Policy Analysis

1Policy Analysis (Updated) – Baltic Sea RegionGovernments’ statements regarding the implementation ofthe25th Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference ResolutionAuthors:Dr. Tobias Etzold & Christian OpitzStiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) /German Institute for International and Security AffairsBerlin, 8 August 2017 The assessment and opinion expressed in this policy analysis are those of the authors alone and neither necessarilyreflect the official opinion of the SWP nor of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference and its institutions.Authors’ contact details: tobias.etzold@swp -berlin.org , christian.opitz@swp -berlin.org .21. IntroductionOn 30th August 201 6 elected legislators from the Baltic Sea Region states1 assembl ed in Riga,Latvia , and adopted the 2 5th Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) Resolution. In additionto a preamble and paragraphs concerning the general cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region, theResolution emphasises t hree priority areas for action:1) Competitiveness in the Baltic Sea Regi on by linking Education and Labour Market;2) Employment Opportunities, Labour Mobility and Youth Unemployment ;3) Sustainable Tourism.As a follow up to the 2 5rd BSPC and in pre paration of the 2 6th BSPC in September 2017 inHamburg , Germany , the BSPC General Secretariat asked the BSPC delegations to request theirrespective governments to submit a statement regarding the implementation of the 2 5th BSPCResolution. The BSPC General Secretariat commissioned Dr. Tobias Etzold and Christian Opit zat the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin to evaluate and analys e the statementssubmitted by the respective governmental bodies of the Baltic Sea Region states.2. Content of this analysis and basic dataThis analysis includes:- an overall quantitative assessment of the governments’ statements ;- a qualitative analysis regarding the governments’ statements regarding the three priorityareas plus the three paragraphs in the general part addressing the environ mental status ofthe Balt ic Sea;- and an overall assessment highlighting shortcomings and identifying recommendationsfor the future .Basic data:- the 25th BSPC Resolution,- written statements by the respective governmental bodies received until early August2017 .1 Baltic Assembly, Free Hanseatic City of Bremen, Denmark, Estonia, European Parliament, Federal Republic ofGermany, Finland, Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg, Iceland, Kaliningrad Region, Latvia, Lithuania,Mecklenburg -Vorpommern, Nordic Council, Norway, Poland, City of St. Petersburg, Council of Federation of theFederal Assembly of the Russian Federation, State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,Schleswig -Holstein, Sweden, Åland Islands .3No statementsubmitted26%Statementsubmitted74%Fig. 1 Overall Response Rate to the BSCP Standing Committee3. Quantitative Overview3.1. Overall Response RateTwenty -two delegations from member parliaments (12 national and eight subnationalparliaments) and parliamentary institutions (three) adopted the 25th BSPC Conference Resolution.Fourteen government al counterparts of the nineteen signatories , excluding the threeparliamentary institutions, submitted statements to the BSPC Standing Committee regarding theimplementation of the Resolution (see Fig . 1).23.2. Overall Response VarietyThe thirteen submitted statements in reaction to the 25th BSPC Resolution vary considerablyconcerning thematic depth and structure. Some statements , for example those from all threeBaltic countries, Poland and Mecklenburg -Vorpommern, portray on 12 - 30 pages in great detailand some even for each paragraph of the Resolution what the respective government has done inorder to implement it. Others , such as Sweden and Norway, keep it limited to a rather generaloverview of about four pages touching upon only a few of the Resolution topics.We explicitly point out to keep in mind that the level of comprehensives of a submittedstatement by itself does not allow a direct inference to the overall activities of a respectivegovernment in the priority areas of the R esolution. Relying only on the statements therefore does2 Denmark, Estonia, Federal Republic of Germa ny, Finland, Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg, Latvia, Lithuania,Mecklenburg -Vorpommern, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the Åland Islands. The government of the RussianFederation submitted one statement . It is unclear to us if this statement is on behalf of all four Russian memberdelegations. The state government of Schleswig -Holstein included an assessment of the Resolution in its Report onEurope ( Europabericht ) 2016 -17 of February 2017.4not constitute a reliable data source for a proper statistical analysis. However, our qualitativeanalysis in the following section does h ighlight some general findings and shortcomings in thesubmit ted statements. While the governments in their responses list both national andtransnational initiatives and actions, with a strong focus on the former, we concentrate ouranalysis on the transnational activities as w ell as the links between both.4. Qualitative AnalysisThe 25th BSPC Resolution consists of several parts. The preamble covers various broader issuessuch as the fight against terrorism, the 25th anniversary of the BSPC as well as the affirmation ofthe United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sust ainable Development. This is followed by a chapterlisting fourteen paragraphs which concern the general situation and atmosphere for cooperationin the Baltic Sea Region. In particular, they call for re -establishing mutual trust and dialogue inthe Baltic Sea region (Paragraph 2), strengthening measures reducing risks and tensions(Paragraph 14), generating synergies between regional strategies and action plans (Paragraph 9)and deepening the overall collaboration and structured dialogue between organisati ons andcooperation formats in the Region (Paragraph 3).More specific issues are subsequently subsumed in three thematic chapters:- “Competitiveness in the Baltic Sea Region by linking Education and Labour Market”(Paragraphs 15 -29),- “Employment Opportunities, Labour Mobility and Youth Unemployment” (Paragraphs30-48),- “Sustainable Tourism” (Paragraphs 49 -61).Our qualitative analysis will group our assessment of the governments’ statements according tothese three priority areas. However, in add ition we decided to also treat the environmental statusof the Baltic Sea as a priority policy area, although it features in the resolution not as a section ofits own but with two paragraphs in the general part (Paragraphs 6 -8). Nonetheless, mostgovernme nts (all but Russia , Schleswig -Holstein and Sweden) dedicate some space toenvironment al issues in their responses .4.1. Assessment regarding the chapter “Competitiveness in the Baltic SeaRegion by linking Education and Labour Market ”The Resolution paragraphs in this chapter fruitfully tie into a prevalent view across the Baltic SeaRegion governments that the issue of linking education and the labour market more closely is ofmajor importance for the future welfare of their people. Overall it can thus be maintained thatthe governments have implemented a great variety of projects and activities aimed at increasingcompetiveness through aligning school and university programmes better with economic needs .While m ost of these efforts hav e already been pursued for years, the EU Commission’sCommunication “New Skills Agenda for Europe” adopted in June 2016 seemed to have providednew impetus, which is also in line with the BSPC Resolution (Paragraph 16) .Against this overall positive backg round, we however must note that many of the ongoingactivities are limited to the national context. While this fact is understandable in light of therelevance of an increased competiveness for each society, we believe that more transnationalprojects cou ld be initiated and implemented. A good example is the project “National Authorities5for Apprenticeships: Implementing Work Based Learning in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia”(WBL -Balt) started in late 2014. WBL -Balt has supported the cooperation between the Balticstates in this field in order to facilitate their reforms related to vocational education and training.Another notable transnational initiative is the “BSR Stars” programme under the aegis of the EUStrategy for the Baltic Sea Region. BSR Stars has facilitate d innovation partnerships betweenresearch institutions and small to medium -sized enterprises in the Baltic Sea Region in order tostrengthen competitiveness and economic growth.Apart from these exemplary activities, other calls for action expressed by the BSPC Resolutionhave largely been unheeded. For instance, the great potential of cross -border activities in the areaof research and standardisation within cyber security are thus far largely unused (Paragraph 26).Furthermore, the future of the successful “CBSS EuroFaculty” programme remains still unclear(Paragraph 19) despite the fact that the German government , amongst other governments, statesthat it “is willing in principle to support a new EuroFaculty project”. In light of this unta ppedpotential, the governments could increase their efforts aimed at increasing competitiveness toeither expand existing or initiate new projects towards a stronger transnational outlook .As another good and even new example for transnational cooperatio n within this field , severalgovernments (e.g. Estonia, Hamburg and Latvia) mention ed the INTERREG project “BalticScience Network” that has been established on the initiative of the state government of Hamburgin March 2016 within the framework of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. With aduration until 2019 this project is to establish a political coordination framework for a jointhigher education, science and research policy. Its main objective is to support the realisation ofthe European Resea rch Area (via intensified cooperation in the BSR) and to increase the researchand innovation performance of the BSR . In its statement, the Norwegian government statedspecifically that Norway , so far not part of the Baltic Science Network , would like to participatein it which is a clear announcement of future action .4.2. Assessment regarding the chapter “ Employment Opportunities, LabourMobility and Youth Unemployment ”Many of the issues raised in this Resolution chapter are well covered by numerous programmesand projects initiated by the governments. In particular, calls for action in the areas of reducingyouth unemployment (Paragraph 33) and integrating NEETs (Paragraph 34) as well assupporting low -skilled and long -term unemployed (Paragraph 37) align with priorities which thegovernments have already identified and pursued. For instance, the Finnish government reportsabout the establishment of so -called One -Stop Shop service points. Serving both urban and ruralareas, these service points provide support to young people under 30 in terms of career guidance,housing and social care provision. The majority of such efforts are carried out in a nationalcontext but draw on conside rable financial support by the EU’s European Social Fund.On the one hand, it thus appears that projects under this chapter are mainly implemented in analready existing and seemingly adequate national and larger European framework. In this regard,the ke y to better programmes is, as the Danish government states it, “knowledge sharing anddissemination of best practices at the pan -EU level”. This approach of exchanging nationalexperiences certainly is also important in and across the Baltic Sea Region. A good example is thepeer-review conference “Approaches to integrate long -term unemployed persons” hosted byGermany in October 2016. Attended by Finland, Lithuania, Estonia and Denmark, theconference offered the participants to learn about each other’s ap proaches and engage in anintensive dialogue. Another example is the regional social dialogue within fora such as the Baltic6Sea Labour Network and the Baltic Sea Labour Forum as listed by se veral governments. In oureyes, it is definitely worthwhile to es tablish more regular exchange platforms between differentactors.Having said that, we also believe that the governments could intensify their efforts to implementan increasing number of common transnational projects. Such an approach would stop not“mer ely” at the exchange of experiences and best practices but crucially embrace the idea ofjointly cooperati ng across national borders . For example, no truly regional common jobs platformhas been installed (Paragraph 31). Achieving this would very likely lead to an increased labourmobility in the Baltic Sea Region. The government of Schleswig -Holstein even addressesexplicitly the call “to work towards the creation of a joint, collaborative labour market in theBaltic Sea Region ” (Paragraph 30). It emphasizes primarily the further development of thecommon labour market of Schleswig -Holstein and Denmark for which joint information officeson both sides of the border, advising companies and employees on practical and legal issues, havebeen very useful. The German -Danish experience could serve as a good example for a commonlabour market across the entire BSR which would offer many chances for enterprises andemployees. In the same vein, the Finnish government reports about a meeting of the labourministers of the CBSS members in June 2017 in Berlin (as part of the Baltic Sea Labour ForumAnnual Round Table). The ministers even adopted a dec laration regarding many issues of a betterconnected labour market. However, neither the declaration nor the governm ents’ statements gofurther in proposing any concrete measures to facilitate and achieve such common Baltic Sealabour market.Another challenge that could benefit from transnational projects is the integration of refugeesinto the labour market (Paragraph 46). This issue generally enjoy s a high priority in the nationalcontext , and as such has been mentioned frequently in the res ponses in connection with someconcrete measures on the national levels to improve the integration, but is not tackled throughmajor regional initiatives. Although not mentioned, the five Nordic countries did a first effort tofoster Nordic cooperation in this field by launching a Nordic Council of Ministers led refugeeintegration programme in autumn 2016 . This programme aims at coordinating and harmonisingthe national integration measures , in particular in relation to the labour markets, and learningfrom one another. The Nordic and Baltic countries had launched a project on challenges ofimmigration and integration in 2016, culminating in two conferences in 2016 and 2017. Perhapsthese could set good example s for future regional cooperat ion in this field around the BSR.Overall we argue that the Baltic Sea Region states would implement the Resolution paragraphs inthis chapter most effectively by combining and integrating the two approaches of exchange andconcrete cooperation.4.3. Assessme nt regarding the chapter “ Sustainable Tourism ”All responding governments dedicate some space to the Resolution’ s chapter on sustainabletourism. As in the previous two sections, the focus lies on national measures to promotesustainable tourism within their respective countries (for example setting up a committee fordeveloping of a new coherent national policy for the tourism industry in a cross -sectoralperspective for Sweden) but also some initiatives to strengthen transnational and cross -bordercoop eration ( Paragraph 49) find mentioning. In several cases the two levels are interconnected.The aforementioned Swedish committee also has the task to suggest “how cooperation betweenactors can be developed and improved to strengthen the cross -border touri sm offer andcooperation ”. The Norwegian government sets as guidelines for its national tourism sector to be7green, sustainable, responsible and ethical and uses the same factors as guiding principles for itscross -border approaches in the BSR .The Estoni an government mainly lists activities that have been im plement ed by the three Balticstates togeth er and therefore form a good example of some sub -regional cooperation in this field.An agreement among these three countries’ governments that has been signe d as early as 2002and has been renewed in 2013 promotes for example the Baltic area as a tourist destination forshort -haul and long -haul markets and the development of a Baltic tourism brand, commontourism products as well as tourism infrastructure and the quality of tourism services. In terms ofrural development (Paragraph 50), the governments of Latvia and Lithuania report about a newproject called “Heritage based agro -tourism”. The project aims at opening agricultural farms andsmall fishing busines ses to new visitors and thus increase cross -border agri -tourism in rural areas.Likewise within this context , the Swedish government mentions efforts within the Nordiccooperation context: the strategy for international branding of the Nordic Region launc hed bythe Nordic Council Ministers for the period 2015 -2018 in which one priority is to protect natureestablished collaborations especially in the BSR , and a recent decision by the Nordic ministers forenterprise of May 2017 to elaborate on a mutual plan for Nordic tourism cooperation . Therecertainly is a need for cross -border approaches. Within the national tourism strategy of thegovernment of the Åland Islands, sustainable tourism in the entire BSR is of great concern forthe government’s goal to keep the archipelago as a green island in a blue sea. Indeed, islands inbetween several countries are particularly strong ly exposed to external influences.Several governments, i.e. Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Poland, express their explicit support forthe Baltic Sea Tourism Forum as well as the Baltic Sea Tourism Centre (Paragraph 56). Also thePolicy Area Tourism within the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region ( Paragraph 58), for whichthe Department of Tourism of the Polish government is a focal point, f inds positive mentioningin these governments’ responses. However, also here the question of how the governments wantto support and strengthen these transnational cooperation efforts remains largely unanswered.Moreover, while the governments welcome the idea of networks and clusters of tourismstakeholders in principle (Paragraph 59), at times worthwhile ideas do not materialise in practice.For example, the Lithuania n government suggested the creation of a Baltic medical tourismcluster but the initiati ve failed due to the lack of financing. This failure is unfortunate anddemonstrates that occasionally political will is lacking to turn words into action.Thus, there certainly already exists some cooperation within the field of sustainable tourism . It,however, remains unclear from the governments’ responses which concrete results thiscooperation has delivered so far.4.4. Assessment regarding the paragraphs on “Environmental Issues ”Several governments (e.g. Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Poland) take up the resol ution’s requestthat the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) should be strengthened and developed as the maincoordinating body in regional efforts to protect the Baltic Sea marine environment , and tostrongly support and encourage a fast implementation of the Marine Litter Action Plan(Paragraph 6). They confirm HELCOM’ s and its Baltic Sea Action Plan’s importance and value .The organisation’s work is especially appreciated in the implementation of relevant EU directives,namely the Water Framework Directive and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive. TheEstonian Government says to have prepared a position in which it states that “HELCOM needsa bigger role in the BSR in order to implement the EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive a nd8better protect the Baltic Sea ”. Finland underlines the cooperation between HELCOM and theInternational Maritime Organization (IMO) and the designation of the Baltic Sea as a special areaunder the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollutio n from Ships and as a NOxemission control area (NECA). Finland underlines its commitment to the implementation of thisregulation through HELCOM .However, no ne of the governments states explic itly how HELCOM should be strengthened andwhat they would contribute towards such goal. The strength and relevance of aninternational/regional organisation depends to an important extent on how strong thegovernments of participating countries want it to be.Apart from some re gional efforts, also various national measures regarding the protection of themarine environment are mentioned. The governments of Estonia and Latvia for example listtheir national efforts to reduce marine litter which serve to implement HELCOM’s Regiona lAction Plan for Marine Litter in the Baltic Sea. It becomes clear that national and regionalmeasures go hand in hand. National measures will not work very effective ly if they are notembedded into wider regional action plans and vice versa.The Norwegian government embeds the environmental status of the Baltic Sea into a widerthematic and geographical context . It lists the government’s White Paper on an Ocean policy andits new national Arctic strategy of April 2017 in which environmental prote ction andsustainability in the High North play important roles. This underlines clearly that the Baltic Seacannot and should not be regarded and treated in isolation since environmental impacts alsoderive fro m adjacent areas and seas.5. Synopsis and suggestionsOverall, the submitted statements demonstrate that the responding governments have taken the25th BSPC Resolution seriously . They generally signal a noteworthy effort to provide a satisfyingaccount of how the governments have tried to impleme nt the Resolution’s calls for action .However, we believe that the statements suffer from several weaknesses.In terms of format, it is obvious that there are differences between the submitted statementsboth regarding length as well as thoroughness . While a certain variability is necessary and suitableto provide a rich picture of the multi -faceted cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region, we do believethat future statements would benefit from some standardisation . In our eyes, a statement doesnot strictly need to address each and every paragraph but it ought to provide a comprehensiveoverview of the projects and programmes in each priority area. Moreover, particularlyinformative are those statements which include different responses from the responsibleministries of the respective government regarding certain activities. It would thus be desirable ifthe governments’ statements could strive for more standardisation towards comprehensivenessand quality in the fut ure.Second, the governments mostly list activities which have been carried out in the past in thenational context. This focus certainly helps to get a better understanding of the developments inthe region but exposes two shortcomings. On the one hand , what is most interesting in thecontext of the BSPC are the projects which are launched and implemented across borders . Thelisting of national activities should therefore be more complemented by transnationalinitiatives . On the other hand , the statements concentrate too much on existing and previousactivities , some of which even date a long time back . It is likely that Parliamentarians already haveknowledge of many of these regional initiatives . Instead, we believe that the governmental9statements should also feature intentions and plans for future activities , as concretely aspossible . This would also fit the character of many paragraphs of the Resolution which could ,and should, be understood as calls for future action. In several cases governmen ts express theirgeneral support for activities and/or institutions. But they do not explicitly state what measuresalready have been implemented and what they think to contribute towards the goal of makingthem stronger in the medium to long term. Thus , the responses hardly reveal vision s for thefuture and in many cases a low level of ambition only.Third, the statements almost exclusively emphasise successful projects and programmes. Whilethis focus is understandable in the governments’ logic, we belie ve that a full picture of the BalticSea cooperation needs to include the failures too. Often, these negative experiences tell usmore about prevailing challenges and point to areas where improvement is needed the most. Wethus argue that the statements should complement success stories with initiatives whichencountered serious problems and/or failed altogether.Fourth, given all the numerous interesting activities which are given attention in the statements, itis sometimes equally interesting what is not mentioned. We find it especially peculiar that hardlyany statement addresses the current fraught political climate around the Baltic Sea Region. TheResolution itself addresses this issue by referring to necessary steps “to re -establish mutual trustand dialogue” (Paragraph 2). We explicitly reject the idea of politicising every successful local andcross -border activitie s. But we encourage the statements to be fully aware of the general politicalclimate and be more explicit about the ramifications of the changed environment , where it causeschallenges , and elaborate how the existing cleavages co uld be overcome.Finally, the responses overall provide a useful and fairly comprehensive overview of initiativesand actions on various levels - national, regional, sub -regional and EU - in specified policy areasacross the Baltic Sea region. But they could be more explicit about the thickinterconnectedness of the various levels . Even national actions are more and more embeddedwithin a wider regional and/or EU context. In this regard, the EU Strategy for the Baltic SeaRegion is also mentione d frequently in connection with many activities. We believe that thegovernmental statements would become more informative and provide the necessary impetus tofurther action , if they factor in these interlinkages and interdependencies more systematically.