Graef presentation at 28 BSPC

The 28th Baltic Sea Parliamentary ConferenceOslo, Norway, 25 – 27 August 2019Clean Oceans & the Future of Working LifeChallenges and VisionsMonday, 26 AugustFIRST SESSIONCooperation in the Baltic Sea Region“Peaceful and close neighbourliness as well as intense cooperation based on democratic values, the rule of Law, human rights andequal opportunities for all”Dr Alexander Graef,Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy University of Hamburg (IFSH)Check against delivery. Only the speech as given has any validity.Beyond DeterrenceRegional Stability through Confidence Building andArms ControlAlexander Graef Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, 25-27 August 2019DeterrenceReassurance State wants to change the status- State seeks security within thequo, seeking expansion, regime anarchy of international relationschange or subversion Military capabilities are an Military capabilities are evidence expression of feeling ‘insecure’of aggressive behaviorPolicy Recommendation Policy RecommendationIncrease military Signal benign intentions,strength and resolve change threat perceptionsAlexander Graef Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, 25-27 August 2019BSR Security Environment since 2014Changing military expenditures between 2014 and 2018 (in current USD)Source: owncompilationbasedon SIPRI, World Bank, 2019Alexander Graef Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, 25-27 August 2019BSR Security Environment since 2014Increasing Quality of Deployment: NATOWales 2014 Warsaw 2016 Brussels 2018 Readiness action plan Enhanced forward Readiness initiative: Very-high readiness presence in Latvia, 4x 30s by 2020joint task force (VJTF) Lithuania, Estonia and Counter-Hybridand Integration Units Poland: 4 multinational Support Teams Expanded NATO rotating battalions NATO Commandresponse force (NRF): Tailored forward Structure Reform:13,000 to 40,000 presence (multinational more personnel, twotroops brigade) in Romania new commands European Reassurance Initiative; European Deterrence Initiative;2015 budget: 985 US$ million 2019 budget: 6,531 US$ millionAlexander Graef Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, 25-27 August 2019BSR Security Environment since 2014Increasing Quality of Deployment: RussiaProblem of Intentions: Modernization, Deterrence or Aggression? Replacement of S-200and S-300 with S-400(2016-2017, 2019) Permanent Deployment(“rearmament”) ofS-400Iskander-M short-rangeXballistic missiles (2019)S-400X X S-400 S-300X Formation of a tankCkhalovsk XS-400 X X S-300X airbase X battalion with an152nd Missile Brigade,XS-400 Chernyakhovsk 11tharmy increased number ofcorps, Gusevtanks (2018) A2/AD CapabilitiesSource: owncompilationbasedonhttps://bmpd.livejournal.com/3566812.html; adaptedfromhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaliningrad#/media/File:Russia_Kaliningrad_location_map.svg.Alexander Graef Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, 25-27 August 2019BSR Security Environment since 2014ConcernsNATO and partners Russian A2/AD capabilities Crimea scenario: fait accompli “Suwalki Gap”: ProblematicReinforcement in case of conflict Air space violationsRussiaXeFP Free access to the Baltic Sea Security of Kaliningrad and St.PetersburgeFPX Aegis Ashore US MissileDefense Base (Redzikowo) NATO eFPeFPX US Patriot missiles and JASSMX XXBMD, Redzikowo Suwalki cruise missiles in PolandXGapeFPSource: adaptedfromhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baltic_Sea#/media/File:Baltic_Sea_map.pngAlexander Graef Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, 25-27 August 2019BSR Security Environment since 2014Mirror ImagingRussia and NATO perceive themselves as status-quo powers in needof deterrenceRisks of Deterrence Strategies Problem of misperceptions: motives, intentions and overall goals; Dangerous incidents in the Baltic air space: deterrence andmiscommunication; Self-fulfilling prophecy: over time deterrent measures that areperceived as threats to one’s own security create a securitydilemma; Assurance masked as deterrence: intra-alliance assurance andsolidarityAlexander Graef Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, 25-27 August 2019Alternative: Reassurance StrategiesGeneral Aims1. Mitigate negative consequences of deterrence2. Reduce the level of uncertainty about deployment missions3. Enhance quality of information about force posture and intentions4. Relax strategic need for deterrence and brinkmanship5. Provide the foundation for a return to wider security cooperation inthe future by establishing trustConfidence ArmsBuilding ControlAlexander Graef Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, 25-27 August 2019Reassurance Stratgies: Confidence BuidlingVienna document on confidence and security building measures, 2011 Exchange of information on military forces, structures, deployment, peacetimestrength, major weapons and equipment systems, annual military budgets Notification and observation of certain military activities (exercises) Inspection and evaluation visits One airbase visit every five yearsProblems High thresholds for notification (9000 or more troops) and observations (13,000 ormore troops) of military exercises; Omission of snap-exercises for regulation (without prior announcement); Important capabilities remain unregulated: e.g. naval forces and drones; Small passive quotas for inspections; Russian position: reform only if the overall security situation changes (NATOdeterrence);Alexander Graef Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, 25-27 August 2019Reassurance Stratgies: Arms ControlTreaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)StatusBT ACV Artillery Combat Attack Two geopolitical blocs: FailedAircraft HelicoptersAdaptation40,000 60,000 40,000 13,600 4,000 Russia suspendedimplementation in December2007; full suspension in March2015 Since 2012: NATO suspendedimplementation in relation toRussiaProblems Non-members: Baltic States,Finland and Sweden High ceilings for militaryequipment Non-regulation of naval forcesor air defence systemsSource: https://fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/intro.htm.Alexander Graef Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, 25-27 August 2019Outlook I: Reassurance - Confidence BuidlingPolitical-Diplomatic NATO-Russia Founding Act 1997: “the Alliance will carry out its collective defenceand other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, andcapability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing ofsubstantial combat forces [...]” CFE Final Act 1999: “Russian Federation will show due restraint with regard toground TLE levels and deployments in the region which includes the Kaliningradoblast and the Pskov oblast.”Legal-Political Extend existing Agreements on Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas(INCSEAs) and Agreements on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities(DMSs); Baltic Sea Project Team (International Civil Aviation Organization) Re-activate bilateral CSBMs under Chapter X of the Vienna Document: i.e. evaluationvisits between Russia and Lithuania;Alexander Graef Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, 25-27 August 2019Outlook II: Reassurance - Arms ControlBaltic Sea Sub-regional Security Regime?Aim: Minimizing the (technical)ability for rapid mobilization andsurprise attackConditions: Avoid isolation of single statesor the establishment ofdifferent zones of security Accept present deploymentlevels Reiterate political agreementson mutual deploymentrestraints Implement according toChapter X “RegionalMeasures” of the ViennaDocumentSource: adaptedfromhttps://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datei:Europe_blank_laea_location_map.svgAlexander Graef Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, 25-27 August 2019Beyond DeterrenceRegional Stability through Confidence Building andArms ControlAlexander Graefgraef@ifsh.deBaltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, 25-27 August 2019