Kollsnes25 NOV

Wesecure energy supplyKollsnes 25th November 2024Gassco is operator oftheNorwegian gastransport system. What does Gassco do?How does it work ?gas fields process plantscontrol centrekm pipelinesreceiving terminals millions ofEuropeans•Physical operatorship forprocess plants, pipelines andreceiving terminals•Gas transport from field tomarket•Further development ofNorwegian gas infrastructure ,including studies for transportofhydrogen and CO2 Our operatorship includes1207 TWh (2023)1294 TWh (2022)1246 TWh (2021)Production and demand . What lies ahead ?01002003004005006002023 2028 2033 2038 2043 2048Salgsgasss, milliarder Sm3Uoppdagede Ressurser i funn Ressurser i felt Div. scenarioerWedeliver safe, effectiveand sustainableNorwegian gas to EuropeTransport Network•Connected to all major gas -producing fieldson the NCS•Ca 8600 km of large -diameter, high -pressurepipelines•Riser platforms•Large processing facilities in Norway•Receiving terminals in four Europeancountries•Connected to major downstream gastransmission systems in Europeand the UKThe integrated Norwegian gastransport system•Flexibility and services•Onshore and offshore•Topside and subsea•Assets with and without TSPsComplexityKollsnesDraupner S/EDornumDornumEmdenNyhamnaEasingtonSt. FergusZeebruggeVestprosessKårstøTjeldbergodden GRFDunkerqueRisked based integrity managementDFI threats•Material related•Manufacturing related•Fabrication related•Installation related•Design errorsCorrosion/erosion•Internal corrosion•External corrosion•Erosion3rd party threats•Trawl interference•Anchoring•Vessel impact•Dropped objects•TerrorStructural threats•Global buckling – exposed line•Global buckling – buried line•End expansion•On bottom stability•Static overload•FatigueNatural hazard threats•Extreme whether•Earthquake•Landslide•Ice loadsIncorrect operation•Incorrect procedures•Procedures not implemented•Human errorsRisked based integrity managementInternal inspection External inspectionOperational monitoringInterventionsPipeline Repair and Subsea Intervention•Member of Pipeline Repair and Subsea Intervention Pool (PRSI)•Cooperation between owners and operators established in 1987•to be prepared in case of damages or defects needing to be repaired•to share costs for investments and operations•to maximise experience transfer and competence•PRSI Pool have a large tool pool of pipeline repair equipment for fast repairs of offshorepipelines and provides subsea interventions, pipeline repair and power cable repairRemote repair clampMoorgripInternal 10 January 2024MORGRIP® repair connector for remote installation•Ball indentation for structuralgripping system•Graphite sealing system –50 years lifetime16 | PRSI Pool generic presentationInternal 10 January 2024Remote installed repair clamps•Remote installation and activation of split repairclamps in dimensions from 10” – 44”•Water depths 0 – 1000 meters17 | PRSI Pool generic presentationInternal 10 January 2024Pipeline isolation servicesFrame agreements with STATS and TDW Offshore Services18 | PRSI Pool generic presentationInternal 10 January 2024Pipe damage to be repaired by new pipe section19 | PRSI Pool generic presentationInternal 10 January 2024Remote Welding SystemMain modules•Remote Welding Habitat•Remote Welding Power andControl (POCO)•Remote Welding Tool20 | PRSI Pool generic presentationInternal 10 January 2024Remote Welding SystemMIG welding process21 | PRSI Pool generic presentationSecurityHuge fluctuations ofgas prices :-Spring 2020: 5 Eurocent /Cubic meter-Spring 2022: 3 Euro /Cubic meter-Spring 2024: 30 Eurocent /Cubic meterThe Big Picture(At least for theNorwegian petroleum sector )•Norway exports 1300 TWh natural gas/yr•EU energy consumption : 13 000 TWh•Gas from Norway: 35 % ofEU/UK needSecuring energy supplyThreat assessmentsThreat assesments 2024Intelligence targets•Political processes and decisions•The High North•Defence and emergencypreparedness .•Natural resources (oiland gas)•Research and development•Dissidents, diaspora andrefugees26OPEN and UNCLASSIFIED messages from theNorwegian securityservicesPST:Businesses in and connected to oilandgas:•These areespecially exposed due toNorway has become a more centralenergy provider for Europa after therussian invsion ofUkraine . Russiasees useofenergy related means ofaction as a central tool to obtaineuropean division . Etterretningstjenesten:Petroleum and internet infrastructure :•The gas pipeline infra structure canbe hit byaccidents , physical sabotage and destructivecyber attacks . Damage to norwegian petroleuminfrastructure gives consequences to bothNorway and theenergy receiving countriesNSM:Norwegian energy supports national security :•Norway secures energy to europe . Russia seeks to weaken western cohesion and willtosupport Ukraina by increase pressure towards Europe’s energy sector , including stoppingenergy supplies from Russia , This has increeased Norway’s importance with regards toeuropean energy security .Securing energy supplySecurity framework -changesTransparentRespectfulAccountableChallengingKnowledgeableLieutenant General Hans -Werner Wiermann , Head of NATO’s Critical UnderseaInfrastructure Coordination Cell, 8. May 2023:The Nord Stream incident demonstrated theclear and present dangerour critical undersea infrastructure faces.1) The Norwegian petroleum Act(“The licensee must implement and maintain securitymeasures to help prevent deliberate attacks againstfacilities and at all times have contingency plans for suchattacks.”)2) The Norwegian security actGassco, Equinor , Offshore Norgeand Tampnet subjugated to theNorwegian security actlate2022.«Transport ofGas throughpipelines to Europa» is theFundamental national functionthatGassco has been givenresponsibility of.Consequences ofsecurity actfor Gassco/ Equinor :1)Designated Fundamental nationalfunction : «Transport ofgasthrough pipelines to Europe»2) Access to classified information3) Major « refurbishment » ofsecurity :-Personnell-Acquisitions-Maritime security-Information handling-IT security-Response /emergency routines-Cooperation authorities-+++(all ofthisis in process now)Securing energy supplySecurity challengesTransparentRespectfulAccountableChallengingKnowledgeableSome defining events22. July20112013 -in Amenas2015 -Snurrevarden2022 –Ukraine war 2022 -Nord Stream 2023 -Balticconnector2024What to expect -Look ahead :➢A long warand following energy conflict➢A permanent breach between theWest and Russia➢Russia willnot change itsposition and/or course➢Increased Russian risk appetite➢Russia has MAJOR destructive cyber capabilities available . Reconnaissance is ongoing towards theenergy sector➢Energy is a ATTRACTIVE target and has thebest potential for escalation➢Gassco’s importance , including in energy transport/ export has increased -and willincrease➢Insider threat is increasing➢«Security ofcritical infrastructure » is only fractionally understood in theWest and Russia -as ofnow.➢Arctic regions/Spitsbergen willdevelop as areas ofconflict