BSPC_Report on Sea-Dumped Munitions_22_23

32BSPCYEARSBerlin , 27 – 29 August 2023Report onSea-Dumped Munitionsfor the 32th BSPCBSPCBaltic Sea Parliamentary ConferenceReport onSea-Dumped Munitionsfor the 32th BSPC2The BSPC Rapporteur’s 2023 Report on Sea-Dumped Munitions The Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) was established in 1991 as a© Berlin, Greifswald, Schwerin, August 2023 forum for political dialogue between parliamentarians from the Baltic SeaRegion. The BSPC aims to raise awareness and opinion on issues of currentText: Anna Kassautzkipolitical interest and relevance for the Baltic Sea Region. It promotes andEditing: Markus Börner and Bodo Bahrdrives various initiatives and efforts to support the sustainable environmen-Layout: produktionsbüro TINUStal, social and economic development of the Baltic Sea Region. It strives toenhance the visibility of the Baltic Sea Region and its issues in a broader Eu-Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conferenceropean context. BSPC gathers parliamentarians from 10 national parlia-Bodo Bahrments, 7 regional parliaments with legislative powers, one supranationalSecretary Generalparliament and 4 parliamentary organisations around the Baltic Sea. The+49 171 5512557BSPC thus constitutes a unique parliamentary bridge between the demo-bodo.bahr@bspcmail.netcratic EU- and non-EU countries of the Baltic Sea Region. BSPC externalwww.bspc.netinterfaces include parliamentary, governmental, subregional and other or-ganisations in the Baltic Sea Region and the Northern Dimension area,BSPC Secretariatamong them CBSS, HELCOM, the Northern Dimension Partnership inSchlossgartenallee 15Health and Social Well-Being (NDPHS), the Baltic Sea Labour Forum19061 Schwerin(BSLF) and the Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation (BSSSC).GermanyThe BSPC shall initiate and guide political activities in the region; supportand strengthen democratic institutions in the participating states; improvedialogue between governments, parliaments and civil society; strengthenthe common identity of the Baltic Sea Region by means of close coopera-tion between national and regional parliaments based on equality; and ini-tiate and guide political activities in the Baltic Sea Region, endowing themwith additional democratic legitimacy and parliamentary authority.The political recommendations of the annual Parliamentary Conferencesare expressed in a Conference Resolution adopted by consensus by the Con-ference. The adopted Resolution shall be submitted to the governments ofthe Baltic Sea Region, the CBSS and the EU and disseminated to other rel-evant national, regional and local stakeholders in the Baltic Sea Region andits neighbourhood.3Content1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 . Activities of the BSPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72.1 29th BSPC ...........................................................................72.1.1 Resolution of the 29th BSPC - August 24, 2020 ............................................72.1.2 Questionnaire on sea-dumped munitions in the Baltic Seain the Report on Sea-Dumped Munitions for the 30th BSPC ..................................82.1.3 Implementation of the 29th BSPC resolution in and by the States ...............................82.2 30th BSPC ...........................................................................92.2.1 Report on sea-dumped munitions for the 30th BSPC - August 17, 2021 ...........................92.2.2 Resolution of the 30th BSPC ...........................................................92.2.3 Implementation of the 30th BSPC resolution in and by the States 20 April 2022 ..................102.3 31th BSPC , Stockholm, June, 14 2022 .....................................................112.3.1 31th BSPC Report ................................................................112.3.2 Resolution 31th BSPC .............................................................122.3.3 Statements of the Governments in the Baltic Sea Region to the 31st BSPC Resolution - June 6, 2023 ...132.4 Sea-dumped munitions on BSPC Standing Committee Meetings .................................132.4.1 Standing Committee of the BSPC - Exploring the Dangers ofSea-Dumped Ammunitions and Steering Towards the New Year – 21 November 2022 .............132.4.2 Deepening Collaboration with the EU, the CBSS and HELCOM -BSPC Standing Committee, Brussels – 6 March 2023 ......................................152.4.3 BSPC Standing Committee, Stralsund – 12 June 2023 .....................................153 . Further Activities at the EU and transnational level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163.1 HELCOM Ministerial Meeting – Lübeck 20 October 2021 .....................................163.2 CBSS and HELCOM: Dumped munitions are on the (round)table, Kiel - 12-13 December 2022 ........183.3 EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan“An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats” – 10 March 2023 ..........193.4 20th CBSS Ministerial Session, Wismar – 2 June 2023 ....................................204 . Motion in the German Bundestag – September 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 . Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205.1 DG MARE “Study on underwater unexploded munition” – March 2022 ...........................215.2 FFI - Analysis of samples of high explosives extracted from explosive remnants of war - 22 June 2022 ......215.3 Effects of climate change on marine dumped munitionsand possible consequence for inhabiting biota - 28 August 2021 ..................................226 . Recommendations for action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2247 . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238 . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 . ANNEXES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259.1 ANNEX Implementation of the 30th BSPC resolution in and by the States .........................25DENMARK .........................................................................25ESTONIA ..........................................................................25FINLAND ..........................................................................25DEUTSCHLAND ....................................................................26HAMBURG .........................................................................27MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN .....................................................27NORWAY ...........................................................................28POLAND ...........................................................................28SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN .............................................................30SWEDEN ...........................................................................309.2 ANNEX Statements of the Governments in the Baltic Sea Region to the 31st BSPC Resolution ..........31DENMARK .........................................................................31ESTONIA ...........................................................................32FINLAND ..........................................................................32GERMANY .........................................................................33HAMBURG .........................................................................33MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN ......................................................34NORWAY ...........................................................................35POLAND ...........................................................................35SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN ..............................................................36SWEDEN ...........................................................................369.3 ANNEX 2.8 Exploring the Dangers of Sea-Dumped Ammunitions and Steering Towards the New Year ...37Excerpt concerning Sea-Dumped Ammunitions ................................................37Introduction .........................................................................37Presentations on Sea-Dumped Ammunitions ..................................................375Introduction1 . IntroductionThis report on my activities as BSPC Rapporteur on sea-dumped mu-nitions and the developments since builds on the last report by the thenRapporteur Peter Stein in 2021.The problem of sea-dumped munitions continues to pose an extraordi-nary challenge both to the Baltic Sea as an ecosystem and to the Euro-pean states on its shores. Many of the scientific findings of the last yearsare still relevant and have recently been further consolidated. This hasonce again highlighted the urgent need for action. In this respect, thereport for the 30th BSPC and the previous interim report by PeterStein are still recommended reading for a basic understanding of theproblem. Ms Anna KassautzkiIn view of the danger posed by the approximately 40,000 tons of chemical mu-nitions containing an estimated 15,000 tons of chemical warfare agents in theBaltic Sea, urgent action is still required. But it is not only chemical warfareagents that pose a danger: In the German Baltic Sea alone, the load of conven-tional munitions is estimated at 400,000 tons.I would like to highlight the political, technical and cooperative devel-opments.I am pleased that the Federal Republic of Germany has not only statedits intention to provide 100 million euros for the development of inno-vative ammunition clearance technologies in a mobile offshore plat-form but has also included these funds in its current budget planning.In view of the quantities to be cleared over the next 20 years, thesefunds can only be a start. I’m convinced that the democratic countriesbordering the Baltic Sea must continue to talk constructively aboutlong-term joint solutions for financingFrom my point of view, there are two main points to note on the tech-nical level.The development of a mobile, floating facility for the final thermal de-struction of explosives, for which German funds are earmarked, givesfurther hope that a modern and effective method of munitions clearancewill soon be available.In view of the time that has already elapsed, however, it is certainlyworth considering how further technical developments that are alreadypossible today, such as better reconnaissance of ammunition dumpswith the aid of AI, can be further advanced.6IntroductionThere has undoubtedly been progress in the area of cooperation. I want to mention only the exchanges andactivities by the BSPC, CBSS, HELCOM, some governments and regionalIn the coming years, however, we must pay attention to further intensifying the processes between the Bal-tic Sea States and to translating technological developments into tangible quantities of recovered ammuni-tion. To this end, it is necessary to jointly put long-term financing on a sound footing and to further inten-sify the already existing exchange of knowledge and experience.Although the ammunition community is strongly networked, encompasses countries and sectors and pur-sues a common goal, it has not yet been possible to make the knowledge available in expert circles accessibleto a broader public sufficiently so that the local people can support the necessary actions adequately.I would like to take this opportunity to thank the experts who generously shared their expertise with me.I would also like to thank Bodo Bahr, who provided me with considerable support in my work as rapporteur.Anna KassautzkiMember of the German Bundestag,BSPC Rapporteur on Sea-Dumped Munitions7Activities of the BSPC2 . Activities of the BSPCSince the 28th Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference held on August 25-27, 2019 in Oslo, the matter of sea-bed disposal of munitions has been discussed at all BSPC and BSPC Standing Committee meetings. Thishighlights the vital concern that parliamentarians from member countries placed on this issue. And this ded-ication ensures that crucial issues remain on the agenda and, at its best, translates community and scientificendeavors into concrete policy.2.1 29th BSPC2.1.1 Resolution of the 29th BSPC - August 24, 20201The 29th annual BSPC took place in digital format on August 24, 2020. During this event, the participants,who were elected and delegated representatives from states in the Baltic Sea region, unanimously adopted aresolution. In particular, item 15 of the resolution included a call to address the issue of legacy munitions inthe Baltic Sea, building on the 28th resolution.Paragraph 15 of the 29th resolution urged governments in the Baltic Sea region, the Council of the BalticSea States (CBSS) and the European Union to intensify efforts to monitor and address the problem ofdumped munitions, wrecks and ghost nets in the Baltic Sea. This call was made in the context of safeguard-ing the environment, seas and oceans for future generations, taking into account the priorities of the Ger-man HELCOM Chairmanship.The resolution emphasized the importance of a common international approach that supports existing na-tional and international efforts and responsibilities. It also underlined the need to strengthen existing policystructures and scientific projects in order to position the Baltic Sea Region as a global leader in addressingthe challenges posed by dumped munitions, underwater unexploded ordnance, wrecks and ghost nets.To clarify the resolution at that time, I will quote paragraph 15 of the declaration below.“acknowledging the priorities of Germany’s HELCOM Chairmanship to intensify efforts to monitor and totreat the problem of dumped munitions, wrecks and ghost nets in the Baltic Sea on a common internation-al approach supporting the existing national and international efforts and responsibilities, moreover tostrengthen existing political structures and scientific projects, also thus to make the Baltic Sea region becomea global leader in the field of solving problems associated with dumped munitions and unexploded ordnancelocated underwater as well as in the field of wrecks and ghost nets.”21 https://www.bspc.net/29th-bspc-resolution-final-adopted/2 https://www.bspc.net/29th-bspc-resolution-final-adopted/8Activities of the BSPC2.1.2 Questionnaire on sea-dumped munitions in the Baltic Sea in the Reporton Sea-Dumped Munitions for the 30th BSPC3In the report on sea-dumped munitions for the 30th BSPC, the former rapporteur Peter Stein summarizedthe results of a questionnaire on the actual national activities in the Baltic Sea on legacy munitions.“Analysis of the replies received firstly confirms that the legacy munitions in the Baltic Sea are seen as a ma-jor joint challenge. Secondly, it reveals that assorted national activities have been happening in the differentcoastal states and – even more importantly – a regular reckoning with the dangerous remnants of war has-been documented.Although the idea of a voluntary donor fund has been hailed as welcome, no specific proposals for its prac-tical implementation have been put forward. Understandably, the need to sort out historical and legal re-sponsibility remains a factor, and I agree that this issue is of particular import. Clearing up these special is-sues must not generate disagreement at the wrong time or be taken as a reason to put off taking action. Theadvancing corrosion of the munitions means we have no time left to play with. The only prerequisite forstarting the necessary measures must be the desire to undertake an immediate joint effort. Otherwise, we willrun out of time.As we only received several responses to my questionnaire, they are not at first glance representative. Takenin combination, however, especially the responses from Germany, Poland, Russia and Sweden and the state-ments on the 29th BSPC resolution together provide a cohesive overall picture that allows for at least somecautious conclusions about the general state of opinion.”42.1.3 Implementation of the 29th BSPC resolution in and by the States5“By the specified date of 16 July 2021, the BSPC Secretariat had received statements from 13 of the 22 re-gional and national governments. This participation by more than half of the states which provide BSPCmembers was gratifying, particularly given that some of the statements were very extensive and detailed. Itshould be noted that four of the 13 statements received do not highlight the part which is of relevance here,item 15. However, some of them did provide responses to the Rapporteur’s questionnaire on sea-dumpedmunitions in the Baltic Sea instead.”6The states’ pronouncements are documented in the appendix of the Report onSea-Dumped Munitions forthe 30th BSPC.3 https://www.bspc.net/bspc_reportonsea-dumpedmunitionsforthe30thbspc/4 https://www.bspc.net/bspc_reportonsea-dumpedmunitionsforthe30thbspc/, Annex 14.75 https://www.bspc.net/bspc_reportonsea-dumpedmunitionsforthe30thbspc/6 https://www.bspc.net/bspc_reportonsea-dumpedmunitionsforthe30thbspc/, Annex 14.19Activities of the BSPC2.2 30th BSPC7“Mr Michael Roth, Member of Parliament and State Minister for Europe, German Presidency 2022–2023of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, underlined their desire to reinforce cooperation between govern-ments, parliaments and civil society. He highlighted three topics of major importance for Baltic cooperation:European general values; the protection of climate and environment; the youth. In terms of the Baltic Sea’senvironmental status, Mr Roth pointed out that sea-dumped ammunitions were a particular danger but of-fered the opportunity for the Baltic Sea region to become a forerunner in cleaning up the sea. In all these ar-eas, the BSPC was a fundamental partner.”82.2.1 Report on sea-dumped munitions for the 30th BSPC - August 17, 20219In his capacity as Rapporteur on sea-dumped munitions, Peter Stein received feedback from experts, high-lighting an unprecedented level of powerful impetus, clear momentum, and readiness to undertake a system-atic effort to salvage and eliminate hazardous munitions. However, Peter Stein emphasized that achieving asustainable solution would require maintaining the current impetus and not simply observing developmentsbut also expanding international collaborations and capabilities to industrial proportions.Peter Stein stressed that it was the responsibility of the regional and national parliament members to urge theirrespective governments to promptly engage in cooperative actions within the Baltic Sea region. The conditionsfor immediate action were already in place, including sufficient data, established methods for risk analysis anddecision-making, proven technological solutions, and the support structures provided by HELCOM.According to Peter Stein, the Baltic Sea area held the potential to become a leading region for research, de-velopment, and application of scalable solutions applicable to the entire maritime industry. Furthermore, theknowledge and advancements made in this area would benefit other munitions dumping grounds, as suchlocations were prevalent worldwide.2.2.2 Resolution of the 30th BSPCThe participants of the 30th BSPC, elected representatives from the Baltic Sea Region States, assembled indigital form on 30 August 2021 and unanimously passed the 30th BSPC resolution. In the resolution, theBSPC addressed the issue of sea-dumped munitions in the Baltic Sea extensively under item 47.“concerning sea-dumped munitions, toa. strengthen efforts to recover and neutralise explosive ordnance in the Baltic Sea with concrete measuresthrough multinational cooperation according to the 28th and 29th BSPC Resolutions as well as the inter-im and final BSPC rapporteur’s reports on sea-dumped munitions;b. bring together the different national findings, research results and data in an expert group - if possible, atHELCOM - and, on this basis, prepare concrete actions for the removal of explosive ordnance in the Bal-tic Sea;7 https://www.bspc.net/the-30th-baltic-sea-parliamentary-conference-gathered-digitally-to-celebrate-intense-cooperation/8 https://www.bspc.net/the-30th-baltic-sea-parliamentary-conference-gathered-digitally-to-celebrate-intense-cooperation/9 https://www.bspc.net/bspc_reportonsea-dumpedmunitionsforthe30thbspc/10Activities of the BSPCc. strive for an international donor fund in the concretisation of the financial instrument mentioned in the28th BSPC Resolution and consider whether HELCOM could manage such funds;d. establish the Baltic Sea Region as a global model region for the environmentally sound, rapid and afforda-ble salvage and decontamination and removal of explosive ordnance dumped in the sea;e. take all necessary measures aiming to complete the disposal and rendering harmless of explosive ordnanceand other hazardous products in the Baltic Sea within the next 20 years;f. look at the option of including this task as a long-term ecological priority explicitly in the HELCOM Bal-tic Sea Action Plan.”The 28th and 29th BSPC Resolutions, along with the interim and final BSPC rapporteur’s reports on sea-dumped munitions, called for concrete measures to address the issue of sea-dumped munitions in the BalticSea. It was proposed to intensify efforts in recovering and neutralizing explosive ordnance through multina-tional cooperation.Additionally, there was a suggestion to create an expert group, preferably at HELCOM, to consolidate na-tional findings, research results, and data. This group would work towards formulating specific actions forthe removal of explosive ordnance from the Baltic Sea.The aim was to establish the Baltic Sea Region as a global model region for environmentally friendly, prompt, andcost-effective salvage, decontamination, and removal of sea-dumped explosive ordnance. In this context, the pos-sibility of seeking an international donor fund was also explored, building on the financial instrument mentionedin the 28th BSPC Resolution. HELCOM’s potential role in managing such funds was to be considered.To achieve the goal of disposing of and rendering harmless all explosive ordnance and hazardous products inthe Baltic Sea, efforts were to be taken over the next 20 years.Furthermore, the option of explicitly incorporating this task as a long-term ecological priority in the HEL-COM Baltic Sea Action Plan was to be examined.102.2.3 Implementation of the 30th BSPC resolution in and by the States 20April 2022On April 20, 2022, the BSPC was able to publish the Implementation of the 30th BSPC resolution in andby the States. The statements are documented here11. The statements and information provided by the gov-ernments form a unique and valuable overview of developments in the respective policy fields in the BalticSea Region. Based on these statements and comprehensive information, parliamentarians can track progressin different policy fields and identify further action needs.Regarding the issue of legacy munitions, most states not only acknowledge its relevance but also participate,among other initiatives, through HELCOM, in further addressing the problem.10 https://www.bspc.net/30-bspc-resolution-2021-adopted/11 https://www.bspc.net/bspc_statements_30thbspc_resolution_opt/11Activities of the BSPC2.3 31th BSPC , Stockholm, June, 14 20222.3.1 31th BSPC ReportThe 31st BSPC took up the issue of sea-dumped munitions at several points. Various speakers addressed thetopic in different sessions as well as in the general debate and the closing session. The contributions are doc-umented below. The contributions are documented here.12“Speech by Ms Annalena Baerbock, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Germany; first session, incomingGerman presidency of the CBSSAnnalena Baerbock: There was a ticking time bomb at the bottom of the Baltic Sea, which they wanted todefuse: munitions from past wars. The seabed was strewn with up to 400,000 tonnes of conventional explo-sives and around 40,000 tonnes of chemical weapons. Ms. Baerbock noted that this was roughly equivalentto the total load of 11,000 articulated lorries – representing a deadly threat to the environment and life inthe sea. During the German presidency, they would therefore look for ways to accelerate the recovery of thesemunitions, bringing together relevant experts as a first step.The bombs, mines and sunken warships at the bottom of the Baltic Sea showed that wars and their conse-quences would often reverberate for decades afterwards.[...]Apart from the announcement of the Federal Foreign Minister, Ms Annalena Baerbock, that one of the pri-orities of the German CBSS presidency would be the sea-dumped ammunitions – which had also been a very important topic in the BSPC’s discussions in the last years -, MrSchraps asked Mr Berstad if that issue had already been deepened during the CBSS Ministerial Meeting in Kristiansand.[...]Concerning sea-dumped ammunitions, Mr Berstad said that it had not been directly addressed by the Nor-wegian presidency. He pointed out that there were 100,000– 200,000 tons of dumped ammunitions in the waters adjacent to their nations. The problems and issueswere known to the Council, and Norway was actively participating in EU-sponsored networks. The task ofthe Norwegian presidency had been to look atboth sides of the straits, as there were similar concerns in the North Sea as well as in the scope of the BalticSea states – the geographic catchment area, so to say. The seriousness of this issue was something that theywere looking into, together with HELCOM and other structures.[...]Ms Simona Jakaitė – one of the representatives from the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum – from Lith-uania pointed out:12 https://www.bspc.net/bspc_raport314/12Activities of the BSPCAt the same time, the youths very much hoped for means of fighting against pollution by regulating and re-ducing single-use plastics, investing in greener shipping, removing munitions and military remains from thesea – as had already been mentioned on this day –, preventing agricultural waste before reaching the watersand perhaps even unifying the bottle deposit system in the Baltic Sea region.Mr Andreas Schoop – another representative of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum – noted that thiswas a tough question. In the end, he believed that now was the time to act, and they had big ideas. Oneshould not look at the past but develop new ideas. He allowed that talking about matters was also important,noting that his colleague and he were both involved in the Baltic Sea Youth Platform of the CBSS. They weremeeting regularly there every two weeks to discuss Baltic Sea policies. It was really important to talk and findideas so as to go forward. For him, a crucial matter at the moment was the matter of dumped ammunitions.All the technologies had been developed, all the necessary knowledge was in place, but the politi-cal will – as well as the budget – was now needed. He pointed out that the German presidency of the BSPCwould also focus on this matter. That was very much a matter that would have to be done in the next period.[Hans Wallmark, Sweden, General Debate]He believed that the old challenges and problems remained – the ones that had been raised before, such as the climatechange, the Baltic Sea water, the sea-dumped ammunitions as mentioned by the foreign minister from Germany.At the same time – underlined by the strong and impressive words of the delegates of the Baltic Sea Parlia-mentary Youth Forum – the climate crisis remained one of the greatest challenges of this time. In view of thefinal year of the BSPC’s current Working Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change, the German Bunde-stag put the protection and preservation of the marine environment and strengthening the resilience of mar-itime ecosystems at the forefront of their presidency. This included cooperation in the energy sector, windenergy and intensifying the efforts to monitor and treat the problem of sea-dumped munitions.”132.3.2 Resolution 31th BSPCIn summary, the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) called in its final resolution for continued andintensified efforts, in cooperation with HELCOM and the CBSS, to explore, identify, recover, and neutral-ize munitions dumped at sea. The importance of the issue can be illustrated by noting that the topic of seas-dumped munitions is addressed in no less than two points of the resolution. The goal, he said, remains theimplementation of specific measures through multinational cooperation, as outlined in the 28th, 29th, and30th BSPC resolutions and in the interim and final reports of the BSPC rapporteurs on seas-dumped mu-nitions. It also said the goal is to establish the Baltic Sea Region as a global model for the environmentallysound, rapid, and cost-effective recovery, decontamination, and disposal of ordnance dumped in the sea.In addition, the BSPC encouraged countries responsible for dumped munitions in the Baltic Sea to establish a re-covery fund and take the lead in recovery efforts. This would help make the Baltic Sea free of dumped ordnance.The BSPC welcomed the commitment of the incoming German CBSS Presidency to advance this issue.13 https://www.bspc.net/bspc_raport314/13Activities of the BSPCItems 26 and 27 of the resolution are documented below.“26. concerning sea-dumped munitions, also in the current times of war continue unabated in close coop-eration with HELCOM and CBSS to strengthen efforts exploring, identifying, recovering and neutral-ising explosive ordnance in the Baltic Sea with concrete measures through multinational cooperationaccording to the 28th, 29th and 30th BSPC Resolutions as well as the interim and final BSPC rappor-teur’s reports on sea-dumped munitions and establish the Baltic Sea Region as a global model region forthe environmentally sound, rapid and affordable salvage and decontamination and removal of explosiveordnance dumped in the sea;27. encourage the countries who are responsible for dumped munitions in the BalticSea to start a recovery fund and to lead the recovery effort that would help achieve a Baltic Sea free from dumpedexplosive ordnance; we welcome the efforts of the incoming German CBSS presidency to push this issue”.142.3.3 Statements of the Governments in the Baltic Sea Region to the 31st BSPCResolution15 - June 6, 2023The states’ pronouncements are documented here.162.4 Sea-dumped munitions on BSPC Standing Committee MeetingsI want to emphasize that the problem of marine disposal of munitions has been addressed not only in recentBSPC meetings, but also in regular standing committee meetings.2.4.1 Standing Committee of the BSPC - Exploring the Dangers of Sea-Dumped Ammunitions and Steering Towards the New Year – 21 November2022The Baltic Sea Parliamentarians Conference (BSPC), held in Berlin, addressed the urgent problem of dumpedmunitions in the Baltic Sea, which has been high on the organization’s agenda since 2019. Because of themeeting’s outstanding importance to the pressing problem of sea-dumped munitions, I am placing a specialemphasis here. International organizations such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Hel-sinki Commission (HELCOM) have recently paid more attention to this problem. The conference stressedthe need for urgent action and international cooperation to clean up the dangerous legacy of munitionsdumped in the sea after World War II.At the conference, experts such as Jann Wendt, CEO of north.io, presented alarming data on the scale of theproblem, emphasizing that dumped munitions are a global problem that affects not only the Baltic andNorth Seas, but also other coastal areas around the world, including the Australian and Japanese coasts. Ithas been estimated that some 1.6 million tons of conventional munitions have been dumped in German14 https://www.bspc.net/conference-resolution-31-bspc/15 https://www.bspc.net/statements-of-the-governments-in-the-baltic-sea-region-to-the-31st-bspc-resolution/16 https://www.bspc.net/statements-of-the-governments-in-the-baltic-sea-region-to-the-31st-bspc-resolution/14Activities of the BSPCwaters alone. This huge amount of munitions has serious economic and environmental consequences. JannWendt’s presentation is documented here.17One of the biggest concerns is the toxicity of these munitions, which affects the marine environment and itsfauna. Over the past seven years, research has focused on understanding the effects of the spilled toxins onmarine life, including fish and shellfish. Toxic substances such as TNT (trinitrotoluene) are not only harm-ful to marine organisms, but also contaminate the marine food web. Concentrations of these toxic substanc-es are higher near dumping sites, making the region extremely sensitive and already heavily polluted com-pared to other seas.The conference recognized the efforts of various countries and organizations to research and solve the prob-lem. The German government and parliament have taken an important step by allocating more than 100million euros to test innovative robotic technology for recovering munitions from the seabed. However, thescale of the problem requires continued international cooperation and increased investment in research, de-tection and clearance technologies.Various methods for detecting and mapping munitions locations have been discussed, such as the use of sonarand magnetic means. However, the complexity of the problem lies in the sheer number of munitions in thewater, making it difficult to determine their exact locations. New systems have been developed to analyze datacollected by sensor stations and various vessels in the area to better understand the extent of the problem.Removing munitions dumped in the sea is a daunting task, and the urgency of action cannot be underesti-mated. Erosion continues to expose munitions, causing toxins to enter the marine ecosystem. If not ade-quately addressed, contamination will continue to spread and pose an even greater threat to marine life, thefood chain, and human health.To effectively address this problem, the conference emphasized the importance of sharing information and bestpractices among countries in the Baltic Sea region and beyond. International cooperation is essential to develop ascience-based roadmap for cleanup efforts, establish toxicological thresholds, and develop safe disposal methods.The Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference has recognized itself as a leader in this field and is committed to contin-uing to support efforts to address the problem of dumped munitions in the Baltic Sea region and beyond.In summary, the BSPC’s focus on munitions dumped in the sea during the conference highlighted the ur-gent need for immediate action and cooperation to protect the marine environment and human health. Tox-ic munitions pose a significant threat to the Baltic Sea region and require coordinated efforts, financial in-vestments, and innovative technologies to be effectively cleared from the sea. The discussions and resolutionsof the conference aim to promote further cooperation and research and make the Baltic Sea region a globalmodel for environmentally sound and rapid munitions recovery and decontamination.As rapporteur for sea-dumped munitions, I would like to emphasize that both the exchange with the expertsand the focus on the topic are very appropriate to the importance of the issue. The task now must be to con-tinue to address the problem, which is not easily recognizable to many people because it lies beneath the sur-face of the sea, with appropriate measures. I would also like to emphasize at this point that further joint ac-tion by the countries concerned and the active use of modern technologies such as artificial intelligence areessential.17 https://www.bspc.net/2022-11-21_bspc_wendt/15Activities of the BSPC2.4.2 Deepening Collaboration with the EU, the CBSS and HELCOM - BSPCStanding Committee, Brussels – 6 March 202318Ambassador Grzegorz Poznański, Director General of the CBSS Secretariat, highlighted how closely theBSPC and the CBSS were working together, especially on the continuation of the regional cooperation afterRussia’s withdrawal. He focused on the most important happenings in the CBSS, beginning with the Germanpresidency’s priorities on youth, offshore power and dumped munitions. The CBSS had provided a sustaina-ble youth platform for the Baltic Sea region, also feeding into the renamed Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Fo-rum. The CBSS Baltic Sea Youth Forum, now a permanent institution, allowed young people to interact withpolitical representatives. On that basis, a CBSS Youth Ministerial Meeting would be held in Berlin, prior tothe Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum in conjunction with the BSPC in Berlin back to back to BSPCConference. On the second point, a planned Offshore Energy Forum would bring together the foreign min-isters of Germany and Denmark as well as the environment ministers of all CBSS member states with thestakeholders, including business and academia. Regarding dumped munitions, the CBSS had moved the mat-ter forward into specific action together with HELCOM. They now knew what was known but also what stillhad to be researched. Monitoring was required, he noted. In December, an expert round table had takenplace, with politicians and civil servants also taking part. Ambassador Poznański underlined the significantrole DG Mare from the European Commission was playing in these endeavours. Furthermore, the CBSS hadbeen considering the future of regional cooperation, looking into safety and security as well as the youth voiceas part of the regional identity. Ambassador Poznański pointed to the upcoming Ministerial Meeting in Wis-mar as decisive for setting the course on all these various issues. As for the present work, he pointed out thatthe cohesion among the member states had increased greatly since the Russian withdrawal as had the impor-tance of the CBSS. In addition, the integration of the successful Baltic Sea cooperation into the European co-operation was important since the Baltic success also meant a success for Europe.192.4.3 BSPC Standing Committee, Stralsund – 12 June 2023BSPC Rapporteur on Sea-Dumped Munitions, Ms Anna Kassautzki, had attended an expert roundtable onthe topic in December 2022, organised by the CBSS. They had discussed with researchers and representa-tives from NATO and the European Commission. Ms Kassautzki had submitted the proposals of the BSPCWorking Group in this respect as well as the German government’s grant of 100 million euros to build a pro-totype mobile disposal platform. It had been consensus that enough data had been collected for action. TheBaltic Sea should serve as the pioneering site for these technologies and processes. The EU was interested infunding further such disposal platforms once the prototype would prove successful. She underlined that sev-eral countries around the Baltic Sea were pursuing this topic.President Johannes Schraps added that the topic of sea-dumped munitions had also been deepened at theMinisterial and VASAB meetings of the CBSS in Wismar one and a half weeks earlier. This proved that theparliamentary efforts of the BSPC worked and affected the government level.Prof Jānis Vucāns presented some wording changes and a proposal on how to present an abstract on sea-dumped munitions. President Johannes Schraps and Secretary General Bodo Bahr were grateful for the textand agreed it would be shaped into the final form. Prof Jānis Vucāns stressed that it was important to showresults achieved from the BSPC’s efforts, especially in this field.18 https://helcom.fi/dumped-munitions-are-on-the-roundtable-in-kiel/19 https://helcom.fi/dumped-munitions-are-on-the-roundtable-in-kiel/16Further Activities at the EU and transnational levelBSPC President Johannes Schraps remarked that he had been invited to the CBSS Foreign Ministers’ Sum-mit in Wismar, where he gave an impact statement on offshore wind, providing insight into the BSPC’s dis-cussions and the parliamentary dimension, particularly on sea-dumped munitions. There had been the op-portunity for additional conversations in the margins of the meeting with high-level representatives.203 . Further Activities at the EU and transnational level3.1 HELCOM Ministerial Meeting – Lübeck 20 October 202121Dealing with the issue of ammunition contamination takes place not only at the level of BSPC, but also atthe level of intergovernmental cooperation. One example is HELCOM, which met in October 2021 for anupdate of the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP).“Recognizing the importance of the Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP) for achieving good environmental statusin the Baltic Sea, the HELCOM Ministers decided, during the Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in 2018, toupdate the plan by the end of 2021 at the latest. It was then further agreed to adopt the updated BSAP dur-ing the HELCOM Ministerial Meeting 2021 (MM2021).The HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP), initially adopted during the HELCOM Ministerial Meetingin Kraków in 2007, is an ambitious and comprehensive regional programme of action to achieve a healthymarine environment. The plan, unique on a global level, remains one of the most effective instruments forachieving the HELCOM environmental objectives, offering a long-term vision and strategic orientation.The original BSAP can be credited with reducing inputs of nutrients and hazardous substances, improvingthe protection and state of biodiversity, and cleaner and safer shipping practices.The updated BSAP is based on the current plan and maintains the same level of ambition. It also includes allactions and measures from the previous plan that haven’t been implemented yet. In addition, the updatedBSAP also considers emerging and previously insufficiently addressed pressures such as climate change, ma-rine litter, pharmaceuticals, underwater noise, and loss and disturbance of seabed, among other pressures,making it fit-for-purpose to address today’s challenges.”22“It is essential, in particular, to recall HELCOM’s important role in the implementation of the legislation onprotection of marine environments at the regional level. Given that only appropriate structures will deliveradequate results, we reiterate HELCOM’s firm determination to ensure the efficiency and maximal supportto the implementation of the updated BSAP. HELCOM has also played a pioneering role at the regional lev-el over the past five decades in reducing various sources of pollution (input of nutrients and hazardous sub-stances, marine litter) and protecting biodiversity.In doing so, HELCOM has applied the ecosystem-based approach and addressed the main pressures on themarine environment in a holistic and integrated way with concrete operational objectives and solid monitor-ing mechanisms.20 https://www.bspc.net/consultations-in-the-face-of-marine-life/21 https://helcom.fi/helcom-at-work/ministerial-meetings/2021-lubeck/22 https://helcom.fi/helcom-at-work/ministerial-meetings/2021-lubeck/17Further Activities at the EU and transnational levelThe updated BSAP is also closely aligned with international and regional ecological objectives such as theUN Sustainable Development Goals, the targets of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the EU’s MarineStrategy Framework Directive (MSFD) as well as all other pertinent EU legislation and programmes and thelegislation of the Russian Federation, including the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation. This po-sitions HELCOM as one of the regional platforms for the implementation of these targets and objectives.”23In the 2021 update of the Baltic Sea Action Plan, the item “Historical ammunition and haz. sunken objects”is one of 17 main activities. In the section “Hazardous substances and litter segment Baltic Sea unaffected byhazardous substances and litter” it is stated:“Furthermore, dumped chemical and conventional munition remain buried on the seafloor, and new chem-icals with currently unknown effects and unquantified inputs are being used and released into the aquaticenvironment.”24In addition, the topic of ammunition waste is mentioned under the item “Sea-based activities segment En-vironmentally sustainable sea-based activities”. There it is stated:“Along with submerged hazardous objects such as sea-dumped munitions, warfare materials and wrecks con-taining oil, activities causing disturbance to the seabed contribute to the potential release of harmful sub-stances that may affect the marine environment and activities in the Baltic Sea. Besides being sources of pol-lution, submerged hazardous objects are also physical obstacles on the seafloor and pose a risk to maritimeworkers. The above-mentioned activities, including the operation of offshore windfarms and aquaculture fa-cilities, also affect marine organisms through the effects of noise and may cause hazards and disturbance tosea birds and other marine life.Despite significant progress in many areas of sea-based activities, it is clear that further actions are needed.The expansion of sea-based activities through emerging maritime sectors has further resulted in several pres-sures for which regulatory frameworks are not or not yet in place. The cumulative effects of existing and newsea-based activities need to be evaluated, and an ecosystem-based approach implemented, where the carry-ing capacity of the ecosystem and the need to set limits for human activities are acknowledged.”Two actions are proposed to address this.“S 34 Develop Best Environmental Practice (BEP) for comprehensive risk assessment of munitions, wrecksand hazardous submerged objects by 2025 and implement the Best Available Techniques (BAT) forenvironmentally sound and safe management by 2028.S 35 Maintain the HELCOM thematic assessment on hazardous submerged objects as a living document,including munitions and wrecks and regularly update the information in the HELCOM Map and DataService by 2024.”2523 https://helcom.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/HELCOM-Ministerial-Statement-2021.pdf24 https://helcom.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Baltic-Sea-Action-Plan-2021-update.pdf25 https://helcom.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Baltic-Sea-Action-Plan-2021-update.pdf18Further Activities at the EU and transnational level3.2 CBSS and HELCOM: Dumped munitions are on the(round)table, Kiel - 12-13 December 2022After extensive efforts, including by the BSPC in past years, around 40 leading experts from the Baltic SeaRegion (BSR) convened in Kiel, Germany on December 12-13, 2022 for a roundtable discussion aimed ataddressing the issue of dumped munitions in the Baltic Sea.This meeting’s importance is evidenced by the co-organizers, including the Council of the Baltic Sea States(CBSS), the German Foreign Office, the State of Schleswig-Holstein, the European Union, and the HEL-COM Contracting Parties, which are Member States of the European Union.HELCOM is dedicated to the topic of ammunition contamination in the EG Submerged (HELCOM Ex-pert Group on Environmental Risks of Submerged Objects).“The overall aim of the HELCOM Expert Group on Environmental Risks of Submerged Objects (EG Sub-merged) is to contribute to regionally coordinated actions on submerged munitions and explosives of con-cern as well as other submerged hazardous objects, aiming, in the long-term, at addressing potential adverseeffects of such objects and their constituents on the marine environment of the Baltic Sea.”26For the year 2023-2024, the Expert Group has set itself 15 tasks that address the issue of sea-dumped muni-tions with a very broad approach. The work plan is documented in the annex.“To tackle the explosive issue of dumped munitions in the waters of the Baltic Sea, about 40 leading expertsfrom the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) met at a roundtable event in Kiel, Germany from 12 to 13 December 2022.The objectives of the roundtable were to establish a common understanding and initiate a multi-disciplinaryand BSR-wide dialogue on dumped munitions, including the best options for remedial and removal of whathas now become a ticking timebomb.After the Second World War, around 40,000 tonnes of chemical munitions were discarded in designateddumping areas in the Baltic Sea. An unknown quantity was also disposed of on the way to the dumping sites,making it difficult to pinpoint exact locations.In addition, an unknown but large amount of conventional ammunition and unexploded ordnance (UXO)such as bombs and mines also lie on the Baltic’s seabed. Experts estimate that about 300,000 tonnes of con-ventional munitions remain in German marine waters alone. In general, dumped munitions and UXO canbe found in the waters of all Baltic Sea countries.Uncertainties prevail about the state of corrosion of the containers of the warfare material, as some have nowbeen submerged for over 75 years. Of the chemical munitions, it is estimated that the majority contain high-ly toxic mustard gas agents.The issue of dumped munitions is one of the priorities under the current German Presidency of the CBSS.It was also a priority under the German Chairmanship of HELCOM (2020-2022), and also features in theHELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP).26 https://helcom.fi/helcom-at-work/groups/sea-based-pressures/submerged/19Further Activities at the EU and transnational levelCo-organised by the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the German Federal Foreign Office, the Ger-man Federal State of Schleswig-Holstein, and the European Union and the Contracting Parties to HEL-COM that are Member States of the European Union, the roundtable was attended by leading experts inpolicy-making, environmental protection, civil protection, large-scale project management and financing.Dumped munitions and UXO pose a threat to all Baltic Sea countries and users of the sea, not only endangering hu-man health and the marine ecosystem but also putting at risk shipping and fisheries, among other maritime activities.As active removal of hazardous underwater objects is complex and expensive, and carries a certain risk of ac-cidents, the default decision of many national authorities has been to leave the material on the seabed. How-ever, there is now a growing consensus about the fact that remediation will eventually be inevitable, and thataction needs to be taken now.”273.3 EU Maritime Security Strategy28 and its Action Plan29“An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy forevolving maritime threats” – 10 March 2023The EU Maritime Security Strategy identifies the risks posed by dumped munitions at sea and addresses fourmeasures in the associated action plan that the EU considers appropriate to reduce these risks.“Threats and illicit activities – such as piracy and armed robbery at sea, organised crime, including smugglingof migrants and trafficking of human beings, trafficking of arms and narcotics, terrorism, illegal, unreportedand unregulated (IUU) fishing, other illegal activities, including unauthorised exploration in the exclusiveeconomic zones of EU Member States, and unexploded ordnance (UXO)16 at sea – remain equally criticalchallenges in multiple regions with some coastal areas and remote territories of the EU being particularlyvulnerable. Some of these illicit activities may be facilitated by poor port security. Malicious actors may alsocombine these threats and activities to carry out hybrid attacks against the EU and its Member States.”30Action Plan27 https://helcom.fi/dumped-munitions-are-on-the-roundtable-in-kiel/28 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_148329 https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-03/join-2023-8-annex_en.pdf30 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_148320Motion in the German Bundestag – September 20213.4 20th CBSS Ministerial Session, Wismar – 2 June 202331The CBSS consists of the 10 Foreign Ministers of the CBSS Member States, plus a High-level Representa-tive of the European Union. At its June 2, 2023 meeting, the Council addressed the issue of sea-dumpedmunitions in two points of its declaration.“10. The Council took note of the decision of the German Government to initiate a national immediate ac-tion programme to address salvaging underwater munition in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, includ-ing the development of a mobile platform for munitions clearance. The Council welcomed Germany’soffer to share experience from this programme with regional partners.11. The Council welcomed the initiation of a cross-sectoral, multi-disciplinary andmacro-regional dialogueon underwater munitions and took note of therecommendations of the expert round table held in Kielin December 2022, and thejoint meeting of HELCOM and CBSS senior officials in April 2023. TheCouncilacknowledged the significant role of HELCOM in this field. It encouraged thecontinuation ofclose cooperation with HELCOM and other relevant organisationswith the aim of filling knowledgegaps, developing best environmental practices forrisk assessment, and exploring financing options fordeveloping and implementingbest available techniques for environmentally sound and safe manage-ment, andinvited the Director General to update the Council on the progress made.12. The Council welcomed the presentation of the Joint Communication on the updateof the EU MaritimeSecurity Strategy and its Action Plan, which includes proposals formeasures on the topic of underwatermunitions in the Baltic Sea, as well as ongoingdiscussions thereon at the EU level. The Council lookedforward to the upcoming OurBaltic Conference 2.0 in September 2023 in Palanga.”324 . Motion in the German Bundestag – September 2021The German federal election of 2021 led to a change in the government. As per the coalition agreement, thenew coalition not only established an immediate programme for recovering and destroying ammunitioncontamination, but also to secure medium- and long-term funding within a national framework. The coali-tion partners specifically intend to set up an immediate programme for the salvage and destruction of mu-nitions waste in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, as well as a federal-state fund for medium- and long-termsalvage, and to finance it solidly.The federal budget allocated 100 million euros to finance a munitions clearance platform in response to this.5 . StudiesAddressing the pressing issue of munitions waste in the Baltic Sea benefits from the broad network of dedi-cated scientists who share their findings with national and transnational policy groups, including the BSPC.31 https://cbss.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/cbss-wismar-declaration_2-june-2023.pdf32 https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/cbss-2023/260013421StudiesFor instance, to demonstrate the impact of global warming on the issue of munitions waste, which shouldnot be underestimated, I will provide examples from some relevant studies below.5.1 DG MARE “Study on underwater unexplodedmunition”33 – March 2022In March 2022, the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency published a studyon underwater unexploded munition. Among other things, the report refers to the large number of unex-ploded munitions. The recommendations of the study are documented in the appendix.“The Baltic Sea was, by contrast, heavily mined during the two wars, and was also the dumping site for manyaborted or accomplished missions. Historical data has been of significant help in attempting to identify themain sites and, through national and regional efforts, clear the path for key maritime routes. The issue withsuch data, however, is the lack of precision that characterized georeferencing tools in the mid-20th century.The presence of different currents had the effect of displacing many UXOs, enlarging therefore the areas ofinterest. Regional cooperation in the basin is very good.”345.2 FFI - Analysis of samples of high explosives extractedfrom explosive remnants of war - 22 June 2022In 2022, Geir P. Novik of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), “the prime institution re-sponsible for defence related research and development in Norway”, published a study on the analysis ofsamples of high explosives extracted from explosive remnants of war. I quote from the conclusion below.“The thermal and impact sensitivity results obtained in the analysis showed no indications of deteriorationof high explosives in explosive remnants of war that could denote any significant reduction in performanceand/or decreased impact sensitivity. Consequently, there is no evidence in this study to support a claim that,if left alone, the ammunition will slowly become harmless over time. The study did show that the high ex-plosives are still in good condition, and that impact sensitivity does not seem to have been reduced over thelast eight decades. Further research into possible variations, as a result of environmental, chemical or techni-cal differences, will be required, in order to gain further knowledge on ageing ERW.It is important to note that this study is limited to only the analysis of TNT and PETN and does not includeeither primary explosives or other high explosives or explosive compositions, some of which could be expect-ed to be significantly more impact-sensitive than the explosives included within this study.”3533 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/publications/study-underwater-unexploded-munition_en34 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/publications/study-underwater-unexploded-munition_en35 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969722039614?via%3Dihub22Recommendations for action5.3 Effects of climate change on marine dumpedmunitions and possible consequence for inhabitingbiota - 28 August 2021An article discussing the impact of climate change on sea-dumped munitions was published in Environmen-tal Sciences Europe in 2021.Completing the discussion, I present the following conclusion from the text. From my perspective, twopoints stand out in particular: It appears that the process of corrosion is increasing, and the toxic effects arebecoming more significant, particularly with the influence of climate change.“Climate change will influence a number of factors that determine the faith of munition compounds in ma-rine environments. Direct effects concern mechanical impact through water turbulences which is likely toincrease the leakage of toxic compounds from dumped munitions. Corrosion is a ticking time bomb, whichwill lead to increased leakage from dumped munitions. There is no doubt about this ongoing process, but itis likely that climate change will rather accelerate corrosion, than attenuate it. Organism confronted withmunition compounds seem to be able to metabolise them to some extent, toxic effects of munition com-pounds might outweigh the benefits of metabolization and degradation, in particular when organisms areexposed to environmental stress due to climate change.”366 . Recommendations for actionThe 32nd BSPC’s baseline version intensively addresses the issue of ammunition contamination. I particu-larly want to highlight that point 1 of the baseline version addresses the necessary joint strategic approachand effort of the democratic Baltic Sea states. It is gratifying that we have achieved this point through recentyears of joint work. Accordingly, the necessary next step is accurately specified: The European partner coun-tries are urged, particularly at the governmental level, to translate their previous cooperation into decisivepractical measures.“Considering the special attention the BSPC devoted to the issue of dumped ammunition in the Baltic Sea,particularly during the Presidency of the German Bundestag, the Conference strongly welcomes1. the intensive consideration of the issue of dumped ammunition in the Baltic Sea by the Council of theBaltic Sea States during the German Presidency – and during the 20th session of the Council of theBaltic Sea States on 1 and 2 June 2023 in Wismar;2. the initiation of a cross-sectoral, multidisciplinary, and macro-regional dialogue on underwater muni-tions in line with its previous demands during the round table of experts in Kiel in December 2022and the joint consultation of HELCOM and the CBSS in April 2023,3. the German government’s decision – based on the resolution of the German Bundestag to provide €100 million for this purpose – to initiate a national immediate action programme for the recovery ofunderwater munitions in the Baltic and North Seas, including the development of a mobile platformfor munitions clearance, and to share the experience gained from this;36 https://enveurope.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s12302-021-00537-423SummaryIn addition, the BSPC states that responsible precautionary policy begins with active and sufficient action at thatpoint in time when necessary action must be taken to avert later enormous and subsequently unpreventable massivedamage to people and the environment in the Baltic Sea region. In the view of the BSPC, this point in time has comeafter years of intensive treatment of the issue of ammunition deposits in the Baltic Sea, according to the findings ofits rapporteurs, the statements in the BSPC resolutions since 2019 as well as based on the reports submitted by theBSPC and an intensive exchange with leading experts in this field, which has been deepened in the past year. Basedon current activities and measures, according to the consensus of leading scientists, removing the munitions depos-its would take some 100 years. At the same time, significant damage to humans and the environment can be expect-ed in 20-30 years. Therefore, the initiation and implementation of a joint strategic approach and effort by the BalticSea States are called for to avoid the damage to human safety, environment safety, security, and the economy thatwould otherwise occur, according to current scientific knowledge, from the 400,000 tonnes of conventional and40,000 tonnes of chemical munitions dumped in the Baltic Sea. To achieve the goal of eliminating the hazard situ-ation within the next 20 years, which is considered crucial for the BSPC, it is necessary not only to push the clear-ance with increased efforts and coordinated cooperation but also, in particular, to rapidly advance by reducing thebottleneck of effectively rendering the munitions harmless, i.e., the final disposal as well as storage capacities on land.in light of the foregoing, the BSPC calls on the Governments in the Baltic Sea Region, the CBSS, and the EU to1. go beyond the previous agreements of the governments and initiate a joint strategic approach and ef-fort of the democratic Baltic Sea states - as has been achieved concerning the expansion of offshorewind capacities -, also based on the continuation of the cooperation between CBSS and HELCOM, tosucceed in the goal, which the BSPC considers necessary, of eliminating the hazard situation caused byammunition dumped in the Baltic Sea within the next 20 years;2. continue close cooperation between the CBSS, HELCOM, and other relevant organisations to fillknowledge gaps, develop best environmental practices for risk assessment, and explore funding oppor-tunities for the development and implementation of the best available techniques for environmentallysound and safe management.”7 . SummaryThe challenges we face with sea-dumped munitions in the Baltic Sea region have not decreased in recentyears. In fact, each day brings us closer to the danger lying off our coasts. However, there have been visibleimprovements in the way we perceive this problem. The hard work of various transnational assemblies onthis matter is an example of such improvements. Furthermore, we are obtaining more precise and valuabledata and insights from the scientific community. Thanks to our extensive network across the Baltic Sea re-gion, we can make even more significant advances in addressing the issue of underwater munitions.Nevertheless, we can only attain a resolution if we cooperate more closely and take more decisive steps toraise awareness of the issue, both at the regional and national levels. Our strong commitment to tackling theissue together should motivate us to pursue an industrial-scale approach to clearing underwater munitions.As members of our national parliaments, it is our responsibility to encourage our governments to act togeth-er in the Baltic Sea region. We now have a practical technical solution to the problem that the BSPC has beenworking to address for a long time. We need to ensure that the framework for using modern technologies todispose of old munitions keeps improving.24References8 . References• https://www.bspc.net/statements-of-the-governments-in-the-baltic-sea-region-to-the-31st-bspc-resolu-tion/• https://helcom.fi/dumped-munitions-are-on-the-roundtable-in-kiel/• https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_1483• https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-03/join-2023-8-annex_en.pdf• https://cbss.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/cbss-wismar-declaration_2-june-2023.pdf• https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/publications/study-underwater-unexploded-munition_en• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969722039614?via%3Dihub• https://www.bspc.net/29th-bspc-resolution-final-adopted/• https://www.bspc.net/bspc_reportonsea-dumpedmunitionsforthe30thbspc/• https://www.bspc.net/the-30th-baltic-sea-parliamentary-conference-gathered-digitally-to-celebrate-in-tense-cooperation/• https://www.bspc.net/30-bspc-resolution-2021-adopted/• https://www.bspc.net/bspc_statements_30thbspc_resolution_opt/• https://www.bspc.net/bspc_raport314/• https://www.bspc.net/statements-of-the-governments-in-the-baltic-sea-region-to-the-31st-bspc-resolu-tion/• https://www.bspc.net/2022-11-21_bspc_wendt/• https://helcom.fi/dumped-munitions-are-on-the-roundtable-in-kiel/• https://www.bspc.net/consultations-in-the-face-of-marine-life/• https://helcom.fi/helcom-at-work/ministerial-meetings/2021-lubeck/• https://helcom.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/HELCOM-Ministerial-Statement-2021.pdf• https://helcom.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Baltic-Sea-Action-Plan-2021-update.pdf• https://helcom.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Baltic-Sea-Action-Plan-2021-update.pdf• https://helcom.fi/helcom-at-work/groups/sea-based-pressures/submerged/• https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_1483• https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-03/join-2023-8-annex_en.pdf• https://cbss.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/cbss-wismar-declaration_2-june-2023.pdf• https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/cbss-2023/2600134• https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Koalitionsvertrag/Koalitionsvertrag_2021-2025.pdf• https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/publications/study-underwater-unexploded-munition_en• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969722039614?via%3Dihub• https://enveurope.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s12302-021-00537-425ANNEXES9 . ANNEXES• Implementation of the 30th BSPC resolution in and by the States• Statements of the Governments in the Baltic Sea Region to the 31st BSPC Resolution• Exploring the Dangers of Sea-Dumped Ammunitions and Steering Towards the New Year9.1 ANNEX Implementation of the 30th BSPC resolutionin and by the StatesDenmarkDenmark contributes to regionally coordinated actions on submerged munitions and explosives in the HEL-COM Expert Group on Environmental Risks of Submerged Objects (EG SUBMERGED). Furthermore,Denmark will take part in the regional work on developing best environmental practice for comprehensiverisk assessment of munitions, wrecks and hazardous submerged objects and implement the best availabletechniques for environmentally sound and safe management in HELCOM (S34) as part of implementationof the newly updated Baltic Sea Action Plan.EstoniaEstonia acknowledges that ammunition dumped at sea is a significant environmental concern in the BalticSea. This matter needs a jointly targeted approach, and we are cooperating regarding this issue within theHELCOM Group on Environmental Risks of Hazardous Submerged Objects.FinlandFinland has taken part in several international projects studying the environmental risks of chemical muni-tions: MERCW (Modelling of Ecological Risks related to Sea- dumped Chemical Weapons), CHEMSEA(Chemical Munitions, Search and Assessment) project, which was partly financed by the EU Baltic Sea Re-gion Programme, and DAIMON (Decision aid for Munition Management) project. Finland will take partin such projects also in the future whenever financing is available. Finland takes actively part in the work ofthe HELCOM SUBMERGED working group (Expert Group on Environmental Risks of Hazardous Sub-merged Objects). The overall aim of the work of this group is to contribute to the development of an actionplan and regionally coordinated actions on submerged munitions and explosives of concern in the Baltic Sea.The Expert Group acts as a knowledge hub to provide the recent information on munitions and other sub-merged hazardous objects in the Baltic Sea. The Expert Group also accompanies the coordination of region-al activities that address the potential challenges posed by munitions and other submerged hazardous ob-jects. The Expert Group also works towards achieving the tasks of the updated HELCOM Baltic Sea ActionPlan (BSAP), related to munitions and other submerged hazardous objects in the Baltic Sea26ANNEXESDeutschland47. im Hinblick auf Munitionsaltlastena. gemäß den Entschließungen der 28. und der 29. BSPC die Anstrengungen zur Entdeckung und Neutral-isierung von Kampfmitteln in der Ostsee mit konkreten Maßnahmen über eine multilaterale Zusamme-narbeit zu verstärken;b. die unterschiedlichen nationalen Erkenntnisse, Forschungsresultate und Daten in einer Expertengruppe– falls möglich bei der HELCOM – zusammenzubringen und auf dieser Grundlage konkrete Maßnah-men zur Beseitigung von Kampfmitteln in der Ostsee zu erarbeiten;c. zur Konkretisierung des in der 28. Entschließung der BSPC erwähnten Finanzinstruments einen interna-tionalen Geberfond anzustreben und zu prüfen, ob die HELCOM einen derartigen Fond verwaltenkönnte;d. den Ostseeraum als eine weltweite Modellregion für die ökologisch nachhaltige, schnelle und bezahlbareBergung, Dekontaminierung und Beseitigung von im Meer versenkten Kampfmitteln zu etablieren;e. alle erforderlichen Maßnahmen zu unternehmen, die darauf abzielen, die Beseitigung und Entschärfungvon Kampfmitteln und anderen gefährlichen Produkten in der Ostsee innerhalb der nächsten 20 Jahre ab-zuschließen.f. die Möglichkeit zu prüfen, diese Aufgabe als eine langfristige ökologische Priorität ausdrücklich in denOstsee-Aktionsplan der HELCOM aufzunehmen.Der aktualisierte Aktionsplan der HELCOM von 2021 sieht Maßnahmen zur Verringerung von versenkterchemischer und konventioneller Munition im Ostseeraum vor. Im Rahmen der HELCOM RESPONSEArbeitsgruppe und der zugehörigen Expert Group on Environmental Risks of Hazardous Submerged Ob-jects (SUBMERGED) sollen Beste Umweltpraktiken (Best Environmental Practice – BEP) für eine umfas-sende Risikobewertung von Munition, Wracks und gefährlichen Objekten im Meer bis 2025 und BesteVerfügbare Techniken (Best Available Techniques - BAT) für ein umweltfreundliches und sicheres Manage-ment bis 2028 umgesetzt werden.Im Koalitionsvertrag für die 20. Legislaturperiode wird die Absicht erklärt, unter Beteiligung der Bunde-sländer für die Bergung und Vernichtung von Munitionsaltlasten in der Nord- und Ostsee ein nationales So-fortprogramm aufzulegen und einen Bund-Länderfonds für die mittel- und langfristige Bergung einzuricht-en und solide zu finanzieren. Das genaue Vorgehen wird derzeit in der Bundesregierung diskutiert und einVorschlag erarbeitet.Mit HELCOM und OSPAR stehen regionale Meeresschutzkooperationen zur Verfügung, welche perspek-tivisch zur grenzüberschreitenden Koordinierung von Maßnahmen genutzt werden können. Die Detektionund Beseitigung der Altlasten ist mit heute verfügbaren Technologien und Methoden ein kosten- und zeit-aufwändiges Unterfangen mit hohen Risiken für das involvierte Personal. Es besteht weiter erheblicherForschungsbedarf, um die Technologien wirtschaftlicher und sicherer zu machen.27ANNEXESHAMBURGWith regard to paragraph 47 of the Resolution:There is a recognisable hazard potential associated with the sea-dumped munitions in the German Northand Baltic Seas. Current scientific findings suggest that, taking into account the progressive corrosion of themunition casings, the burden on the marine environment from escaping pollutants will continue to increasein the future. Furthermore, sea-dumped munitions also pose a risk to shipping and to activities in the ma-rine environment involving ground contact, as well as to affected sectors of the economy. This was again stat-ed by the Conference of Environment Ministers (UMK) at its meeting on 22.4.2021. The report “Muni-tions Pollution of German Maritime Waters – Inventory and Recommendations” from 2011 is currently be-ing fundamentally updated by the Federal/State Working Group on the North and Baltic Seas (BLANO).The Senate supports the UMK’s plan to use this update as a basis for focusing more closely on ways of solv-ing the problem and creating a suitable knowledge base for the necessary introduction of orderly salvage anddisposal.Mecklenburg-Vorpommern28ANNEXESNorwayNorway supports the BSPC focus on sea-dumped munitions, including dumped chemical weapons sub-stances. Norway has similar challenges in our adjacent ocean areas and is a proponent for deepened interna-tional cooperation. Within the CBSS we promote cooperation with HELCOM and JPI Oceans (EU JointProgramming Initiative Healthy and Productive Seas and Oceans) for better coordination and possible pilotaction for clean-up and recovery.PolandPoland participates in international actions dealing with hazardous materials on the bottom of the Baltic Sea.Representatives take an active part in the meetings of the Member States Expert Group on Integrated Mar-itime Security and Surveillance (MSEG MSS) and the Working Party on Maritime Issues (WP EUMSS).Within the framework of the work of the Friends of Presidency for the EU’s Maritime Security Strategy (FoPEUMSS) a representative of Poland contributed to the preparation of the Council conclusions on maritimesecurity, which also include relevant provisions concerning the problem of sunken chemical weapons, con-ventional weapons and hazardous materials on the seabed.The Maritime Border Guard Unit, while performing statutory tasks related to the protection of the state bor-der at sea and supervising the operation of Polish maritime areas, undertakes many activities listed in theResolution, i.e. actions to counteract and combat threats related to marine pollution and activities related tohazardous materials lying in the maritime areas of the Republic of Poland.29ANNEXESThe Marine Environment Protection Division in the Ministry of Infrastructure heads the national HEL-COM Secretariat and coordinates the work related to the implementation of tasks of the Baltic Marine En-vironment Protection Commission (Helsinki Commission) in Poland. The individual actions are carried outby other ministries in accordance with their competences.Within the HELCOM, joint patrols are carried out using vessels of the Maritime Border Guard Unit.The employees of the Chief Inspectorate for Environmental Protection (GIOŚ) and Maritime Offices par-ticipate in these activities which aim is to control compliance with the regulations on the protection of themarine environment, as well as to conduct research on the quality of the marine environment, supervisionand assessment of its condition. For this purpose, GIOŚ employees, among others, take samples of sea waterin designated areas of internal waters and the territorial sea. The results of the inspection are reported to theMarine Unit of the Border Guard.In 2020, 16 exits of the Border Guard patrol vessels with GIOŚ staff were completed, while there were noexits in 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, Border Guard vessels and aircrafts are includ-ed in the system of detecting and combating pollution of Polish maritime areas (10 patrol vessels and 3 air-crafts of the Border Guard are designated for the cooperation with the Maritime Search and Rescue Serviceto overcome threats and pollution of the marine environment).Speaking at the HELCOM Ministerial Meeting, Poland stated that international cooperation in the BalticSea region to protect the marine environment is always topical and necessary. Marine pollution and otherforms of degradation of the marine environment are limitless and sunken hazardous objects, in particularwrecks and conventional and chemical weapons, continue to pose a serious threat to the marine environ-ment. He also informed that the risks posed by hazardous objects on the bottom of the Baltic Sea are cur-rently being assessed in Poland. This does not alter the fact that coordinated, harmonized regional measuresare also needed. Joint initiatives under HELCOM can undoubtedly help to find appropriate solutions forthe whole of the Baltic Sea.Poland suggested, that, in the context of achieving the objectives and tasks of the updated Baltic Sea ActionPlan (BSAP), a joint effort should be made to address the problems of the Baltic Sea, which certainly in-cludes the problems of ground-based hazardous objects.Poland has taken measures aimed at disposal andrendering harmless of explosive ordnance and other hazardous products in the Baltic Sea.The Interdepartmental Team for Risks Arising from Hazardous Materials Deposited in the Maritime Areasof the Republic of Poland was established in 2021. The Team chaired by the Minister of Infrastructure, alsoincluded other ministers (e.g. National Defence, Interior and Administration, Climate and Environment,Education and Science, Development and Technology, Foreign Affairs, Health), regional administration of-fices, maritime offices and state services (Fire, Police, Border Guard). The team met in July, October and No-vember 2021. Since activities dealing with the subject of sunken hazardous objects carried out in previousyears by various ministries and units could be a valuable basis for the continuation of work on this issue, theTeam recognized the necessity to review and aggregate the available information and data.As a result of the work carried out, the Team developed the following recommendations for the Council ofMinisters:1) appointment by a new order of the Prime Minister a team for hazardous materials located in the maritimeareas of the Republic of Poland, whose task would be, in particular, to coordinate the cooperation of min-istries whose competences include activities related to monitoring and neutralizing threats caused bysunken hazardous materials;30ANNEXES2) securing sufficient funding to support the team’s work and to carry out the operation of examining andneutralizing the two most endangering wrecks in the marine environment: Franken and Stuttgart;3) co mmissioning the team to prepare a draft of regulations of a special nature addressing comprehensivelyissues related to the possible reduction of risks stemming from hazardous materials sunk in the maritimeareas of the Republic of Poland.The report on the work of the Team was submitted to the Chancellery of the Prime Minister and adopted bythe Council of Ministers on in January 2022. The adoption of the report together with the recommenda-tions contained therein opens a new stage of government administration’s activities in the field of hazardousmaterials deposited in the maritime areas of the Republic of Poland.Schleswig-HolsteinParagraph 47: Within the framework of the German HELCOM Chairmanship, efforts were made to ensurethat the work of the ad hoc SUBMERGED Working Group is continued. This has been achieved by theadoption of the Terms of Reference for a SUBMERGED Expert Group. This expert group will meet for thefirst time on April 21, 2022. The assessment of the ammunition contamination of the Baltic Sea developedby the working group, taking into account current scientific knowledge, will be finalized during the initialmeeting. A key task of the expert group will be to advise the HELCOM working groups on all issues relatedto munitions contamination in the Baltic Sea and on how to deal with the resulting challenges. In addition,discussion of possible joint plans for further action has been written into the Terms of Reference. This in-cludes discussion of possible funding instruments. The Baltic Sea-wide cooperation in this subject area is al-ready being closely observed outside Europe.Cooperation with the BSPC and the Council of the Baltic Sea States will be able to set a further milestonehere. For the German presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States from July 2022 to June 2023, Ger-many has also included the topic of munitions in the sea on its agenda. Schleswig-Holstein is contributingto this by providing expert advice to the departments responsible for shaping the Presidency.Germany has decided to tackle the environmentally compatible salvage and disposal of ammunition wastewithin the framework of an immediate action program initiated by the federal government.Schleswig-Holstein is contributing to the design of this program with the expertise of the Special Office forMunitions in the Sea (MELUND). At the same time, the experience gained from this program will be in-corporated into the deliberations of the SUBMERGED expert group.Sweden47. concerning sea-dumped munitions, to a. strengthen efforts to recover and neutralise explosive ordnancein the Baltic Sea with concrete measures through multinational cooperation according to the 28th and 29thBSPC Resolutions as well as the interim and final BSPC rapporteur’s reports on sea-dumped munitions;Sweden works actively with measures to avoid trawling in areas with known dumped munitions. Swedish au-thorities cooperate with corresponding agencies in neighbouring countries to recover and neutralise explo-sive ordnance. Several projects have been performed to find sea-dumping sites and to make risk assessmentof those areas.31ANNEXESb. bring together the different national findings, research results and data in an expert group - if possible, atHELCOM - and, on this basis, prepare concrete actions for the removal of explosive ordnance in the Bal-tic Sea;There is an expert group in Helcom specifically dedicated to this task, Environmental risk of SubmergedObjects (EG submerged). They work with identifying areas with dumped mines and shipwrecks that maypose an environmental risk. There are two new measures in the updated BSAP addressing sea-dumped mu-nitions the Baltic Sea and Sweden works already actively to remove or eliminate explosive ordnances.c. strive for an international donor fund in the concretisation of the financial instrument mentioned in the28th BSPC Resolution and consider whether HELCOM could manage such funds;The BSAP-fund, managed by the Nordic Investment Bank and NEFCO was initiated by Sweden and Fin-land 2010 as a tool to finance projects for the BSAP. Sweden and Finland have contributed with funding andare actively seeking support for the involvement of more countries in HELCOM. Sweden considers that thisinstrument has served well and would benefit for the contribution to support the updated BSAP as well.d. establish the Baltic Sea Region as a global model region for the environmentally sound, rapid and afforda-ble salvage and decontamination and removal of explosive ordnance dumped in the sea;Helcom works with regional development and close regional cooperation in this area that could serve as aglobal model.e. take all necessary measures aiming to complete the disposal and rendering harmless of explosive ordnanceand other hazardous products in the Baltic Sea within the next 20 years;See answer above on 47 a, b and c.f . look at the option of including this task as a long-term ecological priority explicitly in the HELCOM Bal-tic Sea Action Plan.There is now a measure in the updated BSAP – to maintain the assessment on hazardous submerged objects(including munitions and wrecks) and to regularly update the information.9.2 ANNEX Statements of the Governments in the BalticSea Region to the 31st BSPC ResolutionDENMARKThe HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan is an important tool to achieve good en vironmental status of the Bal-tic Sea and Denmark is committed to implementing the actions. Denmark is actively taking part in leadinga number of the actions e.g. on marine litter, hazardous substances, eutrophication and underwater noise. Atthe national level, the Danish Government will present an updated maritime spatial plan, with an ambitionof 10 percent strictly protected marine areas and 20 percent protected marine areas. Additionally, the Dan-ish Government will prepare a programme of measures under the Marine Strategy framework di rective thatwill support the goals of the Baltic Sea Action Plan.32ANNEXESDenmark contributes to regionally coordinated actions on submerged munitions and explosives in the HEL-COM Expert Group on Environmental Risks of Submerged Objects (EG SUBMERGED). Furthermore,Denmark takes part in the regional work on developing best environmental practice for comprehensive riskassessment of munitions, wrecks and hazardous submerged objects and implements the best available tech-niques for environmentally sound and safe management in HELCOM (S34) as part of implementation ofthe Baltic Sea Action Plan. Denmark has also taken part in the expert roundtable on dumped munitions inthe Baltic Sea in Kiel in December 2022, where concrete recommendations for management and handlingwere given. Denmark is also actively taking part in the JPI Oceans Knowledge Hub on “Munitions in theSea”.ESTONIAThe underwater munitions from World Wars influence the ecological state of the Baltic Sea, transport andinfrastructure projects, including sea-based wind parks. In HELCOM, Estonia is actively participating inSUBMERGE expert group, where one of its tasks from the BSAP is to develop Best Environmental Practice(BEP) for comprehensive risk assessment of munitions, wrecks, and hazardous submerged objects by 2025.However, we must admit that there needs to be a scientific-based understanding of the risks and effects ofthe remediation and removal of warfare material to the environment, industry and broader society. Thus fur-ther regional cooperation is needed. Estonia welcomes the search for collaboration between HELCOM andCBSS to strengthen efforts exploring, identifying, recovering, and neutralizing explosive ordnance in theBaltic Sea. Regular cleaning from warfare munitions (from both WW I and WW II) is carried out in the Es-tonian marine area by our Navy vessels. According to the Navy data, over the last twenty years, more than1300 explosives were localized and neutralized in Estonian waters.Additionally, shipwrecks’ environmental safety is assessed regularly, and clean-up works are carried out whenneeded.FINLANDFinland has actively taken part in the multilateral work carried out under HELCOM and CBSS to exploreand identify possibilities for neutralizing dumped munitions in the Baltic Sea, including through active par-ticipation in the joint expert roundtable of CBSS and HELCOM organized in Kiel, Germany on 12-13 De-cember 2022. Finland finds it important to profoundly investigate the technologies involved, as well as lookinto potential financial resources available.[...]In different international contexts, including in the EU, Finland has highlighted the risks related to ship-wrecks’ munitions, possible oil leaks and hazards related to other dangerous substances in the Baltic Sea re-gion. If these risks were to materialize, the contaminating effects could be serious for the Baltic Sea area andfor Europe as a whole. Finland will continue to underline this important issue in different international andregional fora, in order to raise awareness on the risks related to underwater shipwrecks and sea-dumped mu-nitions in the Baltic Sea.33ANNEXESGERMANYThe Federal Government has set itself the goal of working to combat excessive pressures on the oceans andimproving marine protection, particularly with regard to harm caused by dumped munitions. To achievethis, an immediate action programme has been announced for German territorial waters (see also the re-sponse to number 27). The programme requires close interdisciplinary cooperation across various fields. Pre-paratory work on implementing the programme has begun. The Federal Government will integrate the ex-perience it gains during this phase into the work of the relevant regional cooperation platforms such as HEL-COM and the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The retrieval of dumped munitions from the BalticSea is also one of the priorities of Germany’s Presidency of the CBSS. For that reason, an expert round tablewas held on 12-13 December 2022 in order to establish a common understanding of the state of the art onchemical munitions and UXO and to develop an initial proposal on best available techniques (BAT) for en-vironmentally sound and safe management. The debate brought together the different perspectives of toxi-cologists, environmental scientists, explosive ordnance clearers and business representatives. The German ac-tion programme was explicitly praised. The CBSS and HELCOM secretariats will work with the EuropeanCommission on proposals for how to proceed. Additional information on this point can be found in theFederal Government’s response to number 47 of the BSPC Resolution of 2021.[...]With regard to dumped munitions in the sea, in the view of the Federal Government and the currently mostaffected coastal federal states (primarily Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Schleswig-Holstein on the BalticSea), there is no existing responsibility in the sense of a general legal obligation for the Federation or the fed-eral states to take action. Based on this, there is also no existing financial obligation. Any action taken willbe based on the precautionary principle in conjunction with competences and mandates anchored in theGerman Basic Law (e. g. Articles 20a, 104a para. 1 Basic Law). The Federal Government intends to beginrecovery under a national immediate action programme with a focus on conventional munitions in easily ac-cessible locations in German territorial waters. The selection process will focus on munitions still in retriev-able condition, with a high chance of success and a proportionate impact in terms of protecting the environ-ment and human health. Target areas for locally bounded recovery need to be identified on the basis of riskassessments which are still to be drawn up. The initial target area is planned for the German territorial wa-ters in the Baltic Sea due to the hydrodynamic conditions there. Additional information on this point canbe found in the Federal Government’s response to number 47 of the BSPC Resolution of 2021.HAMBURGThe Senate supports the “screening” of ordnance-typical pollutants and the site-specific survey of the state ofpreservation of sea-dumped munitions envisaged on the basis of the resolutions of the Conference of Envi-ronment Ministers. This will provide all stakeholders with the necessary technical basis for starting environ-mentally sound salvage and final destruction. Research and technological developments in recent years haveprovided many insights into the interdisciplinary understanding of the overall topic. In addition, new ana-lytical and technical methods have been developed and are ready for testing and application.With regard to paragraph 27: No statement due to the fact that the issue is not relevant to Hamburg or thatthe national level is responsible.34ANNEXESMECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERNThe Digital Ocean Lab at the Ocean Technology Campus Rostock (OTC) is an underwater testfacility for marine technology in the Baltic Sea that started operations in 2021. In 2022, it wasexpanded to include the underwater test field “UXO-Garten” (UXO = Unexploded Ordnance). It is used todevelop efficient systems for the detection of sea-dumped munitions.[...]The State Government welcomes efforts aiming at the location and neutralisation of explosive ordnance inthe Baltic Sea and will contribute toward this aim within the scope of its competences and possibilitiesalongside the Federal Government.In principle, reference is made to the Federal Government’s responsibility in this matter. The responsibilityof the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern extends on the one hand to the prevention and defence againstexplosive ordnance-specific hazards that exist in detonation,which in the case of unexploded ordnance may also occur subsequently. This is also made clear by the Ordi-nance on Explosive Ordnance issued on the basis of the Security and Public Order Law of Mecklenburg-Vor-pommern.On the other hand, the state also has competences and responsibility for the coastal waters of the Baltic Seain Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, which is exercised by the respective State Offices for Agriculture and the En-vironment.According to the due diligence obligations under the Water Law, adverse changes in the properties of waterbodies are to be avoided and the efficiency of the water balance is to be maintained (Water Law § 5 para. 1nos. 1 and 3).Water authorities are obliged to manage water bodies in a sustainable manner in order to, among otherthings, maintain and improve their functional capacity and efficiency as a component of the natural balanceand as a habitat for animals and plants, and to contribute to the protection of the marine environment (Wa-ter Law § 6 para. 1 sentence 1 nos. 1 and 7). In particular, protection against adverse changes in the proper-ties of water bodies may require hazard prevention measures to be taken by the water authorities. This wouldregularly address the owner of the federal waterway Baltic Sea, the Federal Government or the Federal Wa-terways and Shipping Administration, as the party responsible for hazard prevention.With the Fraunhofer Ocean Technology Campus (OTC) in Rostock, Mecklenburg- Vorpommern has anoutstanding cluster-based platform that is co-financed by the Federal Government and internationally rec-ognised in science and industry. It creates a platform for connecting application-oriented research with theprovision of AI-based technological and technical solutions for commercial, governmental and scientific us-ers to reduce the problem of sea-dumped munitions especially in the Baltic Sea. The Fraunhofer OTC is alsoa member of the German Alliance for Marine Research (DAM), whose scientific partners and stakeholdershave built up extensive know-how through years of practical experience, their own research and develop-ment, and their involvement in joint projects at national and European level. Companies benefit from com-prehensive national fundamental research on the topic of sea-dumped ammunition, which is currently coor-dinated at the national level in the DAM.35ANNEXESNORWAYNorway supports the BSPC’s continued focus on underwater munitions, including chemical warfare agentsdumped in the Baltic Sea. Norway faces similar challenges in its adjacent sea areas and strongly supports en-hanced international cooperation to address safety and environmental issues. We note the progress made inraising awareness of these issues andincreasing collaboration, at national level, in an EU context and under the CBSS and HELCOM.POLANDMoreover, Poland participates in the works of subordinated experts groups, inter alia in the Expert Groupon Environmental Risks of Submerged Objects (EG SUBMERGED). The group contributes to the region-ally coordinated actions regarding dumped munitions and explosives as well as other sunken potentially dan-gerous objects in terms of their impact on the marine environment of the Baltic Sea.In 2022, the group completed work on a report on conventional and chemical weapons lying at the bottomof the Baltic Sea.[...]Having regard to the protection of the marine environment, Poland appreciates and supports all efforts car-ried out in regional and international forums, including the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and theBaltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM), in the field of hazardous materialsdumped in the sea. It should be emphasized that this is an issue that requires common, international solu-tions, both in terms of management and ensuring a dedicated source of funding for research and neutraliza-tion, including possible extraction of dumped hazardous materials.On December 13, 2022 Conclusions of the Council of the European Union on International Ocean Gov-ernance for safe, secure, clean, healthy and sustainably managed oceans and seas has been adopted. Polandproposed a paragraph concerning hazardous materials dumped in the Baltic Sea stressing the need of:- undertaking scientific exploration and developing Best Environmental Practice (BEP) as well as Best Avail-able Techniques (BAT) to tackle the issue of conventional, chemical and explosive munitions dumped atsea,- active cooperation between Member States and international organizations in order to establish systematicmanagement of dumped hazardous materials that pose a threat to the marine environment,- exploring possible sources of EU funding.Order No. 345 of the Prime Minister of 20 October 2022, on the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Hazard-ous Materials Deposited in the Maritime Areas of the Republic of Poland entered into force on November16, 2022.The tasks of the Inter-Ministerial Committee include in particular:- coordinating public administration cooperation in the field of dumped hazardous materials;36ANNEXES- recommending activities for the identification of hazardous material lingering on the seabed;- recommending actions aimed at adapting monitoring and manners of neutralization to identified threats;- monitoring existing regulations in terms of their adequacy to the changing state of affairs and preparing rec-ommendations for possible further changes in the regulations.The first meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Committee was held on January 24, 2023.SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEINThe Kiel Declaration and the Baltic Sea Cooperation Action Plan 2030, which was updated in spring 2022,address topics and projects that are highly relevant to Schleswig-Holstein for intensifying Baltic Sea cooper-ation, including, inter alia, the expansion of new technologies as part of the green transformation (hydro-gen), the salvage of munitions waste sites, and the promotion of Baltic Sea-wide projects in the field of AI.Concrete measures and milestones to be achieved are defined within the framework of the interdepartmen-tal Baltic Sea Cooperation Working Group, which meets regularly and is supported by the MLLEV.Munitions in the sea have been and are a priority topic during the HELCOM Presidency 2020-2022 as well asthe Council of the Baltic Sea States Presidency 2022-2023. The plan is to continue work in the HELCOM expertnetwork SUBMERGED. The topic has also been included in the Baltic Sea Action Plan as Actions S34 and S35.A roundtable on munitions in the sea was also hosted as part of the Baltic Sea Region Future Forum in August2022. This was followed by another roundtable on munitions in the sea in Kiel in December 2022 as a joint eventof the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), HELCOM Contracting States that are also members of the EU,the Federal Foreign Office, and MEKUN as part of Germany’s presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States.Possible forms of funding are one of the topics in the discussions between HELCOM, CBSS and EU as wellas other experts from the Baltic Sea region.SWEDENSweden works actively with measures to avoid trawling in areas with known dumped munitions, as this ac-tivity results in a wider dispersal of toxic substances from the munitions.Swedish authorities cooperate with corresponding agencies in neighbouring countries to recover and neu-tralise explosive ordnance. Several projects have been performed to find sea-dumping sites and to make riskassessment of those areas. Sweden is also taking part in the expert group in HELCOM dealing with sea-dumped munition and in the developing cooperation between HELCOM and CBSS.The BSAP-fund, managed by the Nordic Investment Bank and NEFCO was initiated by Sweden and Fin-land in 2010 as a tool to finance projects for the BSAP. Sweden and Finland have contributed with fundingand are actively seeking support for the involvement of more countries in HELCOM. Sweden considers thatthis instrument has served well and would benefit for the contribution to support the updated BSAP as well.37ANNEXES9.3 ANNEX 2.8 Exploring the Dangers of Sea-DumpedAmmunitions and Steering Towards the New YearExcerpt concerning Sea-Dumped AmmunitionsIntroductionBSPC President Johannes Schraps welcomed the members of the Standing Committee to Berlin. He under-scored the manifold threats to democracy in the world right now – the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the con-tinued atrocities committed there, the cost of living crisis and the ever-menacing climate change. This wa-tershed in history meant that the BSPC had to respond with trust, togetherness and even deeper coopera-tion. Parliamentary cooperation was crucial in preserving democratic values, in which context the presidentmentioned the partnership with the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic Council.Presentations on Sea-Dumped AmmunitionsSince the Annual Conference of the BSPC in 2019, the topic of sea-dumped ammunitions has remainedhigh on the agenda of the organisation, leading to the CBSS and HELCOM also increasing focus on the is-sue. In that regard, President Schraps highlighted a recent decision of the German federal government andparliament to provide more than 100 million euros for urgently needed trials of the innovative robotic tech-nology needed to salvage the ammunition from the seabed. He hoped that this would be the initial spark formore investments needed to clear the Baltic Sea from the toxic threats of discarded ammunitionMr Jann Wendt, CEO of north.io, explained that munitions in seas was a worldwide problem. Beyond theBaltic and North Sea, the phenomenon occurred in the Australian and Japanese coast as well as nearly every-where else. Most of the munitions did not come from active warfare but had been dumped after the end ofWorld War II. While there were no exact numbers, estimate saw the amount in German waters alone at 1.6million tonnes. Among others, this had an economic impact as shallow coastal areas were developing intohubs of economy. For windfarm foundations, additional costs of 100 million euros were estimated to ensuresafe construction. Another aspect – as yet under-researched – was how the toxicity of the munitions affectedaquafarming. Over the last seven years, research on the European and national levels had ramped up to cre-ate a basis for decisions like that made by the German government. His company, north.io, was involved ina number of projects, such as GEOMAR and DAEMON.He underlined that the toxicity was affecting the environment including marine fauna. By measuring TNTcontent in water samples, a map of the Baltic and North Seas roughly highlighting the problem areas couldbe created. One hotspot was the Lübeck area, with little water exchange and a high concentration of ammu-nitions. Mr Wendt explained that there was a lot of data, generated by sensor stations but also by variousships in the area. Now, systems were being developed to bring together and analyse that data. Problematicaspects included that there were so many munitions in the water they could not be precisely detailed but alsothat some of them were on the surface while others were buried.Regarding the political level, Mr Wendt noted several activities and projects on the European level launchedsince 2019, including the first EU-wide study on the phenomenon. Interreg-financed projects were commonon the regional level. He underlined the role of the BSPC as a frontrunner in this field, citing the 2021 re-port on sea-dumped munitions. The German government not only had passed the € 102 million budget for38ANNEXESpilot projects but was also envisioning long-term engagement for the removal of the munitions. The federalstate level was also active, such as Schleswig-Holstein which was facing the problem on both its Baltic andNorth Sea coastlines and had been addressing it for fifteen years now. The industry, on the other hand, wascurrently focusing on improving its detection processes to make them safer but also more efficient. As an ex-ample, he showed a system using a ten-metre-long device towed by a ship to detect munitions magnetically– a tedious process that nevertheless represented the state of the art. Improvements were vital. As for theplanned extraction processes, Mr Wendt presented a crawler system with a robotic device that would crawlover the sea floor more or less autonomously. The German investment money would primarily go into theconstruction of large-scale platforms installed on the ocean floor where disposal of the munitions could beundertaken, safely away from land. All of these efforts represented strategic investments, Mr Wendt ex-plained, as they would build a foundation for a market of industrial services.Giving his outlook on the future, the speaker emphasised that the erosion processes made it necessary tocomplete the massive removal processes within the coming 30 – 40 years. This was indeed a problem thatcould be solved in time – if the requisite political and financial will was there. Moreover, recent research andtechnological development had provided the tools allowing the issue to be handled. He also highlighted theurgency to act in the Baltic Sea which was extremely sensitive and already affected more heavily than otherseas.To the questions from Ms Hanna Katrín Friðriksson and Mr Staffan Eklöf, Mr Wendt replied that theawareness of the issue was highest in the Baltic Sea region as a whole. That was likely due to the sensitive na-ture of the sea and the early start of cooperation to restore a good status. Thus, research had also included themunitions topic which had drawn the attention of the media. Nordic and Mediterranean countries were alsobecoming more aware. On the grant of € 100 million by the German government, President Schraps addedthat this was the sum experts had stated as the minimum to develop a functional prototype. He harkenedback to a BSPC demand in its resolution for a common fund for the Baltic Sea region, ensuring that effortswere coordinated and not individually separated. Prof Jānis Vucāns and Secretary General Bodo Bahr askedfurther questions. As for other national activities, Mr Wendt cited Poland as a hub of such efforts as well aspushing the issue on the EU level as did the Baltic countries. Most of these activities concerned research andremoval if connected with navy mine extraction. As for wind farms affecting the munitions issue, he saw itas going both ways. For their construction, autonomous drone technology was being developed that couldalso be used in the extraction process. In return, the research and mapping undertakings also helped withwind farm planning. Frequently, cables from farm to grid had to be rerouted around ammunition clusters.Thus, their extraction would allow cheaper cable laying. Regarding toxicity, Mr Wendt warned that not onlychemical weapons had a toxic effect but also conventional weapons were leaking dangerous substances. Theywere equally threatening.Mr Torsten Frey, Deep Sea Monitoring Group, GEOMAR Helmholtz Centre for Ocean Research, Kiel, ex-plained that he had also been an editor of the HELCOM Submerged Assessment and wanted to talk aboutits main conclusions. Starting with the issue of finding sea-dumped munitions, he presented a map showingthe distribution along the German coast. As major hotspots, he named Lübeck and Kiel. As GEOMAR waslocated in the latter city, this gave them easy access to a testing and research ground right on their doorstep.However, Mr Frey stressed, munitions could be found anywhere in the Baltic Sea. For Germany, some300,000 tonnes of conventional munitions were expected to be distributed in the seas as well as 5,000 tonnesof chemical ordnance. This was based on the historical records but could not yet be reproduced in cur-rent-day assessments. Moving on to the risk of mines, he noted that today, mines were retrieved from thewaters after the conclusion of the conflict. In prior times, though, they were simply disarmed and left to sinkto the bottom of the sea. As an example, he noted that several naval mines had been discovered during theconstruction of the Nordstream pipelines.39ANNEXESTo find munition sites, magnetic means could be employed, but GEOMAR was focusing on using sonar toexamine the sea floor in detail. Once a site was identified, an underwater autonomous vehicle (UAV) wassent there to take extensive pictures. These could be combined into extremely large continuous images. Inexample pictures, Mr Frey not only showed mines and munitions but also guncotton containing TNT outin the open. In fact, ordnance had been taken apart after the war to harvest the steel while the TNT wasdumped without any casing, unfolding its toxic effect. With a video, he showcased the messy, complicatedarrangement of these dumped munitions, underlining that nobody had any experience in clearing such sitesyet. Thus, this was another area where research and learning were needed.Moving on to the HELCOM Submerged Assessment, Mr Frey noted that – as part of the permanent work-ing group Pressure – a sub-group called Submerged had been established in HELCOM. The sub-group’s goalwas to contribute to regionally coordinated actions on submerged munitions and explosives of concern aswell as other submerged hazardous objects. He pointed out that there was another sub-group working onshipwrecks. Based on a three-year assessment of the situation across the Baltic Sea, the report featured achapter on each country bordering the Baltic Sea, describing its history concerning munitions. There was alot of information on the risks posed by munitions as well as protection and management. Finally, for all thebordering countries – with the exception of Latvia and Russia –, there was a list and short description of therespective national and international activities. That report would be published early in 2023. As conclu-sions, three major areas of concern had been identified: explosive hazard which was increasing as the ord-nance was becoming more fragile; potential direct contact such as white phosphorus; the environmental haz-ard. Despite the great efforts in the past years, research gaps remained. For example, there was no sci-ence-based roadmap on where to start clearances nor was there continuous monitoring of the munition hot-spots. Neither had toxicological thresholds been established nor was the effect of the leaking toxins in thefood web fully explored. Mr Frey stated that a Baltic Sea-wide data set had not yet been put together eitheras all the gathered information was stored in national databases. He went on to note that the countries ofHELCOM had been invited to invest in clearance and disposal technologies, such as the crawler mentionedby Mr Wendt earlier. Mr Frey underlined that the current state of the art was good at finding munitions,okay at clearing them, but there was no good way of disposing them as of this point. The further one wentup the process chain, the less developed were the capabilities.Mr Frey summarised his presentations by noting that munitions had to be expected throughout the BalticSea, although contamination hotspots were known from historical records. Yet further – and more detailed– mapping was necessary. Research was ongoing but had to be continued and intensified to fill knowledgegaps and create region-wide data. As for technology, clearance and disposal tools had to be fully established.He cautioned that at the current speed, it would take centuries to clear the sea. Thus, to meet this challengein the 30 – 40 years left at maximum, financial and political will were needed to accelerate the process ap-propriately.Mr Bahr asked whether the clearance process could be completed in the 20-year span demanded in theBSPC resolution. Mr Frey answered that a focused effort on the dumped munitions in German waters couldclear the area within ten years and deposit them on land. But that would represent a bottleneck and inher-ent security problem, so that offshore disposal – ideally with more efficient methods still to be fully devel-oped – should be the goal. Thus, this aspect should be the focus. Even for the German munitions, he expect-ed that disposal would take longer than twenty years. To the question by Mr Schraps about international ef-forts, Mr Frey noted his side’s good connections to Poland, adding that Finland was also research-driven. Hestated that there was no overview of who was responsible for the research and disposal processes in the vari-ous countries, whether it was the military or civil organisations.40ANNEXESProf Dr Edmund Maser, Director of Toxicology and Pharmacology for Natural Scientists at the UniversityMedical School Kiel, recapped that massive amounts of ammunition had been dumped in the North andBaltic Seas after WWII. Now, they had corroded and were leaking toxicological substances into the environ-ment. Thus, they were entering both the sediment but also the habitat as the source of the food chain of ma-rine life. By itself, TNT was already toxic, yet it was metabolised into an even more threatening substance,also affecting the nervous system and raising the mutagenic potential. The marine food web also includedfish caught for human consumption, carrying the toxicological problem straight to people’s dinner plates.This made monitoring and risk assessment crucial. Several projects on this were underway, for instancethrough mussels. As a sedentary species, they were the ideal organism to measure the entry of toxic com-pounds into seafood. Prof Maser picked Kiel as an example with the already mentioned dumping site, morespecifically a cluster of 70 British mines measuring one metre in diameter and containing 250 – 300 kg ofTNT. At that site, his team had built a mooring on which to anchor mussels and expose them to the chem-icals. After several weeks, the mussels were collected and analysed in the lab to find that every single musselhad metabolised TNT. Moreover, the amount taken up was the same, no matter the distance of the animalsfrom the mines and whether they had been located directly on the sea floor or one meter above on the moor-ing. That indicated a cloud of toxic substances surrounding the mines.Another example from the same spot concerned the craters that had been blasted into the sea floor by ex-ploding mines, leaving behind open TNT remains. In the same fashion, mussels were planted there. The sci-entists had been surprised in their analysis to find that not only had TNT been metabolised but that theyhad found 50 times higher concentrations of these munition compounds in the animals. This yielded twoimportant messages: First, any operations disturbing the sea floor had to be avoided – such as “blast in place”– because they would scatter the ordnance and thus further distribute the toxic substances. Second, the met-al casings currently provided a barrier to entry for the TNT. But the metal was corroding and would be gonein a few decades’ time. Then, the TNT would freely distribute, creating 50 times higher concentrations andvastly more severe effects. Prof Maser contextualised this by noting that the mussels in the first case – aroundstill intact mines – could still be eaten safely by a human being but that the mussels themselves were alreadyill from the exposure. The second case of free-floating TNT loaded the mussels up so much that consumingthem would bear a carcinogenic risk to humans. These must not be eaten.The team had moved on to investigate the effect on fish, finding evidence of explosive substances in flatfishin the area. While the amounts were not so high to prevent safe consumption by human beings, they had af-fected the health of the animals, with a quarter of them having developed liver tumours. These findings hadbeen compared to their North Sea investigation of a shipwreck where they had detected up to 9 nanogramsof TNT in fish fillets. Even here, 60 % of the fish had presented liver tumours. In principle, both sitesshowed the same phenomenon. In laboratory experiments, they had found that a concentration of 3 mg perlitre proved fatal for infant fish. In the wild, areas with many clefts and hiding places were preferred placesfor sea animals to lay their eggs – such as the messy dumping sites. But in the areas with free-floating TNT,the saturation of the water was exactly at the lethal dose of 3 mg per litre. At a time when fish stocks were al-ready threatened, this posed an additional pressure on fish species, on top of other contaminants, e.g., frommedical or pesticide runoff. With the ongoing corrosion of the casings, the exposure to TNT would increaseand spread. Thus, it was vital to begin the clearance as early as was possible.Ms Annette Lind asked about Denmark’s involvement and awareness, to which Prof Maser confirmed thathis side was cooperating with Danish scientists and navy. The situation was similar. However, the professorhad witnessed a “blast in place” operation by the Danish navy, taking measurements before and after to seethat the concentration of the explosive compounds was 2000 times higher afterwards. President Schrapsadded that public awareness in Germany was mostly limited to headlines like a navy explosion accidentally41ANNEXESkilling numbers of dolphins. Even though the topic was drowned out by the many crises raging around theworld, that only reinforced the need for the BSPC among others to focus on the topic. Ms Anna Kassautzkipointed out that this topic was not as visible out at sea but that there was still more awareness among thecoastal regions’ population. Mr Staffan Eklöf asked about the carcinogenic baseline and possible retardationof the corrosion. Prof Maser explained that the baseline in other waters was below 5 %, but he stressed thatTNT and TNT derivatives had been measured all across the Baltic Sea, so there were no non-contaminatedcontrol figures. As for corrosion, he knew of no way to reinforce the individual casings. The metal strengthsdiffered; some were only two centimetres thick and had mostly corroded away entirely while others wouldlast longer. Assessing the speed of the corrosion was difficult. Mr Frey confirmed that corrosion could not bestopped. The idea of covering the sites had been put forward, but that was physically not possible due to,among other factors, the dispersion of the ordnance. Mr Wendt pointed out that magnetics were often usedto find munitions but that these were targeting the shells. Thus, that was no longer feasible once the shellshad corroded away. On the other hand, that meant those munitions about to lose their corrosive shells werethe ones that should be removed first before it was too late. Ms Lene Westgaard-Halle inquired about thebest method of clearing mines and whether best practice examples were available. Mr Wendt underlined thatthere had not been any financing for these projects before and also that the clearance had to be a joint effortsince sea-dumped munitions were not a national concern. They went beyond the Baltic Sea as well, affectingthe entire planet. Mr Frey noted that in Norway, mines were taken to fjords and exploded there, but that wasnot applicable to other countries. Disposal methods had to be adapted to the geographical circumstancesand the types of munition in question. Prof Maser pointed to the Skagerrak in Norway as an example ofships filled to the brim with chemical munitions having been sunk purposefully. Given the added danger ofchemical weaponry, such as mustard gas, the Norwegian side was currently limited to monitoring withRUVs.ANNEX:Workplan of the HELCOM Expert Group on Environmental Risks of Submerged Objects (EG SUB-MERGED), 2023-2024 Approved by the HELCOM response Working Group via correspondence in No-vember 202242ANNEXESBaltic Marine Environment Protection CommissionWorkplan of the HELCOM Expert Group on Environmental Risks of Submerged Objects (EG SUBMERGED), 2023-2024Approved by the HELCOM response Working Group via correspondence in November 2022No Task Lead, responsible bodies and interlinked N ext steps and comments O utputactivities1 Finalize the HELCOM Thematic Lead: Poland and Germany Submission of draft Submerged Submerged Assessment isAssessment on Hazardous Responsible: EG SUBMERGED, WG Assessment for consideration by the adopted by HELCOM.Submerged Objects in the Baltic Sea Response Response Working Group. Approved(Submerged Assessment) for by correspondence in Novemberpublication. 2022.2 Maintain the HELCOM thematic Responsible: EG SUBMERGED, Contracting Contracting Parties to provide new A regularly updatedassessment on hazardous submerged Parties, Secretariat data, to be considered by EG Submerged Assessment andobjects as a living document, SUBMERGED. The Secretariat to up to date interactive maps inincluding munitions and wrecks and include approved data in MADS. MADS.regularly update the information inthe HELCOM Map and Data Service(MADS). (2021 BSAP)3 Develop Best Environmental Practice Responsible: EG SUBMERGED; WG Initiation of development of BEP/BAT and control of(BEP) for comprehensive risk Response; WG BioDiv BEP/BAT during 2023, to be finalized threats posed by munitions,assessment of munitions, wrecks and by 2025. BET/BAP being wrecks and other hazardoushazardous submerged objects by implemented by 2028. submerged objects in the2025and implement the Best Baltic Sea are in place and areAvailable Techniques (BAT) for The focus should be on a site specific being implemented forenvironmentally sound and safe environmental and technical risk environmentally sound andmanagement by 2028. (2021 BSAP) assessments. s afe management.4 Act as platform for discussions about Lead: Chair of EG SUBMERGED Continuously at meetings of EGfurther needed actions tackling the Responsible: EG SUBMERGED SUBMERGED.potential challenges posed by Interlinked activities: Research projectsdumped munitions and other and discussions within other fora.submerged hazardous objects.Page 1 of 35 Contribute to a common operational Responsible: EG SUBMERGED Understanding of the concept of Having published data in thepicture about the distribution of Interlinked activities: Research projects common operational picture: HELCOM Map and Datamunitions and explosives of concern and discussions within other fora. consulting framework on service (MADS)in the whole Baltic Sea region. dissemination of data6 Based on the picture and a common Responsible: Contracting Parties, EG Coordinated action and riskunderstanding of distribution SUBMERGED management efforts.processes of munition constituents itwill support Contracting Parties toidentifying hot spot areas, performsite-specific risk assessments anddiscuss a possible prioritization ofaffected areas for furthercoordinated actions in addition toexisting national ambitions forcomprehensive risk managements.7 Seek cooperation with OSPAR Lead: Contracting Parties that are alsorelating to such objects close to the OSPAR Contracting Parties, SecretariatHELCOM area which could affect theconvention area, especially in theSkagerrak.8 Continuously assess, support and Responsible: Contracting Parties, EG Continuous work intersessionally Fit for purpose and up to dateconsult with specific research or SUBMERGED and at meetings of EG SUBMERGED recommendations related toscientific projects to keep previously hazardous submerged objects.issued recommendations up to dateor to add recommendations asdeemed necessary9 Acting as specific stakeholder and Responsible: EG SUBMERGED Continuous work intersessionallyactively convey time-sensitive and at meetings of EG SUBMERGEDinformation on recent findings10 Develop and maintain, as well as Responsible: EG SUBMERGED Consultation with relevant HELCOMmonitor, application of a HELCOM groups as needed, in particulartoolbox for assessment of site- Consultation with relevant HELCOM related to environmental risks.specific environmental risks related groups as needed, in particular related toto potential abandonment, relocation environmental risks.and intended recovery or clean-up ofPage 2 of 35943ANNEXESdumped munitions andcontaminated wrecks;11 Update previously issued guidelines Responsible: EG SUBMERGED Meetings of EG SUBMERGED to Relevant guidelines in placeor develop new guidelines for all consider existing guidelines as well and up to date.potentially affected groups, as as the need for new guidelines.deemed necessary, taking intoaccount existing national guidelinesand contingency plans;12 Develop and maintain procedures for Responsible: EG SUBMERGED, WG Meetings of EG SUBMERGED to Procedures for training oftraining of crews of response vessels Response develop and maintain procedures, crews of response vessels inthat can be engaged in emergency for consideration by RESPONSE. place.response actions involving dumpedmunitions;13 Review and, as appropriate, update Responsible: EG SUBMERGED, WG Fish EG SUBMERGED to review the Up to date and fit for purposethe Guidelines for Fishermen on how Guidelines for Fishermen. Guidelines for Fishermen.to engage with submerged hazardousobjects. Input requested from the FishGroup, as appropriate.14 Facilitating exchange of information Responsible: EG SUBMERGEDin relation to the Nairobi Conventionin case a ship sinks and poses a Interlinked activities: Developments withinthreat to the marine environment, the International Maritime Organizationhuman health or navigation. (IMO).15 Develop and maintain a knowledge Responsible: EG SUBMERGED, Contracting Contracting Parties to submit Publication of an up to datecollection of best available Parties relevant information to meetings of knowledge collection of besttechnologies on dealing with dumped EG SUBMERGED. available technologies.munitions and other submerged Interlinked activities: Relevant researchhazardous objects. projects and national activitiesPage 3 of 3ANNEX 5.1 DG MARE “Study on underwater unexploded munition”44 – March 2022ANNEX 5.1 DG MARE “Study on underwater unexploded munition”37 – March 202237 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/publications/study-underwater-unexploded-munition_en44 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/publications/study-underwater-unexploded-munition_en6044ANNEXESStudy on underwater unexploded munition4 Overall conclusions and recommendationsBy using a mixed-method approach of primary and secondary data collection andanalysis, this Study developed guidance to enhance cooperation between MemberStates’ authorities, private bodies and regional organisations in dealing with accidentalrecovery or any encounter with unexploded ordnances and chemical munitions dumpedat sea by developing relating guidance.Based on the data analysed, the key findings of this report can be summarised asfollows:Mapping of existing unexploded munition at sea in each European Sea basin The presence of UXOs in the Atlantic Ocean appears relatively uneven. Most ofthe UXOs can be found in the Brest Harbour and around Brittany and Normandy,where bombing raids took place during WWII. There are very few identifieddumps along the rest of the French coastline and along the Spanish coastline.Encounters of UXOs are extremely rare in those areas. Generally speaking, UXOsare not considered a risk, even in Brest, because those who regularly encounterthese devices are well trained on what to do (i.e. fishers) and accidents areextremely rare. The Baltic Sea was, by contrast, heavily mined during the two wars, and wasalso the dumping site for many aborted or accomplished missions. Historical datahas been of significant help in attempting to identify the main sites and, throughnational and regional efforts, clear the path for key maritime routes. The issuewith such data, however, is the lack of precision that characterisedgeoreferencing tools in the mid-20th century. The presence of different currentshad the effect of displacing many UXOs, enlarging therefore the areas of interest.Regional cooperation in the basin is very good. The Black Sea is far more difficult to map due to the lack of historical archivesand the inability to access dedicated archives. Limited capabilities as well as alack of immediate risks (especially since the main maritime trade routes havebeen cleared) seem to have negatively affected the regular monitoring and mineclearing activities. The situation in the Mediterranean Sea is uneven, both in terms of UXOpresence and in terms of ways to address the issue. Since accidents andencounters are not frequent, the situation is mostly addressed on an ad hoc basis.The Adriatic Sea reveals the presence of far more UXOs than anywhere else inthe Mediterranean Sea, but regular monitoring activities seems to be lacking. The North Sea, much like the Baltic Sea, was also heavily bombed and minedduring WWII. No regional mechanism for regular monitoring was highlighted,however each country appears to have established different systems in place forensuring the safety of their citizens and of maritime trading routes. Currents andtides in the Sea also make it particularly difficult to be certain of UXO positions,so encounters at sea (as opposed to along beaches) are dealt with in a muchmore reactive manner.Mechanisms/approaches adopted to identify, monitor, and remove UXOs: In all Member States, Navies are involved in the process of identifying,monitoring and/or disposing of underwater unexploded munitions (UXOs). Thenature of their involvement, and the stages of such involvement, is subject tosignificant differences across Member States. For example, while ES, PL, SE andBG navies are systematically involved in all the steps of the UXO managementcycle, other countries (FR, IT, DE, NL) adopt an ad-hoc approach which dependson the particular circumstances and environmental settings. Generally, thisdepends on whether it was an accidental encounter or whether it was part of amonitoring exercise. Private companies are often involved in the activities of UXO identification,particularly in the context of infrastructure works such as port extensions. This isMarch, 2022 716145ANNEXESStudy on underwater unexploded munitionthe case of DE and FR, although the disposal of UXOs remains a prerogative ofnational authorities. UXO Monitoring is not a systematic practice across the different Sea basins.The North and Baltic Seas are regularly monitored, primarily because encounterswith UXOs are frequent leading to further searches around the areas of theseencounters. In the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, this is much less systematic(except Brest harbour where, again, encounters are frequent). In the Black Sea,there is no such regular monitoring. It also appeared that monitoring was farmore systematic when there is regular regional cooperation, such as HELCOMand exercises organised yearly by LT, LV and EE in the Baltic Sea, or such as theBelgian-Dutch bilateral cooperation in the North Sea. With a few exceptions, which generally involve fishers (e.g. IT and LT), there areno rules or guidelines for civilians in case of UXO recovery. Interviewees formost countries did, however, highlight the important role of MRCCs and, in somecases, port authorities (e.g. IT). Environmental risks are not considered as a priority when it comes to removingUXOs. At the monitoring stage, little evidence exists that countries regularlyassess the environmental risks associated with the presence of UXOs in theirwaters. In the disposal stage, the majority of stakeholders interviewed observedthat human safety is a priority over environmental protection (though in FR, forinstance, acoustic devices to scare off mammals are regularly used).Member States' relevant capabilities employed for identification, monitoringand disposal of sea-dumped unexploded weapons: EU Member States MCM (clearance) capabilities are world-class, as are theircooperation, joint exercises, and common training sessions in this context. Allthe Member States in scope have response mechanisms in place for accidentalUXO recoveries. This includes protocols/procedures, reactive chain ofintervention, operational assets mobilization and EOD diver qualifications. As regards responsible authority(ies): both public authorities and privateactors are involved, although the disposal of UXOs remains a prerogative ofnational authorities. As regards capability gaps:- The UXO identification and clearance capability still faces a number ofchallenges in resolving this inherited problem. While accidental discoveriesare very efficiently addressed in all affected EU Member States, underwaterunexploded munitions in the EU seabeds remain an important and long-lastingrisk for the environment and seabed users.- Underwater UXO clearance is a challenging task as compared to terrestrialexplosive clearance, which already faces several difficulties, hazards, and highcosts. Currently, only Naval Forces have the capability to approach, identify,handle, and neutralize underwater UXOs. The development of offshoreinfrastructure along the EU coastline (wind farms, communication cables,pipelines) has enabled the development of civilian capabilities to survey theseabed. However, today the private sector is not authorised to intervene andneutralize the detected UXOs. As the primary mission of armed forces is de-mining in the context of current military operations, the resources availablefor the activities of UXO identification and disposal remain mostly limited toaccidental recoveries.- Climate change-induced coastal erosion is a new aggravating factor: sinceWW2, exposure of UXO has mostly been due to fishing activities - in particularwhen using sea floor trawlers and dredges -. As UXOs encounters arecommon, the fishing community appears well aware of the UXO threat andrightly applies the risk mitigation procedures when UXOs appear tangled intheir fishing gear. In future, coastal erosion might increasingly expose thegeneral population, which is at risk of ignoring precautions and alertMarch, 2022 72626346ANNEXESStudy on underwater unexploded munitionprocedures. This risk is difficult to avoid, as the preventive clearancecapability of buried UXOs remains limited.- The chemical monitoring of UXO leaks is also a yet unsolved capabilitychallenge, still at RT&D stage. It is not only an issue of sensors development,but also a question of insufficient knowledge on the extent of this pollutionand its evolution in time and its impact on marine life, food chain, and possiblyhuman health.- In terms of training capabilities, there is a need for developing, adapting, andvalidating procedures and techniques for the mitigation of environmentalimpacts, as well as the training of operators to allow for their use across thedifferent UXO threats and contexts. Furthermore, it is important to developopen UXO detection systems featuring unified taxonomies and data-modelsto be used for AI-based UXO identification algorithms from sonar andmagnetic anomaly data.Response protocols/procedures in case of UXO accidental recovery Immediate interventions in the EU MS are for large part harmonised underinternational maritime regulations. This is also the case of the deminers'training programme, which is based on NATO standards. In particular, the immediate management of the reported munition is basedon the existing alert systems provided by international maritime regulations. Forinstance, in the event of danger, the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre isalerted on VHF channel 16 or through the European emergency phonenumber 112. As regards to the treatment, this is generally carried out by thealert teams (24/7) of the Member States or regional demining services. Theyusually operate under the authority of the Navy, sometimes the Police, and aretrained according to NATO standards. The risk of accidental discovery of chemically loaded (and sometimes leaking)munitions is still persistent, especially in the Baltic Sea. However, deminingteams are trained only to a limited extent in the use of environmentally safemethods and procedures for handling this type of ammunition. Climate change, with its impact on the erosion of the coastline, may also playa role in increasing accidental discoveries of ammunition on the foreshore. Loss of knowledge is another factor to be considered as older fishers retirewhile being replaced by new generations. Thus, new generations (due to lessfrequent UXO encounters) seem to be less aware of both risk areas and safeprocedures in case of accidental recovery. As regards to the exchange of information, this seems to be still insufficient.It is therefore crucial to enable the circulation of information amongprofessionals, civilians, and Member States authorities, to mitigate the risksposed by underwater unexploded munition, as well as to facilitate the sharing ofbest practices.March, 2022 736447ANNEXESStudy on underwater unexploded munition4.1 Recommendations to support Member States in dealing withaccidental recovery of dumped munitions at seaThe analysis outlined in the first part of the report showed that the management ofdifferent and complex types of risk depends on the specific environmental conditions,as well as a common understanding of the legal aspects concerning the UXOmanagement cycle. However, it is crucial to develop policies and measures that gobeyond emergency situations, including structured and proactive measures tocontinually improve multiple sites at the right time and in the right order of priority. Thisrequires a multilevel cross-border approach, including shared analytical methodologies,capabilities and training systems.Based on the results of the desk research, interviews, survey, and the workshop on 29November 2021, this Study identified four key areas of intervention: Environmental protection; Dedicated capability-building; Capabilities for private actors; and Response models.For each area, the recommendations will be divided according to three levels: EU level; Regional level; and National level.During the workshop, Member States provided feedback on possible actions at EU andnational level. Overall, Member States agreed on the need for more cooperation on acommon categorisation of the risks posed by UXOs to humans, environment, the foodchain and industry. They highlighted the need to further develop cross-border initiativesand policy exchanges between national, regional and local actors from maritimecountries. These should include the organisation of common training, knowledge-sharing, and capability-building initiatives.Member States generally disagreed on the usefulness of centralising capability at EUlevel (i.e. pooling equipment) or establishing an EU centre to coordinate monitoring andintervention activities.4.1.1 Environmental protectionWhile several studies provided evidence on the threats posed by the presence of UXOsin the underwater environment (and on aspects such as the food chain, or industrialactivities, as well as risks of injury or death to marine mammals and other fauna due tothe high sound levels produced)173, other findings highlighted the limited diffusion ofthis pollution into EU waters.The reasons for this lack of consensus are threefold. Firstly, the available data is limitedand/or difficult to obtain/collect. Secondly, there is a lack of shared methodologies forthe collection and analysis of results. Thirdly, leakage of chemicals may not be the sameas corrosion and local conditions differ.Furthermore, traditional disposal techniques (such as high-order detonation) can posea number of risks of injury or death to marine mammals and other fauna due to thehigh sound levels produced. Common standards should therefore be developed for theanalysis of the effects of UXOs on the marine environment and humans. At the sametime, it is important to provide Member States with substantial instruments to assessthe current UXO chemical threat, and to identify the most problematic depots, with asystematic, robust, and generalisable approach across the whole EU.173 See table 2 and Annex 1.March, 2022 746548ANNEXESStudy on underwater unexploded munitionSeveral specific actions can be recommended:Regional and EU levelAction A1.1 - Promote cross-border cooperative projects for systematicsurveys and EU-wide detection of UXO chemical pollutionWhile some research facilities174 already conduct on-site surveys to map the type andconcentration of chemicals (particularly TNT) released by leaking UXOs, their activityremains limited, given the relevance of the UXO threat.Guidelines exist at international level on the environmental monitoring of UXOs175, buthave yet to be translated into effective implementation. A key challenge is thedevelopment of technologies capable of detecting pollutant concentrations on the parts-per-million (ppm) scale, on-site and in real-time. Although some prototypes have beendeveloped, they are far from widespread implementation176.It is essential to promote cross-border cooperative project(s) to: Develop a framework for the mapping of chemical pollution ‘hotspots’ in theEU sea basins, in an open, accessible format177; Develop shared methodologies to define UXO chemical pollution markers, aswell as the associated risk scales (for local sea life, marine food chain, and humanseafood consumption). Such methodologies should also be developed forsampling, analysis, and data publishing; Develop technologies such as sensors for deployment on towed bodies, ROVsand AUVs. This will include the development of common operatingprocedures/protocols for the use of these technologies; and Improve cooperation between civilian and military stakeholders on sharingupdated information. Industry and, more broadly, private companies can gatherimportant information (during risk assessments) on UXO location and potentialrisks.Action A1.2 – Build an EU-wide UXO databaseThe evidence gathered throughout this Study showed that information on the effects ofunderwater UXOs on the marine environment is limited and difficult to access. This isdue to scarcity of data, confidentiality, and a lack of historical archives recordinginformation on UXO location, encounters, or successful removal. This data gap presentsa major obstacle to the creation of common standards and approaches to mitigate theenvironmental risks entailed by underwater munitions. To ensure the organisedcollection of structured data and information, this Study recommends the developmentof an EU-wide UXO database, including: A common taxonomy and data models library (from text to interoperableXML strings for e-repositories), and (possibly) standardised reporting templatesfor UXO locations, encounters, or successful removal;174 For example, the German GEOMAR in Kiel, the Maritime Research Institute of the HelmholtzR&D network.175 Practical Guide for Environmental Monitoring of Conventional Munitions in the Seas. Availableat: http://oceanrep.geomar.de/48842/1/geomar_rep_ns_54_2019.pdf.176 The EU has recently co-funded the ExPloTect project, which aims to develop, optimise and testa prototype sea-going device for detection of chemicals associated with unexploded ordnance inthe marine environment. See: https://www.explotect.eu/177 Since 1992, HELCOM has developed a list of significant pollution sites around the Baltic Sea.Although UXOs are not covered, the updated Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP) asks HELCOM to widenthe scope and include additional criteria for the identification of hot spots. See:https://helcom.fi/action-areas/industrial-municipal-releases/helcom-hot-spotsMarch, 2022 756649ANNEXESStudy on underwater unexploded munition A georeferenced UXO information database, covering type, specific risks,condition, eventual markers, managing authority, neutralisation plan, possiblecauses of concern, images (visual or sonar ‘vignettes’); and A virtual library linked to each known depot, including archives from the originaldisposal process, earlier surveys, relevant studies, accidental recovery reports,neutralisation reports, etc.National levelAction A1.3 - Map the seafloors through risk parametersUXOs pose low risk of releasing chemical agents into the marine environment as longas they remain buried and protected from corrosion. The risk is increased by theirpresence on unconsolidated seafloors, which sees UXOs buried, re-exposed and driftedby currents, or even washed on-shore by storms. UXOs may be subjected to corrosion(e.g. from relatively high oxygen content or acidic sea water) or to accelerated erosionin the surf zone due to rising sea levels. These factors increase the risk of chemical leaksand accidental human exposure.In rocky areas (generally avoided by fishers), the detection of UXOs is complicated bytheir possible similarity with the surrounding rocks, aggravated by corrosion and marinegrowth on the UXOs. This complicates the detection and classification process, withgreater false alarms and limited detection probability.It is therefore important to develop an EU-wide system for geophysical data collectionand mapping activity. This system should include a map of priorities based on riskassessment, aiming to: Map the UXO corrosion risk factors (oxygen content, other corrosionenablers), i.e. to identify the areas where UXOs will degrade faster, for eachcasing material (steel, bronze, aluminum, etc.) Map seabed stability, with reference to UXO dragging, burying and re-exposuremechanisms; and Map UXO risks related to coastal erosion and the effects of sea levelincrease (climate change impact) from the angle of re-exposure of UXOs in thesurf zone.4.1.2 UXO dedicated capability-buildingThe main capabilities to deal with underwater UXOs in the Member States are navalmine countermeasures (MCM), with disposal and removal operations routinely usedto train minehunter crews and EOD divers.Recent developments have seen an increasing number of technologies to facilitate theprocess of UXO disposal, limiting the human and environmental risk178. Thesetechnologies need to be fully developed, however, and also require a systematicassessment of best practices in dealing with these munitions.The current design of MCM equipment (high frequency sonar, robots, shaped chargesetc.) is not driven by UXOs but, rather, by modern mines. The priority of MCM is humansafety and rapid clearing of possibly mined areas in order to reopen seaways. Mostexplosive ordnance clearance protocols/processes currently consider environmentalprotection only to a limited extent.Member States should develop an UXO clearance strategy, including the developmentof specialised equipment and building dedicated clearance capabilities. This would178 This includes the use of bubble curtains and/or alternative techniques for on-site neutralisation anddecontamination (e.g. injection of chemical solvents or mechanical dismantling). A detailed analysis of thesecapabilities is provided in Annex 7 of this report.March, 2022 766750ANNEXESStudy on underwater unexploded munitionfacilitate future cooperation in monitoring initiatives between Member States, privatebodies, and regional stakeholders.Several specific actions are recommended.All levelsAction A2.1 – Scale-up UXO clearance capabilityUnderwater UXOs are a large-scale problem in European sea basins and require anadequate response at EU level. However, there is an overall lack of resources to fosterMember State cooperation and current capabilities appear insufficient.This issue can be resolved by enabling the private sector to operate throughout thewhole UXO management cycle, including disposal and removal. This would require thedevelopment of legal and regulatory frameworks to enable private contractors toneutralise UXOs.Cross-border initiatives and policy exchanges should be promoted between national,regional, and local actors from the different maritime Member States and European thirdcountries. These initiatives could include the organisation of common training andknowledge-sharing/capacity-building programmes179.Action A2.2 – Increase the area detection and identification capability of UXOsThe range of current high-frequency mine detection and identification sonar issignificantly reduced in sea water and rarely exceeds 300m. The use of syntheticaperture array processing requires a stable navigation of towed bodies, giving a verylow survey speed (3 to 5 km) and a long stabilisation time when manoeuvering180. Takentogether, this means a daily survey capability of very few square kilometres.UXO depots already located may be displaced by dredging fishing gear and move farfrom their original location. This represents a major challenge for systematic UXOdetection operations, such as periodic seabed inspections to monitor depots that haveyet to be cleared.Resources dedicated to funding technological RT&D programmes181 should be increasedin order to: Develop/adapt specific MCM equipment for UXO detection andidentification, using advanced sonar and magnetic joint signal processingoptions and/or long range/more penetrating buried UXO detection solutions, suchas low-frequency sonar alternatives coupled with shell resonance detection; Further develop AI-based UXO identification algorithms, with theprerequisite of building shared learning databases of various types of UXOs on avariety of seabed textures and geological nature182; and179 France and the Baltic States already cooperate to reduce risk related to accidental discoveriesof dumped munitions, conducting naval operations under NATO cover in areas known to containWWII minefields. These operations, called OPEN SPIRIT (Baltic Sea) and COD (Channel and NorthSea), are conducted jointly with other Member States. The BOSB initiative, of which OperationOPEN SPIRIT is part, could be extended to other basins in the longer term, to further dispose ofdumped munitions. However, these initiatives only target conventional munitions and thediscovery of chemical munitions routinely raises the question of their safe disposal.180 Sonar is increasingly used on UAVs and ROVs, but has yet to reach full operational capability,resulting in persistent exposure of human operators.181 See BASTA (Boost Applied munition detection through Smart data integration and AIworkflows) and ExPloTect (Ex-situ, near-real-time explosive compound detection in seawater),which aim to advance the approach for munition detection at local and larger scales. The recentlylaunched MIRICLE (Mine Risk Clearance for Europe) project is a military MCM project that doesnot focus on UXOs.182 Ibidem.March, 2022 776851ANNEXESStudy on underwater unexploded munition Develop training facilities with underwater UXO testbeds that combine variousenvironments (sand, mud, rocks, currents, etc.) to support joint testing, trainingand benchmarking of innovative solutions in a controlled environment. The NATOCMRE UXO testbed near La Spezia (Italy) is paving the way for future initiatives.Action A2.3 - Improve impact reduction technologies for underwater UXOdisposalUnderwater detonation is a standard practice for UXOs disposal. However, as a sourceof anthropogenic noise in the marine environment, it can pose a threat to marine biota(e.g. fish, mammals)183. Despite increasing awareness of the environmental impact ofnon-safe neutralisation techniques, on-site blowing remains the most frequent disposaloption184. Safer techniques (e.g. low order explosion or bubble curtains) are increasinglyconsidered, but not always suitable. Low order explosion may turn to a full blow, or maynot entirely consume the explosive charge, releasing debris and creating newenvironmental risks. Bubble curtains have proved effective in damping the shock wave(and debris) but remain difficult to deploy. The EU could play a role in promotinginitiatives dedicated to the development of environmentally safe UXO neutralisationoperations185, such as: Develop bubble curtains technologies that are easy to deploy, as well as otheroptions to control the environmental effects of UXO neutralisation; Improving the current alternative techniques for on-site neutralisation anddecontamination (e.g. injection of chemical solvents or mechanical dismantling); Improve the effectiveness of mammal-frightening techniques/devices. Thiscould include optimised range and frequencies and user-friendly interfaces; and Develop standard protocols/procedures for minimising the environmentalimpact of undersea UXO destruction in a diversity of contexts, and associatedtraining.4.1.3 UXO management capabilities of private operators:National levelAction A3.1 - Increase the UXO management capability of private operatorsWhile NATO has already contributed to standardising the qualification process for MCMprocedures/protocols and EOD diver training, the private sector is regulated onlythrough national provisions, which vary across the Member States.An increasing number of private companies are now specialised in UXO survey anddetection activities. These were initially contracted ahead of oil exploration, dredgingoperations and underwater pipeline construction, but are increasingly contracted bynational authorities. The current involvement of private companies in the UXOmanagement cycle is limited by national legislation and restricted access to appropriatetraining (they generally need to hire former naval EOD divers, limiting the pool ofcandidates for recruitment). This creates a bottleneck effect that contrasts with thegrowing demand for UXO clearance.183 Richardson, W. J. et al. (1995). Marine mammals and noise. Academic Press. San Diego, pp.576.184 However, the thresholds on noise pollution set by the Marine Strategy Framework Directive mightmake this practice more difficult. See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32008L0056185 The EU has recently funded projects to reduce underwater noise from maritime transport,including through the use of specific technologies such as bubble curtains. See AQUO (Achievequieter oceans by shipping noise footprint reduction) and SONIC (Suppression of underwaternoise induced by cavitation) projects. Available at: http://www.aquo.eu/ and http://www.sonic-project.euMarch, 2022 786952ANNEXESStudy on underwater unexploded munitionTwo specific actions are proposed: Develop specific provisions, qualifications, and statutes; and Allow private actors to access training and certification.4.1.4 Response modelsMember States’ current response models have proved effective and sufficient to tackleaccidental discoveries of UXOs. The EU’s Maritime Security Strategy and the relatedAction Plan aim to tackle the challenge of environmental security by setting out acooperative response based on the exchange of information and common operativeapproaches186.Several specific actions are recommended:Regional and EU levelAction A4.1 - Common procedures and response models Few Member States have an effective system of financial compensation inplace for the reporting of UXOs by civil stakeholders. A common system offinancial compensation would incentivise reporting among fishers, who mayotherwise decide to throw the ammunition back into the sea to avoid wastingtime notifying the authorities; and UXO detection capability varies substantially across the Member States. This isvalid not only for an effective UXO management cycle, but also for the quality ofthe data collected. Common training programmes (in synergy with Action A3-1) as well as MCM programmes (such as the former tripartite minehunter design,development, and modernisation plans) have already demonstrated their benefitto the overall community.186 Aker, J., Howard, B., and Reid, M. (2012). ‘Risk Management for Unexploded Ordinance (UXO)in the Marine Environment’. Dalhousie Journal of Interdisciplinary Management, 8 – Fall.March, 2022 7970Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference Secretariatwww.bspc.netBSPC SecretariatSchlossgartenallee 1519061 SchwerinGermany