Spotlight-APRIL-2022

1No. 4 (39), April 2022War and migration:the recent influx fromUkraine into Polandand possiblescenarios for thefutureThe outbreak of war in Ukraine hasdrastically changed the migratorysituation in Central and Eastern Europe,especially Poland. This text by@MaciejDuszczyk @kaczmarczyk_cmrattempt s to estimat e the possible futurestocks of immigrants in the country andpoints out challenges. Regardless ofdeve lopments on the front line, thenumber of Ukrain ians in Poland will besignificantly higher than at the beginningof 2022. Poland must be perceived as anew immigration country in Europe andin the global context. © Pixabay2War and migration : the r ecent influx fromUkraine into Poland and possiblescenarios for the futureMaciej Duszczyk and Paweł KaczmarczykThe outbreak of war in Ukraine has drasticallychanged the migratory situation in manycountries of Central and Easte rn Europe.Among them, Poland is playing the mostimportant role, with around 3 million personsfleeing the war zone who arrived in Polandbetween February 24th and the end of April2022. This unprecedented inflow of warrefugees clearly raises questions a bout futuredevelopments and challenges related to thepresence of Ukrainian citizens in Poland. Thistext presents the first attempt at estimating thepossible future stocks of immigrants fromUkraine in the country and points out relatedchallenges. For obvious reasons, this attempt issubject to a great risk of errors, but thepresented scenarios indicate that regardless ofthe development of the situation on the frontline, we have to reckon with the fact that in theperspective of the coming months (or maybeyears) the number of immigrants from Ukrainein Poland will be significantly higher than it wasat the beginning of 2022. This requires firm anddeliberate action on the part of publicinstitutions. Poland must be perceived as a newimmigration coun try in Europe and also in theglobal context. ContextThe recent inflow of Ukrainians fleeing the warzones to Poland is, by all means, anunprecedented event. Nonetheless, there areseveral contextual factors that (1) explain – toan extent – why Poland is the major destinationcountry, and (2) are helpful for predicting andunderstanding the development of Ukrainianmigration and the presence of Ukrainians inPolish society in the future. It should be bornein mind that the current inflow of war refugeesfrom Ukraine will have long -term consequencesfor Poland, which requires urgent measures toensure the availability of social services inparticular.Importantly, just a decade ago Poland was nota country of immigration. On the contrary, dueto the post -2004 massive mobility to the West,the migration balance of the country was clearlynegative (Górny et al. 2010; Okólski 2012; King,Okólski 2018). Particularly if long -termimmigration is considered, the inflow ofimmigrants to Poland was very limited –according to the 2011 Population Census, thetotal number of foreigners staying in thecountry was estimated at around 110 thousand.3A few years later (in 2015), Poland was rankedas one of the last EU member states in terms ofthe share of immigrants in th e total population.Immigration to Poland also had severalimportant qualitative features, starting from avery limited number of source countries (with aclear domination of post -Soviet countries andUkraine as the most important origin), througha clear concentration in a few bigagglomerations (with Warsaw and theMazowieckie region playing the most importantrole), to a predominance of specific – as forEuropean standards – forms of migration, i.e.temporary or even circular mobility (Górny,Kaczmarczyk 2019; Górny et al. 2010 ; Okólski2021 ).This picture changed substantially after 2014,i.e. after the first war in the Eastern part ofUkraine. In a very short time, Poland became aEuropean leader in terms of newly issuedresidence permits, and even a global leaderwhen seasonal foreign workforce is concerned.According to available estimates, the stock ofimmigrants in Poland has increased fromaround 100 thousand (2011) to a numberexceeding 2 million (2019) (CSO 2020).Ukrainian citizens represented the majority ofthis population, and, by all means, the radicalchange of the migration situation in Poland isattributable to the inflow from this country.This was possible only because of an interplayof factors operating on two sides of the process(Górny, Kaczmarczy k 2018, 2019; Górny 2017):• War (2014) and the related socio -economicdevelopments in Ukraine created a large -scale migration potential;• The “transformation” into a country ofimmigration was possible due to the fasteconomic growth in Poland and related,persistent (and growing) demand for labourin general and also for foreign labour in the Polish labour market; as a consequence,contrary to expectations of some observers,the potential mentioned above has not beentransformed into humanitarian typemigration. Instead, we witnessed a massincrease in labour migration, particularlybased on the simplified procedure, whichmade Poland one of the most liberal regimesin terms of the employment of foreigners(additionally, the fast -growing recruitmentsector also contributed).There are several structural characteristics ofrecent (pre -2022 war) migration from Ukraineto Poland that are highly relevant in the contextof recent inflows:• Already before the war, there was asubstantial group of Ukrainiansworking/residing in Poland that can beestimated at around 1.35 million (based onthe CSO data); this group was highlymasculinized and comprised ofpredominantly economically active persons(over 95% of the total);• Ukrainian immigrants clearly dominated inthe case of all possible channels of inflowonto the Polish labour market (declarations– 88%, work permits – 71%, seasonal workpermits – 98% over the period 2018 -2021);• Immigration – including migration fromUkraine – has been more equally distributedacross the country than in the pre -2014period, with immigrants being present inalmost all regions of Poland (with still a fewimportant concent ration centres – bigagglomerations);• Due to specific forms of migration, i.e.temporary or even circular mobility betweenUkraine and Poland, the two countries wereconnected through well -developedtransportation routes;4• As in many similar cases, such a massivemigration was possible not only due to theactive involvement of formal and informalrecruiters but also because it was stronglydriven by well -developed migrant networks(Kindler, Wójcikowska -Baniak 2019);• Despite the more and more commonpresence of Ukrainians on the Polish labourmarket, the scale of economic andsocial/cultural tensions remained atrelatively low levels; this can be attributedmainly to very positive developments in theeconomy of Poland and a flourishing labourmarket (with the lowest levels ofunemployment recorded since the systemicchange in 1989) (Duszczyk, Matuszczyk,2018).Importantly, the substantial inflow ofimmigrants to Poland took place in practicewithout a coherent and clearly articulatedmigration policy. Individual governm ents haveattempted to create a document that would have a strategic status. In particular, such adocument was accepted in 2012, but it has beencancelled by the government that came topower in 2015, without replacing it with a newone (till today). Fro m that moment on, it can beconcluded that the migration policy pursued inPoland is highly dispersed and continuouslyfocuses on liberalizing access to the labourmarket. As a consequence, before the 2022 warand the massive inflow of war refugees fromUkraine, there was no general integration policyin Poland (with the exception of measuresdedicated to refugees).The processThe war triggered by Russia against Ukraine inFebruary 2022 has resulted in the largestrefugee migration in Europe after World W ar II,estimated by the UNHCR at 5.2 million persons.In the first two months, almost 3 million warrefugees crossed the Polish border, of whichover 95% were Ukrainian citizens. Figure 1presents the scale of the border traffic between-40-2002040608010012014016024.02.202228.02.202204.03.202208.03.202212.03.202216.03.202220.03.202224.03.202228.03.202201.04.202205.04.202209.04.202213.04.202217.04.202221.04.202225.04.2022Dayly number of arrivals (in thous.) Daily number of exits (in thous.)Net balance of arrivals to Poland (daily, in thous.)Figure 1. Border traffic between Ukraine and Poland since Feb 24th 2022Source: Own elaboration based on the Border Guards data (data courtesy of Andrzej Kubisiak).5Ukraine and Poland and points to a spectacularincrease in the scale of mobility in the first two -three weeks after the outbreak of the war.The cumulative outcome of the above -presented flows is as high as over 3 millioninflows and over 880 thousand outflows.Additionally, as shown in Figure 2, the volatilityof both inflows and ou tflows is very high, whichreflects changing war -related realities, but alsopoints to the fact that we are dealing with ahighly mobile population that is inherentlyinterested in returning to their places of origin(if only possible). This mobility patte rnresembles, to some extent, the reality of pre -war migration between Ukraine and Poland,which comprised large numbers of temporarymigrants and circulants moving between thetwo countries on a regular basis. We still lackdata to estimate the scale of t he phenomenon,but anecdotal evidence shows that some of the labour migrants continue their trips despite thewar.The above -mentioned numbers (3 millionarrivals in Poland) equalled more than 60% ofall border crossings with Ukraine's neighbours.At the same time, more than 860 thousandpeople left for Ukraine during the respectiveperiod. Among this number, there were about60-80 thousand people who had lived in Polandbefore the outbreak of war and returned toUkraine to join the army or territorial defence .This means that the balance of war refugeescrossing the border was about 2.2 million. Itdoes not mean, however, that so many peoplearriving in Poland were still in the country at theend of April 2022. Those who only passedthrough Poland on their way to other countries,especially the European Union and – to a muchlesser extent – Canada, the USA, or Israel,should be subtracted from this total flow. Basedon available register data from receiving-60,0%-40,0%-20,0%0,0%20,0%40,0%60,0%80,0%24.02.202228.02.202204.03.202208.03.202212.03.202216.03.202220.03.202224.03.202228.03.202201.04.202205.04.202209.04.202213.04.202217.04.202221.04.202225.04.2022Daily change in the number of arrivals Daily change in the number of exitsFigure 2. Volatility in daily arrivals/exits on the Ukrainian -Polish border since Feb 24th, in %Source: Own elaboration based on the Border Guards data (data courtesy of Andrzej Kubisiak).6countries, this number can be estimated at 800thousand people . At the same time, we alsodealt with arrivals to Poland of war refugeesfrom Ukraine who, after a short stay in othercountries (mainly EU countries), decided tomove to the country which is relatively close incultural and linguistic terms (leaving aside thenatural tendency for staying as close to theborder with Ukraine as possible). Their numbercan be estimated at 70 -80 thousand . Summingup, the number of war refugees who werestaying in Poland at the end of April 2 022 can beestimated at 1.4 -1.55 million people (we willuse the latter estimate for furtherassessments).The influx of war refugees from Ukraine has onevery important feature. Those crossing theUkrainian border with EU member states andMoldova are imm ediately covered by theprovisions of the Temporary ProtectionDirective , which grants them numerous rights.In principle, it makes the status of war refugeesfrom Ukraine similar, but not the same, as thatof EU citizens in terms of rights under the freemovement of persons. This is the first time in EUhistory that the Directive's provisions have beenput into practice.The estimations based on data on bordercrossings can be supplemented with earlyinformation on the registration process, asUkra inians are expected to register to obtainthe Polish ID (PESEL), necessary to get access topublic goods and services. As of April 25th, thenumber of registered persons was as high as998 thousand, with a very special demographicstructure, including over 48% of children(persons aged 0 -18, with a majority of themaged 3 -14 – approx. 34% of the total), 42% offemales (at productive age) and roughly 4% ofelderly (>65). Places of registration clearlyreflect the locations of the biggest Polish agglomeration s, with Mazowieckie (20% of thetotal), Śląskie (10%) and Dolnośląskie (10%)playing the most important role. Polishadministration reports that so far around 100thousand adult war refugees have alreadyentered the Polish labour market (data of thePolish Ministry of Labour).Other data is scarce and very incomplete. Forthis reason, we will refer only to the dataprovided by the city council of Warsaw (as themost important place of residence for newlyarrived war refugees). According to theavailable da ta, the number of persons whoarrived in Warsaw was as high as 700 thousand(as of April 24th, 2022). Out of these,approximately 300 thousand persons were stillstaying in the city, and around 100 thousandregistered to obtain the ID number. Themajority o f persons who arrived in Warsawhave found shelter in private flats/homes, andthe number of persons in care facilities was ashigh as 90 thousand (cumulated number). Thescale of the challenge faced by the localadministration is visible through the numbe r ofchildren staying in Warsaw, estimated at 150thousand, which massively increased thenumber of children of school age in the city. Outof those, roughly 16.5 thousand have alreadybeen integrated into the schooling system (datacourtesy of Warsaw City Council).OutlookWe are perfectly aware of how difficult it is topredict what will be the future of Ukrainian warrefugees in Poland (and other countries). Theirnumbers – as well as the number of thosereturning to Ukraine – mainly depend on war -relat ed developments and the futurereconstruction of the country. Additionally, onemay select other criteria defining particularscenarios (e.g. EU policy). The main aim of theexercise provided in this section is to estimate7the scale of possible challenges we willexpectedly face. In this context, as we showbelow, it should be assumed that in eachscenario we will deal with a higher stock ofimmigrants from Ukraine than was the casebefore the war.We estimate the scale of Ukrainian presence inPoland at the starting point (April 2022) atapproximately 2.9 million. Importantly, thisnumber is a sum of two subpopulations: thosepersons who were staying in Poland before thewar (around 1.35 million) and those whoarrived since then (aro und 1.55 million – asdiscussed above). This is a key remark, as ourfurther estimates refer not only to the recentinflows but also to those persons who were/areunable to return to Ukraine because of the warand, as a consequence, are also experiencingthe impact of the situation in Ukraine. Due tothe very special demographic structure of thenewly arrived war refugees, we estimate thatthe total population is drastically different fromtypical labour migration as observed before,including a large share of women (aged 18 -65):40%, 26% of children, and 2% elderly (see Table1).In the next step, we consider three mainhypothetical scenarios (numerical estimates arepresented in Table 1 and Figure 3 – please notethat these are rough estimates only based oncertain assumptions concerning the maindemographic groups). In all cases, we considerthe short/medium term , i.e. we are estimatingthe stock of immigrants from Ukraine in thenext 12 -20 months, i.e. till the end of 2023.In the first scenario (long continuous war), weexpect the continuation of the conflict (withvarying intensity, scope and scale of activities)for the next several years – e.g., similar to thewar over Donbas and Luhansk after the Russianaggression of 2014. This would mean that thepeace would not be signed within the next 18months and (large) parts of Ukraine would stillbe under threat. This would mean a continuousflow of refugees, but also economic migrants toPoland. There would certainly also benumerous temporary and perm anent returns toregions not affected by the war, mainly westernUkraine. It should be assumed that, as a resultof the continuation of the conflict, which wouldhave different phases of calming down andintensification of fighting, the economicsituation in Ukraine would be bad, which wouldstimulate more intensive economic migrationthan in the past. This means that the structureof the inflow could change, with an increasingStarting point (April 2022) Scenario I Scenario II Scenario IIIEstimatednumbers Sharein thetotal Estimatednumbers Sharein thetotal Estimatednumbers % Estimatednumbers %M (18 -65) 950 000 33% 1 150 000 37% 850 000 49% 850 000 25%F (18 -65) 1 150 000 40% 1 150 000 37% 650 000 37% 1 350 000 40%<18 750 000 26% 750 000 24% 200 000 11% 1 100 000 32%18-65 2 100 000 72% 2 300 000 74% 1 500 000 86% 2 200 000 65%65> 50 000 2% 70 000 2% 50 000 3% 100 000 3%TOTAL 2 900 000 - 3 120 000 - 1 750 000 - 3 400 000 -Table 1. Post -war migration from Ukraine to Poland, the starting point (April 202 2) and possible scenariosSource: Own elaboration based on CSO data, National Insurance Institution data and early registration data.8share of men and older people (we assume thatthe ban on leaving Ukraine by men aged 18 -60will be significantly liberalized or even lifted).Assuming factors influencing flows and patternsof residence of particular demographic groupsas described above, this scenario implies thatabout 3.1 million Ukrainians would reside inPoland in the medium term (economic migrantswho came to Poland before outbreaks of thewar and war refugees). Considering theassumptions described above, we can concludethat the demographic structure would be asfollows: 24% children, about 37% women, and37% men (at productive age). About 72% ofpeople would be of working age, which meansthat the age structure would be similar to theone we have now.In the second scenario (a quick and lastingpeace), one should assume a quick (by autumn)conclusion of peace, which would stabilize thesituation in the short -run, at the same timebringing relatively favourable conditions forUkraine (territorial, reparations, possibilities ofjoining the EU, etc.) in the medium and longterm. It would mean a relatively large re duction(during the 12 months following the signing ofthe peace agreement) in the stock of womenand children, some outflow of men (includingthose residing in Poland in the pre -war period),and a stable stock of elderly people. In thisscenario, it shoul d be assumed that the numberof Ukrainian citizens staying in Poland wouldstabilise at around 1.75 million, of which 1 -1.25million would be "pre -war" immigrants (mainlymales) and 0.5 -0.75 million war refugeestransforming into "post -war" immigrants(mai nly females, children and the elderly, to alarge extent family members of those staying inPoland before the war). It should be assumedthat mainly people from the east of Ukrainewould stay in Poland, since the destruction ofthe infrastructure is the gr eatest there, and reconstruction will take the longest. Thedemographic structure would be as follows:11% children, about 37% women, and about49% men. The economically active adultpopulation would account for about 86%, whichwould mean a gradual but ra ther slow return tothe structure of the population residing inPoland before the outbreak of war (share ofeconomically active persons: over 95%).The third scenario is – at the level ofassumptions – similar to the previous one, butwe assume that the war will lead to greaterdestruction also in the west of Ukraine, but apeace agreement will be signed earlier thanassumed for scenario one. This means thatregardless of the conditions of the assumedpeace, an additional influx of children, theelderly a nd women should be expected, as wellas a possible outflow of men (ongoing fighting,reconstruction of the country after signing thepeace agreement). In this variant, one shouldassume an increase in the number of Ukrainiansin Poland to around 3.4 millio n (end of 2023).This is due to the potential devastation causedby the prolonged war and the partialintegration of Ukrainians into Polish society,which would encourage part of the populationto remain in Poland for longer. Thedemographic structure woul d be as follows:32% children, 40% women, and about 25% men.The economically active adult population wouldaccount for about 65%, due to the increasedproportion of minors compared to the pre -war(or even baseline) period.Scenarios two and three shoul d assumesignificant investment to rebuild damagedinfrastructure, financed either by internationalaid or reparations. If the funds for this purposeare substantial, it may cause an exodus ofworkers currently employed in the constructionindustry in Pola nd. However, it is difficult to9assume that Ukraine's GDP will quickly return topre-war values. Therefore, labour immigrationto Poland and other EU countries will be higherthan before the war (with higher shares offemales). There will also be a reunifi cation offamilies that are now separated, especially fromareas where Ukrainian control will not berestored or bordering them, as well as thosemost damaged by war. The end of the warrefugee -humanitarian immigration should beassumed in this scenario. T he period oftemporary protection in the EU, granted basedon the 2001 Directive, is likely to end after oneyear. An EU Council decision will be required toextend it for another year. Numerous actions bythe Ukrainian government to induce emigrantsto re turn can also be expected.In the fourth (hypothetical and highlyunfavourable) scenario , which is currentlyunlikely and unwelcome but cannot becompletely ruled out, Russia would gain amilitary advantage and eventually occupy muchof Ukraine's territory. Ukrainian citizens, knowing what happened in Bucha, Mariupoland other territories occupied by Russia, wouldflee en masse to Poland a nd other Europeancountries. In such a scenario, the number ofrefugees could even exceed 10 million, of whichabout 60% would stay for some time in Poland.In this scenario, all existing assumptions wouldhave to be changed. Poland and the EuropeanUnion would be hit by a humanitarian crisis thatwould require massive relocation within the EU.It would be crucial to provide basic needs in theform of housing, food, medical care, etc.However, this is not explored further within thistext.As shown in Figu re 3, all three scenariosconsidered would mean a substantial increasein the number of Ukrainian citizens residing inPoland, as compared to the pre -war situation(approximately 1.3 million). However, the scaleof this presence varies depending on thescenario. Differences lie not only in the scale ofthe process but also in its structural featureswith scenarios one and two to be linked to0500 0001 000 0001 500 0002 000 0002 500 0003 000 0003 500 000Starting point (April 2022) Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III<18 18-65 65>Figure 3. Post -war migration from Ukraine to Poland – possible scenarios, absolute figuresSource: Own elaboration.10a significantly higher presence of children (andthe elderly).ChallengesLong -term stays of war refugees in Poland,depending on the presented scenario, willgenerate numerous challenges in the field ofsocial services, which must be prepared to servea larger number of people. In each scenario, thekey challenge is to provide housinginfrastructure. It is unsustainable (even in theshort term) for war refugees to live mainly inprivate houses or apartments. While thechallenge can be overcome somehow in thesummer months, from the autumn it will be ofabsolute priority. Accommo dationinfrastructure must have heating and anappropriate standard of protection againstfrost. The solution to the situation would berelocation within the EU, within Poland, and theconstruction of modular housing estates, inwhich people who do not hav e an apartmentwould be able to spend autumn and winter. Inthe absence of immediate actions or in the caseof an additional influx of war refugees, it will benecessary to build large centres of temporarystay.In scenarios one and three, it will be a m assivechallenge to provide education and care tochildren from Ukraine residing in Poland. In anextreme situation, there could be as many as 1million children in need of care and education.Without it, it is difficult to expect most mothersor family me mbers performing care functions tobe able to take up employment. Therefore, it isnecessary to prepare extraordinary solutionsbased on three models. In the first one,Ukrainian children will continue to follow theUkrainian curriculum, and the goal of th egovernment and local government will be, onthe one hand, to provide infrastructure fordistance learning and, on the other, to recognize the qualifications of Ukrainianteachers residing in Poland, to create Ukrainianschool classes, particularly in big cities. In thesecond model, preparatory classes can becreated to prepare Ukrainian children for entryto Polish schools next year. Since Ukrainianchildren start school a year earlier than Polishchildren, spending a year in a preparatory classshould n ot be a serious problem. In the thirdmodel, directed only at those children fromUkraine who have a sufficient command of thePolish language, the possibility of attendingPolish schools on the same terms as Polishchildren should be created. The decision tochoose a given model should be made byparents, but at the same time entering the thirdmodel would require confirmation of theknowledge of the Polish language.All three scenarios show that the presence ofelderly war refugees, and therefore requirin gfrequent medical care, is limited. However, weshould be aware that some of them have notyet registered in the system, so theirpercentage may be higher than it was assumed.At the same time, the Polish health system hasbeen strongly affected by the pa ndemic, andmany people have postponed their medicalcare. Meanwhile, an additional 1 -2 millionpeople are now entitled to use the system. Thiswill result in longer lines to see doctors. Wehave to deal with this challenge at the latestuntil the number o f sick people increases in theautumn and winter seasons. It may benecessary to ask for support from the otherMember States so that they provide temporaryhospitals and post doctors to Poland for acertain period. Solving communicationproblems will also be crucial.As we showed in the first part of this text, thepresence of Ukrainians in the Polish labourmarket was significant already in the pre -war11reality. It can therefore be assumed that thereshould not be a problem with employinganother several h undred thousand people.Unfortunately, this is a very optimistic scenario.As we have presented in the previous section,the recent inflow comprises mainly of womenwith children, while prior to the war Ukrainianshad been employed in Poland rather inmasc uline occupations. Thus, we may bedealing with classical maladjustment of skills tothe needs of the labour market. This will requirea very high level of activity of labour offices,which will have to prepare training andretraining offers tailored to th e professionalprofile of Ukrainians. Moreover, it will be of keyimportance for employers to organize large jobfairs or arrange virtual platforms to secureefficient job matching between employees andemployers. Information regarding threats suchas expl oitation in the workplace, mobbing orsexual harassment will also have to be widelydisseminated.Preventing conflicts that may occur betweenUkrainians and Poles is also a very importantchallenge. Such a large influx of foreignersaffecting the daily lif e of the host society has thepotential to cause conflicts. Even though in theshort term, due to the uniqueness of thesituation, it can be easily avoided, tensions willcertainly emerge in the medium and long term.Therefore, war refugees should be treat ed inthe same way as Poles in terms of access tosocial services. Some necessary instruments,such as access to social services, should onlydeal with deficits and not constitutepreferences for war refugees from Ukraine. Therole of the government in lau nching socialcampaigns and planning aid in such a way as tolimit controversy and suspicions of Poles is alsovery important here. It is to be expected thatover time tensions will increase in various areas.Especially people using public services may experience a deterioration in the standard ofliving due to the presence of a significantnumber of war refugees, who will also beentitled to benefit from state support. A similarsituation may also take place in the labourmarket, with possible adverse effe cts,particularly on the local scale. These risksshould be identified, monitored and addressedthrough well -tailored public policies, includingcommunication campaigns.ReferencesCSO, 2020. Population of foreigners in Polandduring the COVID -19 pandemic. CentralStatistical Office, Warsaw.Duszczyk M., Matuszczyk K. 2018. TheEmployment of Foreigners in Poland and theLabour Market Situation, Central andEastern European Migration Review 7(2): 53 -68. doi: 10.17467/ceemr.2018.07Górny A., 2017. All circular but different:variation in patterns of Ukraine -to-Polandmigration. Population Space and Place 23, 8,https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2074.Górny, A., Grabowska -Lusińska, I., Lesińs ka, M.,Okólski, M. (eds.) 2010. Immigration toPoland: Policy, Employment, Integration.Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw.Górny, A., Kaczmarczyk, P., 2018. A known butuncertain path: The role of foreign labour inPolish agriculture. Journal of Rural S tudies64, 177 -188.Górny, A., Kaczmarczyk, P., 2019. Europeanmigration transition in the context of post -enlargement migration from and intoCentral and Eastern Europe. W: Ch. Inglis, W.Li,B. Khadria (eds), The SAGE Handbook ofInternational Migration. SAGE Publications,New York.Kindler, M., Wójcikowska -Baniak, K. 2019.Missing) Bridging Ties and Social Capital? TheCreation and Reproduction of Migrants’12Social Network Advantages: The Case ofUkrainian Migrants in Poland. Central andEastern European Migration Review 8(1): 95 -116.King, R., Okólski, M., 2018. Diverse, Fragile andFragmented: The New Map of EuropeanMigration. Central and Eastern EuropeanMigration Review 1 –24.https://doi.org/10.17467/ceemr.2018.18Okólski, M. (Ed.), 2012. European Imm igrations.Trends, Structures and Policy Implications.Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam.Okólski, M. (2021). The Migration Transition inPoland. Central and Eastern EuropeanMigration Review 10 (2).https://doi.org/10.17467/CEEMR.2021.1613Maciej DuszczykProfessor at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies and at the Centre of MigrationResearch, University of Warsaw. Vice -Rector of the University of Warsaw for Research andInternational Relations (2016 -2020). Chairm an of the University Council of the University of Gdańsk.His main rese arch areas include migration policy, integration policy, immigration to Poland, mobilityof the high -skilled, migration and the welfare state, refugees, European Union .Paweł KaczmarczykDirector of the Centre of Migration Research at the University o f Warsaw and professor at the Facultyof Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw. His main research areas include causes andconsequences of labour migration, mobility of the high -skilled, migration and the welfare state,migration policy, methodology of m igration research, labour economics, population economics anddemography, and international economics.Keywords: Poland, Ukraine, war, refugees, migrantsPasteura street 702-093 WarsawTel/fax +48 22 55 46 770e-mail: migration.cmr@uw.edu.plwww.migracje.uw.edu.pl/en/ Suggested citation: Duszczyk M., Kaczmarczyk P. (2022) War and migration: the recent influx from Ukraine into Poland and possiblescenarios for the future , CMR Spotlight 4(39).The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They do not reflect the opinions or views of the CMR or its members.Editors of CMR Spotlight: Michał Nowosielski, Dominika Pszczółkowska© 202 2 Centre of Migration Research