BSPC Working Group on Energy Security, Self-Sustainability, Resilience and Connectivity – Final Report 2023–2025

Baltic Sea Parliamentary ConferenceWorking Group on Energy Security,Self-sustainability, Resilience andConnectivity (ESSRC)Final Report34YEARSBSPCT ext: Working Group, Experts in the WG meetings,Governments of the democratic Baltic Sea States,Andris Kulbergs, Agnija Antanovica, IngridaSticenko, Rovena Berga, Bodo BahrEditing: Bodo BahrPhoto: Reinis Inkēns, Latvia; Kimmo Brandt /Parliament of Finland; Rovena Berga,Bodo Bahr, BSPC SecretariatLayout: produktionsbüro TINUSBaltic Sea Parliamentary ConferenceBodo BahrSecretary General+49 171 5512557bodo.bahr@bspcmail.netwww.bspc.netBSPC SecretariatSchlossgartenallee 1519061 SchwerinGermanyThe Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) was established in 1991 as a forum for poli-tical dialogue between parliamentarians from the Baltic Sea Region. The BSPC aims to raiseawareness and opinion on issues of current political interest and relevance for the Baltic SeaRegion. It promotes and drives various initiatives and efforts to support the sustainable en-vironmental, social and economic development of the Baltic Sea Region. It strives to enhan-ce the visibility of the Baltic Sea Region and its issues in a broader European context. BSPCgathers parliamentarians from 10 national parliaments, 7 regional parliaments and 5 parlia-mentary organisations around the Baltic Sea. The BSPC thus constitutes a unique parlia-mentary bridge between the democratic EU- and non-EU countries of the Baltic Sea Regi-on. BSPC external interfaces include parliamentary, governmental, subregional and otherorganisations in the Baltic Sea Region and the Northern Dimension area, among themCBSS, HELCOM, the Northern Dimension Partnership in Health and Social Well-Being (NDPHS), the Baltic Sea Labour Forum (BSLF) and the Baltic Sea States SubregionalCooperation (BSSSC).The BSPC shall initiate and guide political activities in the region; support and strengthendemocratic institutions in the participating states; improve dialogue between governments,parliaments and civil society; strengthen the common identity of the Baltic Sea Region bymeans of close cooperation between national and regional parliaments based on equality;and initiate and guide political activities in the Baltic Sea Region, endowing them with ad-ditional democratic legitimacy and parliamentary authority.The political recommendations of the annual Parliamentary Conferences are expressed in aConference Resolution adopted by consensus by the Conference. The adopted Resolutionshall be submitted to the governments of the Baltic Sea Region, the CBSS and the EU anddisseminated to other relevant national, regional and local stakeholders in the Baltic Sea Re-gion and its neighbourhood.3 Table of ContentTable of ContentIntroduction .......................................................................................................................................... 7Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................... 9The Working Group met in: .......................................................................................................................................... 91. Programme of the Working Group .................................................................................................. 11a) Constitution ....................................................................................................................................................................... 11b) Background ........................................................................................................................................................................ 11c) Objectives ........................................................................................................................................................................... 11d) Main Directions of the Work of the Working Group ....................................................................................................... 12Energy Security and Self-sustainability of the Region .................................................................................................. 12Resilience and Interconnectivity of the Baltic Sea States .............................................................................................. 12e) Participation ....................................................................................................................................................................... 13f) Mode of Work .................................................................................................................................................................... 13g) Follow-up ........................................................................................................................................................................... 132. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPC ....................................................................... 14Energy ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 14Baltic Sea Region Energy Profiles ........................................................................................................................................... 14Baltic Sea Region Electricity Production in 2023 .................................................................................................................. 18Baltic Sea Region Electricity Production and Consumption in 2023, TWh ........................................................................ 21Geographical Distribution of the European Gas Demand .................................................................................................... 22T ransport ................................................................................................................................................................................ 233. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group .......................................................... 243.1 Meeting on 15-16 October 2023 in Riga, Latvia ......................................................................................................... 24Energy ........................................................................................................................................................................... 25Military Mobility and T ransportation .......................................................................................................................... 28Digital Connectivity ..................................................................................................................................................... 28Cross-Border Projects .................................................................................................................................................... 28Summary of the Key Points from the Expert Presentations ......................................................................................... 29T ransport and Connectivity .......................................................................................................................................... 29Renewable Energy and Market Dynamics ................................................................................................................... 324 Table of Content3.2 Meeting on 17-18 March 2024 in Helsinki, Finland .................................................................................................. 34Geopolitics .................................................................................................................................................................... 35Energy ........................................................................................................................................................................... 36Addressing Hybrid Threats .......................................................................................................................................... 37Maritime Connectivity and Security ............................................................................................................................ 38Crisis Preparedness ........................................................................................................................................................ 39Bioeconomy ................................................................................................................................................................. 39Summary of the Key Points from the Expert Presentations ........................................................................................ 403.3 Meeting on 26-28 May 2024 in Greifswald, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern ................................................................. 43Protection of critical infrastructure .............................................................................................................................. 44Safe decommissioning, dismantling, and disposal of the now-defunct nuclear power plants .................................... 45Digital connectivity ....................................................................................................................................................... 46Cybersecurity ................................................................................................................................................................ 47Emission-free power supply and storage ...................................................................................................................... 48Decarbonising Industrial Zones in the Baltic Sea Region ............................................................................................ 48T ransitioning to Hydrogen Energy .............................................................................................................................. 48Advancing Fusion Energy Research ............................................................................................................................. 49Energy T ransition and Innovation ................................................................................................................................ 49International Policy Framework for Infrastructure Protection ..................................................................................... 493.4 Meeting on 26-28 November 2024 in Bergen, Norway .............................................................................................. 501) Visit to Kollsnes Process Plant .................................................................................................................................. 512) Visit to Eviny Renewable Energy Company ........................................................................................................... 523) Meeting with the Royal Norwegian Navy ............................................................................................................... 534) Session on the Russian “Shadow Fleet” ................................................................................................................... 54Looking Ahead .............................................................................................................................................................. 563.5 Meeting on 16-18 March 2025 in Stockholm, Sweden .............................................................................................. 57Sustainable T ransport Solutions and Technological Innovation .................................................................................. 58Electric Maritime Mobility and the Role of Industry .................................................................................................. 59Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Maritime Security ........................................................................................ 59Cooperation with Baltic Sea Institutions ...................................................................................................................... 60Summary of the key points from the Expert Presentations ......................................................................................... 613.6 Meeting on 18-20 May 2025 in Tallinn, Estonia ........................................................................................................ 62Operation of the shadow fleet and the geopolitical implications ................................................................................. 63Digital Governance and Cyber Resilience .................................................................................................................... 63Cyber Range Technology and Simulation .................................................................................................................... 64Protection of Maritime Infrastructure, and Domain Awareness ................................................................................. 64Resilience of Critical Infrastructure and Legal Coordination ...................................................................................... 64International Legal Framework and Strategic Coordination ....................................................................................... 65Resilience of Electricity Grids after Synchronisation .................................................................................................... 655 Table of ContentWartime Energy Resilience and Lessons from Ukraine ............................................................................................... 65Summary of the key points from the Expert Presentations ......................................................................................... 66Outlook ......................................................................................................................................................................... 674. Political Recommendations ............................................................................................................. 684.1 Recommendations of the BSPC Working Group to the 33rd BSPC Resolution ...................................................... 68Regarding energy security and self-sustainability to ..................................................................................................... 68Regarding resilience and interconnectivity to ............................................................................................................... 694.2 Recommendations of the BSPC Working Group to the 34th BSPC Resolution ....................................................... 701. Develop a comprehensive, well-coordinated strategy: ........................................................................................ 702. Centralise responsibilities across the Baltic Sea region: ....................................................................................... 703. Establish a standing Baltic Naval Force: ............................................................................................................. 714. Digital Real-Time Connectivity - Jointly fund and sustain open-source technology: ....................................... 715. Strengthening Maritime Domain Awareness in the Baltic Sea .......................................................................... 716. Framework for Preventing and Responding to Hybrid Attacks on Critical Infrastructure ............................... 717. Coordinated Action Against the Russian and other Shadow Fleets ................................................................... 728. Resilience and Redundancy of Energy and Communication Networks ........................................................... 729. Strengthening NATO and EU Coordination on Baltic Sea Security ................................................................ 7210. Research in the field of sustainability, energy and transport innovation ............................................................ 7311. Establishment of Regional Repair Capabilities for Critical Maritime Infrastructure (WG) ............................. 7312. Creation of a Baltic Sea Infrastructure Resilience Forum for Cross-Sectoral Exchange (WG) ......................... 7413. Development of a Baltic Sea Cyber Crisis Simulation Framework (WG) ........................................................ 7414. Promotion of Multi-Use Design Standards for Critical Infrastructure (WG) ................................................... 7415. Enhancing Digital Resilience in Rural and Peripheral Areas of the Baltic Sea Region (WG) .......................... 7416. Integration of Environmental Risk into Maritime Security Strategy (WG) ...................................................... 755. Intergovernmental Survey ................................................................................................................ 765.1 Responses to the BSPC Working Group survey about the areas of interest for the respective parliamentarians ........ 761) What are the national and regional long-term energy consumption projections and energy production plans? ...... 762) What are the plans of the governments regarding developing new energy interconnections? .......................... 773) How does your country or region plan to ensure the balancing of power systems in the long term?What are the plans for balancing renewable sources of energy? ........................................................................ 794) What cross-border energy projects are being implemented or are plannedto be developed in your country or region? ....................................................................................................... 806 Table of Content5.2 Government Responses to the BSPC Intergovernmental Survey on Energy Security, Maritime Resilience,and Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Baltic Sea Region ................................................................................... 84Key Findings and Policy Considerations ...................................................................................................................... 84Observations on Confidentiality and Completeness of Responses ............................................................................. 861) Monitoring and Regulation of Shadow Fleet Activities in the Baltic Sea ............................................................... 862) Enhancing Joint Maritime Patrols and Surveillance Systems .................................................................................. 893) Legal Opinions on Recent Incidents and National Response Plans ....................................................................... 914) Coordinated Measures to Strengthen the Protection of Critical Offshore Infrastructure ...................................... 935) Shared Intelligence and Rapid Response Mechanisms ............................................................................................ 956) Support Mechanisms for Technical and Financial Resources .................................................................................. 977) Role of CBSS and Other International Organisations in Strengthening Cooperation .......................................... 998) Gaps and Limitations in Existing Legal Frameworks (UNCLOS, EEZs, and Responses to Sabotage) .............. 1019) Applying Legal Jurisdictions More Dynamically ................................................................................................... 10310) Prospects for High-Level CBSS Meetings ........................................................................................................... 1056. Best Cross-Border Practices ........................................................................................................... 107Baltic States’ Synchronisation with the Continental European Network .................................................................. 107CCS Baltic Consortium project ................................................................................................................................. 107ELWIND .................................................................................................................................................................... 107Fehmarnbelt T unnel .................................................................................................................................................... 108FinBalt 108Green Industrial Areas ................................................................................................................................................ 108Nordic Hydrogen Route ............................................................................................................................................ 108Rail Baltica ................................................................................................................................................................. 109Team ThaiGer ............................................................................................................................................................. 109Members of the BSPC Working Group ............................................................................................. 110Chairmanship ............................................................................................................................................................. 110List of Members .......................................................................................................................................................... 110Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................................................... 1137 IntroductionIntroductionLadies and gentlemen,In 2023, the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference took a pivotalstep towards reinforcing our region’s energy security, self-sustaina-bility, resilience, and connectivity. The establishment of the Wor-king Group on ESSRC followed the BSPC’s decision to suspendrelations with the Russian Federation, which has opened the doorto more transparent, democratic, and results-oriented dialogueamong the parliaments of the democratic Baltic Sea states.Between September 2023 and June 2025, the Working Groupconvened for six comprehensive and highly productive meetings:· The first meeting in Riga laid the groundwork for the Group’sdeliberations and defined the key principles to guide its work.Discussions addressed energy, defence, digitalisation, and trans-port, particularly concerning energy diversification and regio-nal interconnections.· The second meeting in Helsinki focused on hybrid threats, re-silience of critical infrastructure, and the strategic role of energyand maritime security in countering destabilising influences inthe Baltic Sea region.· The third meeting in Greifswald brought forward crucial in-sights into infrastructure protection, energy transition techno-logies, and cross-border cybersecurity challenges.· The fourth meeting in Bergen included in-depth field visits tothe Kollsnes gas processing plant and the Norwegian Navy. Itaddressed offshore resilience, the shadow fleet, and the need formultilateral enforcement mechanisms.Mr Andris Kulbergs8 Introduction· The fifth meeting in Stockholm centred on maritime and land transport innovations, the protectionof subsea infrastructure, and EU/NATO coordination frameworks. It also deepened cooperation withthe CBSS and Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR) Baltic Sea Commission.· The final meeting in Tallinn concluded the Working Group’s work, highlighting digital sovereignty,cyber defence, and maritime surveillance as the next strategic frontiers. Estonia’s experience withdecentralised digital governance and NATO’s cyber resilience platforms served as key references.Throughout these sessions, the Working Group engaged more than 40 external experts, conducted fieldvisits, exchanged best practices, and discussed targeted Calls for Action to address the interlinked securi-ty, connectivity, and sustainability challenges. These discussions resulted in comprehensive policy recom-mendations to the 33rd and 34th BSPC Resolutions.I want to extend my deepest gratitude to all those who have made a decisive contribution to the great suc-cess of this working group with their utmost commitment, particularly the members of the WorkingGroup, our expert contributors and the secretariat, and to those in the governments and other public in-stitutions who have answered our questions very thoroughly in detail and have taken a stand on the im-plementation of our recommendations and calls for action. Your engagement – whether through provi-ding national insights, sharing cutting-edge research, or discussing regional strategies – has made this pro-cess a genuinely collaborative and forward-looking endeavour. Your commitment to strengthening the re-gion’s resilience, from underwater cables to hydrogen corridors, from joint surveillance to climate-neutralenergy, has been invaluable.The BSPC has proven its role as an essential forum for regional parliamentary dialogue and joint agen-da-setting. As we move forward, we invite all member parliaments to build on this Working Group’s con-clusions, embed them in national strategies, and deepen interparliamentary cooperation to benefit the en-tire Baltic Sea region.Andris KulbergsMember of the Baltic Assembly and the Parliament of LatviaChair of the Working Group9 Executive SummaryExecutive SummaryThe BSPC Working Group on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, Resilience and Connectivity (ESSRC),established in 2023, convened six times between October 2023 and May 2025. Its aim was to identifyconcrete policy recommendations and foster deeper cooperation among the democratic states and parlia-ments of the Baltic Sea region in addressing critical strategic challenges.The Working Group met in:· Riga (15–16 October 2023) to define priorities and guiding principles,· Helsinki (17–18 March 2024) to focus on geopolitics, hybrid threats, and energy security,· Greifswald (26–28 May 2024) to explore infrastructure protection and maritime resilience,· Bergen (26–28 November 2024) to address offshore energy, shadow fleets,and military-civil cooperation,· Stockholm (16–18 March 2025) to deepen discussions on cyber and subsea infrastructure security,transport resilience, and regional coordination,· and Tallinn (18–20 May 2025) to conclude its work with a focus on cyber resilience,digital sovereignty, and multilateral governance.10 Executive SummaryThroughout its sessions, the Working Group welcomed more than 40 expert presentations, conducted se-veral field visits, and prepared joint recommendations. These are reflected in the BSPC Resolutions of2024 and 2025 and provide a strategic framework for regional parliamentary cooperation.Key cross-cutting topics included:· energy transition and regional interconnectivity,· critical infrastructure protection and preparedness,· cybersecurity and hybrid threats,· maritime security and the rule of law at sea,· digital governance and innovation,· and the geopolitical context of resilience-building in the Baltic Sea region.The Group’s work was grounded in openness, mutual respect, and practical exchange between nationaland regional parliaments. Its outcomes are intended to support long-term stability, cooperation, and de-mocratic resilience in the Baltic Sea region.11 1. Programme of the Working Group1. Programme of the Working Groupa) ConstitutionThe Working Group is constituted as an ad hoc working group under the auspices of the Standing Com-mittee of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, following the BSPC Rules of Procedure.b) BackgroundThe Russian invasion of Ukraine was a shock to the Baltic Sea region and its energy systems. Energy de-pendence on Russia is dangerous, and it is important to find new ways to ensure energy security andself-sustainability of the region. Another area of importance for the Baltic Sea region is resilience andconnectivity. The regional energy, transport, and digital networks need to become stronger and more in-tegrated to meet the needs of the modern world. The BSPC Working Group on Climate Change and Bio-diversity ended its work in August 2023, but despite that, the BSPC needs to continue working on sus-tainability and meeting the regional climate goals. The BSPC has become an excellent format for discus-sing energy security, self-sustainability, resilience, and connectivity in the Baltic Sea region. The BSPC hasa pivotal role in finding solutions to current and future challenges and the potential to enhance coopera-tion of the Baltic Sea states in the areas covered by the Working Group.c) ObjectivesThe overarching objective of the Working Group is to elaborate political positions and recommendationson energy security, self-sustainability, resilience, and connectivity. For this purpose, the Working Groupshould establish and maintain contacts with relevant institutions, organisations, and other actors in theBaltic Sea region and beyond. The Working Group shall contribute to the exchange of knowledge andbest practices. It shall also help to actively drive cooperation in the Baltic Sea region in this policy fieldand to follow and influence political initiatives.12 1. Programme of the Working Groupd) Main Directions of the Work of the Working Group• Energy Security and Self-sustainability of the RegionProducing green, affordable, and climate-neutral energy has been among the traditional common challen-ges for the countries in the Baltic Sea region; however, the activities of Russia have also brought aboutchallenges relating specifically to energy security, availability, and affordability. In the energy sector, theBaltic Sea region should aim to achieve self-sustainability that would contribute greatly to the economicdevelopment and stability of the region.The main topics to be discussed by the Working Group include:· joint approaches in further phasing out and preventing dependency on fossil fuels,especially from Russia;· enhancing cooperation to ensure clean and affordable energy, in particular,but not limited to hydrogen policy;· encouraging collaboration in energy and sustainability research and innovation.• Resilience and Interconnectivity of the Baltic Sea StatesThe aim to connect the Baltic Sea region is based on common features and challenges of the region. In-creasing the connectivity between the Baltic Sea states and the resilience of critical infrastructure will con-tribute to thriving regional communities and businesses as well as to building similarly strong relations-hips with neighbouring countries.The main topics to be discussed by the WG include:· joint measures towards an open, competitive, fully integrated, and resilient regional energy market;· building interconnected, sustainable, and resilient transport systems together;· accelerating the transition to a single digital market resilient to internal and external threats.13 1. Programme of the Working Groupe) ParticipationAll member parliaments and parliamentary organisations of the BSPC are invited to participate in theWorking Group with one member and one substitute each, accompanied by staff. Members and substi-tutes must be parliamentarians.f) Mode of WorkThe Working Group will collect and compile information utilizing expert presentations, study visits, andother information-gathering activities. The materials will be discussed and analysed continuously duringthe meetings of the Working Group. The aim is to gradually elaborate positions and recommendations forthe annual resolutions of the BSPC.The Working Group shall adopt a working plan at its first meeting. The Working Group is expected tohold at least two meetings a year and prepare a set of political recommendations for the annual resolutionsof the BSPC. The interim report will be presented during the 33rd BSPC and the final report during the34th BSPC.g) Follow-upAfter the publication of the political recommendations at the 33rd and 34th BSPC, the members of theWorking Group should take various initiatives to disseminate the recommendations and monitor theirimplementation. The members are invited to raise discussions about the recommendations in their homeparliaments and relevant Committees, pose questions to their governments and public authorities, andengage in various opinion-building activities, not least in their constituencies.14 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPC2. Comparative Analysisof the Countries in the BSPCEnergyThe countries in the Baltic Sea region have different energy portfolios, meaning there are plenty of possi-bilities and challenges. The Baltic Sea countries, to varying degrees, have to change their energy portfoliosto achieve carbon-neutral generation. For the past 10-15 years, energy research publications have shownthat the future of energy systems is hybrid. To build a hybrid energy system, it is necessary to understandthe contents of the energy portfolio and identify the needs to be produced, imported or borrowed fromthe neighbouring countries.Baltic Sea Region Energy Profiles15 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPC16 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPC17 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPC18 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCBaltic Sea Region Electricity Production in 20231Country Production, TWh Share of renewable energy Electricity production by sourceDenmark 32.9 83 %14%10%60%9%6%1%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknownEstonia 4.63 46 %14%43%17%15%11%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknownFinland 74.5 48 %43%0%7%6%20%19%3%1%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknown1 Data retrieved on 16 June 2024, https://app.electricitymaps.com/zone/NOttps://www.gie.eu/publications/maps/system-capacity-map/19 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCCountry Production, TWh Share of renewable energy Electricity production by sourceGermany 446 60 %10%27%33%13%3% 11%1%1%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknownIceland 15.9 100 %28%72%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknownLatvia 5.69 74 %4%4%65%24%3%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknown20 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCCountry Production, TWh Share of renewable energy Electricity production by sourceLithuania 5.44 86 %14%49%13%8%13%3% NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknownNorway 151 99 %10%89%1%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknownPoland 153 27 %1%64%15%9%1%8%2%NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknown21 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCCountry Production, TWh Share of renewable energy Electricity production by sourceSweden 155 70 %30%22%1%42%5% NuclearGeothermalBi omassCoalWindSol arHydroGasOilUnknownBaltic Sea Region Electricity Production and Consumption in 2023, TWh2Country Production Consumption BalanceDenmark 32.9 51.7 -18.8Estonia 4.63 11.9 -7.27Finland 74.5 84.3 -9.8Germany 446 498 -52Iceland 15.9 15.9 0Latvia 5.69 9.05 -3.36Lithuania 5.44 15 -9.56Norway 151 162 -11Poland 153 168 -15Sweden 155 163 -82 Data retrieved on 16 June 2024, https://app.electricitymaps.com/zone/NOttps://www.gie.eu/publications/maps/system-capacity-map/22 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCBaltic Sea Region Gas Infrastructure and Capacities in 2023, GWh3Country Yearly demand Maximum production, GWh/d Working gas volume4Denmark 20.873 27 10.372Estonia 3.425 - -Finland 13.315 0.5 -Germany 803.300 147 251.353Iceland - - -Latvia 8.201 - 25.000Lithuania 14.912 - -Norway - - -Poland 176.613 82 37.493Sweden 6.116 0.2 102Geographical Distribution of the European Gas Demand53 Data retrieved on 30 June 2025, https://www.gie.eu/publications/maps/system-capacity-map/4 Total volume of gas storage minus the cushion gas5 Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023 of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG)23 2. Comparative Analysis of the Countries in the BSPCTransportThe countries of the Baltic Sea region have significant differences in transport infrastructure. Throughoutthe Working Group meetings, the members have discussed increasing connectivity between the countries.However, to understand the future possibilities, it is important to understand the strengths of each coun-try.Country Short description regarding roads, railway lines, airports, and seaportsDenmark Regional transport hub (air, sea, and railway) of major importance connecting Scandinavia and beyondEstoniaQuality and sufficient capacity for national travel, seaports ensuring passenger and freight mobility as well as the developmentof the Rail Baltica projectFinland Major source and destination of passengers and commercial freightGermany Advanced and varied public transport systemIceland Well-developed sea transport and air travelLatvia Riga Airport as the largest air traffic hub in the Baltic States, increased ferry connection to Sweden, and the development ofthe Rail Baltica projectLithuania Quality road infrastructure and the development of the Rail Baltica projectNorwayWell integrated into the overall Scandinavian transport system, a major sea-going capability with unprecedented relevance forthe energy sectorPoland Rapid improvements in developing roads and railway connectionsSweden Well-developed national road, railway, and air travel system24 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group3. Main Conclusions after the Meetingsof the Working Group3.1 Meeting on 15-16 October 2023 in Riga, Latvia25 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupDuring the Working Group’s inaugural meeting, the members and experts discussed all the topics to becovered during its meetings, including energy, defence, transport, and digital connectivity of the BalticSea region. WG Chairman Andris Kulbergs underlined that the region was facing many challenges, a ma-jor one being the security of energy, economies, and societies. Ukraine showed an example of how theenergy sector could be attacked directly and its vulnerability if it was too centralised.The main information and conclusions of the meeting – particularly from the perspective of the experts– are summarised in this subchapter, but more detailed information can be found in the meeting notes.The experts that have contributed to the meeting are Energy market analyst Mr Reinis Āboltiņš, Ministerof T ransport Mr Kaspars Briškens, Latvenergo AS Regulatory Affairs Director and Sadales tīkls AS Chair-man of the Supervisory Board Mr Kristaps Ločmelis, and Deputy State Secretary Ms Līga Rozentāle.Energy• Reinis Āboltiņš pointed out that countries in the Baltic Sea region had different energy portfolios, me-aning that there were plenty of possibilities and challenges. He emphasised that all countries in theBaltic Sea region had challenges in reaching carbon-neutral energy portfolios. Despite that, there wasno single technology that could provide an ultimate solution; however, for the last 10-15 years, all in-dexed energy research publications had been showing that the future of energy systems was hybrid.The ability to build a hybrid energy system, according to Mr Āboltiņš, required understanding thecontents of the energy portfolio and identifying the needs to be produced, imported, or borrowedfrom the neighbouring countries. The maintenance and timely investment in the energy portfolio washighlighted as important.• Energy production and balancing were important topics for future discussion. The parliamentary sideemphasised the importance of understanding the plans in this area for the countries in the Baltic Searegion. They highlighted the importance of balancing “unreliable” sources of energy such as wind andsolar and finding solutions to balance renewables while improving regional connectivity.26 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• Minister of T ransport of the Republic of Latvia Kaspars Briškens agreed that electricity and gas infra-structure required years to develop. He added that for this reason, transmission system operators wereregularly updating 10-year network development plans, including so-called common interest projects.• Mr Āboltiņš noted that it was important to ensure interconnections and energy flows across bordersin the Baltic Sea region. He highlighted the huge wind energy potential in the area, although thecountries were not utilising it to its full extent, despite it potentially being the second biggest sourceof electricity.• Kristaps Ločmelis noted that the development of wind energy projects in the region were facing con-siderable difficulties and thus needed better coordination. He concluded that several challenges wereconnected with public support and biodiversity requirements. Nowadays, according to him, it tooktoo long to get access to or realize the projects. Sharing experience in this area was vital for the develop-ment of wind energy in the region.• Mr Āboltiņš affirmed that there was a clear projection of rapid electricity consumption increase in se-veral industry-leading countries such as Sweden and Germany, whose electricity generation portfoliowould be falling behind the demand and would have to be balanced by neighbouring countries th-rough improved interconnectivity.• Mr Kristaps Ločmelis spoke of an untapped renewable energy system potential in the Baltic States, asthey might supply the European Union member states with green energy. Considering the relativelylow local consumption, the Baltic States could export most.• Mr Āboltiņš suggested that the gas market had reacted to the global convulsions provoked by the Russianinvasion of Ukraine, a very targeted and long-planned action by Russia. He reminded the meeting thatmany policymakers and decision-makers had refused to view the Nord Stream pipelines as a political pro -ject and security risk. At their cumulative capacity of 110 billion cubic metres of natural gas, Nord Stre -am would have matched almost exactly the volume annually carried from Ukraine to Europe.• He further noted that, when looking at the energy systems, the countries had become cleverer: They weremanaging quite well and diversifying their gas supplies away from Russia. The biggest challenge was con-tinuing to look for better solutions and having a broad vision, not narrowing down on the national inte-rests. That was even more important at the present time of increasing interconnection of markets.27 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• Mr Āboltiņš indicated that the countries with more energy connections having lower energy prices de-monstrated to the rest of Europe that interconnections were extremely important. If there was noconnectivity in the energy market, there would be blackouts, constrained situations, and limitedcross-border capacities, leading to price spikes.• Mr Āboltiņš suggested regional policies in terms of hydrogen in the Baltic Sea countries as another im-portant issue to be addressed, such as considering the synchronisation of their plans and policies.• Deputy State Secretary of the Ministry of Climate and Energy of the Republic of Latvia, Ms Līga Ro-zentāle, explained the current energy storage solutions in Latvia, mentioning that the country was ex-ploring various storage technologies, including large-scale batteries, hydrogen storage, and nuclearenergy. While Latvia was currently focusing on maintaining natural gas as a key energy source, thetransition to more sustainable storage solutions was crucial. The integration of these technologieswould be essential for balancing the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources such as wind andsolar.• Ms Rozentāle discussed investments in solar energy, emphasising that Latvia saw significant potentialin solar energy, particularly for households and small businesses. The country was focusing on suppor-ting solar microgeneration and creating a legal framework to encourage the adoption of solar energysystems. This included simplifying the process for households to install solar panels and ensuring aneasy connection to the grid. Additionally, she highlighted the importance of solar energy in achievingLatvia’s renewable energy targets and reducing dependence on fossil fuels.• Mr Kristaps Ločmelis outlined the developments in the electric vehicle (EV) infrastructure in the Bal-tic Sea region. He emphasized that its expansion was critical for promoting the adoption of electric ve-hicles and achieving sustainability goals. Latvia, for instance, was investing in the development of na-tionwide EV charging networks, with a focus on ensuring that there were sufficient charging stationsin both urban and rural areas to support the growing number of electric vehicles. He mentioned thatLatvenergo, one of the leading energy companies in the Baltic States, was actively developing a char-ging network for electric vehicles in the region. Among other aspects, they were installing fast-char-ging stations along major highways and in cities, ensuring convenient access to charging points for EVusers. The company was also exploring innovative solutions such as smart charging and vehicle-to-grid(V2G) technologies to optimise energy use and support grid stability.28 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupMilitary Mobility and Transportation• Minister Kaspars Briškens called the integration of the Baltic Sea region across various areas, includingtransport, digital connectivity, and defence, very important for regional security and development.• He stated that the Baltic Sea region had the potential to become an integrated defence area with strongcooperation on coastal, air, and maritime defence. Strengthening military mobility or a new strategyfor military mobility should be a joint priority in all different modes of transport. He added that, forexample, the cable corridors connected with the development of the Rail Baltica project would servenot just for the railway’s technical and commercial requirements, but also as an opportunity to connectthe defence and civil infrastructure with independent digital networks.• Mr Briškens noted that the Baltic Sea was heavily navigated, yet significant potential remained tofurther strengthen the interconnection across the Baltic Sea region, especially in the East-West direc-tion.Digital Connectivity• Minister Briškens saw the last-mile connectivity as a challenge across the Baltic Sea region. It was im-portant to share all the best practices across the region on how to implement these final connections,how to commercialise them, and how to ensure that the digital infrastructure managers would coope-rate with commercial operators.• He viewed potential in the Baltic Sea region for strengthening digital connectivity, both across andalong the Baltic Sea. One example was the far greater number of submarine cables in the North Seaand the Atlantic Ocean than in the Baltic Sea. However, some of the cables in the Baltic Sea had beenlaid down in the early 1990s. The development of high-capacity broadband 5G – and the impendingadvent of 6G technologies – meant that their capacity might prove insufficient.Cross-Border Projects• Minister Briškens said that large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the Rail Baltica railway and theFehmarn Belt tunnel, tended to experience delays in their development. Such delays were causing ca-pital expenditure escalations and leading to the generous funding from the European Union being re-duced. Each call seemed to be a separate action with a separate accounting procedure and paperwork.29 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupOn occasion, a project might receive one package while waiting for another. Thus, the project develo-pers were left idling. He proposed raising awareness of these issues in the European Union: Changeswere necessary if Europe wanted to accelerate large-scale projects and deliver the TEN-T core networkby 2030.Summary of the Key Points from the Expert PresentationsThe following summary captures the key points from the expert presentations, emphasising the strategicinitiatives, challenges, and solutions in transport and energy security within the Baltic Sea region. The fo-cus on regional cooperation, renewable energy development, and infrastructure investments underscoresthe importance of integrated approaches to enhance connectivity, resilience, and sustainability.Transport and ConnectivityMinister of Transport of the Republic of Latvia, Kaspars Briškens:• Rail Baltica Project: A critical initiative to enhance north-south access, connecting the Baltic Stateswith Poland and integrating into the broader European transport network. This project is part of theNorth Sea-Baltic TEN-T corridor and aims to create new corridors connecting the Baltic Sea, BlackSea, and Aegean Sea, including integration with the UK.• Air Baltic: The airline operates from bases in Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius, covering routes in Finland,Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland, and beyond. It has one of the greenest fleets in Europe.• Marine T raffic: The Baltic Sea, particularly the Danish straits, is heavily frequented. Efforts are under-way to reestablish ferry connections between Riga and Stockholm and improve the east-west connec-tion.Latvian Logistics Sector:• It is undergoing a significant shift from reliance on Russian raw materials to focusing on Europeanconnections. Its historical ties with Central Asia provide opportunities to enhance trade routes th-rough Latvian ports.• Emphasis is placed on creating integrated logistics corridors for Western and Nordic customers.30 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupDigital Connectivity:• There is a potential for strengthening submarine cable infrastructure in the Baltic Sea.• Rail Baltica will feature cable ducts for commercial and defence digital networks, contributing to Lat-via’s digital connectivity policy.Energy Infrastructure:• Future plans include developing coastal wind farms and hydrogen policies for transport.• Ports and logistics sectors are prepared to support investments in offshore wind parks and hydrogenstorage distribution.Challenges and Solutions:• Administrative burdens and capital expenditure escalations affect mega-projects like Rail Baltica. Stre-amlining processes and ensuring timely EU funding are vital.• The geopolitical situation emphasises the importance of regional security and interconnectivity pro-jects.For more details, see the following presentations:https://www.bspc.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Briskens_Kaspars_RegT ran_161023_194_KB.pdfhttps://www.bspc.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2023-10-13-_RBR-final.pdf31 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupEnergy Sector and SecurityDeputy State Secretary of the Ministry of Climate and Energy, Līga Rozentāle:• Energy Independence and Export: Latvia aims to achieve energy independence and eventually exportenergy, leveraging wind, biomass, solar, and hydroelectric power.• Liberalised Markets: Latvia’s electricity and gas markets are fully liberalised, encouraging competitionand consumer choice.• Synchronisation with Continental Europe: An accelerated timeline aims to synchronise with Europe’sgrid by February 2025, enhancing energy security.Renewable Energy Development:• Projects include the Estonian-Latvian Wind Park (ELWIND) and the Baltic Wind Connector bet-ween Estonia and Germany.• Efforts focus on optimising network use and auctioning public land for wind parks.Gas Sector:• Developing a common gas market with Estonia and Finland, with the potential for Lithuania to join.• Exploring a hydrogen infrastructure and biomethane production, leveraging the Inčukalns underg-round gas storage for regional security.Current Security of Gas Supply:• The Inčukalns storage is close to full capacity, with significant reserves and long-term agreements withthe Klaipėda LNG terminal.• There are plans to develop a common framework for utilising the Paldiski LNG terminal if needed.32 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupClimate Neutrality Goals:• High renewable energy targets have been set, with a focus on solar and wind power for domestic useand exports.• There is potential for hydrogen production from electricity and regional cooperation on nuclear ener-gy.Challenges and Considerations:• Regional cooperation on balancing renewable energy sources and infrastructure investments is nee-ded.• Timely investment in electricity and gas infrastructure is vital to prevent blackouts and ensure supplysecurity.https://www.bspc.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Rozentale_Liga_BSPC_KEM__161023.pdfRenewable Energy and Market DynamicsLatvenergo AS:• Strategy: The company aims to double its generation capacity by 2030, focusing on hydropower, co-generation plants, and renewable energy solutions.• Challenges: Environmental permits, grid connections, and military-restricted areas pose obstacles towind power development.• Interconnections: These are essential for the security of supply, with planned investments in new ra-dars to facilitate wind farms.Regional Wind Energy:• Despite the high potential for wind energy in the Baltic Sea region, permitting processes and biodiver-sity concerns delay projects.33 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• European Commission regulations could help expedite wind power plant installations.Market Dynamics:• Different energy portfolios across the region offer opportunities for cooperation and hybrid energysystems.• Maintaining and investing in transmission grids and interconnections to balance supply and demandis crucial.Hybrid Energy Systems:• Future energy systems will be hybrid, combining various renewable sources and technologies.• Regional cooperation and open-market policies are crucial for managing interconnected energy mar-kets and ensuring resilience.Geopolitical Considerations:• The exclusion of Russia allows for more cohesive regional energy strategies.• Synchronisation of national plans for energy production, consumption, and interconnection is essen-tial for regional security and sustainability.34 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group3.2 Meeting on 17-18 March 2024 in Helsinki, Finland35 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupDuring the 2nd meeting of the WG, the members discussed geopolitics, energy, addressing hybrid threatsand other topics. The main conclusions of the meeting are summarised in this subchapter; however, moredetailed information can be found in the notes of the meeting. The experts that have contributed to thediscussions of the meeting: Programme Director of Natural Resources of the Institute of Finland Ms Jo-hanna Kohl, Head of International Relations at the Hybrid Centre of Excellence Mr Tapio Pyysalo, COIDirector Mr Jukka Savolainen, Leading Researcher of the Finnish Institute for International Affairs MrMarco Siddi, Mr Jussi Soramäki, and Docent of the Russian Resource and Energy Policy of the NationalDefence University of Finland Mr Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen.Geopolitics• Mr Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen emphasised that the Baltic Sea region countries should reevaluate the stra-tegy of Russia not just from the military but also from the economic and hybrid perspective. He sta-ted that it was necessary to understand the strategy of Russia as “a great power of flows”. In present-dayEurope, imperial and colonial Russia was battling against a free, democratic Ukraine serving as an an-ti-Russian module. He indicated that the culture, language, and sovereignty of Ukraine and Belaruswere unthinkable for many Russians.• Mr Tynkkynen claimed that Russia viewed the world as all “flows” functioning as means of coercionand repression, which were persuasive and alluring at the same time. There was the violence of war ma-chinery: bullets and missiles killing people, troops, tanks, and others. But Russia had also been targe-ting infrastructure and nature. He noted that people were also considered as flows – the deported andRussianised Ukrainians were either seen as new Russians and given passports or Russianised in Ukrai-nian lands. While the flows of violence were material, the greatest export commodity was fear. TheRussian regime continued claiming that it would nuke its adversaries as if Russia were the only nucle-ar power in the world. It was important to be sceptical in taking this fear in.• He further said that Russia was also battling against the energy transition and climate policies. In thepast 30 years of Vladimir Putin’s reign, energy had been vital in centralising the power of Russia. Ener-gy revenues were highly important for the country as they made up half of the state budget. That hadalso created enormous economic liberties and had made it possible to divert a large share of that mo-ney to violence. Throughout Putin’s years in power, energy had been crucial in paving the way for thedictatorship and increasing violence both inside and outside Russia.36 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• Mr Tynkkynen indicated that Russia was a “fossil empire”. Based on a fossil energy economy, and dueto its mystified history, it stood against technological modernisation, the energy transition, and clima-te action. Russia was pulling the brakes on the European energy transition, understanding that thecountry would suffer because of climate change but seeing that other countries would suffer more,which would make them a stronger player. The people in power were willing to let Russia suffer as longas others suffer more.• He also said that energy had turned from a soft to a hard weapon. It could still be alluring if a coun-try is interested. T ransport routes had also been used – for example, by impacting the ability to fly overRussia. Other material targets included grain (such as destroying Ukrainian fields), metals (such as ni-ckel and lithium), the environment (coercing and exporting fear via the potential of an accident, suchas in the Baltic Sea), people (illegal immigrants on the borders), cyber (cyber attacks and informationwar), critical infrastructure (targeting and threatening western infrastructures such as wind parks),money (funding right-/left-wing extremists in the West) as well as assassinations (covert killings andsabotage in Europe). If this was the strategy of Russia, due to their economic vulnerabilities, they wereunder threat. For Mr Tynkkynen, this was a narrative Europe could use.Energy• Mr Marco Siddi noted that nowadays energy was used as a weapon. Before 2022, there were instancesof such weaponisation but not to such a scale. He added that within certain limits, Gazprom had al-ready been exporting less to Europe before the full-scale invasion. A series of measures, such as embar-gos, phaseouts, and price gaps on Russian oil products had taken place. These had lost their effect asRussia had found ways around these sanctions. Thus, it was very important to link up with the rest ofthe world.• He furthermore mentioned that the EU had quickly responded to the war. This had been the secondtime in two years that the region had faced a serious crisis. In the energy sector, the RePowerEU Planhad been presented by the European Commission on 18 May 2022. It proposed accelerating the ener-gy transition by reducing gas imports from Russia, focusing on energy efficiency and saving as well asdiversifying energy sources. Mr Siddi viewed these as temporary fixes, though. The best way for theEU to move ahead was to focus on the green transition. At the same time, the debate on nuclear po-wer seemed to have revitalised.37 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• Mr Siddi stated that the EU should also balance its energy security by domestic production. The warwas not confined to Ukraine as critical infrastructure was being targeted in the Baltic Sea as well (e.g.,the Nord Stream sabotage). Gas from Russia was reaching the EU via T urkstream and Ukraine, whileLNG imports had been increasing, with Spain and Belgium becoming larger importers. He believedthat the Balticconnector damage on 8 October 2023 was another example of damage to the infrastruc-ture.• He also noted that the winter of 2025 could be crucial in terms of energy, necessitating better prepa-redness. He encouraged the countries in the Baltic Sea region to set up more interconnections in theenergy sector and exchange information.Addressing Hybrid Threats• Mr Tapio Pyysalo asserted that hybrid threats were coordinated and synchronised actions that delibe-rately targeted systemic vulnerabilities of states and institutions through a wide range of means, ex-ploiting the thresholds of detection and attribution. They were aimed at influencing the decision-ma-king of the target country. Hybrid threats were targeting the foundations of democracy across civicservices and governance spaces, challenging the availability of their services. He noted that hybridthreats were currently increasing due to disinformation and cognitive threats. This process was also af-fected by global competition and systemic rivalry, global instability and the proliferation of conflict,weaponised interdependence, technological developments, cognitive threats, and the cost-efficiency ofhybrid tools.• Mr Pyysalo stated that the cyber domain was used for attacks against Western societies and mass datacollection. Military cooperation was also increasingly used for strategic gain. Responding to such hy-brid threats, in the short term, required raising the situational awareness. In the medium and longterm, there was a need to build societal resilience that would help build deterrence against hybrid thre-ats, providing a cultural or systemic change.• Mr Jukka Savolainen indicated that critical infrastructure was vital and used in cases of conflict andespionage. Since private companies did not welcome any extra costs, they did not want to provide ex-tra security. In his view, it was necessary to explain that investing in security was important for dura-bility.38 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupMaritime Connectivity and Security• Jussi Soramäki highlighted that connectivity was under threat, as shown by the example of the Baltic-connector pipeline case. Protecting maritime infrastructure in the exclusive economic zone was extre-mely difficult as it questioned the freedom of the sea, a problem most states had not yet solved.• Additionally, he pointed out that Finland was technically an island dependent on maritime transportwith 95 % of exports and imports to the country transported by sea. The Baltic Sea was the main ship-ping route and lifeline for Finland. Some traffic was still incoming from Russia, but the majority ofthe border was almost entirely closed. He asserted that this temporary closure would persist as long asRussia continued its different kinds of hybrid threats.• Mr Jussi Soramäki further warned that the so-called Shadow fleet (tankers transporting oil from Rus-sian ports in the Gulf of Finland) harboured a great risk of a major oil spill. He advocated for the Eu-ropean Maritime Safety Agency taking a stronger role in controlling and helping the countries in theBaltic region. Additionally, he referenced wastewater from St Petersburg and the Leningrad Oblast,stressing the importance of cooperating with neighbouring countries and investment banks to cut theemissions, adding that, with the geopolitical situation and the embargo, anything might happen. Anykind of deliberate hybrid acts could result in major pollution in the Baltic Sea.39 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupCrisis Preparedness• Mr Janne Känkänen observed that there was no infrastructure for regional stockpiling and combiningresources. However, it would be useful to develop one. Finland and Sweden had had fairly extensivediscussions on developing a joint stockpile, but the idea could be explored even further in the future.It would be excellent to create an extra layer of security and resilience that could complement the na-tional solutions. He also pointed out a growing interest in countries cooperating on preparedness.Bioeconomy• Johanna Kohl emphasised that Europe aimed for open strategic autonomy challenges to optimise theuse of bio-based raw materials throughout the value chain. In her view, it was vital for the EU to re-duce its food system’s dependence on imported production inputs.• She believed that the bioeconomy had the potential to boost the added value; however, the develop-ment of bioeconomy value chains had recently been forgotten. She stressed the need to utilise and op-timise the sustainable use of the forests and waters, advocating for the field to become an essential partof EU industrial and finance policies to create bioeconomy solutions to the polycrisis.• Johanna Kohl recommended investing in research, technology development, and innovation, suppor-ting the development of strong regional business clusters and value chains, educating the new genera-tion of farmers and identifying the linkages between land use, new challenges in providing compre-hensive regional security, and the need to increase the added value of the food sector. She highlightedthe importance of increasing the EU RDI budget, focusing on the strategic competitiveness in Euro-pe. She pointed out that it was important to focus on building long-term competitiveness rather thanjust providing manufacturing subsidies. Strengthening the role of bioeconomy in EU industrial policyand emphasising the collaboration between research, finance, and industry was necessary to stimulateinvestments leading to high value-added production using bio-based raw materials.For more details, see the following presentations:https://www.bspc.net/bspc-maritime-policy180324final2jussi-soramaki/https://www.bspc.net/russia_great-power-of-flows-tynkkynen/https://www.bspc.net/energy-politics-and-security-in-the-baltic-region-cbp2-siddi/https://www.bspc.net/nutrient-recycling-in-the-grip-of-geopolitics-_kohl2/40 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupSummary of the Key Points from the Expert PresentationsThis summary encapsulates the key points of the BSPC WG meeting on 18 March 2024, reflecting thediscussions and contributions of the experts involved.1. Hybrid Threats and Countermeasures:• Hybrid CoE Overview: Mr Pyysalo from the Hybrid CoE explained its role as an international, auto-nomous network promoting a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to counter hybridthreats.• Rising Hybrid Threats: These threats target systemic vulnerabilities through various means, includingdisinformation, cyberattacks, and economic influence.• Cooperation and Capacity Building: The emphasis is on fostering EU-NATO cooperation and increa-sing situational awareness to counter these threats. There is a need to build societal resilience for me-dium- and long-term deterrence.2. Specific Hybrid Threats and Responses:• Artificial Intelligence in Hybrid Threats: Ulrike Täck raised concerns about the role of AI in hybrid threats.Mr Pyysalo acknowledged the challenge, noting that AI could be used both defensively and offensively.• Platforms and Measures: Anna Kassautzki questioned the effectiveness of current measures and regu-lations. Mr Pyysalo emphasised the need for better implementation and cooperation across social me-dia platforms.3. Maritime Security and Connectivity:• Finnish Dependency on Maritime T ransport: Mr Soramäki highlighted Finland’s dependence on ma-ritime transport, with 95 % of exports and imports transported by sea.• Shadow Fleet Risks: Experts discussed the environmental threats posed by the Shadow fleet, includingpotential major oil spills. They advocated for a stronger role for the European Maritime Safety Agen-cy (EMSA).41 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group4. Geopolitical Context:• Russia’s Strategy: Mr Tynkkynen explained Russia’s use of energy as a tool for coercion and repression,dubbing it a “fossil empire”. He stressed the importance of understanding Russia’s hybrid strategy andthe need for Europe to use this narrative.• Economic and Hybrid Perspective: Experts emphasised the need to reassess Russia not just militarilybut also economically and in terms of hybrid threats. They highlighted the central role of energy re-venues in Russia’s state budget and its use for funding violence.5. Energy Security:• Energy as a Weapon: Mr Siddi and Ms Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek discussed the weaponisation ofenergy and the EU’s response through measures like the RePowerEU Plan, aimed at reducing gas im-ports from Russia and diversifying energy sources.• Renewable Energy and Interconnectivity: They noted the ongoing energy transition and the importanceof regional cooperation and interconnections in the energy sector to ensure security and resilience.6. Crisis Preparedness:• National Emergency Supply Agency of Finland (NESA): Mr Känkänen detailed NESA’s mission toensure the continuity of vital state functions during crises. He highlighted Finland’s extensive stockpi-ling system and the importance of cooperation with national and international partners.• Pharmaceutical Supply: Ms Ulrike Täck emphasised the need for better cooperation among Europeancountries to ensure a stable pharmaceutical supply, learning from the COVID-19 pandemic.7. Bioeconomy:• Potential of the Bioeconomy: Ms Kohl saw the bioeconomy’s potential to boost added value althoughthe development of bioeconomy value chains had recently been forgotten. She stressed the need to uti-lise and optimise the sustainable use of forests and waters, advocating for the field to become an essen-tial part of EU industrial and finance policies to create bio-based solutions to the polycrisis.42 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group8. Policy Recommendations:• Regional Stockpiling: Experts observed the lack of infrastructure for regional stockpiling and combi-ning resources, suggesting the development of a joint stockpile for added security and resilience.• Collaboration and Competitiveness: They recommended investing in research, technology develop-ment, and innovation, supporting the development of strong regional business clusters and valuechains, in addition to increasing the EU RDI budget to build long-term competitiveness.43 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group3.3 Meeting on 26-28 May 2024 in Greifswald, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern44 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupDuring the 3rd meeting of the WG, the members continued discussions on energy policy and energy se-curity in the Baltic Sea Region with a particular focus on protecting critical infrastructure, energy trans-formation and reducing energy dependency. The main conclusions of the meeting are summarised in thissubchapter; however, more detailed information can be found in the notes of the meeting. The expertsthat have contributed to the discussions of the meeting: Academic coordinator at the Alfred-Krupp-Wis-senschaftskolleg Dr Christian Suhm, Minister of the Interior, Construction, and Digitalisation of Meck-lenburg-Vorpommern Mr Christian Pegel, Entsorgungswerk für Nuklearanlagen GmbH, Dismantling ofGreifswald Nuclear Power Plant Mr Kurt Radloff, European Commission, Head of Unit “Investment inHigh-Capacity Networks”, Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technolo-gy (DG CONNECT) Mr Franco Accordino, Mayor of Greifswald Dr Stefan Fassbinder, Stralsund Uni-versity of Applied Sciences Dr Andreas Noack and Stralsund University of Applied Sciences Dr ThomasLuschtinetz.Protection of critical infrastructure• Minister Christian Pegel stressed that only a comprehensive, coordinated strategy can secure the Bal-tic Sea region’s infrastructure, protecting energy supply, communications, and transport routes againstthreats like cyberattacks, war, and natural disasters.• He added that in the area of transport and traffic, the ports were becoming increasingly important ascontrol and transhipment points due to new geopolitical developments.• Minister Christian Pegel added that critical infrastructure, including LNG terminals and industrialports, now have increased security measures and regular patrols to prevent and quickly address dis-ruptions at sea. He noted improved information sharing between state and federal authorities, whilealso suggesting that centralizing responsibilities across the Baltic Sea region could strengthen collecti-ve security efforts.• A recent NATO exercise took place at Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’s seaport, where military equip-ment is now being transported via the Baltic Sea. The minister emphasized that the training, equip-ment, and mindset of soldiers are adapting as internal and external security increasingly overlap.45 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• Minister Christian Pegel outlined challenges following the Nord Stream incident in Germany, notingthe complications due to separate policing systems across federal states and the federal police on thecoastline. However, he highlighted improved information sharing, given the federal police’s limitedsurveillance capacity across the Baltic Sea. Minister Christian Pegel expressed concern that Russianships could freely move and stop along the Baltic, likely to monitor undersea electricity and commu-nication cables. He noted similar discussions were happening in Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Po-land, aimed at strengthening regional security coordination.• Minister Christian Pegel explained that, from Germany’s perspective, the navy was the third part ofthe Baltic Sea. Russia is actively exploring the seabed for critical infrastructure like cables and pipe-lines. He shared that while the federal police saw the navy as already stretched thin, he hoped theywould consider future responsibilities for monitoring this area. To achieve effective oversight, Pegelstressed the need for better technical resources and envisioned a regional cooperation center whereBaltic Sea partners could coordinate. He also noted that, though international law may not evolve onthis matter soon, proactive cooperation and information sharing are essential.Safe decommissioning, dismantling, and disposal of the now-defunct nuclear power plants• Kurt Radloff explained that following German reunification, the Federal Republic inherited state-runenterprises, including those operating the East German nuclear power plants in Greifswald andRheinsberg. No investors stepped forward to privatize these plants, and significant upgrades wouldhave been required to align with Western safety standards. As a result, the decision was made to de-commission both plants.• Kurt Radloff explained that dismantling the plants would produce around 1.8 million tonnes of ma-terial. About two-thirds could be released without radiological restrictions, while the remaining thirdwould require decontamination at on-site conditioning facilities. By removing radioactive particlesfrom materials like concrete, steel, stainless steel, and copper, these could then be recycled. This decon-tamination process is crucial not only for sustainability but also for reducing the final volume of radi-oactive waste needing disposal.46 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• He also shared that the Konrad shaft, Germany’s designated repository for low and intermediate-levelradioactive waste, is set to begin operations in 2029. Meanwhile, the search for a site to store high-le-vel radioactive waste remains underway, managed by the Federal Company for Radioactive Waste Di-sposal. Radloff noted that a decision on a potential location is projected for no earlier than 2046, andpossibly as late as 2068. This means that a functional high-level repository may still be several decadesaway.Digital connectivity• Franco Accordino explained that the goal of the EU vision for connectivity in the digital ecosystem ai-med to have end-to-end integrated infrastructures and platforms as well as bundling connectivity withinnovative use-cases, providing a stimulus to EU digital supply, new business models, and ensuring thecompetitiveness of the EU supply. This vision also included EU digital sovereignty, trusted suppliers,post-quantum crypto, and backbone connectivity. It was also to serve as an instrument to combineEuropean and national public and private funds.• The EU Regulation 2021/1153 supports two main actions: 5G infrastructure deployment, including5G corridors and Smart Communities, and the development of pan-EU backbone infrastructures likeConnectivity for Digital Global Gateways (e.g., submarine cables). The EU aims to strengthen inter-nal connections and links to third countries, coordinating with various financial instruments and en-suring EU control over operations and technology (e.g., SMART cables). So far, 31 projects, includingthose in the Baltics, have received 311 million euros in funding.• He suggested that a White Paper had been created to address Europe’s digital infrastructure needs. Re-garding submarine cable infrastructure, it proposed strengthening research and innovation in new fi-bre and cable technologies, creating an EU governance system for these infrastructures, and harmoni-zing security requirements in international forums. The paper also discussed establishing a dedicatedEU certification scheme, a Delegated Act under the Connecting Europe Facility, and a review of avai-lable funding options, including the potential creation of an equity fund. The goal was to establish asystem to understand the resilience gaps in the EU.47 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• Franco Accordino noted the strategic importance of the cables, sometimes leading to quite a lot of compe -tition. It was vital to make these investments together with the private sector alongside interventions withthe public and also at the level of governance. He recommended post-quantum cryptography data; further -more, an expert group should be established and invitations sent to appoint member state representatives.• Franco Accordino explained that the cables are equipped with sensors for temperature, movement,and optical changes, enabling them to detect any disruptions autonomously. By integrating these sen-sors, a global network can be formed, transmitting data to various entities, including defence organi-sations. He emphasised that this approach must be coordinated within the G7 and NATO. While theprivate sector should continue to deploy these cables, regulations should ensure that cable operatorshave specific obligations to protect them.Cybersecurity• Andreas Noack said that cybersecurity ventures was expecting global cybercrime costs to grow by 15% per year over the next five years, reaching 10.5 trillion dollars annually by 2025. That made it moreprofitable than the global trade of all major illegal drugs combined. This had been the case since 2004,proving that cybercrime was a very important topic.• The positive aspect was that companies spent around 10 % to 20 % of their IT budget on security.However, cybersecurity budget growth was below cybercrime cost growth (15 %).• Andreas Noack summarised that present-day attackers ran very sophisticated cyber attacks that mighttake many years to reach their goal. In particular, he stressed that social engineering was a very power-ful attack vector. This meant that more security awareness was needed, along with support for opensource developers and considering social engineering in security monitoring tools.48 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupEmission-free power supply and storage• Thomas Luschtinetz highlighted the significant effort required for Germany to achieve the EU’s goalof 40 gigawatts of electrolysis by 2030. He pointed out that importing green hydrogen could greatlybenefit Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, potentially boosting jobs and economic value.• He also emphasized the need for better knowledge exchange with the industry and the creation oftransport infrastructure to effectively utilize hydrogen. Thomas Luschtinetz called on politicians to es-tablish the necessary legal framework and offer support to make this transition possible.Decarbonising Industrial Zones in the Baltic Sea Region• Gabriele Hoffmann presented the “GreenIndustrialAreas” project, which aims to decarbonise indust-rial activities in the Baltic Sea region to reduce CO2 emissions and decrease reliance on oil and gas im-ports. The project, involving partners from multiple Baltic states, seeks to certify green industrial zo-nes and provides a toolbox showcasing decarbonisation technologies. Key outcomes include buildingcapacities, developing certification guidelines, and establishing pilot sites. Dr. Hoffmann emphasizedthe project’s contribution to fostering peace and stability in Europe.Securing Offshore Wind Infrastructure• Henrich Quick, Head of Offshore at 50Hertz, discussed the security risks facing offshore wind infra-structure, highlighting vulnerabilities such as drone attacks. He stressed the need for resilient systemsand strong cross-border coordination, given the Baltic Sea’s strategic importance to NATO. Dr Quickproposed enhanced communication with authorities and suggested implementing concentrated de-fence points to protect critical infrastructureTransitioning to Hydrogen Energy• Professor Stephan Knabe from Deutsche ReGas outlined their current LNG terminal in Lubmin andplans for transitioning to hydrogen energy. This includes a large-scale hydrogen production facility po-wered by offshore and onshore renewable energy, with the aim of integrating hydrogen into the regi-onal energy grid. He underscored this initiative as part of Germany’s transition from nuclear to rene-wable energy.49 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupAdvancing Fusion Energy Research• Andreas Dinklage introduced the Wendelstein 7-X project at the Max-Planck-Institute for PlasmaPhysics in Greifswald, focusing on fusion energy research using stellarator technology. With signifi-cant progress in plasma confinement and discharge times, the Wendelstein 7-X represents a promisingstep toward fusion energy as a potential future energy source alongside renewables.Energy Transition and Innovation• Stefan Fassbinder, Mayor of Greifswald and World Mayor 2023, provided insights into Greifswald’srich historical legacy and its recent development as a hub for science and technology. He highlightedGreifswald’s efforts in energy transition, including initiatives for decarbonising district heating sys-tems, improving efficiency, and promoting combined heat and power systems. These local strategiesalign with broader regional goals for energy security and self-sustainability, contributing to CO2 re-ductions and supporting Greifswald’s role as a progressive, science-oriented city.International Policy Framework for Infrastructure Protection• Katrin Zschau, Chair of the Bundestag Committee on Climate Protection and Energy, addressed thecritical need for infrastructure protection in the Baltic Sea, especially considering the threat posed byRussian scouting activities. She called for a strong international policy framework and robust coope-ration between industry and environmental sectors to safeguard the region’s infrastructure and promo-te investor confidence.50 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group3.4 Meeting on 26-28 November 2024 in Bergen, Norway51 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupThe 4th meeting of the WG ESSRC took place in Bergen, Norway, from 24 to 26 November 2024. Themeeting focused on critical infrastructure protection, energy resilience, offshore wind security, and the se-curity implications of the Russian “shadow fleet” in the Baltic Sea. The discussions built on previous mee-tings, particularly the Greifswald session in May 2024, and included site visits, expert presentations, andpolicy recommendations. More detailed information can be found in the notes of the meeting.The PowerPoint presentations used at the meeting are linked (in bold under blue font) in the article aboutthe meeting on the BSPC website and can be downloaded from the link below:https://www.bspc.net/strengthening-energy-security-and-infrastructure-resilience-in-the-baltic-sea-region/1) Visit to Kollsnes Process PlantThe BSPC WG visited the Kollsnes Process Plant, a key facility in Norway‘s gas infrastructure. Site Ma-nager Bjarte Padøy provided an overview of the plant‘s role in European energy supply, its operational fra-mework, and future strategic goals. Kollsnes is operated by Gassco, with Equinor as the technical serviceprovider. It processes natural gas from the Norwegian continental shelf and exports it to European mar-kets. The plant has been in operation since 1996, and continuous upgrades have increased capacity andefficiency.Key T akeaways• Essential Role in European Gas Supply: Kollsnes delivers gas to approximately 18 million householdsin Europe daily. The facility has a processing capacity of up to 156 million standard cubic meters perday, nearly doubling its initial capacity of 80 million cubic meters when it began operations.• Strategic Infrastructure and Workforce: The Kollsnes plant employs around 350 Equinor staff, whileGassco serves as the system operator. In total, Equinor’s Norwegian operations include approximately1,600 offshore employees and 4,000 onshore staff. The facility comprises a gas processing plant, liquidseparators, and export compressors to ensure continuous gas flow.52 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• Security and Resilience Measures: In response to the Nord Stream sabotage and rising geopolitical ten-sions, Kollsnes has strengthened its security measures to guard against cyber and physical threats. TheNorwegian Navy and security services have intensified their monitoring of critical infrastructure.• Carbon Capture and Emission Reductions: The Northern Lights project, a major carbon capture andstorage (CCS) initiative, will begin operations in 2025. It will store liquefied CO2 in subsea reservoirs,contributing to Equinor‘s goal of reducing operational emissions by 50% by 2030.• Energy Strategy and Market Dynamics: Norway exports approximately 1,207 TWh of natural gas peryear, meeting up to 35% of the EU and UK‘s gas demand. The Kollsnes plant exports gas exclusivelyvia pipelines, without reliance on sea transport. Future investments focus on optimising gas producti-on while expanding into renewables, battery storage, and CCS technologies.• During discussions, Working Group members examined gas infrastructure vulnerabilities, Europe‘senergy independence, and long-term sustainability strategies. The visit offered valuable insights intoNorway‘s role in ensuring European energy stability amid evolving geopolitical dynamics.2) Visit to Eviny Renewable Energy CompanyThe BSPC WG visited Eviny, one of Norway’s largest renewable energy companies, where Senior AdviserPer Rune Henriksen provided insights into the company’s operations and Norway’s energy landscape. Evi-ny has been a key player in hydropower for over a century, with its first power station, built in 1927, stillin operation today. The company also plays a significant role in regional grid services, electric vehicle char-ging infrastructure, and offshore wind energy development.Rune Bratland, Head of HSE, Security, Emergency Preparedness, and Quality, outlined Norway’s powersupply governance structure, highlighting the roles of various authorities in energy security, crisis manage-ment, and emergency preparedness. The Power Supply Central Crisis Authority coordinates national res-ponses, ensuring resilience against potential threats, including hybrid attacks and cyber risks.Key T akeaways• Hydropower Dominance: Hydropower accounts for 89% of Norway‘s power production, with 1,240reservoirs holding more than 75% of Europe’s total capacity. Eviny owns 39 hydropower plants, gene-rating 7.7 TWh annually—enough to supply 480,000 households.53 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• Decentralised Grid Operations: Norway‘s regionalised energy system enhances resilience but requiresclose coordination among 85 different grid operators to balance supply and demand.• Energy Export and Grid Interconnections: Norway’s extensive cross-border energy links connect it toSweden, Denmark, Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands, securing regional energy supply but alsogenerating policy debates on electricity exports and price fluctuations.• Cyber and Security Challenges: Hybrid threats to energy infrastructure are increasing, with state ac-tors and organised crime potentially exploiting system vulnerabilities. Strict cybersecurity and closecooperation with law enforcement are necessary to mitigate risks.• Future of Hydrogen and Renewables: While Eviny is expanding into offshore wind and battery stora-ge, the high cost of hydrogen production currently limits its large-scale deployment. Future projectswill depend on economic feasibility and regulatory frameworks.• Discussions emphasised the importance of Norway‘s hydropower in ensuring energy security for theregion and the challenges of balancing market dynamics with national energy policy goals. The Wor-king Group gained valuable insights into how Norway integrates resilience, sustainability, and mar-ket-based principles in its energy strategy.3) Meeting with the Royal Norwegian NavyDuring the visit to the Royal Norwegian Navy, Commander Senior Grade Preben Ottesen provided in-sights into maritime security operations in the North and Baltic Seas, focusing on the protection of un-dersea infrastructure. The discussion addressed the growing security threats posed by Russian and Chine-se vessels, which are actively monitoring gas pipelines, communication cables, and offshore energy instal-lations. The Nord Stream sabotage in 2022 highlighted the vulnerabilities of critical energy infrastructureand underscored the urgent need for enhanced surveillance and response capabilities.Key T akeaways• Increased Naval Presence for Deterrence: Since the Nord Stream attacks, the Norwegian Navy has in-creased its patrols around key offshore energy installations to reassure energy workers and deter poten-tial sabotage. While 24/7 monitoring is no longer in place, strategic presence and rapid response ca-pabilities have been reinforced.54 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• Surveillance of Russian and Chinese Activities: Norwegian forces actively monitor Russian militaryand state-controlled research vessels, which frequently operate near critical infrastructure. Additional-ly, there is rising concern over Chinese ships, as recent incidents suggest their involvement in seafloormapping and potential espionage.• Challenges in International Waters: Under current international maritime law, no legal frameworkexists to intervene preemptively against suspicious activities in international waters. The lack of NA-TO-wide coordination further complicates the situation, as most responses are managed at the natio-nal level.• Maritime Security Network and Intel Sharing: The Navy collaborates with NATO allies, civilian in-dustry partners, and security agencies to strengthen information-sharing mechanisms. This includesjoint vessel monitoring, surveys of undersea cables, and real-time intelligence exchange with offshoreinfrastructure operators.• Need for Stronger Policy Coordination: The discussion emphasised the necessity of developing a coor-dinated international approach to maritime security threats, particularly through closer cooperationbetween naval forces, governments, and industry stakeholders.4) Session on the Russian “Shadow Fleet”The Working Group discussed the growing presence of Russian “shadow fleet” oil tankers in the BalticSea, focusing on their legal, environmental, and security implications. Professor Henrik Ringbom and DrAlexander Lott provided detailed insights into the challenges posed by these unregulated vessels, whichfrequently change ownership and flags to evade sanctions on Russian oil exports.Legal and Security ChallengesProfessor Ringbom outlined how these vessels exploit legal loopholes in international maritime law, ope-rating under flags of convenience with minimal oversight. He emphasised that the lack of clear enforce-ment mechanisms prevents effective action against them. Alexander Lott noted that while the EU has in-troduced stricter regulations, enforcement remains problematic due to flag-state reluctance and jurisdic-tional limitations in international waters.55 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• The 1857 Copenhagen Convention, guaranteeing freedom of navigation in the Danish Straits, was ci-ted as a legal barrier to imposing stricter controls on shadow fleet vessels.• The frequent renaming and re-registration of these ships make it difficult to enforce sanctions andtrack ownership structures.• Several Baltic Sea states are exploring coordinated responses, but a lack of harmonized legal frame-works complicates enforcement efforts.Environmental and Operational RisksThe aging condition of many shadow fleet vessels raises serious environmental and navigational safetyconcerns. Professor Ringbom warned that these ships often operate with outdated safety systems, posinga high risk of oil spills.• Many tankers disable their Automatic Identification System (AIS), making collisions and illegaldischarges harder to detect.• The Baltic Sea’s fragile ecosystem is particularly vulnerable to spills or chemical discharges from poor-ly maintained vessels.• Alexander Lott highlighted the absence of liability mechanisms, meaning that any environmental da-mage caused by these ships could go unpunished.Maritime Security and Intelligence RisksAlexander Lott raised concerns that some shadow fleet vessels may be engaged in intelligence gathering,mapping undersea energy and communication infrastructure. Professor Ringbom linked this issue to bro-ader hybrid threats, emphasizing that current international law does not adequately address state-led sa-botage in international waters.• The Nord Stream pipeline sabotage (2022) demonstrated the vulnerability of undersea infrastructure.• Experts called for stronger surveillance measures to detect and deter potential sabotage activities.56 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group• The Working Group discussed proposals for enhanced cooperation among Baltic Sea states to impro-ve monitoring and legal responses.Surveying Regional GovernmentsA significant outcome of the meeting was the decision to launch a survey targeting national and regionalgovernments in the Baltic Sea states. The survey, developed by the BSPC WG ESSRC, seeks to assess:1. Existing measures for monitoring shadow fleet activities and plans for enhancing maritime surveillance.2. Legal opinions and procedures in place to address undersea infrastructure sabotage.3. Gaps in current legal frameworks and potential initiatives for bridging these gaps.4. The feasibility of establishing regular high-level Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) meetings toaddress critical infrastructure protection.The survey aims to foster a coordinated response and will serve as a foundation for discussions at the nextworking group meeting in March 2025 in Stockholm.https://www.bspc.net/government-survey-of-the-bspc-wg-november-2024-10-dec-webversion/Looking AheadChairman Andris Kulbergs closed the meeting by emphasising the urgency of building resilience acrossthe Baltic Sea region. The WG ESSRC will continue addressing these critical challenges, ensuring the Bal-tic Sea remains a bastion of cooperation and sustainability.57 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group3.5 Meeting on 16-18 March 2025 in Stockholm, Sweden58 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupThe fifth meeting of the WG ESSRC took place in Stockholm, Sweden, from 16 to 18 March 2025. Itwas attended by 30 participants representing parliaments and institutions from the Åland Islands, the Bal-tic Assembly, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hamburg, Latvia, Lithuania, Mecklenburg-Vor-pommern, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Schleswig-Holstein. The meeting focused on advancing sustain-able and resilient land and maritime transport, safeguarding critical infrastructure, enhancing civil prepa-redness, and fostering interinstitutional cooperation in light of increasing geopolitical instability in theBaltic Sea region. The main conclusions of the meeting are summarised in this subchapter; however, moredetailed information can be found in the notes of the meeting.The PowerPoint presentations used at the meeting are linked (in bold under blue font) in the article aboutthe meeting on the BSPC website and can be downloaded from the link below:https://www.bspc.net/developing-sustainable-and-resilient-transport-and-energy-solutions-in-the-bal-tic-sea-region/Chairman of the Working Group, Andris Kulbergs, opened the meeting by underlining the urgency ofcloser coordination in view of the deteriorating security environment and repeated hybrid threats in theBaltic Sea. He reaffirmed the Working Group’s commitment to strengthening democratic resilience andupholding the rule of law and freedom of expression.Sustainable Transport Solutions and T echnological InnovationThe Working Group visited the KTH Royal Institute of Technology and received an introduction to theuniversity’s research profile. Professor Jonas Åkerman presented key findings of the “Sustainable T ransport2035” study, emphasising that short-distance land transport is rapidly shifting to electrification, while seaand air transport remain hard to decarbonise due to technical and cost barriers. He called for greater po-licy effort to manage demand and eliminate tax exemptions for fossil-based air travel.Professor Henrik Ernstson highlighted the ecological and geopolitical implications of dredging operationsin Baltic ports, urging a more integrated understanding of industrial expansion, environmental degrada-tion, and infrastructure development in light of NATO’s strategic expansion.59 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupProfessor Lina Bertling Tjernberg outlined how power grids must evolve to support the energy transition,combining local renewable generation, green hydrogen production, and potentially small modular nucle-ar reactors. She noted that resilient and decentralised grid architecture is crucial for regional self-sufficien-cy and crisis resistance.Electric Maritime Mobility and the Role of IndustryDuring a site visit to the electric boat company Candela, CEO Gustav Hasselskog introduced the de-velopment of hydrofoil-based, high-speed electric vessels. The P-12 shuttle, currently operating on Stock-holm’s commuter Route 89, offers 90% energy savings and a 97% reduction in carbon emissions per pas-senger kilometre. Hasselskog criticised the lack of EU regulatory incentives for non-fossil maritime trans-port, pointing out that maritime diesel is still tax-privileged compared to electricity. He called for reformsin procurement frameworks to enable broader deployment of clean waterborne mobility.The visit also underlined the regulatory challenges facing small electric vessels in Europe and the lack oftechnology-neutral public procurement rules in maritime transport. Participants discussed the potentialof electric waterborne mobility for peripheral communities around the Baltic Sea and the strategic rele-vance of regional manufacturing capacities.Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Maritime SecurityProfessor Hans Liwång of the Swedish Defence University and KTH warned that resilience in the under-water domain of the Baltic Sea is hampered by poor situational awareness, limited sensor reach, and frag-mented communication between infrastructure operators and national authorities. He called for a gene-rative culture of civil-military cooperation and emphasised that infrastructure diversity is key to counte-ring coordinated attacks. He supported the idea of establishing a Baltic Sea Maritime Security Coordina-tion Centre (BSMSCC) but cautioned that better baseline data and actionable information from the seaare prerequisites for its effectiveness.He argued that resilience depends not only on technical capabilities but on deeper societal preparednessand mutual trust between sectors. A key challenge remains the current legal ambiguity in reacting to hy-brid threats in international waters, which was discussed extensively during the meeting.60 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupFredrik Gustavsson, Deputy Head of Security at Svenska kraftnät, detailed Sweden’s efforts to protect thenational electricity transmission system from cyberattacks, physical sabotage, and supply chain dis-ruptions. He reported increased cooperation with the Swedish Navy and Coast Guard and called for re-dundancy and multi-operator diversity in cross-border energy links. He also announced the formation ofa civil defence repair force to support infrastructure restoration in crisis scenarios.Rebecka Bergholtz of the Swedish Energy Agency presented national long-term energy scenarios. All va-riants show sharp declines in fossil fuel use and rising electricity demand. Electrification of transport andheating, expansion of land-based wind power, and extended nuclear plant lifespans are central. Sheemphasised that resilience must be built into the energy transition by combining flexibility, redundancy,and decentralised systems. She also warned of declining investment confidence due to perceived politicalrisks around hydrogen infrastructure and energy system planning.She further stressed that resilience planning must account for wartime conditions, including prioritisati-on of critical energy users, secure communication infrastructure, and civil-military coordination. Theenergy transition must be designed in a way that strengthens—not undermines—national defence capa-bilities.Cooperation with Baltic Sea InstitutionsGustav Lindström, Director General of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), outlined current pri-orities of the CBSS in the areas of regional identity, security, and sustainability. He presented the ongoingstrategic review led by Toomas Hendrik Ilves and Gabrielius Landsbergis, which is expected to include re-commendations on deepening security-related cooperation.He underlined the importance of stronger involvement of regional actors in EU infrastructure and resili-ence strategies. Multilevel governance and cross-border cooperation were cited as indispensable for facingthe emerging risks in the Baltic Sea.Tomas Mörtsell, President of the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR) Baltic SeaCommission, presented the Commission’s vision for a connected, climate-resilient, and competitive Bal-tic Sea region. He called for EU cohesion policy to be better tailored to regional realities and for the rein-forcement of critical undersea infrastructure as part of the EU Port Strategy and Ocean Pact.61 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupSummary of the key points from the Expert Presentations• T ransport: Electrification is progressing in land transport, but maritime and aviation sectors remaindifficult to decarbonise. Regulatory reform and demand-side management are essential.• Maritime innovation: Electric hydrofoil ferries offer transformative potential for sustainable waterbor-ne transport, but EU policy lags behind technological advances.• Infrastructure resilience: Interconnected, diversified, and decentralised energy systems are critical tocountering hybrid threats. Greater data sharing and civil-military coordination are needed.• Cyber and physical threats: TSOs and operators face persistent cyberattacks and physical risks. Civilpreparedness measures, including strategic reserves and rapid repair capabilities, are being developed.• Strategic interconnectivity: Investment in grid redundancy and cross-border interconnections mustaccelerate to avoid single-point failures.• Governance: Regional and multilevel governance institutions (CBSS, CPMR) should be empoweredto promote cooperative responses to infrastructure security and energy transition challenges.• Legal frameworks: Participants stressed the need to clarify and modernise international maritime lawto enable effective preventive action against hybrid threats and protect undersea infrastructure.• Societal resilience: Experts and delegates underlined the role of civil society and local actors in contri-buting to security and preparedness. Engaging municipalities and infrastructure operators in strategicplanning is essential.The Working Group agreed on a set of five draft recommendations covering maritime domain awareness,hybrid threat response, action against the Russian shadow fleet, infrastructure resilience, and NATO-EUcoordination.62 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working Group3.6 Meeting on 18-20 May 2025 in Tallinn, Estonia63 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupThe sixth and concluding meeting of the BSPC WG ESSRC was held from 18 to 20 May 2025 in Tal-linn, Estonia. Over 30 participants from Åland, the Baltic Assembly, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ham-burg, Latvia, Lithuania, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Schleswig-Holsteinconvened to examine regional strategies for maritime and cyber resilience, secure digital infrastructure,and energy system preparedness. The meeting featured high-level expert contributions and study visits tokey national and NATO institutions in Estonia.Operation of the shadow fleet and the geopolitical implicationsThe meeting opened with a visit to the Seaplane Harbour, where security expert Raivo Vare outlined thecurrent economic and military situation in the Russian Federation. He highlighted that Russia continuesto finance its war through revenues from commodities, supported by the operations of the shadow fleet,including ageing and underinsured tankers in the Gulf of Finland. This poses significant security, legal,and environmental challenges to the Baltic Sea region.Digital Governance and Cyber ResilienceThe Working Group then visited the e-Estonia Briefing Centre, where Digital T ransformation Adviser Jo-hanna-Kadri Kuusk presented Estonia’s model of decentralised digital governance. Estonia’s digital ser-vices are now almost entirely automated and accessible online. The national electronic ID system and theX-Road platform facilitate secure data exchange and empower citizens. Estonia also hosts leading cyber-security institutions and exercises, including the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellen-ce (CCDCOE) and the “Locked Shields” cyber defence simulation, which was described in detail by MsAngelica Tikk, Head of International Relations at the CCDCOE. Estonia’s experience underlines the clo-se interlinkage between public trust, cybersecurity, and digital service resilience.64 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupCyber Defence Architecture and CapabilitiesA key theme of the meeting was maritime infrastructure protection. During a visit to the Estonian Navy,Deputy Commander Johan-Elias Seljamaa described the challenges of securing the maritime domain andcritical underwater infrastructure. He reported that Estonia’s undersea electricity cable EstLink 1 hadrecently been damaged by a commercial vessel, leading to a prolonged monitoring operation. Over 5,600ships were visually inspected, and more than 4,000 were identified, illustrating the scale of monitoring ef-forts required. A new NATO operation, “Baltic Sentry”, was launched in response to these incidents.Cyber Range T echnology and SimulationAt the cyber defence and training centre CR14, the delegation was introduced to Estonia’s cyber range in-frastructure by Mr Martin Hanson. The cyber range supports exercises and scenario simulations in defen-ce, industry, and critical infrastructure protection – including domains such as space technology andAI-enabled attacks. Dr Tarmo Korõtko of Tallinn University of Technology explained how resilience en-gineering and digital twin technologies could enable earlier detection of adverse conditions, simulatecascading failures, and improve crisis management across electricity and heat systems. The main conclu-sions of the meeting are summarised in this subchapter; however, more detailed information can be foundin the notes of the meeting.Protection of Maritime Infrastructure, and Domain AwarenessMr Johan-Elias Seljamaa, Estonian Navy discussed the complexity of maritime surveillance in the BalticSea, described Estonia’s patrolling of the EstLink 1 cable, and outlined the functions and challenges facingthe Estonian Navy in maritime domain protection and international legal enforcement.Resilience of Critical Infrastructure and Legal CoordinationAt the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), several speakers analysed the legal and stra-tegic shortcomings in protecting undersea infrastructure. Dr Tomas Jermalavičius and Mr Henrik Prakspointed out that hybrid attacks in the Baltic Sea remain difficult to attribute and respond to, partly dueto legal gaps in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and inconsistent nationalpractices. They called for a regional harmonisation task force and stronger legal interoperability. A BalticSea code of practice and resilience fund were proposed as concrete steps to close the implementation gap.65 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupInternational Legal Framework and Strategic CoordinationKristi Land, Director General at the Estonian Foreign Ministry’s Legal Department, added that whileamending UNCLOS was unrealistic, Baltic Sea states could pursue joint legal interpretations, develop anon-binding regional framework for behaviour at sea, and reform national laws to enable stronger en-forcement. Estonia has already updated its legislation to give the navy more powers and criminalise infra-structure sabotage. Participants agreed that a regional initiative was needed to support joint surveillance,early warning, and shared maritime security protocols.Resilience of Electricity Grids after SynchronisationFurther discussion focused on electricity grid synchronisation and market resilience. Mr Andrus Durejko,CEO of Eesti Energia, reported on the challenges following the February 2025 synchronisation of theBaltic States with the continental European grid. While the technical transition was successful, Estonia isnow experiencing high system balancing costs due to a lack of dispatchable generation and insufficientfrequency reserves. Balancing prices have increased significantly, leading to higher electricity prices forconsumers. Estonia’s system currently depends on fossil-based reserves and test-scale batteries. There is anurgent need for new fast-reacting, gas-based generation and more grid-friendly market structures.Wartime Energy Resilience and Lessons from UkrainePermanent Secretary of the Estonian Ministry of Defence, Mr Kaimo Kuusk, delivered a vivid account ofhow fuel shortages and air attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure exposed systemic weaknesses duringwartime. He underlined the importance of grid redundancy, regional interconnections, and protected in-frastructure. Investments in resilience – from shelters to stockpiles – must be made before a crisis occurs.His message was clear: prepare early, or pay dearly later.The presentations of the meeting are available here (in bold under blue font):https://www.bspc.net/news/enhancing-maritime-cybersecurity-and-energy-grid-resilience-in-the-bal-tic-sea-region66 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupSummary of the key points from the Expert Presentations• Shadow fleet and maritime security: Russian shadow fleet activity poses persistent legal, environmen-tal, and security threats. Surveillance and legal coordination are still insufficient.• Digitalisation and cybersecurity: Estonia’s model shows the potential of decentralised, citizen-centricgovernance with strong cybersecurity backing. Interoperable digital infrastructure is key.• Maritime domain awareness: Constant monitoring and clear legal mandates are essential to deter sa-botage. Existing patrol and identification systems must be scaled and coordinated regionally.• International legal frameworks: While UNCLOS amendment is not feasible, coordinated interpreta-tions and harmonised national laws can bridge legal gaps in responding to hybrid threats.• Electricity market resilience: Grid synchronisation has created new balancing costs and market insta-bilities. Dispatchable generation and frequency containment assets are urgently needed.• Cyber defence readiness: NATO and Estonian cyber defence initiatives (e.g. Locked Shields) show thevalue of regular, scenario-based cyber exercises and private-public-military cooperation.• AI and system resilience: Digital twins, scenario simulations and AI-enhanced early detection are pro-mising tools for improving infrastructure resilience.• Lessons from Ukraine: Robust civil protection infrastructure, rapid repair capability, and interconnec-tion with allies are essential to withstand energy warfare.• Policy recommendation: Governments should establish legal frameworks and mandates for testing,invest in scalable monitoring, and synchronise their maritime and energy resilience efforts.During the final meeting, the WG also held an in-depth discussion of the proposed Calls for Action tothe governments to be included in this year’s Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference Resolution. The groupunanimously endorsed the recommendations as presented in this final report.67 3. Main Conclusions after the Meetings of the Working GroupIn conclusion, Chairman Andris Kulbergs thanked all delegates, experts, and the secretariat for their sus-tained commitment. Reflecting on the significant achievements in the recent past, he emphasised the ur-gency posed by cyber threats and highlighted the necessity for swift, coordinated governmental action. Hesummarised the Tallinn meeting as a final call to action. He stressed that the tools for coordination alrea-dy exist but require stronger political will, harmonised national legislation, and synchronised implemen-tation. A shared roadmap, regional legal interoperability, and increased maritime domain awareness mustnow follow.OutlookThe Tallinn meeting marked the conclusion of the BSPC Working Group’s series of sessions across the re-gion. Chairman Kulbergs reiterated that energy, digital, and transport systems must be made resilientagainst physical, hybrid and cyber threats. He called for a comprehensive regional strategy, closely coordi-nated with national efforts and embedded in EU and NATO legal frameworks. The Working Group re-solved to finalise its work and to present its conclusions and recommendations to the 34th Baltic Sea Par-liamentary Conference in Mariehamn in August 2025.68 4. Political Recommendations4. Political Recommendations4.1 Recommendations of the BSPC Working Group to the 33rd BSPCResolutionBased on the expert presentations, discussions and results of the first two meetings mentioned before, theBSPC Working Group developed and discussed in its meeting in Greifswald on 28 May 2024 and an ad-ditional digital meeting on 3 June 2024 the following political recommendations and unanimously agreedto propose including them in the 33rd BSPC resolution; the input to its third meeting in Greifswald wasdiscussed and considered for the final report of the working group and the 34th resolution:Regarding energy security and self-sustainability to• given the current geopolitical challenges, prioritise and support projects aimed at improving energy se-curity in the Baltic Sea region;• while building new or transforming the already existing energy infrastructure, take strongly into ac-count the regional needs, resilience considerations, and sustainability goals;• facilitate more interconnections in the Baltic Sea region;• unite in a regional political initiative for common interconnections and strongly involve the EU Fundsin order to succeed in the development of a regional renewable energy market;• regularly exchange experience and best practices concerning the implementation of onshore andoffshore wind projects in the Baltic Sea region;69 4. Political RecommendationsRegarding resilience and interconnectivity toDefence• agree on a coordinated approach to address the lack of information exchange, threat control centres,threat mitigation policy as well as effective communication against the spread of targeted fake newsand propaganda, considering multiple recent and potential hybrid threats towards critical energy andcommunication infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region;• commit to realising the potential of the Baltic Sea region to become an integrated NATO defence areawith strong regional cooperation in coastal, maritime, and air defence;• pay particular attention to raising situational awareness and increasing societal resilience to respond tohybrid threats in the Baltic Sea region;Transport• increase the funding for improving infrastructure and start discussions on a new strategy to enhancemilitary mobility capabilities and civil transport in the region;• develop and execute plans to further improve maritime and railway transport connectivity in the Baltic Sea region;• significantly improve coordination of activities and regular cooperation of the democratic Baltic Seacountries in protecting maritime infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region;• create a plan for addressing shipping insurance challenges in the region that can disrupt trade routes,leading to delays and increased costs for businesses;Digital connectivity• commence negotiations between the democratic Baltic Sea countries on enhancing cooperation in thearea of cybersecurity;• develop incentives and support for strengthening underwater communication infrastructure in theBaltic Sea, including expanding connections and ensuring the resilience of the existing ones;70 4. Political Recommendations• cooperate and exchange practices on increasing universal coverage and service for Internet connectivi-ty in the Baltic Sea region;Cross-border projects• raise awareness and search for solutions to facilitate the implementation of large-scale cross-borderprojects of regional importance;• coordinate cooperation to rapidly stimulate the installation of needed computing capacity in the Bal-tic Sea region, in light of the rapid development of AI software and services demanding green and suf-ficient energy as well as abundant computing power; in this regard, the Baltic Sea renewable energymarket growth and interconnectivity development are to serve as a basis for supercomputer imple-mentation and usage.4.2 Recommendations of the BSPC Working Group to the 34th BSPCResolution1. Develop a comprehensive, well-coordinated strategy:• Further develop a detailed, region-wide strategic framework to enhance the resilience of energy sup-plies, transportation and communications networks. This strategy should integrate threat-specific re-silience planning and align with both national initiatives and existing EU/NATO frameworks for pro-tecting critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region.2. Centralise responsibilities across the Baltic Sea region:• Promote a centralised coordination mechanism within the Baltic Sea region to address maritime thre-ats proactively. This mechanism would focus on early threat detection, rapid response, and preventionof criminal activities, drawing on existing cross-national cooperation frameworks and aiming for alig-nment with NATO initiatives.71 4. Political Recommendations3. Establish a standing Baltic Naval Force:• Encourage actions regarding a collaborative maritime security unit, modelled after successful NATOand EU initiatives, to protect vital sea lines of communication. This unit would operate with memberstates’ naval contributions and focus on safeguarding critical maritime routes.4. Digital Real-Time Connectivity - Jointly fund and sustain open-source technology:• Initiate a funding initiative focused on securing and advancing open-source digital infrastructure es-sential to the Baltic Sea region’s connectivity and resilience. This could include setting up a regionalfund to sustain and protect shared digital tools critical to maintaining cybersecurity and informationintegrity.5. Strengthening Maritime Domain Awareness in the Baltic Sea• Establish a permanent Baltic Sea Maritime Security Coordination Centre (BSMSCC) to enhance si-tuational awareness, coordinate intelligence-sharing, and improve the monitoring of hybrid threats.• Advocate for real-time data-sharing agreements between Baltic Sea states, linking naval forces, coastguards, and infrastructure operators.• Develop and use automated monitoring systems, including satellite surveillance, AI-powered anoma-ly detection, and sonar-based detection of underwater activities.6. Framework for Preventing and Responding to Hybrid Attacks on Critical Infrastructure• Establish a common legal framework among democratic Baltic Sea states to criminalise intentionaldisruptions to critical subsea infrastructure, ensuring sanctions and legal accountability.• Develop a joint operational protocol for responding to sabotage and hybrid attacks, including mili-tary, law enforcement, and emergency response coordination.• Advocate for a Baltic Sea Rapid Response Mechanism (BSRRM) to ensure that joint naval and coastguard teams can react to suspected sabotage within hours.72 4. Political Recommendations7. Coordinated Action Against the Russian and other Shadow Fleets• Expand the EU sanctions list to include logistics providers, insurers, and flag states facilitating Russi-an and other shadow fleet operations.• Require port inspections and tracking of Russian-linked tankers to ensure full transparency of cargoand destinations.• Establish a Baltic Sea’ No-Go Zone’ for uninsured tankers to mitigate environmental and security ris-ks.• Develop a joint Baltic Sea position with IMO and EU institutions to create legal pathways for enfor-cing sanctions in international waters.8. Resilience and Redundancy of Energy and Communication Networks• Establish a Baltic Sea Critical Infrastructure Resilience Fund, co-financed by EU and regional gover-nments, to upgrade energy and communication networks.• Invest in strengthening fibre-optic and power grid interconnections between democratic Baltic Seastates.• Strengthen cyber resilience and intrusion detection systems for all undersea infrastructure.9. Strengthening NATO and EU Coordination on Baltic Sea Security• Support and reinforce NATO’s existing maritime security operations in the Baltic Sea, including Ope-ration Baltic Sentry and the Commander Task Force Baltic (CTF Baltic) Headquarters in Rostock, toensure the continued protection of undersea infrastructure and trade routes.• Advocate for the institutionalisation of a long-term NATO maritime security mission in the BalticSea, building upon existing frameworks to create a structured and permanent regional security presen-ce focused on deterring hybrid threats.73 4. Political Recommendations• Enhance EU-NATO cooperation by integrating NATO maritime security efforts with:o The EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects on maritime security.o The European Maritime Safety Agency’s (EMSA) initiatives to strengthen surveillance and res-ponse to hybrid threats.o The EU’s Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and European Defence Fund (EDF) to improveenergy and communication infrastructure resilience.• Expand joint NATO-EU exercises, with a specific focus on protecting offshore wind farms, pipelines,undersea cables, and critical coastal infrastructure, ensuring the integration of hybrid threat scenariosin regional military planning.• Strengthen political and parliamentary engagement by ensuring parliamentary participation in NATOand EU security discussions related to maritime security, hybrid threats, and critical infrastructureprotection.• Ensure BSPC participation in relevant NATO and EU security discussions.10. Research in the field of sustainability, energy and transport innovationContinue support for research in long-term energy solutions and innovative maritime mobility.11. Establishment of Regional Repair Capabilities for Critical Maritime Infrastructure (WG)• Develop a coordinated Baltic Sea mechanism to repair damaged undersea infrastructure rapidly.• Provide shared storage of essential spare parts and tools, and deploy multipurpose repair vessels.• Ensure joint contingency protocols and shared technical standards for cross-border interventions.74 4. Political Recommendations12. Creation of a Baltic Sea Infrastructure Resilience Forum for Cross-Sectoral Exchange (WG)• Establish a standing Baltic Sea Infrastructure Resilience Forum to bring together public authorities,private operators, research institutions, and civil protection actors.• Facilitate best-practice exchange on infrastructure resilience and emergency risk management acrosssectors.• Include regular simulation-based training for resilience to hybrid and climate-induced disruptions.13. Development of a Baltic Sea Cyber Crisis Simulation Framework (WG)• Establish a recurring, multinational cyber crisis simulation framework focused on critical maritime in-frastructure in the Baltic Sea Region.• Engage public institutions (defence, energy, coast guard) and private stakeholders (grid operators, ma-ritime companies).• Utilise digital twins and scenario planning tools to create joint standard operating procedures.14. Promotion of Multi-Use Design Standards for Critical Infrastructure (WG)• Introduce Baltic-wide technical guidelines and planning incentives for the multi-use design of infra-structure assets.• Promote cross-functionality of infrastructure (e.g., fibre-optic + power cables, transport + data corri-dors).• Incentivise public-private innovation projects on dual-purpose infrastructure.15. Enhancing Digital Resilience in Rural and Peripheral Areas of the Baltic Sea Region (WG)• Launch dedicated EU and national programmes to upgrade digital infrastructure in rural and islandregions.75 4. Political Recommendations• Expand secure satellite and underwater connectivity (e.g. LoRaWAN, redundant cabling, 5G/6Gbackbones).• Prioritise the implementation of the CISE platform in peripheries and promote transnational connec-tivity resilience.16. Integration of Environmental Risk into Maritime Security Strategy (WG)• Mandate environmental risk assessments (e.g. oil spills, dredging impact, noise) as part of Baltic Seamaritime security planning.• Incorporate environmental risk indicators into hybrid threat monitoring.• Promote the development of dual-use detection technologies for both environmental and security in-cidents.76 5. Intergovernmental Survey5. Intergovernmental Survey5.1 Responses to the BSPC Working Group survey about the areas of interestfor the respective parliamentariansIn Spring 2024, the BSPC Working Group sent out a survey with several questions about the areas of in-terest for the respective parliamentarians. The summary of the answers received until June 2024 is com-piled in this chapter. The answers in full are available on the BSPC homepage under the link:https://www.bspc.net/government-statements-on-energy-security-in-the-democratic-baltic-sea-region/1) What are the national and regional long-term energy consumption projections and energy pro-duction plans?Country AnswerEstoniaEstonia will analyse the system requirements and launch a call in order to contract 150-400 MW of dispatchable energy forthe balancing reserve by 2028. From the beginning of 2025, Estonia will open additional capacity markets for balancingreserves and aFRR (automatic Frequency Restoration Reserve) and FCR (Frequency Containment Reserve) energy markets(this need is due to the desynchronisation from BRELL and synchronization to the Continental-Europe network). As theBaltics forms one load-frequency containment block (LFC block), the reserve need will be addressed and kept jointly in theBaltic area.FinlandThe latest energy projections are being modelled in a project that will end in June 2024. They are based on existing policymeasures as additional measures are still being prepared for modelling work.GermanyBy 2030, at least 80 % of gross electricity consumption in Germany is to come from renewable energies. The expansion pathsfor wind and solar energy will be significantly increased: The expansion target for offshore wind energy will increase to at least30 gigawatts (GW) by 2030, to at least 40 GW by 2035 and to at least 70 GW by 2045. For onshore wind energy, 10 GWof installed capacity is to be added each year to reach a total of 115 GW by 2030 and 160 GW from 2040, and 22 GW peryear for solar installations to reach a total of around 215 GW by 2030 and 400 GW by 2040.HamburgHamburg’s total energy consumption is set to decrease gradually until 2045 by about 25.6 % from 50.8 TWh per annum in2020. Fossil fuel consumption, most notably conventional gas as well as petrol and diesel, is projected to decrease to nearlyzero in 2045, with part of that reduction achieved through efficiency gains and another part through a shift to renewable orcarbon-free energy sources. The energy shift will lead to a rise in electricity consumption, set to be decarbonised nationwideby 2035, district heating, biomass, hydrogen for industry and heavy-duty transport as well as e-fuels. In absolute terms, thelargest increases are expected in hydrogen and e-fuel consumption.77 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerLatvia Regarding plans for energy production, the long-term development plan of the joint-stock company “Latvenergo” envisagesthe installation of renewable energy resources generating a capacity of 600 MW by 2026 and 2300 MW by 2030. At the sametime, work is being done on strengthening the infrastructure (reinforcing the capacity of the electricity transmission anddistribution network, construction of interconnections).LithuaniaThe National Energy Independence Strategy 2050 (NEIS 2050) foresees that Lithuania will become a self-sufficient energycountry by 2050 with a climate-neutral energy industry that generates significant added value. Most of Lithuania’s consumedenergy will be generated by onshore and offshore wind and solar power plants. Electricity will become the main primaryenergy source in the overall energy system and is expected to be used to a large extent in other sectors. Final energy demandfor all users is projected at 88 TWh in 2030, 81 TWh in 2040, and 75 TWh in 2050. Electricity generation is estimated at25 TWh in 2030, 54 TWh in 2040, and 74 TWh in 2050. The share of RES will be 55 % in 2030, 85 % in 2040, and 95 %in 2050.Mecklenburg-VorpommernPrimary energy consumption (PEC) in Germany is currently around 13,200 PJ (petajoules) per year. The forecast for 2030 isaround 11,100 PJ and around 9,700 PJ for 2040. The PEC in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is around 170 PJ per year. Differentforecasts for the years starting from 2030 fluctuate at +/- 15 to 20 %.SwedenThe government sees increased electrification of society as necessary and believes at present that Sweden should plan to be ina position to meet electricity requirements of at least 300 TWh in 2045 (proposal in the government’s energy bill of 2024).In the Swedish Energy Agency’s scenario Högre elektrifiering (“Higher Electrification”) up to 2050, with 2045 as an interimyear, electricity use is expected to amount to more than 300 TWh in 2045 and approximately 350 TWh in 2050. The totalenergy supply in 2050 is expected to be 470–643 TWh depending on the scenario, compared with 509 TWh in 2020.Schleswig-HolsteinThe government of Schleswig-Holstein generally supports these goals und has no quantitative goals of their own in the fieldof energy efficiency. In the field of energy production, Schleswig-Holstein pursues the following goals: 1) expansion ofelectricity generation from renewable energies to at least 40-45 TWh until 2030. This means that the electricity generationfrom renewable energies will be three times higher than the current electricity consumption in Schleswig-Holstein; 2) reaching37-50 % as the share of heat from renewable energy sources in the final energy consumption as heat.2) What are the plans of the governments regarding developing new energy interconnections?Country AnswerEstoniaNew EE-FI interconnection in 2035->Estlink3 with the capacity of 700 MW. New EE-LV connection EstLat4 by 2033 withthe capacity of 1000 MW, and as it will cross our biggest island, Saaremaa, this enables offshore wind parks to better connectto the grid.FinlandFinnish electricity transmission system operator (TSO) Fingrid published in autumn 2023 its main grid development plan for2024-2033. A new interconnection from Northern Finland to Northern Sweden (Aurora line 1) is under construction andwill be completed in 2025. A new cross-border line to Sweden, known as Aurora Line 2, is also planned for 2032. Fingrid andElering are currently initiating a study to gain greater insight into the profitability and timing of the EstLink 3 connection.There are no plans for cross-border gas pipelines.78 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerGermanyInterconnectors that are currently in the planning or construction phase include: Klixbüll–Endrup (with Denmark),Bornholm Energy Island (with Denmark), North Sea Wind Power Hub (with Denmark and Netherlands), Emden/Ost-Eemshaven (with Netherlands), Altheim–St Peter/Pleinting–St Peter (with Austria), Neu-Ravensburg–Österreich (withAustria), Vöhringen–Westtirol (with Austria), Dahlem–Gramme (Belgium), Aach–Bofferdange (with Luxembourg),Eichstetten–Muhlbach (with France), Uchtelfangen-Ensdorf-Vigy (with France), Hansa Power Bridge I + II (with Sweden),Eisenhüttenstadt-Baczyna (with Poland), NeuConnect (with UK), Waldshut-Tiengen-Beznau (with Switzerland), Böblingen–Mettlen (with Switzerland).HamburgHamburg is well integrated into the national grids for power and natural gas. Hamburg strongly supports a new hydrogenconnection to Denmark (Hyperlink III). The realisation depends on the national plan for grid development, which will becompleted within a few years.Latvia The development of the following interconnections is planned by the Latvian government: 1) The Tsirgulin (EE)–Valmiera(LV) 330kV interconnection project is being implemented and will be completed in 2025; 2) Work continues on the Balticoffshore grid initiative (BOGI), promoting the development of offshore wind farms. The following projects are planned to bedeveloped within BOGI: 3) The Latvian-Swedish interconnection (LaSGo Link) is being developed to increase grid capacityto Gotland; 4) The fourth Estonian-Latvian interconnection (ELWIND), a joint Estonian-Latvian state-run cross-borderoffshore wind project; 5) Baltic-German interconnection (BalticWind Connector).LithuaniaLithuania continues working on a cross-border electricity interconnection capacity increase between Lithuania and Poland.The current Lithuanian-Polish interconnector “LitPol Link” ensures a 500-MW transmission capacity. The previously plannednew 700 MW Lithuanian-Polish undersea interconnection “Harmony link” is currently undergoing a new examination byLithuanian and Polish TSOs. The possibility of increasing the current Lithuanian-Latvian 950-MW cross-border electricitytransmission capacity is being evaluated by Lithuanian and Latvian TSOs. Lithuania will evaluate the possibility of thedevelopment of additional electricity interconnections with Central Europe.Mecklenburg-VorpommernBornholm Energy Island: On the Danish Island of Bornholm in the Baltic Sea, at least 3 GW of offshore wind powergeneration capacity is to be connected on Danish territory by the early 2030s. The electricity is then to be transported toGermany (2 GW) and the Danish mainland (1.2 GW) via new grid connections. In addition, the national networkdevelopment plans are instruments of German energy policy planning the long-term development of the network infrastructurefor electricity, gas, and hydrogen.SwedenThe Swedish electricity network is closely physically connected not only to the electricity networks in other Nordic countriesbut also has electricity connections with Germany, Poland, and the Baltic countries. However, the Government wants thereto be a pause in the expansion of exposed electricity cables (for example Hans Powerbridge) until the price differences betweenprice areas in Sweden have considerably decreased.Schleswig-Holstein380kV-high voltage power line Klixbüll–Endrup: The new interconnector is being built between Klixbüll (North of Schleswig-Holstein) and Endrup (Jutland/Denmark); planned start of operation: Q1/2025; West Coast Line: new interconnector toGermany (energinet.dk)79 5. Intergovernmental Survey3) How does your country or region plan to ensure the balancing of power systems in the longterm? What are the plans for balancing renewable sources of energy?Country AnswerEstoniaFrom the beginning of 2025, Estonia will open additional capacity markets for balancing reserves and aFRR (automaticFrequency Restoration Reserve) and FCR (Frequency Containment Reserve) energy markets (this need is due to thedesynchronization from BRELL and synchronization to Continental-Europe network). As the Baltics forms one load-frequency containment block (LFC block), the reserve need will be addressed and kept jointly in the Baltic area.FinlandThere is a need to develop the flexibility of the electricity system. Flexibility can be increased through flexible generation,demand response, energy storages, and electricity interconnections. Fossil fuel-based condensing power plants in Finland havebeen shut down (the last coal condensing power plant, Meripori, now serves as a “crises reserve” for the National EmergencySupply Agency). There have been huge investments in onshore wind power. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employmentwill set up a working group to study the issue.GermanyIn order to ensure a secure and cost-effective supply of electricity while at the same time integrating increasing shares ofrenewable energies into the electricity system, the large market area makes it possible to utilise geographical balancing effectsin generation and consumption. The high level of liquidity in the electricity market helps to bring supply and demandtogether flexibly and efficiently, even with fluctuating electricity generation from renewable energies. As part of the Platformfor a Climate-Neutral Electricity System (PKNS), an options paper on the use of flexibility options for balancing the systembalance is being developed as a basis for political decision-making.HamburgThe main tools for balancing renewable sources of energy are implemented on the national level. The energy company“Hamburger Energiewerke”, owned by the City of Hamburg, is acting within this framework. It develops flexibilitytechnologies like flexible power generation or power to heat.Latvia Since 1 January 2018, Baltic TSOs have been operating a common model for the balancing of power systems of the threecountries. To accommodate this, the common Baltic coordinated balancing area was introduced along with establishing thecommon Baltic balancing market for exchange of balancing energy in the form of frequency restoration reserves with manualactivation (hereinafter mFRR). The existing Baltic balancing model and balancing energy market will be changed once BalticTSOs will join the common European platform for the exchange of mFRR energy (Manually Activated Reserve Initiative -MARI), planned for July 2024. The main change to the Baltic balancing model when joining MARI platform will be theintroduction of separate balance control for each control area (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and moving to a 15-minutebalancing market time unit with respective changes in mFRR energy products as well as processes.LithuaniaFlexibility needs in the electricity sector will be met by preserving the existing capacity of natural gas power plants, increasingthe capacity of the Kruonis Pumped Storage Plant, 1.5-GW battery storage power stations, cross-border electricityinterconnections, and more flexible electricity consumption in industry and other sectors. In 2050, electricity storage inLithuania’s energy system will be provided by a 1-GW pumped storage plant and 4 GW of electricity storage facilities. Bothtypes of energy storage will be able to store up to 17.5 GWh of energy.80 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerMecklenburg-VorpommernA wide variety of technologies is available for balancing renewable energies. In addition to storage in the electricity sector(batteries), renewable electricity can also be transferred to other sectors (sector coupling), for example by using it to generateheat and power electric cars or by converting it into alternative fuels such as hydrogen or methane. The state government istherefore working hard to significantly improve the economic framework conditions for sector coupling technologies. One ofits most important goals is to utilise as much of the clean energy generated in the federal state as possible. All of thesetechnologies will (have to) be used in a balanced mix in order to achieve the goals of the energy transition.SwedenIn order to maintain a high security of supply, a new balancing model is being developed which should remain secure in thefuture and cover the entire Nordic region. Work is being done within a joint Nordic project, the Nordic Balancing Model(NBM), together with Nordic TSOs (T ransmission System Operators). The purpose of the NBM is to provide a balance thatwill maintain security in future and that will provide for energy transition while at the same time being adapted to commonEuropean legislation and the internal market for electricity.Schleswig-HolsteinFlexibility in the electricity market is essential to balance energy systems in the long term. In addition to electrolysers andbattery storage systems, these include flexible power plants. According to a new power plant strategy of the Germangovernment, new power plant capacities of up to 4 x 2.5 GW are to be put out to tender as H2-ready gas-fired power plantsin the short term. These are to switch completely to hydrogen between 2035 and 2040 from a switchover date to be set in2032. The current German electricity market design provides too few incentives for the use of flexibility. In addition to thereorganisation of levies and surcharges on electricity, the aim will also be to make electricity prices more flexible and offerappropriate tariffs.4) What cross-border energy projects are being implemented or are planned to be developed inyour country or region?Country AnswerEstoniaAs per the pan-TSO ten-year network development plan (TYNDP), Estonia is involved in developing the third EE-FI andfourth EE-LV electricity interconnector. In addition, pre-feasibility studies are scheduled for a direct EE-DE maritime cableand for a section of the European Hydrogen Backbone connecting the Nordics to Germany via the Baltic States.81 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerFinlandGermanyCurrent overview of hybrid offshore projects currently being planned, discussed or realised in Germany. The FederalGovernment supports the development of cross-border projects for the expansion and decarbonisation of district heating andcooling systems. In 2024, an application for funding for the project “Unified Network for Innovative T ransition in EnergyDecarbonisation of HEATing - UNITED HEAT” was supported as part of the Connecting Europe Facility. The cross-borderproject aims to connect the district heating networks of the cities of Görlitz (DEU) and Zgorzelec (POL). Further projects arebeing realised or planned in Strasbourg/Kehl and Frankfurt/Oder/Slubice.HamburgHamburg aims to become a major hub for the import and use of hydrogen. With the third largest port in Europe, Hamburgis well suited to function as one of the most important distribution centres for green hydrogen and its derivatives in Europe.Additionally, the port of Hamburg is one of the largest industrial areas within Germany and thus hosts numerous energy-intensive companies. Hydrogen landed here would in part also be used here. Against this backdrop, Hamburg will contributeto the national start grid, by building parts of it and connecting various users in the commodity industry. Part of this effort isthe development of harbour capacity for the import of hydrogen.Latvia The Estonian-Latvian joint hybrid offshore wind project – ELWIND – and the Latvia-Estonia Cross-Border ULP-RESOnshore Wind Park Development – ULP-RES WP – developed by Utilitas Wind SIA (Latvia) and Utilitas Wind OÜ(Estonia) are selected to contribute to cross-border cooperation on renewable energy under the Connecting Europe Facility.82 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerLithuaniaIn 2022, Lithuania and Latvia formed a consortium called the “CCS Baltic Consortium” to create a carbon capture andstorage (CCS) value chain in Lithuania and Latvia, which would include the capture of CO2 generated in the industrial sector(cement factories in Lithuania and Latvia) as well as onshore and offshore transportation to permanent storage sites, withoperations scheduled to commence in 2030. In May 2024, the European Commission has granted the status of Project ofCommon Interest (PCI) to this project. The consortium consists of Akmenės cementas AB, KN Energies AB, Larvik ShippingAS, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd., and SCHWENK Latvija SIA.Mecklenburg-VorpommernThe Ministry of Economics, Infrastructure, Tourism, and Labour of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is participating as a leadpartner in the Interreg project titled “Green Industrial Areas” (GIA) as part of the transnational cooperation in the Baltic Searegion. The aim is to develop a transnational certification standard and a toolbox to promote the energy transition incommercial and industrial areas in the Baltic Sea region. The project partners are companies, associations, municipalities, andadministrations from Finland, Latvia, Denmark, Poland, Sweden, Lithuania, and Germany. The project is scheduled to runfrom January 2023 to December 2025.SwedenThere are two significant hydrogen infrastructure projects run by Nordion Energi and Gasgrid Finland. These concern 1,000km of cross-border hydrogen infrastructure in the Gulf of Bothnia and creating an open market for hydrogen by 2030 at thelatest. The purpose of the Nordic Hydrogen Route is to promote reduced carbon dioxide emissions, support regional greenindustrialisation, economic development, and the European self-sufficiency of energy by developing a network of pipelinesthat will effectively transport green energy from producers to consumers in order to ensure their access to an open, reliable,and secure hydrogen market.Schleswig-HolsteinAt present, no additional electricity interconnector projects are being planned in the Baltic Sea to Schleswig-Holstein. Newinterconnector projects are being planned from Denmark to Germany (region of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) - (BornholmEnergy Island, Home) and from Sweden to Germany (region of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) - (Hansa Power Bridge (50hertz.com) Germany intends to build a new hydrogen grid infrastructure. Hyperlink III is a hydrogen grid project that is part of thehydrogen core grid and is being planned from Ellund (DK) to Hamburg via Schleswig-Holstein (hyperlink-gasunie.de).5) What are the main national and regional objectives regarding hydrogen production and supply?Country AnswerEstoniaThe national objective is to fulfil European requirements which will lead to at least 1,000 metric tonnes of hydrogen beingproduced for road transport by 2030. Given the ample technical wind energy potential in Estonia both on- and offshore, thepotential for hydrogen production is at around 600,000 tonnes (around 20 TWh of H2) per year that can be deployedaccording to economic feasibility, safety, environmental, and socioeconomic considerations.FinlandFinland seeks to achieve a leading position in the European hydrogen economy throughout the value chain. If the marketconditions develop favourably, Finland can produce at least 10 % of the EU’s emission free hydrogen by 2030. The objectivesare to produce clean hydrogen and electric fuels for the needs of Finnish industry, transport and the energy system, modernisethe industrial sector, increase high value-added exports, and secure investments in Finland.83 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCountry AnswerGermanyHydrogen and its derivatives will be used in particular in non-electrifiable applications in industry, in heavy commercialvehicles, and increasingly in aviation and shipping. In the electricity sector, hydrogen can contribute to the security of theenergy supply. Coherent legal requirements at national, European, and, if possible, international level support the marketramp-up. The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Protection is also working on a hydrogen storage strategy.HamburgRight now, the estimate for hydrogen demand from the commodity industry will be about 5 to 10 TWh. Most of it will beimported via the start grid. In addition, the Hamburger Energiewerke are developing a former site of a coal plant into aproduction site for renewable energy. Work has started on the installation of an electrolyser with a capacity of 100 MW for theproduction of green hydrogen.Latvia The Latvian natural gas transmission system operator AS “Conexus Baltic Grid” is carrying out a feasibility study together withother countries on the construction of a “hydrogen corridor”, in order to set up a main hydrogen transmission network inseveral European Union countries. At the same time, no decisions have been made in Latvia regarding the construction of ahydrogen transmission and distribution infrastructure, because currently only a few potential users of hydrogen have beenidentified in Latvia: The construction of infrastructure to meet the needs of a small number of users is not profitable, and itwould not be permissible to make other systems cover the costs of such infrastructure maintenance (for example, natural gassystems) for users.LithuaniaBy 2030, Lithuania plans to build 1.3 GW of electrolysis capacity to produce 129 kt (kilo tonnes) of green hydrogen per year.By 2050, these figures are expected to increase significantly to 8.5 GW of installed electrolysis capacity, producing around 732kt of green hydrogen per year. It is expected to account for about 32 % of Lithuania’s total final energy demand in 2050. Theprojected use of 129 kt of green hydrogen in Lithuania by 2030: feedstock (ammonia production, 82 kt; oil refinery, 5 kt), fuel(heavy and other vehicles, 8 kt; other uses, 1 kt), export (including derivates of hydrogen), 33 kt. The projected use of 732 ktof green hydrogen in Lithuania by 2030: feedstock (ammonia production, other feedstock, 472 kt; oil refinery, synthetic fuelproduction, 141 kt), fuel (heavy vehicle, public transport, 51 kt; other uses, 7 kt; electricity production, 17 kt), green hydrogenexport, 44 kt.Mecklenburg-VorpommernHydrogen production and supply targets for the federal state will be drawn up in the Hydrogen Strategy for Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, which is currently being developed.SwedenThe government considers that fossil-free hydrogen will constitute an important part of Sweden’s future energy systems and isa pre-condition for the phasing out of fossil fuels in industry and will be important when it comes to reducing emissions fromsuch sources as heavy goods transport. Swedish production of fossil-free hydrogen requires a great expansion of fossil-freeenergy production. Regulatory frameworks are already in place in order to test the construction of hydro-gen pipelines inSweden, but other regulatory frameworks and instruments need to be reviewed and developed as the use of hydrogen increasesin society.Schleswig-HolsteinThere are hydrogen strategies at both the national and regional level. Schleswig-Holstein’s hydrogen strategy was updated at theend of 2023. The overarching goal is to expand electrolysis capacity in Schleswig-Holstein from over 5 GW in 2037 to over 9GW in 2045.84 5. Intergovernmental Survey5.2 Government Responses to the BSPC Intergovernmental Survey on EnergySecurity, Maritime Resilience, and Critical Infrastructure Protection inthe Baltic Sea RegionThe Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) Working Group on Energy Security, Self-Sustainability,Resilience, and Connectivity (WG ESSCR) initiated another intergovernmental survey to assess the cur-rent policies and measures in place among the Baltic Sea states regarding key security challenges in the re-gion. The survey focused on four primary areas of concern:• Energy security, including resilience against external disruptions and supply diversification.• Regulation of shadow fleet activities, particularly in light of sanctions evasion, maritime security risks,and environmental concerns.• Protection of critical maritime infrastructure, such as undersea cables and pipelines, which are increa-singly targeted by hybrid threats.• Strengthening regional cooperation, with an emphasis on joint intelligence-sharing, coordinated ma-ritime patrols, and crisis response mechanisms within existing multilateral frameworks.Governments were asked to provide detailed responses to ten key questions, covering their monitoringmechanisms, legal frameworks, surveillance capabilities, and cooperation within NATO, the EU, andother international organisations.Key Findings and Policy ConsiderationsThe responses from participating governments highlight growing security challenges in the Baltic Sea re-gion, particularly in relation to hybrid threats, surveillance gaps, and legal enforcement limitations. Manygovernments stress the need for enhanced multilateral cooperation and increased intelligence-sharing, aswell as more effective legal mechanisms to address emerging security threats in the maritime domain.85 5. Intergovernmental SurveyA strong focus is placed on EU and NATO-led initiatives, which serve as essential instruments in securingthe region. Key frameworks and strategies highlighted in the responses include:• The EU Action Plan on Cable Security was recently introduced to strengthen the protection and re-silience of critical undersea infrastructure through enhanced surveillance, crisis response mechanisms,and public-private cooperation.• NATO’s Baltic Sentry operation has led to an increased military presence in the Baltic Sea to deterthreats against undersea infrastructure and maritime transport routes.• The EU Hybrid T oolbox and Hybrid Rapid Response T eams, which are designed to counter hybridthreats, including sabotage, cyber-attacks, and disinformation campaigns targeting maritime infra-structure.• CISE (Common Information Sharing Environment), which facilitates real-time intelligence-shar-ing between European maritime security agencies to improve situational awareness and response co-ordination.• CUIN/NATO (Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network), which serves as a coordinated NA-TO-led surveillance mechanism for critical undersea infrastructure, ensuring real-time monitoringand response capabilities.• The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), which plays a crucial role in ensuring rapid military responsecapabilities in Northern Europe, including the Baltic Sea region.• The European Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and WP EUMSS, which aim to enhance mar-itime defence cooperation within the EU, particularly in relation to critical infrastructure protection.• MARCOM (NATO’s Allied Maritime Command), which leads NATO’s maritime situational aware-ness efforts and serves as the central hub for naval coordination in the Baltic Sea region.• The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), which is currently examining its potential future rolein security-related matters, particularly in relation to energy security and maritime resilience.86 5. Intergovernmental SurveyObservations on Confidentiality and Completeness of ResponsesThe level of detail and specificity in the responses varies significantly among participating governments.Some states have provided extensive insights into their national policies, legal perspectives, and multilat-eral cooperation efforts, while others have limited their submissions to broad assessments without sub-stantial elaboration.Additionally, several responses include confidentiality markings, such as “For Official Use Only”, indicat-ing that certain details may not be intended for broader public circulation.It is important to emphasise that this summary serves only as an overview for discussion purposes. Itdoes not replace a thorough examination of the original government responses, some of which containdetailed and highly substantial content.Furthermore, a direct question has been raised to the German delegation regarding MARCOM’s role inintelligence-sharing and security coordination. This reflects other states’ expectations for further clarifica-tion on Germany’s involvement in NATO-led intelligence operations in the Baltic Sea region.1) Monitoring and Regulation of Shadow Fleet Activities in the Baltic SeaGovernments in the Baltic Sea region acknowledge the growing activity of the Russian shadow fleet,which presents risks related to sanctions evasion, environmental hazards, and hybrid security threats.Many responses highlight concerns that existing legal frameworks do not provide sufficient tools to res-trict the movement of these vessels, particularly in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), where the princi-ple of innocent passage applies.87 5. Intergovernmental SurveyNational Monitoring MeasuresIndividual governments have implemented various measures to track and regulate shadow fleet activities:• Navies, coast guards, and maritime authorities continuously monitor vessel movements using nationalsurveillance systems, maritime domain awareness platforms, and cooperation with allied intelligenceservices.• EU sanctions enforcement plays a key role in restricting shadow fleet operations. Some countries ac-tively implement the vessel listing mechanism, which denies shadow fleet vessels access to essential ser-vices, such as flag registration, insurance, port facilities, and financial transactions.• The European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) is engaged in tracking high-risk vessels and ensuringcompliance with maritime safety regulations. Several governments emphasize the need to strengthenEMSA’s mandate to address shadow fleet activities more effectively.• Some governments report the systematic verification of CLC certificates (Certificate of Insurance orOther Financial Security in Respect of Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage) related to oil spill li-ability as a practical enforcement tool. When broadly applied along key routes, this functions as a defacto monitoring system.• Regional cooperation frameworks link the surveillance systems of multiple coastal states, enablingnear real-time situational awareness of vessel movements across the Baltic Sea. These mechanisms areactively used in operational monitoring.• A dedicated expert group composed of maritime, sanctions, legal, and environmental authorities sup-ports coordination of flag state responsibilities, insurance checks, and enforcement of port state cont-rols.88 5. Intergovernmental SurveyRegional and International CooperationTo enhance maritime security and intelligence-sharing, governments stress the importance of regional co-operation mechanisms:• NATO’s Baltic Sentry operation has intensified joint maritime patrols, aerial reconnaissance, and na-val surveillance across the Baltic Sea to detect and deter suspicious vessel movements.• The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) supports rapid response capabilities in the event of maritime se-curity threats, providing high-readiness naval assets to counter hybrid activities.• NB8++ intelligence-sharing mechanisms facilitate coordinated sanctions enforcement, vessel tracking,and information-sharing among Baltic and Nordic countries.• The EU Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) is being utilized to integrate real-timeintelligence-sharing across civilian and military maritime security agencies.• Some governments suggest that the NATO Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network (CUIN) couldbe leveraged for enhanced monitoring of shadow fleet vessels, particularly in proximity to critical ma-ritime infrastructure.Challenges and Areas for ImprovementWhile national and regional mechanisms are in place, many responses highlight persistent challenges inregulating shadow fleet activities:• Legal gaps in international maritime law limit the ability of states to intercept or inspect vessels ope-rating in EEZs, where the right of innocent passage applies.• The absence of a unified EU enforcement framework leads to inconsistencies in shadow fleet regulati-on among Baltic Sea states.• Improved intelligence-sharing and coordinated vessel tracking are necessary to prevent loopholes insanctions enforcement.89 5. Intergovernmental SurveySome governments call for reforms in international maritime law to introduce stricter controls overshadow fleet activities and propose the harmonization of regional enforcement measures to ensure a coor-dinated response across the Baltic Sea region.2) Enhancing Joint Maritime Patrols and Surveillance SystemsGovernments across the Baltic Sea region emphasize the need to strengthen maritime situational aware-ness and enhance coordinated surveillance mechanisms in response to increasing threats to maritime se-curity and undersea infrastructure. Many responses highlight the importance of integrating national sur-veillance capabilities into broader EU and NATO frameworks to ensure a more comprehensive and re-al-time overview of activities in the region.Key Measures and Ongoing Initiatives• Baltic Sentry, NATO’s enhanced Vigilance Activity, has been expanded with additional naval patrols,aerial reconnaissance, and underwater drone surveillance to detect and deter hostile activities, inclu-ding those related to shadow fleet movements.• NATO’s Task Force X is testing and deploying high-tech monitoring systems to detect undersea thre-ats and hybrid security risks. These include automated surveillance tools, artificial intelligence-drivenvessel tracking, and advanced sonar technology.• The EU’s CISE (Common Information Sharing Environment) framework is being used to facilitatereal-time intelligence-sharing between civilian and military maritime authorities across Europe, hel-ping to bridge information gaps.• The NATO Maritime Centre for Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (MARCOM) has beentasked with enhancing cooperation between allied naval forces and improving information-sharing onmaritime threats. Some governments have suggested that MARCOM’s role should be further strengt-hened to ensure faster coordination of response measures in case of incidents.• The European Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) Action Plan is guiding the development of newmaritime security protocols, ensuring that joint patrols and surveillance systems are aligned with bro-ader EU security objectives.90 5. Intergovernmental Survey• One government reports hosting a multinational joint operation (Multipurpose Maritime Operation,MMO) in the northern Baltic in 2025, conducted together with neighbouring countries and EUagencies such as EMSA, Frontex, and EFCA. This operation combines satellite surveillance, artificialintelligence, and remotely piloted aerial systems (RPAS) with regional coast guard and law enforce-ment efforts.• Some responses highlight the importance of aligning military presence with national maritime autho-rities, ensuring that civilian and military operations in shared waters are effectively coordinated.National and Regional Cooperation Efforts• Several governments emphasise the need for closer cooperation between navies, coast guards, and bor-der control agencies to enhance joint maritime patrols and intelligence-sharing.• Some states are investing in national maritime surveillance upgrades, including coastal radar networks,unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and underwater detection systems to improve early warning capa-bilities.• Governments stress the importance of NATO-EU coordination, particularly in monitoring criticalmaritime infrastructure and responding to threats in real-time.• The BSRBCC (Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation) is being used as a flexible inter-agen-cy coordination platform for joint exercises, risk assessments, and rapid response planning.Challenges and Future Considerations• While significant progress has been made, several governments highlight the need for additional finan-cial and technical resources to support long-term surveillance upgrades.• Some countries stress the importance of harmonising surveillance data-sharing protocols to ensurethat all regional actors operate with a common situational awareness framework.• Further development of NATO’s Mainsail system – an AI-driven maritime surveillance tool – is beingexplored to improve threat detection capabilities across the region.91 5. Intergovernmental Survey• Several governments underline the need for improved coordination with private sector actors, inclu-ding energy and telecommunications companies, which operate much of the undersea infrastructureat risk.• There is also broad agreement that existing mechanisms should be strengthened rather than replaced,in view of limited resources and the need for continuity in operational structures.3) Legal Opinions on Recent Incidents and National Response PlansGovernments reaffirm their commitment to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-CLOS) as the primary legal framework governing maritime activities. However, many emphasize the li-mitations of current international law when it comes to enforcing security beyond territorial waters, par-ticularly in cases of hybrid threats, sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, and shadow fleet opera-tions.Legal Challenges and National Positions• Several governments stress that UNCLOS lacks explicit enforcement provisions that would allowcoastal states to take preventive action against vessels suspected of engaging in illegal activities withinExclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).• Some countries argue for a reinterpretation of UNCLOS provisions, which would allow for a moredynamic application of legal jurisdictions to safeguard maritime security interests.• Others advocate for bilateral or regional agreements to strengthen enforcement mechanisms and im-prove rapid response capabilities.• A few states highlight existing national legal frameworks that allow them to inspect, detain, or restrictaccess to vessels suspected of violating maritime security laws.• One government reports that criminal investigations are currently ongoing in connection with recentincidents within its EEZ and in relation to damage to undersea infrastructure owned by national ope-rators.92 5. Intergovernmental SurveyCrisis Response Mechanisms and Recent Initiatives• Governments report that they have national emergency protocols in place to address maritime securi-ty incidents, but many stress the need for better international coordination.• Recent naval exercises have been conducted by some countries to test rapid response protocols, parti-cularly for scenarios involving shadow fleet activities, sabotage of undersea infrastructure, and uniden-tified vessels in restricted maritime zones.• National crisis management centers have been tasked with ensuring effective inter-agency coordinati-on in the event of an incident. Some governments have formalized action plans that include cross-bor-der cooperation, intelligence-sharing, and military response options.• Some states propose the creation of no-anchoring zones around critical undersea infrastructure, suchas submarine cables and pipelines, to limit unauthorized maritime activities in these areas.Regional and International Cooperation on Legal Frameworks• The EU Hybrid Toolbox is being explored as a mechanism to develop coordinated legal and policy re-sponses to hybrid threats in the maritime domain.• Governments underline the importance of NATO’s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network (CUIN)in improving legal cooperation and operational coordination between allies.• Some governments support closer cooperation with the International Maritime Organization (IMO)to update or refine existing maritime security conventions.• The European Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) Action Plan is guiding discussions on how theEU can support more effective maritime law enforcement in response to growing security concerns.93 5. Intergovernmental SurveyChallenges and Open Questions• Governments express concerns over the difficulty of assigning responsibility in cases of maritime sabo-tage, particularly given the ability of actors to obscure vessel ownership and operational intent.• There is no clear consensus on whether UNCLOS amendments should be pursued, with some gover-nments advocating for a reinterpretation of existing provisions rather than a full-scale revision.• A direct question has been raised to the German delegation regarding MARCOM’s role in coordina-ting legal enforcement actions in the Baltic Sea region, reflecting the need for further clarity on intel-ligence-sharing and response mechanisms.4) Coordinated Measures to Strengthen the Protection of Critical Offshore InfrastructureGovernments recognize the increasing vulnerability of critical offshore infrastructure, including underseacables, pipelines, and offshore energy facilities, in light of growing hybrid threats, sabotage risks, andshadow fleet activities. Several measures are being taken at the national, regional, and international levelsto strengthen detection, deterrence, and response capabilities.National Strategies for Infrastructure Protection• Some governments have tasked national security agencies, armed forces, and crisis management cen-ters with ensuring continuous monitoring of undersea infrastructure.• National maritime surveillance systems have been upgraded to track vessel activity near critical assets,using coastal radars, satellites, and underwater sensors.• Some countries are developing legal provisions to restrict unauthorized activities near key infrastruc-ture sites, such as creating designated security zones around undersea cables and pipelines.• One response stresses the need to establish a regional reserve of spare parts and specialized repair ves-sels, particularly suited to northern maritime conditions, such as ice.94 5. Intergovernmental SurveyRegional and International Cooperation on Infrastructure Protection• The EU Action Plan on Cable Security, published in early 2025, outlines concrete steps to strengthenmonitoring, resilience, and rapid response mechanisms for critical underwater infrastructure acrossEurope. Governments highlight this initiative as a key step toward better cross-border coordinationand joint risk assessment.• NATO’s Baltic Sentry has enhanced patrols and surveillance of critical offshore assets, utilizing navalforces, aerial reconnaissance, and underwater drones to monitor suspicious maritime activities.• The NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUIN) at MAR-COM plays a central role in coordinating intelligence-sharing and military responses to threats againstundersea networks.• Some governments propose strengthening cooperation with private operators of undersea cables andpipelines to improve early-warning systems, resilience planning, and emergency repair capabilities.• The use of European-developed technologies in cable and pipeline protection is encouraged, with theaim of reducing dependency on non-European suppliers in strategically sensitive sectors.T echnological Measures and New Monitoring Capabilities• The EU’s Critical Entities Resilience Directive (CER) is being implemented to improve the security ofessential infrastructure, including energy and communications networks.• Some governments are investing in new sensor technologies, including quantum sensors and seismicmonitoring, to detect and prevent unauthorized activities near critical maritime assets.• NATO’s Task Force X is piloting advanced undersea monitoring systems, integrating AI-driven dataanalysis and autonomous underwater drones to enhance threat detection and incident response.• The Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) framework is being expanded to incorporate underwatersurveillance technologies, ensuring a comprehensive maritime security picture for regional actors.95 5. Intergovernmental SurveyChallenges and Areas for Further Development• Some governments stress the limited availability of repair vessels and personnel in the event of lar-ge-scale infrastructure damage, calling for greater EU and NATO support in this area.• There is a call for more structured public-private partnerships, particularly regarding data-sharingagreements between governments and infrastructure operators.• Some governments propose closer alignment between EU and NATO efforts, ensuring that militaryassets can support civilian infrastructure protection when necessary.5) Shared Intelligence and Rapid Response MechanismsGovernments recognize that effective intelligence-sharing and rapid response coordination are essentialfor securing maritime infrastructure, tracking shadow fleet activities, and countering hybrid threats in theBaltic Sea region. While various intelligence networks exist, some countries highlight the need for impro-ved coordination, faster decision-making, and better interoperability between national and internationalactors.Existing Intelligence-Sharing FrameworksSeveral intelligence-sharing platforms are already in place to exchange maritime security information, de-tect threats, and coordinate responses:• CISE (Common Information Sharing Environment) – A EU-wide framework that enables real-timemaritime intelligence-sharing between European border agencies, coast guards, navies, and customsauthorities.• CUIN/NATO (Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network) – A NATO-led platform dedicated to mo-nitoring and protecting critical subsea assets, such as undersea cables and pipelines, by coordinatingsurveillance and risk assessments.• MARCOM (NATO’s Allied Maritime Command) – A central NATO hub for intelligence-sharing,naval coordination, and rapid response planning. Some governments seek clarification from the Ger-man delegation on MARCOM’s role in intelligence-sharing within the Baltic Sea region.96 5. Intergovernmental Survey• The BSRBCC (Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation) – A regional initiative focused on pre-venting cross-border crime, smuggling, and unauthorized maritime activities, which also contributesto maritime security efforts.• One government highlights that although cooperation platforms such as SUCBAS are actively used,the lack of a secure, dedicated infrastructure for sharing classified or operationally sensitive informati-on remains a limiting factor.• Additionally, the establishment of a Shadow Fleet Expert Working Group within the NB8+ frame-work is reported. This group, comprising representatives from coastal states, focuses on joint approa-ches to sanctions enforcement, insurance control, and coordination with flag and port state authori-ties.Rapid Response Mechanisms and Military CoordinationTo respond swiftly to potential threats, multiple NATO and EU initiatives have been deployed:• Baltic Sentry – A NATO-enhanced maritime presence operation that provides continuous naval andaerial surveillance of the Baltic Sea, improving situational awareness and deterrence.• JEF (Joint Expeditionary Force) – A UK-led coalition of Nordic and Baltic countries designed forhigh-readiness military deployments in response to regional security threats.• EU Hybrid Rapid Response Teams – A EU-wide task force that can be deployed to assist member sta-tes facing hybrid threats, including cyber-attacks and maritime sabotage.• EU Hybrid Toolbox – A comprehensive EU mechanism that provides legal, technical, and operatio-nal tools to counter coordinated hybrid attacks, including those targeting maritime security.97 5. Intergovernmental SurveyAreas for Further DevelopmentWhile these frameworks offer strong foundations for intelligence-sharing and rapid response, some gover-nments emphasize the need to:• Improve coordination between NATO and the EU, ensuring seamless information exchange and cri-sis management between military and civilian actors.• Enhance real-time surveillance technologies, particularly AI-driven data analysis, underwater sensors,and automated threat detection.• Expand cooperation with private sector operators of undersea cables, ports, and offshore energy infra-structure to improve early-warning capabilities.• Establish a dedicated regional crisis response framework for the Baltic Sea, similar to NATO’s Air Po-licing mission, that allows for pre-approved, coordinated reactions to maritime incidents.6) Support Mechanisms for T echnical and Financial ResourcesGovernments emphasise the need for enhanced financial, technical, and operational support to addressgrowing maritime security challenges, critical infrastructure protection, and hybrid threats in the BalticSea region. While existing EU and NATO frameworks provide some assistance, several countries high-light the necessity of additional resources to improve response capabilities.Existing EU and NATO Support MechanismsSeveral EU and NATO initiatives already provide funding, expertise, and crisis response capabilities:• EU Hybrid Rapid Response Initiative – This EU mechanism deploys expert teams to assist states facinghybrid security challenges, including cyber-attacks, maritime sabotage, and infrastructure disruptions.• EU Critical Entities Resilience Directive (CER) – A new EU legal framework designed to increase theresilience of critical infrastructure operators by enhancing risk preparedness, emergency planning, andrecovery capacities.98 5. Intergovernmental Survey• EU Action Plan on Cable Security – A comprehensive strategy recently introduced by the EuropeanCommission to improve the resilience, surveillance, and repair capacity of undersea cables across theEU.• NATO’s CUIN (Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network) – A NATO-led platform for coordinatingsurveillance, intelligence-sharing, and protection measures for vital undersea assets.• EU Hybrid Toolbox – A multi-layered EU framework that provides legal, diplomatic, and operationalmeasures to respond to hybrid threats, including coordinated cyber and maritime attacks.• One government highlights the Baltic Sea region’s role as a designated testbed for cable security underthe EU Action Plan, aiming to establish a regional coordination hub and accelerate the implementa-tion of CISE-based information exchange.Funding Needs and Capacity BuildingGovernments identify several key areas where additional support is required:• Strengthening undersea cable repair capacity – Many countries highlight the limited availability of re-pair vessels and specialised equipment for fixing damaged undersea infrastructure. They call for EUand NATO funding to establish dedicated repair units.• Enhancing regional intelligence-sharing and threat detection – Several governments stress the need forincreased investment in AI-driven surveillance, automated threat detection, and satellite monitoringsystems.• Expanding military-civilian cooperation – Countries advocate for closer coordination between natio-nal navies, private operators of critical infrastructure, and international security frameworks to impro-ve crisis response capabilities.• Improving cross-border crisis management structures – Some states propose the establishment of apermanent regional crisis response framework to coordinate actions across NATO, the EU, and nati-onal security agencies in the event of a major maritime incident.99 5. Intergovernmental Survey• One response also underlines the need for improved integration of risk assessments from national au-thorities and EU agencies, coordinated through structured regional mechanisms. While some structu-res exist, further development is considered necessary.Calls for Further EU and NATO InvolvementSeveral governments urge stronger financial and operational commitments from NATO and the EU, par-ticularly in the Baltic Sea security context. Some countries argue that new funding mechanisms should beestablished to bolster resilience against hybrid threats, enhance undersea infrastructure protection, andsupport regional defense cooperation.Others highlight the importance of integrating private-sector stakeholders into resilience planning, parti-cularly companies that own and operate undersea cables, offshore energy facilities, and key maritime lo-gisticshubs.7) Role of CBSS and Other International Organisations in Strengthening CooperationGovernments recognise the CBSS and other regional and international organisations as potential facili-tators of enhanced cooperation on maritime security and critical infrastructure protection. However, the-re are differing views on the extent to which CBSS should assume a greater security-related role.Council of the Baltic Sea States• CBSS is acknowledged as a key regional political forum for fostering dialogue and cooperation amongthe democratic Baltic Sea states.• Some countries emphasize that CBSS has historically focused on environmental, economic, and soci-al issues rather than security and defense.• Others propose leveraging CBSS ministerial meetings to expand discussions on maritime infrastruc-ture protection, resilience-building, and hybrid threat response strategies.• The upcoming CBSS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Tallinn in May 2025 is expected to address thefuture scope of CBSS engagement in security-related topics.100 5. Intergovernmental Survey• One government highlights the ongoing CBSS strategic review initiated in mid-2024, led by two se-nior political figures appointed by the Estonian Presidency. The review aims to assess the future role ofthe CBSS in regional security coordination and is expected to present recommendations at the May2025 Council meeting.International Maritime Organization (IMO)• The IMO sets global maritime safety standards, particularly regarding shipping regulations, pollutioncontrol, and vessel security.• Some governments suggest that the IMO’s mandate should be expanded to address the challenges po-sed by shadow fleet activities and maritime hybrid threats.• The recently adopted IMO Resolution A.1192(33) urges member states and stakeholders to take coor-dinated action against illegal operations in the maritime sector, including the activities of the so-called“dark fleet” or “shadow fleet”.European and NATO Security Frameworks• The European Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) Action Plan provides a comprehensive frame-work for EU coordination on maritime security challenges.• The EU’s Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) enhances real-time intelligence-sha-ring between European maritime security agencies.• The NATO Maritime Centre for Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUIN/NATO) plays agrowing role in monitoring and securing undersea cables and pipelines.• The BSRBCC (Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation) serves as an additional platform forenhancing maritime security cooperation, particularly in countering cross-border crime and unautho-rized vessel activities.101 5. Intergovernmental SurveyBalancing Regional and International Cooperation• Several countries advocate for stronger CBSS engagement in security while maintaining its currentrole as a primarily political and economic forum.• Others emphasize the importance of NATO and EU coordination on defense-related aspects, ensu-ring complementarity rather than duplication of responsibilities.• A recent initiative cited by one government is the establishment of a Shadow Fleet Expert WorkingGroup composed of legal, sanctions, environmental, and maritime authorities from 14 coastal statesin the Baltic and North Sea regions. This group facilitates joint analysis and operational alignment inthe enforcement of maritime sanctions.8) Gaps and Limitations in Existing Legal Frameworks (UNCLOS, EEZs, and Responses to Sabotage)Governments widely agree that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) pro-vides an important legal foundation for maritime governance. However, they stress that its current provi-sions do not adequately address modern security threats, including hybrid attacks, shadow fleet opera-tions, and sabotage of undersea infrastructure.Key Legal Gaps in UNCLOS and Enforcement Challenges• Limited enforcement powers in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs): UNCLOS grants coastal statescertain rights within their territorial waters (12 nautical miles) but significantly limits enforcement ca-pabilities in EEZs (200 nautical miles). This creates challenges in preventing and responding to sabo-tage of critical infrastructure outside territorial waters.• Lack of explicit provisions for undersea infrastructure protection: While UNCLOS recognizes therights of states to lay and maintain undersea cables and pipelines, it does not provide clear enforce-ment mechanisms to prevent damage or interference with such infrastructure.• No legal framework to counter shadow fleet activities: Existing international maritime law does notspecifically regulate vessels engaged in sanctions evasion or deceptive shipping practices.102 5. Intergovernmental Survey• Difficulties in assigning attribution for sabotage incidents: The covert nature of hybrid threats and un-dersea sabotage makes it challenging to identify perpetrators and apply international legal consequen-ces.• Following a recent summit of Baltic Sea NATO Allies, a joint legal working strand was launched toexplore concrete measures under international maritime law—including within the scope of navigati-onal freedoms—to improve prevention and enforcement against deliberate damage to subsea infra-structure.Proposed Solutions and Ongoing InitiativesSeveral governments suggest regional and international legal adjustments to enhance security, enforce-ment, and preventive measures:• Reinterpretation of UNCLOS provisions to allow coastal states to take preventive action againstsuspected sabotage and illegal activities in EEZs.• The creation of special security zones around critical undersea infrastructure, which could impose ad-ditional restrictions on vessel movement, anchoring, and operations near cables and pipelines.• Bilateral and multilateral agreements among Baltic Sea nations to strengthen joint enforcement mea-sures and intelligence-sharing regarding shadow fleet operations and hybrid threats.• Legal discussions within NATO and the EU to develop new frameworks for countering hybrid thre-ats at sea, including through sanctions enforcement, surveillance expansion, and military deterrence.• The Legal Conference on the Protection of Critical Underwater Infrastructure, scheduled for April 3,2025, in Tallinn, will address potential legal adjustments.• The EU Action Plan on Cable Security aims to improve preventive measures and response coordina-tion for undersea infrastructure sabotage across member states.103 5. Intergovernmental SurveyThe Role of Existing and Emerging Legal Instruments• The IMO’s Resolution A.1192(33) urges member states to take stronger action against illegal mariti-me operations, though its implementation remains a challenge.• The EU Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive provides a framework for protecting essential in-frastructure but does not extend enforcement authority beyond territorial waters.• The EU Hybrid Toolbox is being explored as a legal and operational instrument for countering hybridmaritime threats, including sabotage and shadow fleet activities.• The NB8++ intelligence-sharing format could serve as a foundation for developing new legal frame-works at the regional level.9) Applying Legal Jurisdictions More DynamicallyGovernments broadly agree that current international maritime law does not provide sufficient flexibility to addressemerging security threats in the Baltic Sea. They emphasize that UNCLOS and other existing frameworks must beinterpreted and applied more dynamically to improve enforcement, deterrence, and response mechanisms.Key Challenges in Applying Legal Jurisdictions• UNCLOS limitations on enforcement actions in EEZs: While coastal states have sovereignty overtheir territorial waters, their ability to intervene in security threats beyond 12 nautical miles (withinEEZs) is restricted.• Hybrid threats and shadow fleet operations operate in legal grey zones, making it difficult to apply tra-ditional maritime enforcement mechanisms.• Lack of binding international agreements on protecting undersea infrastructure, leading to delays andlegal uncertainties in responding to sabotage incidents.• One response describes a newly launched legal cooperation process among Baltic Sea states, taskedwith identifying practical measures under the current law of the sea—including provisions on the free-dom of navigation—to prevent and respond to intentional acts of sabotage or irresponsible behavior.104 5. Intergovernmental SurveyProposed Strategies to Apply Legal Frameworks More Dynamically1. Expanding National and Regional Enforcement Rights• Several governments propose strengthening national maritime security laws to extend enforcement ca-pabilities in EEZs, particularly in cases of sabotage, unauthorized vessel movements, and hybrid thre-ats.• Some suggest bilateral and regional agreements to allow for cross-border enforcement cooperationamong Baltic Sea nations.• Developing emergency legal measures that allow for immediate intervention in suspected sabotage in-cidents, rather than waiting for lengthy investigations or international legal approvals.2. Strengthening Coordination Between Military and Civilian Agencies• Governments emphasize the need for closer cooperation between military, intelligence, law enforce-ment, and maritime authorities to enable faster decision-making and response actions.• NATO’s MARCOM (Maritime Command) and the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network(CUIN) play an increasingly important role in facilitating joint security efforts.• The European Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and the Common Information Sharing Environ-ment (CISE) are highlighted as key frameworks for improving civil-military coordination.3. Creating Special Security and Protection Zones Around Critical Infrastructure• Some governments propose the establishment of designated protection zones around key undersea in-frastructure, such as pipelines and communication cables, where stricter monitoring and enforcementwould apply.• These security zones could be enforced through regional agreements, using precedents from the NorthSea Protection Zone model.105 5. Intergovernmental Survey• The EU Action Plan on Cable Security is seen as a potential tool to introduce legal and operationalmechanisms for securing undersea infrastructure.4. Reinterpreting UNCLOS to Address Modern Threats• Some states call for a reassessment of UNCLOS provisions to explore whether hybrid threats, shadowfleet activities, and sabotage can be addressed under existing international law.• There is interest in using the principle of necessity in international law to justify immediate actionagainst threats to national security and critical infrastructure.• Developing case law through international maritime courts could help establish clearer legal prece-dents for interventions in EEZs.10) Prospects for High-Level CBSS MeetingsGovernments express differing views on the need for a regular CBSS heads-of-government meeting focu-sed on critical infrastructure protection and maritime security.The CBSS Foreign Ministers’ Meetings, which were reinstated in 2022 after a long hiatus, now serve asthe primary platform for political dialogue. However, the extent to which they will address security-rela-ted topics remains uncertain. The upcoming CBSS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Tallinn (May 2025)may provide further clarity on the organization’s evolving role in security coordination within the BalticSea region.Government Positions on Reviving CBSS Summits• Some governments argue that the current security situation in the Baltic Sea warrants a more structu-red, high-level political coordination mechanism.• Other governments prefer maintaining flexibility, arguing that ad-hoc consultations among Baltic Seastates have proven effective in addressing security concerns.• Existing platforms such as the Nordic-Baltic 8 (NB8), NATO summits, and EU Council discussionsalready provide opportunities for high-level coordination.106 5. Intergovernmental Survey• Some governments see no immediate need to formalize CBSS summits but remain open to discussingthe issue further.• One response links this discussion to the ongoing CBSS reform process launched in 2024, noting thatthe role of heads-of-government meetings is among the topics under review.Next Steps and Upcoming Discussions• The CBSS is currently undergoing a strategic review to determine its future priorities and role in regi-onal security cooperation.• The Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Tallinn (May 2025) is expected to address security-related matterswithin the CBSS framework, potentially clarifying the organization’s future engagement in maritimesecurity.• The “Wise Men Report” on CBSS reform, commissioned by CBSS foreign ministers, is anticipated tooutline recommendations on whether and how CBSS should expand its security mandate.107 6. Best Cross-Border Practices6. Best Cross-Border PracticesOne of the purposes of the Working Group is to share best practices to ensure energy security, self-sus-tainability, resilience, and connectivity in the Baltic Sea region. This chapter highlights some of the ex-amples of the best practices identified throughout the work of the BPSC Working Group.Baltic States’ Synchronisation with the Continental European NetworkThe Baltic States have historically operated in sync with the electric power systems of Russia and Belarus.The origins of the idea to synchronise with the European grid go back as far as 2007 when the prime mi-nisters of the Baltic States proposed the idea of investigating this possibility. The synchronisation of theBaltic States with the European electric power networks is planned for 2025. It will result in the Balticelectric power transmission system becoming part of the European system, meaning more independencefrom Russia, ensuring energy security and independence. T raders and producers of electric power will beable to sell electric power everywhere in Continental Europe.CCS Baltic Consortium projectIn 2022, Lithuania and Latvia formed a consortium called the “CCS Baltic Consortium” to create a car-bon capture and storage (CCS) value chain in Lithuania and Latvia, which would include the capture ofCO2 generated in the industrial sector (cement factories in Lithuania and Latvia) as well as onshore andoffshore transportation to permanent storage sites, with operations scheduled to commence in 2030. InMay 2024, the European Commission has granted the status of Project of Common Interest (PCI) to thisproject. The consortium consists of Akmenės cementas AB, KN Energies AB, Larvik Shipping AS, Mit-sui O.S.K. Lines Ltd., and SCHWENK Latvija SIA.ELWINDELWIND is a joint Estonian-Latvian state-run cross-border offshore wind project in the Baltic Sea. It is anambitious, environmentally friendly renewable energy project that will provide for increased energy inde -pendence and security, for more affordable energy prices, contribute to reducing costs for households andbusinesses, and also create new business opportunities for the value chain. ELWIND is being launched tostrengthen the regional energy market by investing in offshore wind electricity production and hybrid in -terconnection between Estonia and Latvia. 2030 is planned to be the deadline for project completion.108 6. Best Cross-Border PracticesFehmarnbelt T unnelThe Fehmarnbelt tunnel is an immersed tunnel under construction to connect the Danish island of Lolland withthe German island of Fehmarn, crossing the 18-kilometre-wide Fehmarn Belt in the Baltic Sea. The Fehmarnbelttunnel will remove a bottleneck, reduce travel time, and strengthen links between Scandinavia and Central Europe.When the Fehmarnbelt tunnel is completed, the journey between Rødbyhavn and Puttgarden will take seven mi -nutes by train and 10 minutes by car. The Fehmarnbelt tunnel is expected to be completed in 2029.FinBaltOn 1 January 2020, the single-entry tariff zone of Finland, Estonia, and Latvia (FinEstLat) started operating. Themerger of FinEstLat means the linking of the Finnish, Estonian, and Latvian markets, removing the internal tariffsin the region and setting the entry tariffs in the region at the same level. The results of the operation of the FinEst -Lat single-entry tariff zone are positive. Further market integration, merging FinEstLat and the Lithuanian gasmarket is a clear opportunity for the Baltic States and Finland to reap all the benefits of their existing and futureinfrastructure. On 12 October 2022, the merger was postponed and could happen no sooner than October 2024.Green Industrial AreasThe Interreg project “Green Industrial Areas” empowers public authorities to increase the share of smartand climate-neutral industrial areas and co-develop a transnational certification standard. The aim is to de -velop a transnational certification standard and a toolbox to promote the energy transition in commercialand industrial areas in the Baltic Sea region. The project partners are companies, associations, municipali -ties, and administrations from Finland, Latvia, Denmark, Poland, Sweden, Lithuania, and Germany. Theproject is scheduled to run from January 2023 to December 2025.Nordic Hydrogen RouteThe Nordic Hydrogen Route is an initiative between Finnish gas transmission system operator “Gasgrid”and Swedish energy infrastructure company “Nordion Energi” to accelerate the creation of a hydrogeneconomy by building up cross-border hydrogen infrastructure in Bothnian Bay region and an open hy-drogen market by 2030. Nordic Hydrogen Route is to promote reduced carbon dioxide emissions, sup-port regional green industrialisation, economic development, and the European self-sufficiency of energyby developing a network of pipelines that will effectively transport green energy from producers to consu-mers in order to ensure their access to an open, reliable, and secure hydrogen market.109 6. Best Cross-Border PracticesRail BalticaRail Baltica is a greenfield rail transport infrastructure project aiming to integrate the Baltic States into theEuropean rail network. The project includes five European Union countries – Poland, Lithuania, Latvia,Estonia, and indirectly also Finland. It will connect Helsinki, Tallinn, Pärnu, Riga, Panevezys, Kaunas,Vilnius, and Warsaw. The project completion is scheduled for 2030. Rail Baltica is not only a railway pro-ject but also a multi-infrastructure ecosystem that will help form a new economic and security corridor aswell as provide digital connectivity. It includes electricity and electrification requirements and substationsthat can be used for dual purposes. The project has a wide international and regional partner network, in-cluding more than 150 active contracts and over 50 international partnerships.T eam ThaiGerThe so-called hydrogen truck had grown into the project Team ThaiGer. It had been founded in 2007-2008 together with exchange students from Thailand. They were now organising an international springschool that had been held annually over the last 30 years. Teaching staff from Finland, Poland, Lithuania,Estonia, Norway, Austria, the Netherlands, and Brazil took part. In addition, a master course had beendeveloped on the topics of renewable energy and mobility, also including hydrogen. Team ThaiGer alsoheld energy symposiums, international conferences, master seminars, and more.110 Members of the BSPC Working GroupMembers of the BSPC Working GroupChairmanshipMember Parliament and/or Organisation Member MP Staff Point of ContactBaltic AssemblyCitadeles Street 2, room 616Riga LV-1010,LatviaAndris KulbergsChairperson Agnija AntanovičaAgnija.Antanovica@baltasam.orgIngrīda SticenkoIngrida.Sticenko@saeima.lvRovena Berga-MinkevičaRovena.Berga@baltasam.orgMecklenburg-VorpommernState Parliament of Mecklenburg-VorpommernLennéstr. 119053 SchwerinGermanyPhilipp da CunhaVice-chairperson Georg SträtkerGeorg.Straetker@landtag-mv.deNorwayStorting0026 OsloNorwayMarius Arion NilsenVice-chairpersonThomas FraserThomas.Fraser@stortinget.noList of MembersMember Parliament and/or Organisation Member MP Staff Point of ContactDenmarkFolketingChristiansborg1240 CopenhagenDenmarkHenrik MøllerKim AasJoan ÓlavsdottirJoan.Olavsdottir@ft.dkEstoniaRiigikoguLossi plats 1A15165 TallinnEstoniaMeelis Kiili Merlin ReepaluMerilin.Reepalu@riigikogu.ee111 Members of the BSPC Working GroupMember Parliament and/or Organisation Member MP Staff Point of ContactFinlandEduskunta00102 EduskuntaFinlandMikko Polvinen Mika Laaksonenmika.laaksonen@eduskunta.fiGermanyDeutscher BundestagPlatz der Republik 111011 BerlinGermanyAnna Kassautzki,until 25 March 2025Katalin ZadorKatalin.Zador@bundestag.deLatviaSaeimaJēkaba Street 11Rīga LV-1811LatviaAndris KulbergsProf Jānis VucānsIngrīda SticenkoIngrida.Sticenko@saeima.lvLithuaniaSeimasGediminas Ave 532002 VilniusLithuaniaAndrius Kupčinskas,until 14 November 2024Giedrius Drukteinis,since December 2024Renata GodfreyRenata.Godfrey@lrs.ltNorwayStorting0026 OsloNorwayMarius Arion Nilsen Thomas FraserThomas.Fraser@stortinget.noPolandSenate6 Wiejska Str.00-902 WarsawPolandKacper Płażyński Piotr KoperskiPiotr.Koperski@senat.gov.plSwedenRiksdagenSE-10012 StockholmSwedenJesper Skalberg Karlsson Helena LundstedtHelena.Lundsedt@riksdagen.seÅlandÅland ParliamentPB 69AX-22101 MariehamnÅland IslandsBenny Pettersson Benjamin SidorovBenjamin.Sidorov@lagtinget.ax112 Members of the BSPC Working GroupMember Parliament and/or Organisation Member MP Staff Point of ContactHamburgState Parliament of the Free and Hanseatic Cityof HamburgAdministration of the ParliamentSchmiedestraße 220095 HamburgGermanyPhiline Sturzenbecher Friederike LünzmannFriederike.Luenzmann@bk.hamburg.deMecklenburg-VorpommernState Parliament of Mecklenburg-VorpommernLennéstr. 119053 SchwerinGermanyPhilipp da CunhaBeate SchluppGeorg SträtkerGeorg.Straetker@landtag-mv.deSchleswig-HolsteinState Parliament of Schleswig-HolsteinPostfach 712124171 KielGermanyUlrike Täck Mareike WatollaMareike.Wotalla@landtag.ltsh.deJan DiedrichsenJan.Diedrichsen@landtag.ltsh.deSecretariat of the Working GroupBodo BahrSecretary General of theBaltic Sea Parliamentary ConferenceSchlossgartenallee 1519061 SchwerinGermanyTel: +49 171 5512557bodo.bahr@bspcmail.nethttp://www.bspc.netAgnija AntanovičaSecretary General of theBaltic AssemblyCitadeles Street 2-616Riga LV-1010LatviaTel: +371 67225178agnija.antanovica@baltasam.orghttps://baltasam.org/113 Members of the BSPC Working GroupAcknowledgementsThe members of the Working Group on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, Resilience, and Connectivityexpress their deepest appreciation to all those who provided their expertise that allowed the completion ofthis report:Reinis ĀboltiņšFranco AccordinoRebecka BergholtzKaspars BriškensAndreas DinklageAndrus DurejkoStefan FassbinderFredrik GustavssonMartin HansonGustav HasselskogPer Rune HenriksenGabriele HoffmannTomas JermalavičiusStephan KnabeJohanna KohlTarmo KorõtkoJohanna-Kadri KuuskKaimo KuuskKristi LandTony LawrenceGustav LindströmHans LiwångKristaps LočmelisAlexander LottThomas LuschtinetzTomas MörtsellAndreas NoackBjarte PadøyChristian PegelHenrik PraksTapio PyysaloHenrich QuickPål RasmussenHenrik RingbomLīga RozentāleJukka SavolainenJohan-Elias SeljamaaMarco SiddiJussi SoramäkiChristian SuhmAndres SuttAngelica TikkVeli-Pekka TynkkynenRaivo VareKatrin ZschauKurt RadloffBaltic Sea Parliamentary Conferencewww.bspc.netBSPC SecretariatSchlossgartenallee 1519061 SchwerinGermany