BSPC Working Group On Energy Security 2024 1

Working Group on Energy Security,Self-sustainability, Resilience andConnectivity (ESSRC)Interim ReportInterim Report on Energy Security, Safe Sustainability,Resilience and Connectivity (ESSRC)for the 33rd BSPC, © Schwerin, August 2024T ext: Working Group, Experts in the WG meetings,Governments of the democratic Baltic Sea States,Andris Kulbergs, Agnija Antanovica, IngridaSticenko, Rovena Berga, Bodo BahrEditing: Bodo BahrPhoto: Reinis Inkēns, Latvia; Kimmo Brandt /Parliament of Finland; Rovena Berga,Bodo Bahr, BSPC SecretariatLayout: produktionsbüro TINUSBaltic Sea Parliamentary ConferenceBodo BahrSecretary General+49 171 5512557bodo.bahr@bspcmail.netwww.bspc.netBSPC SecretariatSchlossgartenallee 1519061 SchwerinGermanyThe Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) was established in 1991 as a forum for po-litical dialogue between parliamentarians from the Baltic Sea Region. The BSPC aims toraise awareness and opinion on issues of current political interest and relevance for the Bal-tic Sea Region. It promotes and drives various initiatives and efforts to support the sustain-able environmental, social and economic development of the Baltic Sea Region. It strives toenhance the visibility of the Baltic Sea Region and its issues in a broader European context.BSPC gathers parliamentarians from 10 national parliaments, 7 regional parliaments and 5parliamentary organisations around the Baltic Sea. The BSPC thus constitutes a unique par-liamentary bridge between the democratic EU- and non-EU countries of the Baltic Sea Re-gion. BSPC external interfaces include parliamentary, governmental, subregional and otherorganisations in the Baltic Sea Region and the Northern Dimension area, among themCBSS, HELCOM, the Northern Dimension Partnership in Health and Social Well-Be-ing (NDPHS), the Baltic Sea Labour Forum (BSLF) and the Baltic Sea States SubregionalCooperation (BSSSC).The BSPC shall initiate and guide political activities in the region; support and strengthendemocratic institutions in the participating states; improve dialogue between governments,parliaments and civil society; strengthen the common identity of the Baltic Sea Region bymeans of close cooperation between national and regional parliaments based on equality;and initiate and guide political activities in the Baltic Sea Region, endowing them with ad-ditional democratic legitimacy and parliamentary authority.The political recommendations of the annual Parliamentary Conferences are expressed in aConference Resolution adopted by consensus by the Conference. The adopted Resolutionshall be submitted to the governments of the Baltic Sea Region, the CBSS and the EU anddisseminated to other relevant national, regional and local stakeholders in the Baltic Sea Re-gion and its neighbourhood.3Table of ContentsIntroduction .......................................................................................................................................... 6Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................... 81. Programme of the Working Group .................................................................................................. 9a. Constitution .................................................................................................................................................................... 9b. Background ..................................................................................................................................................................... 9c. Objectives ........................................................................................................................................................................ 9d. Main Directions of the Work of the Working Group .................................................................................................. 10Energy Security and Self-sustainability of the Region ................................................................................................ 10Resilience and Interconnectivity of the Baltic Sea States ............................................................................................ 10e. Participation .................................................................................................................................................................. 11f. Mode of Work ............................................................................................................................................................... 11g. Follow-up ...................................................................................................................................................................... 112. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPC ..................................................................... 12Energy ................................................................................................................................................................................ 12Baltic Sea Region Energy Profiles ...................................................................................................................................... 12Baltic Sea Region Electricity Production in 2023 ............................................................................................................. 16Baltic Sea Region Electricity Production and Consumption in 2023, TWh ................................................................... 20Baltic Sea Region Gas Infrastructure and Capacities in 2022, GWh ............................................................................... 21Geographical Distribution of the European Gas Demand ............................................................................................... 21T ransport ........................................................................................................................................................................... 2243. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group ......................................................... 233.1 Meeting on 15-16 October 2023 in Riga, Latvia ...................................................................................................... 23Energy ......................................................................................................................................................................... 25Military Mobility and T ransportation ........................................................................................................................ 28Digital Connectivity ................................................................................................................................................... 28Cross-Border Projects .................................................................................................................................................. 29T ransport and Connectivity ........................................................................................................................................ 29Energy Sector and Security ......................................................................................................................................... 31Renewable Energy and Market Dynamics ................................................................................................................. 333.2 Meeting on 17-18 March 2024 in Helsinki, Finland ................................................................................................ 35Geopolitics .................................................................................................................................................................. 36Energy ......................................................................................................................................................................... 37Addressing Hybrid Threats ........................................................................................................................................ 38Maritime Connectivity and Security .......................................................................................................................... 38Crisis Preparedness ...................................................................................................................................................... 39Bioeconomy ............................................................................................................................................................... 40Summary of the Key Points from the Expert Presentations ............................................................................................. 411. Hybrid Threats and Countermeasures: .................................................................................................................. 412. Specific Hybrid Threats and Responses: ................................................................................................................. 413. Maritime Security and Connectivity: ..................................................................................................................... 424. Geopolitical Context: ............................................................................................................................................. 425. Energy Security: ...................................................................................................................................................... 426. Crisis Preparedness: ................................................................................................................................................. 437. Bioeconomy: ........................................................................................................................................................... 438. Policy Recommendations: ...................................................................................................................................... 4354. Political Recommendations ............................................................................................................ 44Recommendations of the BSPC Working Group to the 33rd BSPC Resolution ......................................................... 44Regarding energy security and self-sustainability to ................................................................................................... 44Regarding resilience and interconnectivity to ............................................................................................................. 455. Intergovernmental Survey .............................................................................................................. 471. What are the national and regional long-term energy consumption projections and energy production plans? ................. 472. What are the plans of the governments regarding developing new energy interconnections? .................................... 493. How does your country or region plan to ensure the balancing of power systems in the long term?What are the plans for balancing renewable sources of energy? .................................................................................. 514. What cross-border energy projects are being implemented orare planned to be developed in your country or region? ............................................................................................. 535. What are the main national and regional objectives regarding hydrogen production and supply? ............................. 556. Best Cross-Border Practices ............................................................................................................ 58Baltic States’ Synchronisation with the Continental European Network ......................................................................... 58ELWIND ........................................................................................................................................................................... 58Fehmarnbelt T unnel ........................................................................................................................................................... 59FinBalt ................................................................................................................................................................................ 59Rail Baltica ......................................................................................................................................................................... 597. Members of the BSPC Working Group ......................................................................................... 60Chairmanship ..................................................................................................................................................................... 60List of Members ................................................................................................................................................................. 61Secretariat of the Working Group .............................................................................................................................. 63Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................................................... 636 IntroductionIntroductionLadies and gentlemen,In 2023, the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference made a pivotalstep towards increasing energy security, self-sustainability, resilienceand connectivity in the region. The creation of the Working Groupwas an important step after our organisation severing its ties withthe Russian Federation has opened possibilities for more open,transparent, and result-orientated discussions about topics of mu -tual interest for the countries of the democratic Baltic Sea region.Until August 2024, we have held three very productive meetings.The Working Group convened in Riga on 15-16 October 2023,establishing a plan and core principles to guide discussions and ac-tivities from October 2023 to June 2025. During this inauguralmeeting, members and experts deliberated on various topics cru-cial to the Baltic Sea region, including energy, defence, transport,and digital connectivity. Subsequently, the Working Group held itssecond meeting in Helsinki on 17-18 March 2024. Discussions atthis meeting focused on geopolitics, energy issues, strategies to ad-dress hybrid threats, and other relevant topics. The third meetingtook place in Greifswald on 26-28 May 2024. During this meet-ing, discussions centred around safeguarding critical infrastruc-ture, challenges related to maritime transport, efforts to maintainregional stability, and other pertinent issues. Overall, these meet-ings underscored our commitment to addressing multifacetedchallenges within the Baltic Sea region and fostering cooperationamong member states on critical strategic matters.Mr Andris Kulbergs7 IntroductionI would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to each of the participants of our meetings for their invalu-able contributions and active participation in the meetings focused on energy security, self-sustainability,resilience, and connectivity in the Baltic Sea region. Your insights, expertise, and dedication have been in-strumental in shaping meaningful discussions and formulating strategies that are crucial for the future ofour region. Your commitment to addressing complex challenges, from safeguarding critical infrastructureto enhancing energy resilience, highlights the importance of collaborative efforts and shared responsibili-ties in ensuring a secure and sustainable future. The members of the Working Group deeply appreciateexpert engagement, thoughtful contributions, and constructive dialogue throughout the meetings held inRiga, Helsinki, and Greifswald.The BSPC serves as an effective platform for addressing issues of energy security, self-sufficiency, resil-ience, and connectivity in the Baltic Sea region. It plays a critical role in devising solutions to current andfuture challenges and has the potential to foster greater cooperation among Baltic Sea states in the areascovered by the working group. Moving forward, we look forward to continuing our collaborative effortsand building upon the outcomes of the first meetings to further strengthen our collective resilience andconnectivity in the Baltic Sea region.Andris KulbergsMember of the Baltic Assembly and the Parliament of LatviaChair of the Working Group8 Executive SummaryExecutive SummaryThe Working Group on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, Resilience and Connectivity (ESSRC) waslaunched at the 32nd Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) held on 27-29 August 2023 in Berlin,Germany. The overarching objective of the Working Group is to elaborate political positions and recom-mendations on energy security, self-sustainability, resilience, and connectivity.On 15-16 October 2023 in Riga (Latvia), the Working Group established a plan and main principles thatwill guide the discussions and activities within the newly established Working Group from October 2023to June 2025. During the inaugural meeting of the Working Group, the members, together with experts,also discussed all the topics to be covered during the meetings of the Working Group, including energy,defence, transport and digital connectivity of the Baltic Sea region. During the 2nd meeting of the Work-ing Group on 17-18 March 2024 in Helsinki (Finland), the members discussed geopolitics, energy, ad-dressing hybrid threats and other topics. The discussions during the 3rd meeting of the Working Groupon 26-28 May 2024 in Greifswald (Germany) were about the protection of critical infrastructure, chal-lenges regarding maritime transport, maintaining regional stability, and others.This Interim Report provides an overview of the Working Group’s results until June 2024. The primaryfocus is on the results of its meetings, the scientific input, statistics, and the political recommendationselaborated during the meetings and forwarded to the 33rd Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference on 25-27August 2024 in Helsingør, Denmark.9 1. Programme of the Working Group1. Programme of the Working Groupa. ConstitutionThe Working Group is constituted as an ad hoc working group under the auspices of the Standing Com-mittee of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, following the BSPC Rules of Procedure.b. BackgroundThe Russian invasion of Ukraine was a shock to the Baltic Sea region and its energy systems. Energy de-pendence on Russia is dangerous, and it is important to find new ways to ensure energy security andself-sustainability of the region. Another area of importance for the Baltic Sea region is resilience and con-nectivity. The regional energy, transport, and digital networks need to become stronger and more integrat-ed to meet the needs of the modern world. The BSPC Working Group on Climate Change and Biodiver-sity ended its work in August 2023, but despite that, the BSPC needs to continue working on sustaina-bility and meeting the regional climate goals. The BSPC has become an excellent format for discussingenergy security, self-sustainability, resilience, and connectivity in the Baltic Sea region. The BSPC has apivotal role in finding solutions to current and future challenges and the potential to enhance cooperationof the Baltic Sea states in the areas covered by the Working Group.c. ObjectivesThe overarching objective of the Working Group is to elaborate political positions and recommendationson energy security, self-sustainability, resilience, and connectivity. For this purpose, the Working Groupshould establish and maintain contacts with relevant institutions, organisations, and other actors in theBaltic Sea region and beyond. The Working Group shall contribute to the exchange of knowledge andbest practices. It shall also help to actively drive cooperation in the Baltic Sea region in this policy fieldand to follow and influence political initiatives.10 1. Programme of the Working Groupd. Main Directions of the Work of the Working GroupEnergy Security and Self-sustainability of the RegionProducing green, affordable, and climate-neutral energy has been among the traditional common chal-lenges for the countries in the Baltic Sea region; however, the activities of Russia have also brought aboutchallenges relating specifically to energy security, availability, and affordability. In the energy sector, theBaltic Sea region should aim to achieve self-sustainability that would contribute greatly to the economicdevelopment and stability of the region.The main topics to be discussed by the Working Group include:• joint approaches in further phasing out and preventing dependency on fossil fuels, especially fromRussia;• enhancing cooperation to ensure clean and affordable energy, in particular, but not limited tohydrogen policy;• encouraging collaboration in energy and sustainability research and innovation.Resilience and Interconnectivity of the Baltic Sea StatesThe aim to connect the Baltic Sea region is based on common features and challenges of the region. In-creasing the connectivity between the Baltic Sea states and the resilience of critical infrastructure will con-tribute to thriving regional communities and businesses as well as to building similarly strong relation-ships with neighbouring countries.The main topics to be discussed by the WG include:• joint measures towards an open, competitive, fully integrated, and resilient regional energy market;• building interconnected, sustainable, and resilient transport systems together;• accelerating the transition to a single digital market resilient to internal and external threats.11 1. Programme of the Working Groupe. ParticipationAll member parliaments and parliamentary organisations of the BSPC are invited to participate in theWorking Group with one member and one substitute each, accompanied by staff. Members and substi-tutes must be parliamentarians.f. Mode of WorkThe Working Group will collect and compile information utilizing expert presentations, study visits, andother information-gathering activities. The materials will be discussed and analysed continuously duringthe meetings of the Working Group. The aim is to gradually elaborate positions and recommendations forthe annual resolutions of the BSPC.The Working Group shall adopt a working plan at its first meeting. The Working Group is expected tohold at least two meetings a year and prepare a set of political recommendations for the annual resolutionsof the BSPC. The interim report will be presented during the 33rd BSPC and the final report during the34th BSPC.g. Follow-upAfter the publication of the political recommendations at the 33rd and 34th BSPC, the members of theWorking Group should take various initiatives to disseminate the recommendations and monitor theirimplementation. The members are invited to raise discussions about the recommendations in their homeparliaments and relevant Committees, pose questions to their governments and public authorities, andengage in various opinion-building activities, not least in their constituencies.12 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPC2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCEnergyThe countries in the Baltic Sea region have different energy portfolios, meaning there are plenty of possi-bilities and challenges. The Baltic Sea countries, to varying degrees, have to change their energy portfoli-os to achieve carbon-neutral generation. For the past 10-15 years, energy research publications haveshown that the future of energy systems is hybrid. To build a hybrid energy system, it is necessary to un-derstand the contents of the energy portfolio and identify the needs to be produced, imported or bor-rowed from the neighbouring countries.Baltic Sea Region Energy ProfilesDDeennmmaarrkkSource:Finnish Institute of International AffairsGeopolitics, EU Energy Policy andEnergy Security in the Baltic Sea RegionPresentation BSPC WG ESSRC,18 March 2024, Helsinki, Parliament of FinlandDr. Marco Siddi, Cordelia Buchanan Ponczekwww.bspc.net/energy-politics-and-securi-ty-in-the-baltic-region-cbp2-siddi/13 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCEEssttoonniiaa LLaattvviiaaLLiitthhuuaanniiaaSource:Finnish Institute of International AffairsGeopolitics, EU Energy Policy andEnergy Security in the Baltic Sea RegionPresentation BSPC WG ESSRC,18 March 2024, Helsinki, Parliament of FinlandDr. Marco Siddi, Cordelia Buchanan Ponczekwww.bspc.net/energy-politics-and-securi-ty-in-the-baltic-region-cbp2-siddi/14 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCFFiinnllaannddGGeerrmmaannyySource:Finnish Institute of International AffairsGeopolitics, EU Energy Policy andEnergy Security in the Baltic Sea RegionPresentation BSPC WG ESSRC,18 March 2024, Helsinki, Parliament of FinlandDr. Marco Siddi, Cordelia Buchanan Ponczekwww.bspc.net/energy-politics-and-securi-ty-in-the-baltic-region-cbp2-siddi/15 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCSSwweeddeennPPoollaannddSource:Finnish Institute of International AffairsGeopolitics, EU Energy Policy andEnergy Security in the Baltic Sea RegionPresentation BSPC WG ESSRC,18 March 2024, Helsinki, Parliament of FinlandDr. Marco Siddi, Cordelia Buchanan Ponczekwww.bspc.net/energy-politics-and-securi-ty-in-the-baltic-region-cbp2-siddi/16 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCBaltic Sea Region Electricity Production in 20231Country Production,TWhShare of renew-able energyElectricity production by sourceDenmark 32.9 83 % 14%10%60%9%6%1%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknownEstonia 4.63 46 %14%43%17%15%11%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknown1 Data retrieved on 16 June 2024, https://app.electricitymaps.com/zone/NOttps://www.gie.eu/publications/maps/system-capacity-map/17 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCFinland 74.5 48 %43%0%7%6%20%19%3%1%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknownGermany 446 60 %10%27%33%13%3% 11%1%1%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknownIceland 15.9 100 %28%72%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknown18 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCLatvia 5.69 74 %4%4%65%24%3%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknownLithuania 5.44 86 %14%49%13%8%13%3% NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknownNorway 151 99 %10%89%1%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknown19 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCPoland 153 27 %1%64%15%9%1%8%2%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknownSweden 155 70 %30%22%1%42%5% NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknown20 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCBaltic Sea Region Electricity Production and Consumption in 2023, TWh2Country Production Consumption BalanceDenmark 32.9 51.7 -18.8Estonia 4.63 11.9 -7.27Finland 74.5 84.3 -9.8Germany 446 498 -52Iceland 15.9 15.9 0Latvia 5.69 9.05 -3.36Lithuania 5.44 15 -9.56Norway 151 162 -11Poland 153 168 -15Sweden 155 163 -82 Data retrieved on 16 June 2024, https://app.electricitymaps.com/zone/NOttps://www.gie.eu/publications/maps/system-capacity-map/21 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCBaltic Sea Region Gas Infrastructure and Capacities in 2022, GWh3Country Yearly demand Maximum production, GWh/d Working gas volume4Denmark 20.801 26 9.845Estonia 3.770 - -Finland 11.833 1 -Germany 813.921 174 254.673Iceland - - -Latvia 8.777 - 22.600Lithuania 15.657 - -Norway - - -Poland 171.438 82 37.511Sweden 6.466 0.3 102Geographical Distribution of the European Gas Demand53 Data retrieved on 16 June 2024, https://www.gie.eu/publications/maps/system-capacity-map/4 Total volume of gas storage minus the c ushion gas5 Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023 of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG)22 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCT ransportThe countries of the Baltic Sea region have significant differences in transport infrastructure. Throughout theWorking Group meetings, the members have discussed increasing connectivity between the countries. How -ever, to understand the future possibilities, it is important to understand the strengths of each country.Country Short description regarding roads, railway lines, airports, and seaportsDenmarkRegional transport hub (air, sea, and railway) of major importance connecting Scandina-via and beyondEstoniaQuality and sufficient capacity for national travel, seaports ensuring passenger andfreight mobility as well as the development of the Rail Baltica projectFinland Major source and destination of passengers and commercial freightGermany Advanced and varied public transport systemIceland Well-developed sea transport and air travelLatvia Riga Airport as the largest air traffic hub in the Baltic States, increased ferry connectionto Sweden, and the development of the Rail Baltica projectLithuania Quality road infrastructure and the development of the Rail Baltica projectNorwayWell integrated into the overall Scandinavian transport system, a major sea-going capa-bility with unprecedented relevance for the energy sectorPoland Rapid improvements in developing roads and railway connectionsSweden Well-developed national road, railway, and air travel system23 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group3.1 Meeting on 15-16 October 2023 in Riga, LatviaDuring the Working Group’s inaugural meeting, the members and experts discussed all the topics to becovered during its meetings, including energy, defence, transport, and digital connectivity of the BalticSea region. WG Chairman Andris Kulbergs underlined that the region was facing many challenges, a ma-jor one being the security of energy, economies, and societies. Ukraine showed an example of how the en-ergy sector could be attacked directly and its vulnerability if it was too centralised.The main information and conclusions of the meeting – particularly from the perspective of the experts– are summarised in this subchapter, but more detailed information can be found in the meeting notes.The experts that have contributed to the meeting are Mr Reinis Āboltiņš, Minister Kaspars Briškens, MrKristaps Ločmelis, and Deputy State Secretary Līga Rozentāle.24 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group25 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupEnergy• Mr Reinis Āboltiņš pointed out that countries in the Baltic Sea region had different energyportfolios, meaning that there were plenty of possibilities and challenges. He emphasised that allcountries in the Baltic Sea region had challenges in reaching carbon-neutral energy portfolios.Despite that, there was no single technology that could provide an ultimate solution; however, forthe last 10-15 years, all indexed energy research publications had been showing that the future ofenergy systems was hybrid. The ability to build a hybrid energy system, according to Mr Āboltiņš,required understanding the contents of the energy portfolio and identifying the needs to beproduced, imported, or borrowed from the neighbouring countries. The maintenance and timelyinvestment in the energy portfolio was highlighted as important.• Energy production and balancing were important topics for future discussion. The parliamentaryside emphasised the importance of understanding the plans in this area for the countries in theBaltic Sea region. They highlighted the importance of balancing “unreliable” sources of energysuch as wind and solar and finding solutions to balance renewables while improving regionalconnectivity.• Minister of T ransport of the Republic of Latvia Kaspars Briškens agreed that electricity and gasinfrastructure required years to develop. He added that for this reason, transmission systemoperators were regularly updating 10-year network development plans, including so-calledcommon interest projects.• Mr Āboltiņš noted that it was important to ensure interconnections and energy flows acrossborders in the Baltic Sea region. He highlighted the huge wind energy potential in the area,although the countries were not utilising it to its full extent, despite it potentially being the secondbiggest source of electricity.• Kristaps Ločmelis noted that the development of wind energy projects in the region were facingconsiderable difficulties and thus needed better coordination. He concluded that several challengeswere connected with public support and biodiversity requirements. Nowadays, according to him,it took too long to get access to or realize the projects. Sharing experience in this area was vital forthe development of wind energy in the region.26 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• Mr Āboltiņš affirmed that there was a clear projection of rapid electricity consumption increase inseveral industry-leading countries such as Sweden and Germany, whose electricity generationportfolio would be falling behind the demand and would have to be balanced by neighbouringcountries through improved interconnectivity.• Mr Kristaps Ločmelis spoke of an untapped renewable energy system potential in the Baltic States,as they might supply the European Union member states with green energy. Considering therelatively low local consumption, the Baltic States could export most.• Mr Āboltiņš suggested that the gas market had reacted to the global convulsions provoked by theRussian invasion of Ukraine, a very targeted and long-planned action by Russia. He reminded themeeting that many policymakers and decision-makers had refused to view the Nord Streampipelines as a political project and security risk. At their cumulative capacity of 110 billion cubicmetres of natural gas, Nord Stream would have matched almost exactly the volume annuallycarried from Ukraine to Europe.• He further noted that, when looking at the energy systems, the countries had become cleverer:They were managing quite well and diversifying their gas supplies away from Russia. The biggestchallenge was continuing to look for better solutions and having a broad vision, not narrowingdown on the national interests. That was even more important at the present time of increasinginterconnection of markets.• Mr Āboltiņš indicated that the countries with more energy connections having lower energy pricesdemonstrated to the rest of Europe that interconnections were extremely important. If there wasno connectivity in the energy market, there would be blackouts, constrained situations, andlimited cross-border capacities, leading to price spikes.• Mr Āboltiņš suggested regional policies in terms of hydrogen in the Baltic Sea countries as anotherimportant issue to be addressed, such as considering the synchronisation of their plans andpolicies.27 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• Deputy State Secretary of the Ministry of Climate and Energy of the Republic of Latvia, Ms LīgaRozentāle, explained the current energy storage solutions in Latvia, mentioning that the countrywas exploring various storage technologies, including large-scale batteries, hydrogen storage, andnuclear energy. While Latvia was currently focusing on maintaining natural gas as a key energysource, the transition to more sustainable storage solutions was crucial. The integration of thesetechnologies would be essential for balancing the intermittent nature of renewable energy sourcessuch as wind and solar.• Ms Rozentāle discussed investments in solar energy, emphasising that Latvia saw significantpotential in solar energy, particularly for households and small businesses. The country wasfocusing on supporting solar microgeneration and creating a legal framework to encourage theadoption of solar energy systems. This included simplifying the process for households to installsolar panels and ensuring an easy connection to the grid. Additionally, she highlighted theimportance of solar energy in achieving Latvia’s renewable energy targets and reducing dependenceon fossil fuels.• Mr Kristaps Ločmelis outlined the developments in the electric vehicle (EV) infrastructure in theBaltic Sea region. He emphasized that its expansion was critical for promoting the adoption ofelectric vehicles and achieving sustainability goals. Latvia, for instance, was investing in thedevelopment of nationwide EV charging networks, with a focus on ensuring that there weresufficient charging stations in both urban and rural areas to support the growing number ofelectric vehicles. He mentioned that Latvenergo, one of the leading energy companies in the BalticStates, was actively developing a charging network for electric vehicles in the region. Among otheraspects, they were installing fast-charging stations along major highways and in cities, ensuringconvenient access to charging points for EV users. The company was also exploring innovativesolutions such as smart charging and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technologies to optimise energy useand support grid stability.28 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupMilitary Mobility and T ransportation• Minister Kaspars Briškens called the integration of the Baltic Sea region across various areas,including transport, digital connectivity, and defence, very important for regional security anddevelopment.• He stated that the Baltic Sea region had the potential to become an integrated defence area withstrong cooperation on coastal, air, and maritime defence. Strengthening military mobility or a newstrategy for military mobility should be a joint priority in all different modes of transport. Headded that, for example, the cable corridors connected with the development of the Rail Balticaproject would serve not just for the railway’s technical and commercial requirements, but also asan opportunity to connect the defence and civil infrastructure with independent digital networks.• Mr Briškens noted that the Baltic Sea was heavily navigated, yet significant potential remained tofurther strengthen the interconnection across the Baltic Sea region, especially in the East-Westdirection.Digital Connectivity• Minister Briškens saw the last-mile connectivity as a challenge across the Baltic Sea region. It wasimportant to share all the best practices across the region on how to implement these finalconnections, how to commercialise them, and how to ensure that the digital infrastructuremanagers would cooperate with commercial operators.• He viewed potential in the Baltic Sea region for strengthening digital connectivity, both across andalong the Baltic Sea. One example was the far greater number of submarine cables in the NorthSea and the Atlantic Ocean than in the Baltic Sea. However, some of the cables in the Baltic Seahad been laid down in the early 1990s. The development of high-capacity broadband 5G – andthe impending advent of 6G technologies – meant that their capacity might prove insufficient.29 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupCross-Border Projects• Minister Briškens said that large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the Rail Baltica railway andthe Fehmarn Belt tunnel, tended to experience delays in their development. Such delays werecausing capital expenditure escalations and leading to the generous funding from the EuropeanUnion being reduced. Each call seemed to be a separate action with a separate accountingprocedure and paperwork. On occasion, a project might receive one package while waiting foranother. Thus, the project developers were left idling. He proposed raising awareness of theseissues in the European Union: Changes were necessary if Europe wanted to accelerate large-scaleprojects and deliver the TEN-T core network by 2030.Summary of the Key Points from the Expert Presentations on T ransport and Energy Secu -rity in the Baltic Sea Region:The following summary captures the key points from the expert presentations, emphasising the strategicinitiatives, challenges, and solutions in transport and energy security within the Baltic Sea region. The fo-cus on regional cooperation, renewable energy development, and infrastructure investments underscoresthe importance of integrated approaches to enhance connectivity, resilience, and sustainability.T ransport and ConnectivityMinister of T ransport of the Republic of Latvia, Mr Kaspars Briškens:• Rail Baltica Project: A critical initiative to enhance north-south access, connecting the Baltic Stateswith Poland and integrating into the broader European transport network. This project is part ofthe North Sea-Baltic TEN-T corridor and aims to create new corridors connecting the Baltic Sea,Black Sea, and Aegean Sea, including integration with the UK.• Air Baltic: The airline operates from bases in Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius, covering routes inFinland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland, and beyond. It has one of the greenest fleets inEurope.• Marine T raffic: The Baltic Sea, particularly the Danish straits, is heavily frequented. Efforts are underwayto reestablish ferry connections between Riga and Stockholm and improve the east-west connection.30 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupLatvian Logistics Sector:• It is undergoing a significant shift from reliance on Russian raw materials to focusing on Europeanconnections. Its historical ties with Central Asia provide opportunities to enhance trade routesthrough Latvian ports.• Emphasis is placed on creating integrated logistics corridors for Western and Nordic customers.Digital Connectivity:• There is a potential for strengthening submarine cable infrastructure in the Baltic Sea.• Rail Baltica will feature cable ducts for commercial and defence digital networks, contributing toLatvia’s digital connectivity policy.Energy Infrastructure:• Future plans include developing coastal wind farms and hydrogen policies for transport.• Ports and logistics sectors are prepared to support investments in offshore wind parks andhydrogen storage distribution.Challenges and Solutions:• Administrative burdens and capital expenditure escalations affect mega-projects like Rail Baltica.Streamlining processes and ensuring timely EU funding are vital.• The geopolitical situation emphasises the importance of regional security and interconnectivity projects.For more details, see the following presentations:https://www.bspc.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Briskens_Kaspars_RegTran_161023_194_KB.pdfhttps://www.bspc.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2023-10-13-_RBR-final.pdf31 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupEnergy Sector and SecurityDeputy State Secretary of the Ministry of Climate and Energy, Līga Rozentāle:• Energy Independence and Export: Latvia aims to achieve energy independence and eventuallyexport energy, leveraging wind, biomass, solar, and hydroelectric power.• Liberalised Markets: Latvia’s electricity and gas markets are fully liberalised, encouragingcompetition and consumer choice.• Synchronisation with Continental Europe: An accelerated timeline aims to synchronise withEurope’s grid by February 2025, enhancing energy security.Renewable Energy Development:• Projects include the Estonian-Latvian Wind Park (ELWIND) and the Baltic Wind Connectorbetween Estonia and Germany.• Efforts focus on optimising network use and auctioning public land for wind parks.Gas Sector:• Developing a common gas market with Estonia and Finland, with the potential for Lithuania to join.• Exploring a hydrogen infrastructure and biomethane production, leveraging the Inčukalnsunderground gas storage for regional security.32 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupCurrent Security of Gas Supply:• The Inčukalns storage is close to full capacity, with significant reserves and long-term agreementswith the Klaipėda LNG terminal.• There are plans to develop a common framework for utilising the Paldiski LNG terminal ifneeded.Climate Neutrality Goals:• High renewable energy targets have been set, with a focus on solar and wind power for domesticuse and exports.• There is potential for hydrogen production from electricity and regional cooperation on nuclearenergy.Challenges and Considerations:• Regional cooperation on balancing renewable energy sources and infrastructure investments isneeded.• Timely investment in electricity and gas infrastructure is vital to prevent blackouts and ensuresupply security.https://www.bspc.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Rozentale_Liga_BSPC_KEM__161023.pdf33 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupRenewable Energy and Market DynamicsLatvenergo AS:• Strategy: The company aims to double its generation capacity by 2030, focusing on hydropower,cogeneration plants, and renewable energy solutions.• Challenges: Environmental permits, grid connections, and military-restricted areas pose obstaclesto wind power development.• Interconnections: These are essential for the security of supply, with planned investments in newradars to facilitate wind farms.Regional Wind Energy:• Despite the high potential for wind energy in the Baltic Sea region, permitting processes andbiodiversity concerns delay projects.• European Commission regulations could help expedite wind power plant installations.34 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupMarket Dynamics:• Different energy portfolios across the region offer opportunities for cooperation and hybrid energysystems.• Maintaining and investing in transmission grids and interconnections to balance supply anddemand is crucial.Hybrid Energy Systems:• Future energy systems will be hybrid, combining various renewable sources and technologies.• Regional cooperation and open-market policies are crucial for managing interconnected energymarkets and ensuring resilience.Geopolitical Considerations:• The exclusion of Russia allows for more cohesive regional energy strategies.• Synchronisation of national plans for energy production, consumption, and interconnection isessential for regional security and sustainability.35 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group3.2 Meeting on 17-18 March 2024 in Helsinki, FinlandDuring the 2nd meeting of the Working Group, the members discussed geopolitics, energy, addressinghybrid threats and other topics. The main conclusions of the meeting are summarised in this subchapter;however, more detailed information can be found in the notes of the meeting. The experts that have con-tributed to the discussions of the meeting: Ms Johanna Kohl, Mr Tapio Pyysalo, Mr Jukka Savolainen, MrMarco Siddi, Mr Jussi Soramäki, and Mr Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen.36 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupGeopolitics• Mr Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen emphasised that the Baltic Sea region countries should reevaluate thestrategy of Russia not just from the military but also from the economic and hybrid perspective.He stated that it was necessary to understand the strategy of Russia as “a great power of flows”. Inpresent-day Europe, imperial and colonial Russia was battling against a free, democratic Ukraineserving as an anti-Russian module. He indicated that the culture, language, and sovereignty ofUkraine and Belarus were unthinkable for many Russians.• Mr Tynkkynen claimed that Russia viewed the world as all “flows” functioning as means ofcoercion and repression, which were persuasive and alluring at the same time. There was theviolence of war machinery: bullets and missiles killing people, troops, tanks, and others. ButRussia had also been targeting infrastructure and nature. He noted that people were alsoconsidered as flows – the deported and Russianised Ukrainians were either seen as new Russiansand given passports or Russianised in Ukrainian lands. While the flows of violence were material,the greatest export commodity was fear. The Russian regime continued claiming that it wouldnuke its adversaries as if Russia were the only nuclear power in the world. It was important to besceptical in taking this fear in.• He further said that Russia was also battling against the energy transition and climate policies. Inthe past 30 years of Vladimir Putin’s reign, energy had been vital in centralising the power ofRussia. Energy revenues were highly important for the country as they made up half of the statebudget. That had also created enormous economic liberties and had made it possible to divert alarge share of that money to violence. Throughout Putin’s years in power, energy had been crucialin paving the way for the dictatorship and increasing violence both inside and outside Russia.• Mr Tynkkynen indicated that Russia was a “fossil empire”. Based on a fossil energy economy, anddue to its mystified history, it stood against technological modernisation, the energy transition,and climate action. Russia was pulling the brakes on the European energy transition,understanding that the country would suffer because of climate change but seeing that othercountries would suffer more, which would make them a stronger player. The people in power werewilling to let Russia suffer as long as others suffer more.37 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• He also said that energy had turned from a soft to a hard weapon. It could still be alluring if acountry is interested. T ransport routes had also been used – for example, by impacting the ability tofly over Russia. Other material targets included grain (such as destroying Ukrainian fields), metals(such as nickel and lithium), the environment (coercing and exporting fear via the potential of anaccident, such as in the Baltic Sea), people (illegal immigrants on the borders), cyber (cyber attacksand information war), critical infrastructure (targeting and threatening western infrastructures suchas wind parks), money (funding right-/left-wing extremists in the West) as well as assassinations(covert killings and sabotage in Europe). If this was the strategy of Russia, due to their economicvulnerabilities, they were under threat. For Mr Tynkkynen, this was a narrative Europe could use.Energy• Mr Marco Siddi noted that nowadays energy was used as a weapon. Before 2022, there wereinstances of such weaponisation but not to such a scale. He added that within certain limits,Gazprom had already been exporting less to Europe before the full-scale invasion. A series ofmeasures, such as embargos, phaseouts, and price gaps on Russian oil products had taken place.These had lost their effect as Russia had found ways around these sanctions. Thus, it was veryimportant to link up with the rest of the world.• He furthermore mentioned that the EU had quickly responded to the war. This had been thesecond time in two years that the region had faced a serious crisis. In the energy sector, theRePowerEU Plan had been presented by the European Commission on 18 May 2022. It proposedaccelerating the energy transition by reducing gas imports from Russia, focusing on energyefficiency and saving as well as diversifying energy sources. Mr Siddi viewed these as temporaryfixes, though. The best way for the EU to move ahead was to focus on the green transition. At thesame time, the debate on nuclear power seemed to have revitalised.• Mr Siddi stated that the EU should also balance its energy security by domestic production. Thewar was not confined to Ukraine as critical infrastructure was being targeted in the Baltic Sea aswell (e.g., the Nord Stream sabotage). Gas from Russia was reaching the EU via T urkstream andUkraine, while LNG imports had been increasing, with Spain and Belgium becoming largerimporters. He believed that the Balticconnector damage on 8 October 2023 was another exampleof damage to the infrastructure.38 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• He also noted that the winter of 2025 could be crucial in terms of energy, necessitating betterpreparedness. He encouraged the countries in the Baltic Sea region to set up moreinterconnections in the energy sector and exchange information.Addressing Hybrid Threats• Mr Tapio Pyysalo asserted that hybrid threats were coordinated and synchronised actions thatdeliberately targeted systemic vulnerabilities of states and institutions through a wide range ofmeans, exploiting the thresholds of detection and attribution. They were aimed at influencing thedecision-making of the target country. Hybrid threats were targeting the foundations ofdemocracy across civic services and governance spaces, challenging the availability of their services.He noted that hybrid threats were currently increasing due to disinformation and cognitivethreats. This process was also affected by global competition and systemic rivalry, global instabilityand the proliferation of conflict, weaponised interdependence, technological developments,cognitive threats, and the cost-efficiency of hybrid tools.• Mr Pyysalo stated that the cyber domain was used for attacks against Western societies and massdata collection. Military cooperation was also increasingly used for strategic gain. Responding tosuch hybrid threats, in the short term, required raising the situational awareness. In the mediumand long term, there was a need to build societal resilience that would help build deterrenceagainst hybrid threats, providing a cultural or systemic change.• Mr Jukka Savolainen indicated that critical infrastructure was vital and used in cases of conflict andespionage. Since private companies did not welcome any extra costs, they did not want to provide extrasecurity. In his view, it was necessary to explain that investing in security was important for durability.Maritime Connectivity and Security• Mr Jussi Soramäki highlighted that connectivity was under threat, as shown by the example of theBalticconnector pipeline case. Protecting maritime infrastructure in the exclusive economic zonewas extremely difficult as it questioned the freedom of the sea, a problem most states had not yetsolved.39 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• Additionally, he pointed out that Finland was technically an island dependent on maritimetransport with 95 % of exports and imports to the country transported by sea. The Baltic Sea wasthe main shipping route and lifeline for Finland. Some traffic was still incoming from Russia, butthe majority of the border was almost entirely closed. He asserted that this temporary closurewould persist as long as Russia continued its different kinds of hybrid threats.• Mr Jussi Soramäki further warned that the so-called Shadow fleet (tankers transporting oil fromRussian ports in the Gulf of Finland) harboured a great risk of a major oil spill. He advocated forthe European Maritime Safety Agency taking a stronger role in controlling and helping thecountries in the Baltic region. Additionally, he referenced wastewater from St Petersburg and theLeningrad Oblast, stressing the importance of cooperating with neighbouring countries andinvestment banks to cut the emissions, adding that, with the geopolitical situation and theembargo, anything might happen. Any kind of deliberate hybrid acts could result in majorpollution in the Baltic Sea.Crisis Preparedness• Mr Janne Känkänen observed that there was no infrastructure for regional stockpiling andcombining resources. However, it would be useful to develop one. Finland and Sweden had hadfairly extensive discussions on developing a joint stockpile, but the idea could be explored evenfurther in the future. It would be excellent to create an extra layer of security and resilience thatcould complement the national solutions. He also pointed out a growing interest in countriescooperating on preparedness.40 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupBioeconomy• Ms Johanna Kohl emphasised that Europe aimed for open strategic autonomy challenges tooptimise the use of bio-based raw materials throughout the value chain. In her view, it was vital forthe EU to reduce its food system’s dependence on imported production inputs.• She believed that the bioeconomy had the potential to boost the added value; however, thedevelopment of bioeconomy value chains had recently been forgotten. She stressed the need toutilise and optimise the sustainable use of the forests and waters, advocating for the field tobecome an essential part of EU industrial and finance policies to create bioeconomy solutions tothe polycrisis.• Ms Kohl recommended investing in research, technology development, and innovation,supporting the development of strong regional business clusters and value chains, educating thenew generation of farmers and identifying the linkages between land use, new challenges inproviding comprehensive regional security, and the need to increase the added value of the foodsector. She highlighted the importance of increasing the EU RDI budget, focusing on the strategiccompetitiveness in Europe. She pointed out that it was important to focus on building long-termcompetitiveness rather than just providing manufacturing subsidies. Strengthening the role ofbioeconomy in EU industrial policy and emphasising the collaboration between research, finance,and industry was necessary to stimulate investments leading to high value-added production usingbio-based raw materials.For more details, see the following presentations:https://www.bspc.net/bspc-maritime-policy180324final2jussi-soramaki/https://www.bspc.net/russia_great-power-of-flows-tynkkynen/https://www.bspc.net/energy-politics-and-security-in-the-baltic-region-cbp2-siddi/https://www.bspc.net/nutrient-recycling-in-the-grip-of-geopolitics-_kohl2/41 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupSummary of the Key Points from the Expert PresentationsThis summary encapsulates the key points of the BSPC WG meeting on 18 March 2024, reflecting thediscussions and contributions of the experts involved.1. Hybrid Threats and Countermeasures:• Hybrid CoE Overview: Mr Pyysalo from the Hybrid CoE explained its role as an international,autonomous network promoting a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach tocounter hybrid threats.• Rising Hybrid Threats: These threats target systemic vulnerabilities through various means,including disinformation, cyberattacks, and economic influence.• Cooperation and Capacity Building: The emphasis is on fostering EU-NATO cooperation andincreasing situational awareness to counter these threats. There is a need to build societal resiliencefor medium- and long-term deterrence.2. Specific Hybrid Threats and Responses:• Artificial Intelligence in Hybrid Threats: Ms Ulrike Täck raised concerns about the role of AI inhybrid threats. Mr Pyysalo acknowledged the challenge, noting that AI could be used bothdefensively and offensively.• Platforms and Measures: Anna Kassautzki questioned the effectiveness of current measures andregulations. Mr Pyysalo emphasised the need for better implementation and cooperation acrosssocial media platforms.42 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group3. Maritime Security and Connectivity:• Finnish Dependency on Maritime T ransport: Mr Soramäki highlighted Finland’s dependence onmaritime transport, with 95 % of exports and imports transported by sea.• Shadow Fleet Risks: Experts discussed the environmental threats posed by the Shadow fleet,including potential major oil spills. They advocated for a stronger role for the European MaritimeSafety Agency (EMSA).4. Geopolitical Context:• Russia’s Strategy: Mr Tynkkynen explained Russia’s use of energy as a tool for coercion andrepression, dubbing it a “fossil empire”. He stressed the importance of understanding Russia’shybrid strategy and the need for Europe to use this narrative.• Economic and Hybrid Perspective: Experts emphasised the need to reassess Russia not justmilitarily but also economically and in terms of hybrid threats. They highlighted the central role ofenergy revenues in Russia’s state budget and its use for funding violence.5. Energy Security:• Energy as a Weapon: Mr Siddi and Ms Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek discussed the weaponisationof energy and the EU’s response through measures like the RePowerEU Plan, aimed at reducinggas imports from Russia and diversifying energy sources.• Renewable Energy and Interconnectivity: They noted the ongoing energy transition and theimportance of regional cooperation and interconnections in the energy sector to ensure securityand resilience.43 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group6. Crisis Preparedness:• National Emergency Supply Agency of Finland (NESA): Mr Känkänen detailed NESA’s missionto ensure the continuity of vital state functions during crises. He highlighted Finland’s extensivestockpiling system and the importance of cooperation with national and international partners.• Pharmaceutical Supply: Ms Ulrike Täck emphasised the need for better cooperation amongEuropean countries to ensure a stable pharmaceutical supply, learning from the COVID-19pandemic.7. Bioeconomy:• Potential of the Bioeconomy: Ms Kohl saw the bioeconomy’s potential to boost added valuealthough the development of bioeconomy value chains had recently been forgotten. She stressedthe need to utilise and optimise the sustainable use of forests and waters, advocating for the fieldto become an essential part of EU industrial and finance policies to create bio-based solutions tothe polycrisis.8. Policy Recommendations:• Regional Stockpiling: Experts observed the lack of infrastructure for regional stockpiling andcombining resources, suggesting the development of a joint stockpile for added security andresilience.• Collaboration and Competitiveness: They recommended investing in research, technologydevelopment, and innovation, supporting the development of strong regional business clusters andvalue chains, in addition to increasing the EU RDI budget to build long-term competitiveness.44 4. Political Recommendations4. Political RecommendationsRecommendations of the BSPC Working Groupto the 33rd BSPC ResolutionBased on the expert presentations, discussions and results of the first two meetings mentioned before, theBSPC Working Group developed and discussed in its meeting in Greifswald on 28 May 2024 and an ad-ditional digital meeting on 3 June 2024 the following political recommendations and unanimously agreedto propose including them in the 33rd BSPC resolution; the input to its third meeting in Greifswald willbe discussed and considered for the final report of the working group and the 34th resolution:Regarding energy security and self-sustainability to• given the current geopolitical challenges, prioritise and support projects aimed at improvingenergy security in the Baltic Sea region;• while building new or transforming the already existing energy infrastructure, take strongly intoaccount the regional needs, resilience considerations, and sustainability goals;• facilitate more interconnections in the Baltic Sea region;• unite in a regional political initiative for common interconnections and strongly involve the EUFunds in order to succeed in the development of a regional renewable energy market;• regularly exchange experience and best practices concerning the implementation of onshore andoffshore wind projects in the Baltic Sea region;45 4. Political RecommendationsRegarding resilience and interconnectivity toDefence• agree on a coordinated approach to address the lack of information exchange, threat controlcentres, threat mitigation policy as well as effective communication against the spread of targetedfake news and propaganda, considering multiple recent and potential hybrid threats towardscritical energy and communication infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region;• commit to realising the potential of the Baltic Sea region to become an integrated NATO defencearea with strong regional cooperation in coastal, maritime, and air defence;• pay particular attention to raising situational awareness and increasing societal resilience torespond to hybrid threats in the Baltic Sea region;T ransport• increase the funding for improving infrastructure and start discussions on a new strategy toenhance military mobility capabilities and civil transport in the region;• develop and execute plans to further improve maritime and railway transport connectivity in theBaltic Sea region;• significantly improve coordination of activities and regular cooperation of the democratic BalticSea countries in protecting maritime infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region;• create a plan for addressing shipping insurance challenges in the region that can disrupt traderoutes, leading to delays and increased costs for businesses;46 4. Political RecommendationsDigital connectivity• commence negotiations between the democratic Baltic Sea countries on enhancing cooperation inthe area of cybersecurity;• develop incentives and support for strengthening underwater communication infrastructure in theBaltic Sea, including expanding connections and ensuring the resilience of the existing ones;• cooperate and exchange practices on increasing universal coverage and service for Internetconnectivity in the Baltic Sea region;Cross-border projects• raise awareness and search for solutions to facilitate the implementation of large-scale cross-borderprojects of regional importance;• coordinate cooperation to rapidly stimulate the installation of needed computing capacity in theBaltic Sea region, in light of the rapid development of AI software and services demanding greenand sufficient energy as well as abundant computing power; in this regard, Baltic Sea renewableenergy market growth and interconnectivity development are to serve as a basis for supercomputerimplementation and usage.47 5. Intergovernmental Survey5. Intergovernmental SurveyIn Spring 2024, the BSPC Working Group sent out a survey with several questions about the areas of in-terest for the respective parliamentarians. The summary of the answers received until June 2024 is com-piled in this chapter. The answers in full are available on the BSPC homepage under the link:https://www.bspc.net/government-statements-on-energy-security-in-the-democratic-baltic-sea-region/1. What are the national and regional long-term energy consumptionprojections and energy production plans?Country AnswerEstoniaEstonia will analyse the system requirements and launch a call in order to contract150-400 MW of dispatchable energy for the balancing reserve by 2028. From the be-ginning of 2025, Estonia will open additional capacity markets for balancing reservesand aFRR (automatic Frequency Restoration Reserve) and FCR (Frequency Contain-ment Reserve) energy markets (this need is due to the desynchronisation fromBRELL and synchronization to the Continental-Europe network). As the Balticsforms one load-frequency containment block (LFC block), the reserve need will beaddressed and kept jointly in the Baltic area.FinlandThe latest energy projections are being modelled in a project that will end in June2024. They are based on existing policy measures as additional measures are still be-ing prepared for modelling work.GermanyBy 2030, at least 80 % of gross electricity consumption in Germany is to come fromrenewable energies. The expansion paths for wind and solar energy will be significant -ly increased: The expansion target for offshore wind energy will increase to at least 30gigawatts (GW) by 2030, to at least 40 GW by 2035 and to at least 70 GW by 2045.For onshore wind energy, 10 GW of installed capacity is to be added each year toreach a total of 115 GW by 2030 and 160 GW from 2040, and 22 GW per year forsolar installations to reach a total of around 215 GW by 2030 and 400 GW by 2040.48 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerHamburgHamburg’s total energy consumption is set to decrease gradually until 2045 by about25.6 % from 50.8 TWh per annum in 2020. Fossil fuel consumption, most notablyconventional gas as well as petrol and diesel, is projected to decrease to nearly zero in2045, with part of that reduction achieved through efficiency gains and another partthrough a shift to renewable or carbon-free energy sources. The energy shift will leadto a rise in electricity consumption, set to be decarbonised nationwide by 2035, dis-trict heating, biomass, hydrogen for industry and heavy-duty transport as well ase-fuels. In absolute terms, the largest increases are expected in hydrogen and e-fuelconsumption.Latvia Regarding plans for energy production, the long-term development plan of the joint-stock company “Latvenergo” envisages the installation of renewable energy resourcesgenerating a capacity of 600 MW by 2026 and 2300 MW by 2030. At the sametime, work is being done on strengthening the infrastructure (reinforcing the capacityof the electricity transmission and distribution network, construction of interconnec-tions).LithuaniaThe National Energy Independence Strategy 2050 (NEIS 2050) foresees that Lithua-nia will become a self-sufficient energy country by 2050 with a climate-neutral ener-gy industry that generates significant added value. Most of Lithuania’s consumed en-ergy will be generated by onshore and offshore wind and solar power plants. Electrici-ty will become the main primary energy source in the overall energy system and is ex-pected to be used to a large extent in other sectors. Final energy demand for all usersis projected at 88 TWh in 2030, 81 TWh in 2040, and 75 TWh in 2050. Electricitygeneration is estimated at 25 TWh in 2030, 54 TWh in 2040, and 74 TWh in 2050.The share of RES will be 55 % in 2030, 85 % in 2040, and 95 % in 2050.Mecklenburg-VorpommernPrimary energy consumption (PEC) in Germany is currently around 13,200 PJ(petajoules) per year. The forecast for 2030 is around 11,100 PJ and around 9,700 PJfor 2040. The PEC in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is around 170 PJ per year. Differ-ent forecasts for the years starting from 2030 fluctuate at +/- 15 to 20 %.SwedenThe government sees increased electrification of society as necessary and believes atpresent that Sweden should plan to be in a position to meet electricity requirementsof at least 300 TWh in 2045 (proposal in the government’s energy bill of 2024). Inthe Swedish Energy Agency’s scenario Högre elektrifiering (“Higher Electrification”)up to 2050, with 2045 as an interim year, electricity use is expected to amount tomore than 300 TWh in 2045 and approximately 350 TWh in 2050. The total energysupply in 2050 is expected to be 470–643 TWh depending on the scenario, com-pared with 509 TWh in 2020.49 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerSchleswig-HolsteinThe government of Schleswig-Holstein generally supports these goals und has noquantitative goals of their own in the field of energy efficiency. In the field of energyproduction, Schleswig-Holstein pursues the following goals: 1) expansion of electrici-ty generation from renewable energies to at least 40-45 TWh until 2030. This meansthat the electricity generation from renewable energies will be three times higher thanthe current electricity consumption in Schleswig-Holstein; 2) reaching 37-50 % asthe share of heat from renewable energy sources in the final energy consumption asheat.2. What are the plans of the governments regarding developing newenergy interconnections?Country AnswerEstoniaNew EE-FI interconnection in 2035->Estlink3 with the capacity of 700 MW. NewEE-LV connection EstLat4 by 2033 with the capacity of 1000 MW, and as it willcross our biggest island, Saaremaa, this enables offshore wind parks to better connectto the grid.FinlandFinnish electricity transmission system operator (TSO) Fingrid published in autumn2023 its main grid development plan for 2024-2033. A new interconnection fromNorthern Finland to Northern Sweden (Aurora line 1) is under construction andwill be completed in 2025. A new cross-border line to Sweden, known as AuroraLine 2, is also planned for 2032. Fingrid and Elering are currently initiating a studyto gain greater insight into the profitability and timing of the EstLink 3 connection.There are no plans for cross-border gas pipelines.GermanyInterconnectors that are currently in the planning or construction phase include:Klixbüll–Endrup (with Denmark), Bornholm Energy Island (with Denmark), NorthSea Wind Power Hub (with Denmark and Netherlands), Emden/Ost-Eemshaven(with Netherlands), Altheim–St Peter/Pleinting–St Peter (with Austria), Neu-Ra-vensburg–Österreich (with Austria), Vöhringen–Westtirol (with Austria), Dahlem–Gramme (Belgium), Aach–Bofferdange (with Luxembourg), Eichstetten–Muhlbach(with France), Uchtelfangen-Ensdorf-Vigy (with France), Hansa Power Bridge I + II(with Sweden), Eisenhüttenstadt-Baczyna (with Poland), NeuConnect (with UK),Waldshut-Tiengen-Beznau (with Switzerland), Böblingen–Mettlen (with Switzer-land).50 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerHamburgHamburg is well integrated into the national grids for power and natural gas. Ham-burg strongly supports a new hydrogen connection to Denmark (Hyperlink III). Therealisation depends on the national plan for grid development, which will be com-pleted within a few years.Latvia The development of the following interconnections is planned by the Latvian gov-ernment: 1) The Tsirgulin (EE)–Valmiera (LV) 330kV interconnection project is be-ing implemented and will be completed in 2025; 2) Work continues on the Balticoffshore grid initiative (BOGI), promoting the development of offshore wind farms.The following projects are planned to be developed within BOGI: 3) The Latvi-an-Swedish interconnection (LaSGo Link) is being developed to increase grid capaci-ty to Gotland; 4) The fourth Estonian-Latvian interconnection (ELWIND), a jointEstonian-Latvian state-run cross-border offshore wind project; 5) Baltic-German in-terconnection (BalticWind Connector).LithuaniaLithuania continues working on a cross-border electricity interconnection capacityincrease between Lithuania and Poland. The current Lithuanian-Polish interconnec-tor “LitPol Link” ensures a 500-MW transmission capacity. The previously plannednew 700 MW Lithuanian-Polish undersea interconnection “Harmony link” is cur-rently undergoing a new examination by Lithuanian and Polish TSOs. The possibili-ty of increasing the current Lithuanian-Latvian 950-MW cross-border electricitytransmission capacity is being evaluated by Lithuanian and Latvian TSOs. Lithuaniawill evaluate the possibility of the development of additional electricity interconnec-tions with Central Europe.Mecklenburg-VorpommernBornholm Energy Island: On the Danish Island of Bornholm in the Baltic Sea, atleast 3 GW of offshore wind power generation capacity is to be connected on Danishterritory by the early 2030s. The electricity is then to be transported to Germany (2GW) and the Danish mainland (1.2 GW) via new grid connections. In addition, thenational network development plans are instruments of German energy policy plan-ning the long-term development of the network infrastructure for electricity, gas,and hydrogen.SwedenThe Swedish electricity network is closely physically connected not only to the elec-tricity networks in other Nordic countries but also has electricity connections withGermany, Poland, and the Baltic countries. However, the Government wants thereto be a pause in the expansion of exposed electricity cables (for example Hans Power-bridge) until the price differences between price areas in Sweden have considerablydecreased.51 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerSchleswig-Holstein380kV-high voltage power line Klixbüll–Endrup: The new interconnector is beingbuilt between Klixbüll (North of Schleswig-Holstein) and Endrup (Jutland/Den-mark); planned start of operation: Q1/2025; West Coast Line: new interconnectorto Germany (energinet.dk)3. How does your country or region plan to ensure the balancing ofpower systems in the long term? What are the plans for balancingrenewable sources of energy?Country AnswerEstoniaFrom the beginning of 2025, Estonia will open additional capacity markets for bal-ancing reserves and aFRR (automatic Frequency Restoration Reserve) and FCR(Frequency Containment Reserve) energy markets (this need is due to the desyn-chronization from BRELL and synchronization to Continental-Europe network).As the Baltics forms one load-frequency containment block (LFC block), the re-serve need will be addressed and kept jointly in the Baltic area.FinlandThere is a need to develop the flexibility of the electricity system. Flexibility can beincreased through flexible generation, demand response, energy storages, and elec-tricity interconnections. Fossil fuel-based condensing power plants in Finland havebeen shut down (the last coal condensing power plant, Meripori, now serves as a“crises reserve” for the National Emergency Supply Agency). There have been hugeinvestments in onshore wind power. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Em-ployment will set up a working group to study the issue.GermanyIn order to ensure a secure and cost-effective supply of electricity while at the sametime integrating increasing shares of renewable energies into the electricity system,the large market area makes it possible to utilise geographical balancing effects ingeneration and consumption. The high level of liquidity in the electricity markethelps to bring supply and demand together flexibly and efficiently, even with fluc-tuating electricity generation from renewable energies. As part of the Platform for aClimate-Neutral Electricity System (PKNS), an options paper on the use of flexi-bility options for balancing the system balance is being developed as a basis for po-litical decision-making.HamburgThe main tools for balancing renewable sources of energy are implemented on thenational level. The energy company “Hamburger Energiewerke”, owned by theCity of Hamburg, is acting within this framework. It develops flexibility technolo-gies like flexible power generation or power to heat.52 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerLatvia Since 1 January 2018, Baltic TSOs have been operating a common model for thebalancing of power systems of the three countries. To accommodate this, the com-mon Baltic coordinated balancing area was introduced along with establishing thecommon Baltic balancing market for exchange of balancing energy in the form offrequency restoration reserves with manual activation (hereinafter mFRR). The ex-isting Baltic balancing model and balancing energy market will be changed onceBaltic TSOs will join the common European platform for the exchange of mFRRenergy (Manually Activated Reserve Initiative - MARI), planned for July 2024. Themain change to the Baltic balancing model when joining MARI platform will bethe introduction of separate balance control for each control area (Estonia, Latvia,and Lithuania) and moving to a 15-minute balancing market time unit with re-spective changes in mFRR energy products as well as processes.LithuaniaFlexibility needs in the electricity sector will be met by preserving the existing ca-pacity of natural gas power plants, increasing the capacity of the Kruonis PumpedStorage Plant, 1.5-GW battery storage power stations, cross-border electricity inter-connections, and more flexible electricity consumption in industry and other sec-tors. In 2050, electricity storage in Lithuania’s energy system will be provided by a1-GW pumped storage plant and 4 GW of electricity storage facilities. Both typesof energy storage will be able to store up to 17.5 GWh of energy.Mecklenburg-VorpommernA wide variety of technologies is available for balancing renewable energies. In ad-dition to storage in the electricity sector (batteries), renewable electricity can alsobe transferred to other sectors (sector coupling), for example by using it to generateheat and power electric cars or by converting it into alternative fuels such as hydro-gen or methane. The state government is therefore working hard to significantlyimprove the economic framework conditions for sector coupling technologies. Oneof its most important goals is to utilise as much of the clean energy generated inthe federal state as possible. All of these technologies will (have to) be used in a bal-anced mix in order to achieve the goals of the energy transition.SwedenIn order to maintain a high security of supply, a new balancing model is being de-veloped which should remain secure in the future and cover the entire Nordic re-gion. Work is being done within a joint Nordic project, the Nordic BalancingModel (NBM), together with Nordic TSOs (T ransmission System Operators). Thepurpose of the NBM is to provide a balance that will maintain security in futureand that will provide for energy transition while at the same time being adapted tocommon European legislation and the internal market for electricity.53 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerSchleswig-HolsteinFlexibility in the electricity market is essential to balance energy systems in the longterm. In addition to electrolysers and battery storage systems, these include flexiblepower plants. According to a new power plant strategy of the German government,new power plant capacities of up to 4 x 2.5 GW are to be put out to tender as H2-ready gas-fired power plants in the short term. These are to switch completely tohydrogen between 2035 and 2040 from a switchover date to be set in 2032. Thecurrent German electricity market design provides too few incentives for the use offlexibility. In addition to the reorganisation of levies and surcharges on electricity,the aim will also be to make electricity prices more flexible and offer appropriatetariffs.4. What cross-border energy projects are being implemented or areplanned to be developed in your country or region?Country AnswerEstoniaAs per the pan-TSO ten-year network development plan (TYNDP), Estonia is in-volved in developing the third EE-FI and fourth EE-LV electricity interconnector.In addition, pre-feasibility studies are scheduled for a direct EE-DE maritime cableand for a section of the European Hydrogen Backbone connecting the Nordics toGermany via the Baltic States.Finland54 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerGermanyCurrent overview of hybrid offshore projects currently being planned, dis -cussed or realised in Germany. The Federal Government supports the devel-opment of cross-border projects for the expansion and decarbonisation ofdistrict heating and cooling systems. In 2024, an application for funding forthe project “Unified Network for Innovative Transition in Energy Decarboni -sation of HEATing - UNITED HEAT” was supported as part of the ConnectingEurope Facility. The cross-border project aims to connect the district heatingnetworks of the cities of Görlitz (DEU) and Zgorzelec (POL). Further projectsare being realised or planned in Strasbourg/Kehl and Frankfurt/Oder/Slu -bice.HamburgHamburg aims to become a major hub for the import and use of hydrogen. Withthe third largest port in Europe, Hamburg is well suited to function as one of themost important distribution centres for green hydrogen and its derivatives in Eu-rope. Additionally, the port of Hamburg is one of the largest industrial areas withinGermany and thus hosts numerous energy-intensive companies. Hydrogen landedhere would in part also be used here. Against this backdrop, Hamburg will contrib-ute to the national start grid, by building parts of it and connecting various users inthe commodity industry. Part of this effort is the development of harbour capacityfor the import of hydrogen.Latvia The Estonian-Latvian joint hybrid offshore wind project – ELWIND – and theLatvia-Estonia Cross-Border ULP-RES Onshore Wind Park Development – ULP-RES WP – developed by Utilitas Wind SIA (Latvia) and Utilitas Wind OÜ (Esto-nia) are selected to contribute to cross-border cooperation on renewable energy un-der the Connecting Europe Facility.LithuaniaIn 2022, Lithuania and Latvia formed a consortium called the “CCS Baltic Con-sortium” to create a carbon capture and storage (CCS) value chain in Lithuaniaand Latvia, which would include the capture of CO2 generated in the industrialsector (cement factories in Lithuania and Latvia) as well as onshore and offshoretransportation to permanent storage sites, with operations scheduled to commencein 2030. In May 2024, the European Commission has granted the status of Projectof Common Interest (PCI) to this project. The consortium consists of Akmenės ce-mentas AB, KN Energies AB, Larvik Shipping AS, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd., andSCHWENK Latvija SIA.55 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerMecklenburg-VorpommernThe Ministry of Economics, Infrastructure, Tourism, and Labour of Mecklen-burg-Vorpommern is participating as a lead partner in the Interreg project titled“Green Industrial Areas” (GIA) as part of the transnational cooperation in the Bal-tic Sea region. The aim is to develop a transnational certification standard and atoolbox to promote the energy transition in commercial and industrial areas in theBaltic Sea region. The project partners are companies, associations, municipalities,and administrations from Finland, Latvia, Denmark, Poland, Sweden, Lithuania,and Germany. The project is scheduled to run from January 2023 to December2025.SwedenThere are two significant hydrogen infrastructure projects run by Nordion Energiand Gasgrid Finland. These concern 1,000 km of cross-border hydrogen infrastruc-ture in the Gulf of Bothnia and creating an open market for hydrogen by 2030 atthe latest. The purpose of the Nordic Hydrogen Route is to promote reduced car-bon dioxide emissions, support regional green industrialisation, economic develop-ment, and the European self-sufficiency of energy by developing a network of pipe-lines that will effectively transport green energy from producers to consumers in or-der to ensure their access to an open, reliable, and secure hydrogen market.Schleswig-HolsteinAt present, no additional electricity interconnector projects are being planned inthe Baltic Sea to Schleswig-Holstein. New interconnector projects are beingplanned from Denmark to Germany (region of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) -(Bornholm Energy Island, Home) and from Sweden to Germany (region of Meck-lenburg-Vorpommern) - (Hansa Power Bridge (50hertz.com) Germany intends tobuild a new hydrogen grid infrastructure. Hyperlink III is a hydrogen grid projectthat is part of the hydrogen core grid and is being planned from Ellund (DK) toHamburg via Schleswig-Holstein (hyperlink-gasunie.de).5. What are the main national and regional objectives regarding hy-drogen production and supply?Country AnswerEstoniaThe national objective is to fulfil European requirements which will lead to at least1,000 metric tonnes of hydrogen being produced for road transport by 2030. Giv-en the ample technical wind energy potential in Estonia both on- and offshore, thepotential for hydrogen production is at around 600,000 tonnes (around 20 TWhof H2) per year that can be deployed according to economic feasibility, safety, envi-ronmental, and socioeconomic considerations.56 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerFinlandFinland seeks to achieve a leading position in the European hydrogen economythroughout the value chain. If the market conditions develop favourably, Finlandcan produce at least 10 % of the EU’s emission free hydrogen by 2030. The objec-tives are to produce clean hydrogen and electric fuels for the needs of Finnish in-dustry, transport and the energy system, modernise the industrial sector, increasehigh value-added exports, and secure investments in Finland.GermanyHydrogen and its derivatives will be used in particular in non-electrifiable applica-tions in industry, in heavy commercial vehicles, and increasingly in aviation andshipping. In the electricity sector, hydrogen can contribute to the security of the en-ergy supply. Coherent legal requirements at national, European, and, if possible, in-ternational level support the market ramp-up. The Federal Ministry for EconomicAffairs and Climate Protection is also working on a hydrogen storage strategy.HamburgRight now, the estimate for hydrogen demand from the commodity industry willbe about 5 to 10 TWh. Most of it will be imported via the start grid. In addition,the Hamburger Energiewerke are developing a former site of a coal plant into aproduction site for renewable energy. Work has started on the installation of anelectrolyser with a capacity of 100 MW for the production of green hydrogen.Latvia The Latvian natural gas transmission system operator AS “Conexus Baltic Grid” iscarrying out a feasibility study together with other countries on the construction ofa “hydrogen corridor”, in order to set up a main hydrogen transmission network inseveral European Union countries. At the same time, no decisions have been madein Latvia regarding the construction of a hydrogen transmission and distributioninfrastructure, because currently only a few potential users of hydrogen have beenidentified in Latvia: The construction of infrastructure to meet the needs of a smallnumber of users is not profitable, and it would not be permissible to make othersystems cover the costs of such infrastructure maintenance (for example, natural gassystems) for users.LithuaniaBy 2030, Lithuania plans to build 1.3 GW of electrolysis capacity to produce 129kt (kilo tonnes) of green hydrogen per year. By 2050, these figures are expected toincrease significantly to 8.5 GW of installed electrolysis capacity, producing around732 kt of green hydrogen per year. It is expected to account for about 32 % of Lith-uania’s total final energy demand in 2050. The projected use of 129 kt of green hy-drogen in Lithuania by 2030: feedstock (ammonia production, 82 kt; oil refinery, 5kt), fuel (heavy and other vehicles, 8 kt; other uses, 1 kt), export (including deri-vates of hydrogen), 33 kt. The projected use of 732 kt of green hydrogen in Lithua-nia by 2030: feedstock (ammonia production, other feedstock, 472 kt; oil refinery,synthetic fuel production, 141 kt), fuel (heavy vehicle, public transport, 51 kt; oth-er uses, 7 kt; electricity production, 17 kt), green hydrogen export, 44 kt.57 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerMecklenburg-VorpommernHydrogen production and supply targets for the federal state will be drawn up inthe Hydrogen Strategy for Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, which is currently being de-veloped.SwedenThe government considers that fossil-free hydrogen will constitute an importantpart of Sweden’s future energy systems and is a pre-condition for the phasing out offossil fuels in industry and will be important when it comes to reducing emissionsfrom such sources as heavy goods transport. Swedish production of fossil-free hy-drogen requires a great expansion of fossil-free energy production. Regulatoryframeworks are already in place in order to test the construction of hydro-gen pipe-lines in Sweden, but other regulatory frameworks and instruments need to be re-viewed and developed as the use of hydrogen increases in society.Schleswig-HolsteinThere are hydrogen strategies at both the national and regional level. Schle-swig-Holstein’s hydrogen strategy was updated at the end of 2023. The overarchinggoal is to expand electrolysis capacity in Schleswig-Holstein from over 5 GW in2037 to over 9 GW in 2045.58 6. Best Cross-Border Practices6. Best Cross-Border PracticesOne of the purposes of the Working Group is to share best practices to ensure energy security, self-sus-tainability, resilience, and connectivity in the Baltic Sea region. This chapter highlights the examples ofthe best practices identified throughout the work of the BPSC Working Group.Baltic States’ Synchronisation with the Continental European NetworkThe Baltic States have historically operated in sync with the electric power systems of Russia and Belarus.The origins of the idea to synchronise with the European grid go back as far as 2007 when the prime min-isters of the Baltic States proposed the idea of investigating this possibility. The synchronisation of the Bal-tic States with the European electric power networks is planned for 2025. It will result in the Baltic elec-tric power transmission system becoming part of the European system, meaning more independence fromRussia, ensuring energy security and independence. T raders and producers of electric power will be ableto sell electric power everywhere in Continental Europe.ELWINDELWIND is a joint Estonian-Latvian state-run cross-border offshore wind project in the Baltic Sea. It isan ambitious, environmentally friendly renewable energy project that will provide for increased energy in-dependence and security, for more affordable energy prices, contribute to reducing costs for householdsand businesses, and also create new business opportunities for the value chain. ELWIND is being launchedto strengthen the regional energy market by investing in offshore wind electricity production and hybridinterconnection between Estonia and Latvia. 2030 is planned to be the deadline for project completion.59 6. Best Cross-Border PracticesFehmarnbelt T unnelThe Fehmarnbelt tunnel is an immersed tunnel under construction to connect the Danish island of Lol-land with the German island of Fehmarn, crossing the 18-kilometre-wide Fehmarn Belt in the Baltic Sea.The Fehmarnbelt tunnel will remove a bottleneck, reduce travel time, and strengthen links between Scan-dinavia and Central Europe. When the Fehmarnbelt tunnel is completed, the journey between Rødby-havn and Puttgarden will take seven minutes by train and 10 minutes by car. The Fehmarnbelt tunnel isexpected to be completed in 2029.FinBaltOn 1 January 2020, the single-entry tariff zone of Finland, Estonia, and Latvia (FinEstLat) started oper-ating. The merger of FinEstLat means the linking of the Finnish, Estonian, and Latvian markets, remov-ing the internal tariffs in the region and setting the entry tariffs in the region at the same level. The resultsof the operation of the FinEstLat single-entry tariff zone are positive. Further market integration, merg-ing FinEstLat and the Lithuanian gas market is a clear opportunity for the Baltic States and Finland toreap all the benefits of their existing and future infrastructure. On 12 October 2022, the merger was post-poned and could happen no sooner than October 2024.Rail BalticaRail Baltica is a greenfield rail transport infrastructure project aiming to integrate the Baltic States into theEuropean rail network. The project includes five European Union countries – Poland, Lithuania, Latvia,Estonia, and indirectly also Finland. It will connect Helsinki, Tallinn, Pärnu, Riga, Panevezys, Kaunas,Vilnius, and Warsaw. The project completion is scheduled for 2030. Rail Baltica is not only a railway pro-ject but also a multi-infrastructure ecosystem that will help form a new economic and security corridor aswell as provide digital connectivity. It includes electricity and electrification requirements and substationsthat can be used for dual purposes. The project has a wide international and regional partner network, in-cluding more than 150 active contracts and over 50 international partnerships.60 7. Members of the BSPC Working Group7. Members of the BSPC Working GroupChairmanshipMember Parliament and/or Organisation Member MP Staff Point of ContactBaltic AssemblyCitadeles Street 2, room 616Riga LV-1010,LatviaMr Andris KulbergsChairperson Ms Agnija AntanovičaAgnija.Antanovica@baltasam.orgMs Ingrīda SticenkoIngrida.Sticenko@saeima.lvMs Rovena BergaRovena.Berga@baltasam.orgMecklenburg-VorpommernState Parliamentof Mecklenburg-VorpommernLennéstr. 119053 SchwerinGermanyMr Philipp da CunhaVice-chairperson Mr Georg SträtkerGeorg.Straetker@landtag-mv.deNorwayStorting0026 OsloNorwayMr Marius Arion Nils-enVice-chairpersonMr Thomas FraserThomas.Fraser@stortinget.no61 7. Members of the BSPC Working GroupList of MembersMember Parliament and/or Organisation Member MP Staff Point of ContactDenmarkFolketingChristiansborg1240 CopenhagenDenmarkMr Henrik MøllerMr Kim AasMs Joan ÓlavsdottirJoan.Olavsdottir@ft.dkEstoniaRiigikoguLossi plats 1A15165 TallinnEstoniaMr Meelis Kiili Ms Merlin ReepaluMerilin.Reepalu@riigikogu.eeFinlandEduskunta00102 EduskuntaFinlandMr Mikko Polvi -nenMr Mika Laaksonenmika.laaksonen@eduskunta.fiGermanyDeutscher BundestagPlatz der Republik 111011 BerlinGermanyMs Anna Kas-sautzkiMs Katalin ZadorKatalin.Zador@bundestag.deLatviaSaeimaJēkaba Street 11Rīga LV-1811LatviaMr Andris Kul-bergsProf Jānis VucānsMs Ingrīda SticenkoIngrida.Sticenko@saeima.lvLithuaniaSeimasGediminas Ave 532002 VilniusLithuaniaMr AndriusKupčinskasMs Renata GodfreyRenata.Godfrey@lrs.ltNorwayStorting0026 OsloNorwayMr Marius ArionNilsenMr Thomas FraserThomas.Fraser@stortinget.no62 7. Members of the BSPC Working GroupMember Parliament and/or Organisation Member MP Staff Point of ContactPolandSenate6 Wiejska Str.00-902 WarsawPolandMr KacperPłażyńskiMr Piotr KoperskiPiotr.Koperski@senat.gov.plSwedenRiksdagenSE-10012 StockholmSwedenMr Jesper Skal-berg KarlssonMs Helena LundstedtHelena.Lundsedt@riksdagen.seÅlandÅland ParliamentPB 69AX-22101 MariehamnÅland IslandsMr Benny Petters-sonMr Sten ErikssonSten.Eriksson@lagtinget.axHamburgState Parliament of the Free and HanseaticCity of HamburgAdministration of the ParliamentSchmiedestraße 220095 HamburgGermanyMs Philine Stur -zenbecherMs Friederike LünzmannFriederike.Luenzmann@bk.ham-burg.deMecklenburg-VorpommernState Parliament of Mecklenburg-Vorpom-mernLennéstr. 119053 SchwerinGermanyMr Philipp daCunhaMs Beate SchluppMr Georg SträtkerGeorg.Straetker@landtag-mv.deSchleswig-HolsteinState Parliament of Schleswig-HolsteinPostfach 712124171 KielGermanyDr Ulrike Täck Ms Mareike WatollaMareike.Wotalla@landtag.ltsh.deMr Jan DiedrichsenJan.Diedrichsen@landtag.ltsh.de63 7. Members of the BSPC Working GroupSecretariat of the Working GroupMr Bodo BahrSecretary Generalof the Baltic Sea Parliamentary ConferenceSchlossgartenallee 1519061 SchwerinGermanyTel: +49 171 5512557bodo.bahr@bspcmail.nethttp://www.bspc.netMs Agnija AntanovičaSecretary Generalof the Baltic AssemblyCitadeles Street 2-616Riga LV-1010LatviaTel: +371 67225178agnija.antanovica@baltasam.orghttps://baltasam.org/AcknowledgementsThe members of the Working Group on EnergySecurity, Self-sustainability, Resilience, and Con-nectivity express their deepest appreciation to allthose who provided their expertise that allowedthe completion of this report: Reinis ĀboltiņšKaspars BriškensJohanna KohlKristaps LočmelisTapio PyysaloLīga RozentāleJukka SavolainenMarco SiddiJussi SoramäkiVeli-Pekka TynkkynenBaltic Sea Parliamentary Conferencewww.bspc.netBSPC SecretariatSchlossgartenallee 1519061 SchwerinGermany