Joenniemi presentation at 19th BSPC

Pertti Joenniemi Presentation at the 19th Baltic Sea ParliamentarySenior Research Fellow Conference (BSPC), Mariehamn, 31.08.2010Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)THE BALTIC SEA REGION:STUCK IN THE PAST?Security has, as an argument, traditionally figured quite central in the debate concerning the Baltic Sea area. It has consequently brought about a very divided political landscape. With issues pertaining to alliances, balances, security guarantees etc. high on the agenda, there has been very little space for regionalization to unfold and impact the political scenery.This changed with the end of the Cold War and in fact the Baltic Sea region has been quite quick in capitalizing on this. It has, within a relatively short span of time, turned into one of the most regionalized parts of Europe.This does not imply, however, that arguments pertaining to security would have vanished altogether. They are still to some extent part of the discourse, albeit now void of any key formative impact. It would obviously be much of an overstatement to claim that the Baltic Sea area remains stuck with the old power political discourse. There might well be issues pertaining to various ‘soft’ forms of security to pursue and following up on arms control and confidence-building could still be of some relevance, but the various megalomaniac issues concerning ‘big’ war are forlorn. They have been left behind and lost their constitutive impact – despite some voices at the fringes of the debate still clinging to such arguments.Instead, the really powerful arguments pertain to centrality and marginality. There assumedly exists a superior core surrounded by inferior actors positioned at the margins of the overall system. Hence the aim and meaning of Baltic Sea cooperation is to bolster our position within such a concentric setting. We are generally seen to be located here in spatial terms whereas we should aspire to move there in order for us really to become something significant. Similarly, we have to catch up in temporal terms. We have to do so in order for us to catch up with those who are seen to be ahead of us in the sense of having already reached the core.In consequence, this spatio-temporal matrix then also brings about an emotive distance to the core; in being comprehended as not yet belonging fully the core but doomed to join the core through a constant process of becoming, there are both feeling of admiration as well as aversion to be detected as to how we view our relation to the core.Notably, the Union’s recent Baltic Sea Strategy breaks profoundly with such a pattern. It aims at the creation of a rather pluralistic constellation instead of staying within the confines of a concentric one. This time Brussels does not seem to insist on imposing strict conditions for the unfolding of regionalization as also exemplified by the three nos part of the BSS-policy: no new institutions, no new money and no new legislation.Importantly, the message is rather one of encouraging the Baltic Sea area to continue precisely on the basis of its own indigenous logic. We are not asked to copy and abide to something that is already there and dictated by Brussels but requested very much to pursue policies on our own terms. We are in fact being cast in the role of a creative and pro-active force, one calling the tune. Other European macro-regions are encouraged to emulate us rather than us changing our own being. We now stand out, within the confines of the new story, as leaders and they have been assigned the role of followers.Furthermore, the point is not that we have to aspire to move spatially from here to there in order to be really good Europeans. The argument is instead that we should remain precisely where we already are. Instead of being encouraged in proceeding further and continue the perpetual process of becoming, we are informed that we have actually already arrived. The end-station and the top have in fact been reached. Interestingly, Brussels does not request change but rather testifies to fulfillment in temporal terms.It then follows that the emotive distance to Europe is bound to experience change as well. It is actually bound to vanish with our previous loving or hating of Europe turning into self-love or self-hate. We become more self-enclosed with a Europe external to us no longer providing an emotive outlet in the same way as it used to do. This is so as we are no more on our way towards Europe but have already reached the destination and have been subsequently elevated to the status of exemplary Europeans.What worries me in this context is that we seem to be far from prepared in the Baltic Sea region to digest these changes. Paradoxically, by accepting and outlining us in the region as a template, a forerunner and a model in the sphere of Europe-making Brussels does not confirm our understanding of who we are, where we are and what we are about in the new Europe. Instead of vindicating our established self-understanding as marginal actors gradually and successfully aspiring to be somewhat better Europeans, the core questions our identity. It endeavours at positioning us in an entirely new and Europe-related discourse, one quite unfamiliar to us in terms of the spatial, temporal and emotional parameters at play.Overall, there are clear signs of a formative moment in Europe-making with far more stress on a rather de-centered Europe of macro-regions than has been the case previously. The constitutive discourse impacting the unfolding of political space in Europe seems to be changing and it also positions the Baltic Sea area in a new context. Considerable possibilities are opening up, but the change underway also entails formidable challenges. Rather than testifying to competence, the recent reactions in the region appear to point to bewilderment, stagnation and passivity. Therefore, yet another jump from a discourse to another seems to be needed for us not to remain stuck with an already outdated one.