more quickly and more forcefully.Security is becoming more and more complex, whereas both our societies andwe, politicians, want simple, quick, popular, and visible decisions. The paramountchallenge thus is how to devise security agenda that would combine simplicity withcomplexity without sacrificing one to the other. This is a task that no country in ourregion can address alone, and therefore, I invite the Baltic Sea ParliamentaryConference to focus on the aspects of security that I outlined above.||i|||