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As maritime trade, climate pressures, and geopolitical challenges converge, the Baltic Sea region faces a critical turning point. In his new report “Shipping in the Baltic Sea: Where We Stand and What Comes Next” , BSPC Rapporteur on Integrated Maritime Policy and President of Ålands Lagting, Jörgen Pettersson , outlines the strategic choices ahead for the region’s policymakers. Presented in preparation of the 34 th Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference in Mariehamn on 24-26 August, the 2025 report provides a compelling, data-driven overview of the major transformations under way — from emerging energy demands and shadow fleet operations to digital port innovation, green shipping corridors, and the integration of carbon capture solutions. Structured into six thematic chapters and grounded in both local realities and global forecasts, the report highlights how the Baltic Sea can remain a model of resilience, sustainability, and innovation — but only if current momentum is sustained. Five clear and practical recommendations urge BSPC members to: Put security first, Make sustainability the standard, Think in systems, not silos, Accelerate the modal shift, and Champion digital innovation. With climate goals tightening and maritime infrastructure under growing pressure, the report calls on all actors to align national and regional strategies — to future-proof shipping, ensure energy resilience, and reinforce the Baltic Sea as a zone of cooperation, not confrontation. Access the Full Report: We invite policymakers, maritime industry stakeholders, environmental organisations, and the public to download and explore the complete “Maritime Rapporteur’s Report” to consider the strategic measures and collaborative efforts essential for the ongoing transformation of the Baltic Sea maritime sector. The Report can be downloaded here and on the Rapporteur’s webpage . Stay tuned to our website and follow our exclusive content related to various BSR-relevant policy fields.

BSPC Working Group addresses naval defence, cyber deterrence and the potential of AI for securing vital maritime assets The sixth and final meeting of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) Working Group on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, Resilience, and Connectivity (WG ESSRC) convened in Tallinn, Estonia, from 18-20 May 2025, drawing more than 30 participants from across the Baltic Sea region. Delegates from the Åland Islands, the Baltic Assembly, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hamburg, Latvia, Lithuania, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Schleswig-Holstein joined officials and experts to explore the possibilities for addressing digital vulnerabilities and strengthening energy resilience in the region. Chair of the WG ESSRC, Mr Andris Kulbergs , expressed his sincere gratitude to all delegations, experts and the secretariat for their continued contributions to the WG. Reflecting on the substantial progress made since the Bergen meeting in March 2025, he underscored the present risks posed by cyber threats, stressing the need for swift, coordinated governmental responses. Emphasising the unity within the WG, he highlighted how this format has proven the ability of Baltic Sea countries to align on shared goals, exchange expertise and resources, as well as act collectively. Spotlight on Maritime Security, Cyber Resilience and Digital Innovations The participants engaged in a series of high-level site visits, including the e-Estonia Briefing Centre, Estonian Navy, CR14 and International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) : e-Estonia Briefing Centre : As a cornerstone of the digital leadership of Estonia, the e-Estonia Briefing Centre offers an immersive overview of how the country has become one of the most advanced digital societies in the world. Established in 2009 as an NGO, it is today part of Enterprise Estonia and plays an integral role in promoting the know-how and expertise in digital services. Participants were introduced to the digital transformation journey of Estonia by Digital Transformation Adviser Ms Johanna-Kadri Kuusk , who highlighted how digital identity, e-governance and AI-driven solutions are enhancing national resilience, public services and infrastructure management. Estonia was the first country to introduce i-voting in 2005, which now accounts for more than half of all votes cast, offering a secure, cost-effective and flexible voting method. The visit demonstrated that digital success is built on a citizen-centric approach, strong public-private and academic partnerships and digital-minded leadership. Estonian Navy : The Estonian Navy protects the territorial waters of Estonia and, in case of crisis, defends harbour areas, sea lines of communication and by-sea approaches to the coastline. Ships of the Estonian Navy regularly participate in major international exercises and operations that are carried out in the Baltic and the North Sea. Hosted at the Miinisadam naval base, the visit offered a comprehensive overview of the naval operations and defence responsibilities of Estonia. Deputy Commander Mr Johan-Elias Seljamaa emphasised that maritime surveillance is complicated by legal ambiguities, cross-border data sharing limitations and hybrid threats merging civilian and military interests. Improved coordination and clearer frameworks for information exchange are urgently needed, especially as the region continues to face evolving security threats. CR14 : Foundation CR14, established by the Ministry of Defence of Estonia in 2021, is based on more than 10 years of military-grade cyber range experience. It offers cyber ranges, cyber exercise automation, a digital library and cybersecurity simulation tools, as well as solutions that allow for the simple and effective planning and implementation of cyber defence exercises and activities. More than 3500 cyber experts are trained within a year. Head of International Relations of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) Ms Angelica Tikk presented the Centre’s mission to support NATO and its member nations with interdisciplinary expertise in cyber defence, spanning technology, strategy, operations and law. Established in 2008 following the 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia, the CCDCOE has since become a global leader in cyber resilience. Its flagship exercise, Locked Shields, is the world’s largest live-fire cyber defence drill. The work of the Centre highlights the importance of partnerships, national capability-building, and ensuring everyday cyber hygiene practices, such as two-factor authentication, as a first line of defence. Head of Marketing at CR14 Mr Martin Hanson briefed the participants about the work of CR14 and offered the participants the possibility to see the NATO Cyber Range – a platform and data centre enabling NATO to conduct its largest cyber defence exercises and training, such as the Cyber Coalition and the Coalition Warrior Interoperability exercise (CWIX). International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) : ICDS is the leading think-tank in Estonia, specialising in foreign policy, security and defence issues. Founded in 2006, it aims to be the regional knowledge hub of first choice for the security and defence communities of Estonia, its allies and partners. The ICDS team of experts – Head of Studies Mr Tomas Jermalavičius , Head of Defence Policy & Strategy Programme Mr Tony Lawrence and Research Fellow Mr Henrik Praks – shared their analysis on the protection of critical maritime infrastructure, regional naval cooperation and responses to hybrid attacks. Drawing on recent research, they addressed the evolving security environment in Europe, offering policy-oriented solutions for resilience and deterrence in the Baltic Sea region. The presentations highlighted the need for forward-looking cooperation to counter complex threats. Energy Security, Maritime Resilience and Regional Preparedness in the Baltic Sea Security and international relations expert Mr Raivo Vare outlined the growing vulnerabilities of Russia, highlighting its reliance on manipulated economic data, structural dependence on raw material exports and limited technological development. Additionally, Russia faces deepening demographic challenges, such as workforce shortages and a brain drain of educated professionals, all of which hinder its long-term economic stability and capacity for modernisation. Despite sanctions, Russia continues to fund its war effort through commodity exports, using mechanisms like the shadow fleet to bypass restrictions, posing both geopolitical and environmental risks. Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Estonia and former Ambassador to Ukraine Mr Kaimo Kuusk shared first-hand insights on the energy resilience of Ukraine during wartime. Drawing from his experience in Kyiv, he described how Russia deliberately targeted critical energy infrastructure while avoiding nuclear plants. He emphasised the importance of resilience and rapid repair capacity, noting that Ukraine’s ability to quickly restore power was vital to maintaining basic services. Critical infrastructure must be designed with redundancy in mind and protected through both physical defences and cyber preparedness. His core lesson was that, to ensure the survival of energy systems, countries must not only defend against attacks but also be ready to rebuild and adapt quickly under pressure. Director General of the Legal Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia Ms Kristi Land emphasised the critical importance of protecting underwater maritime infrastructure within the framework of international maritime law, particularly UNCLOS, which serves as the foundational legal instrument for the seas. While recent incidents have sparked calls to amend UNCLOS, she noted that reopening or amending this nearly universal treaty is impractical due to the complexity and length of negotiations involved. Instead, she advocates for focusing on clearer interpretations and harmonised implementation of existing UNCLOS provisions, alongside improving national laws to criminalise damage to underwater infrastructure, as well as developing non-binding regional codes of practice. Chairman of the Board at Eesti Energia Mr Andrus Durejko reflected on the lessons learned from the recent desynchronization of the Baltic States from the BRELL energy system , emphasising the importance of regional cooperation and forward-thinking. He stressed that small nations cannot afford to act in isolation – coordinated planning, unified decision-making and fair cost-sharing principles are essential. Highlighting Eesti Energia’s role as a vertically integrated energy provider with a focus on cleaner production, he underlined the need to strengthen collective resilience in the evolving regional energy landscape. Lastly, Senior Researcher at Tallinn University of Technology Dr Tarmo Korõtko explored the transformative role of digitalisation and AI in enhancing energy security . As energy systems become increasingly complex due to rising global demand and the integration of variable renewables, traditional engineering methods are no longer sufficient. AI offers powerful tools for managing this complexity by processing multidimensional data to improve stability, reliability and efficiency. However, challenges remain, including data integration, system transparency and scalability. Thus, AI should not be seen as a solution in itself, but as a vital enabler for achieving energy resilience, self-sustainability and improved system performance. Looking Ahead Chairman Mr Andris Kulbergs closed the meeting by emphasising the need for a detailed, regional strategy that strengthens the resilience of energy supply, communications and transport networks, including a specific action plan to prevent threats, and it should be coordinated with national initiatives and all EU institutions, NATO legal acts related to the protection of critical infrastructure. It was agreed that the WG would conclude its work during the summer and present the final results at the 34 th BSPC in Mariehamn in August.

BSPC Working Group addresses emerging geopolitical challenges, energy security risks, and the future of interconnected transport systems in Stockholm The fifth meeting of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) Working Group on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, Resilience, and Connectivity (WG ESSRC) convened in Stockholm, Sweden, from 16-18 March 2025, drawing 30 participants from across the Baltic Sea region. Delegates from the Åland Islands, the Baltic Assembly, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hamburg, Latvia, Lithuania, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Schleswig-Holstein joined officials and experts in addressing the possibilities for developing sustainable and resilient land and maritime transport solutions. The working group also further reinforced the importance of safeguarding critical infrastructure and ensuring maritime security amid growing geopolitical uncertainties. Chair of the WG ESSRC, Mr Andris Kulbergs , pointed out that since the last meeting of the WG in Bergen in November 2024, significant progress has been made in various areas of discussion. However, the geopolitical situation has changed fundamentally and is still changing daily. Therefore, the WG ESSRC is required to coordinate and communicate on the issues to be able to come up with the necessary action, as strengthening cooperation across the Baltic Sea region is more important than ever, and this commitment will be crucial for shaping joint policies moving forward. He also emphasised that the Baltic Sea countries should be the pillars of democracy and legality and continue to fight for the rule of law and freedom of speech. Spotlight on Transport and Resilience The participants engaged in a series of site visits, including the KTH Royal Institute of Technology , Candela , and the Swedish Coast Guard : KTH Royal Institute of Technolog y : Founded in 1827, KTH has grown to become a leading technical university worldwide. As the largest institution in Sweden for technical education and research, it brings together students, researchers, and educators worldwide. Its activities are grounded in a strong tradition of advancing science and innovation, focusing on contributing to sustainable societal development. KTH conducts basic and applied research, currently ranking 73 rd among 1,500 universities worldwide in the QS World University Rankings. Their research structures enable interdisciplinary and external collaborations that contribute to new knowledge, technologies, products, and services. Thus, during the visit, leading researchers shared insights on some of the recent research topics, such as sustainable transport development, power grid evolution, and industrial expansion in the Baltic Sea region. A demonstration at the Integrated Transport Research Lab (ITRL) showcased cutting-edge research in transport automation and electrification. The visit emphasised the role of technological innovation in shaping the future of mobility while ensuring energy efficiency and environmental sustainability. Candela : Candela was founded in 2014 by Gustav Hasselskog, who was determined to find ways to make electric boats with both range and speed that would ensure a better performance than the fossil fuel competitors. At the end of 2016, a full-scale prototype was launched, reaching the target of more than 50 nautical miles per charge at a speed of 22 knots. Serial production of the world’s first electric hydrofoil boat started in 2019, but in 2020, Candela C-7 became the best-selling electric boat in Europe. During the visit to Candela headquarters, participants had the opportunity to practically experience the potential of electric hydrofoil boats to revolutionise maritime transport. The innovative Candela P-12 is the world’s first high-speed and long-range electric shuttle ship. Cruising at 20+ knots on computer-controlled hydrofoils, it consumes 80% less energy than conventional ships. These vessels offer an energy-efficient alternative to traditional ferries and could play a key role in reducing emissions in the Baltic Sea region. Swedish Coast Guard : The Swedish Coast Guard surveils, rescues, and provides assistance at sea 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, along the entire Swedish coastline. It is a civilian government agency under the authority of the Ministry of Defence of Sweden. The Coast Guard also coordinates civilian needs for maritime surveillance, disseminates maritime information, and carries out the day-to-day maritime surveillance for many government agencies. The visit to the Swedish Coast Guard station in Djurö further reinforced the importance of safeguarding critical infrastructure and ensuring maritime security in the face of growing geopolitical uncertainties. Security in the Baltic Sea, energy security, and civil preparedness Professor at the Swedish Defence University and Maritime Systems Researcher at the Royal Institute of Technology, KTH, Mr Hans Liwång, informed that the underwater domain of the Baltic Sea presents unique and complex challenges. Thus, it requires specialised knowledge. Unlike incidents on land, where causes are quickly identified, maritime incidents can remain uncertain for long periods, leading to unnecessary speculation. A more structured approach to incident reporting and learning is needed to improve resilience. He also emphasised that increasing diversity in infrastructure, such as multiple cables with different technologies and operators, would enhance resilience against coordinated attacks. Lastly, maritime security should be approached from an international perspective rather than a purely national one. Deputy Head of Security, Svenska kraftnät, Mr Fredrik Gustavsson, provided an overview of the Svenska kraftnät, which is the authority responsible for ensuring that Sweden’s transmission system for electricity is safe, environmentally sound and cost-effective. They also conduct and support research projects to manage critical challenges to the national electricity grid and possible risks in the power system. He also informed about the threats that the electricity sector is facing, including cyberattacks, physical damage and sabotage, unreliable supply chains, and different kinds of hybrid activities. To deal with these challenges, the Svenska kraftnät is taking different measures to maintain the electricity supply in all social conditions, such as remedial measures, preparedness, security, and dialogue with stakeholders. Analyst at the Swedish Energy Agency, Ms Rebecka Bergholtz, informed about the Swedish Energy Agency, which is the national authority for energy policy issues charged with promoting sustainable and resilient energy use and supply in Sweden. It supports research, innovation, policies, and actions to enable the energy transition while increasing the overall resilience of the energy system. She also emphasised that efforts are being made to ensure energy resilience in times of conflict by analysing supply and demand gaps and ensuring robust energy availability for critical sectors. Cooperation of the Baltic Sea states in international organisations The members of the WG ESSRC also had been updated about the current activities of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and learned about the work of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMR) Baltic Sea Commission. Director General of the CBSS, Mr Gustav Lindström, informed that the CBSS was established in 1992 as an inter-governmental political forum for cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region. It currently consists of 11 members: the 10 Member States of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Sweden, plus the European Union. Today, the CBSS serves as a primary platform for political dialogue, encompassing international cooperation in areas agreed on by its members. He highlighted that the CBSS focuses on its current three long-term priorities – Regional Identity, Safe & Secure Region, and Sustainable & Prosperous Region. On 13 January 2025, Toomas Hendrik Ilves and Gabrielius Landsbergis were appointed as the high-level rapporteurs of the CBSS following their nomination by the Estonian Presidency. They are now working on a report on the future of the CBSS, which will be launched in May 2025. President of CPMR Baltic Sea Commission, Mr Tomas Mörtsell, informed that the CPMR Baltic Sea Commission is an international, independent organisation of Regional Authorities across the Baltic Sea Region. Established in 1996, it serves as a forum for policy-oriented cooperation and lobbying amongst Regional Authorities. The organisation supports the main goals of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and works for a stronger involvement of regional stakeholders in the governance and implementation of the EU Strategy of the Baltic Sea Region. Looking Ahead Chairman Mr Andris Kulbergs closed the meeting by emphasising the urgency of cooperation across the Baltic Sea region to ensure preparedness for any future risks. It was agreed that the WG will reconvene in Tallinn in May 2025 for its sixth and final meeting, focusing on maritime cybersecurity and accelerating the transition to a single digital market resilient to internal and external threats.

The BSPC Standing Committee gathered in the European Parliament in Brussels to look into the European Commission’s recent achievements in the bioeconomy, fishery and oceans, shipping and response, and the ongoing threat of hybrid and cyber-attacks. Representatives of the European Parliament, particularly the Vice-Presidents of the European Parliament, Ms Christel Schaldemose and Mr Roberts Zīle , former EU Commissioner MEP Virginijus Sinkevičius and MEP Rasa Juknevičienė,the European Commission, namely EU Commissioner Mr Costas Kadis, representatives of the GD Environment, HELCOM, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and NATO discussed the current challenges in Europe, former and current main activities of the EU Commission regarding the Ocean Policy, shipping and response as well as benefits of the bioeconomy for the Baltic Sea Region. Further preparations were made for the annual conference in Mariehamn on 24-26 August. More than 40 participants, representatives and delegations of the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM) and the BSPC members from the Åland Islands, the Baltic Assembly, the European Parliament, Denmark, Estonia, the German Bundestag, Finland, Hamburg, Latvia, Lithuania, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the Nordic Council, Norway, Poland, Schleswig-Holstein and Sweden participated in the meeting. Introduction BSPC President Alfons Röblom welcomed the Standing Committee to the traditional winter meeting at the European Parliament in Brussels. Welcome Word by Mr Roberts Zīle , the Vice-President of the European Parliament, responsible for the Baltic/Nordic/Arctic countries, including the Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, the Barents Parliamentary Conference, the Northern Dimension Parliamentary Forum, the Nordic Council and the West Nordic Council Current Challenges in Europe and the Future of Europe Mr Zīle stressed that, amidst all the changes, security remained a top priority on which decisive action was required for the survival of the region as a democratic and prosperous area. He acknowledged the threat of the Russian shadow fleet and other vessels in the Baltic Sea. In light of the recent US-Russian agreement to talk about Ukraine without European involvement, Mr Zīle said that strong action was needed. He then pointed to the upcoming presentations which would highlight further important areas. President Röblom noted that his homeland of Åland was called the “Islands of Peace”, underlining that the world needed more examples of peace. Presentations Presentation on Recent accomplishments and future plans in the Baltic Sea area by Former Commissioner, MEP Virginijus Sinkevičius, European Parliament Mr Virginijus Sinkevičius saw the importance of the Baltic Sea on the rise in recent years, propelled not least by challenges requiring pan-European solutions, such as Brexit and the pandemic. He regretted the poor condition of the Baltic Sea, lauding the work of HELCOM in improving this. The greatest achievement of the first von der Leyen Commission had been overhauling the energy situation, pointing to the Baltic States integrating into the European power grid, the European Wind Power Charter, and Greece joining the Three Seas Initiative. In environmental concerns, he stressed the Baltic Initiative bringing together all the environment and agriculture ministers from the Baltic Sea states. But clearing the Baltic Sea of the dumped munitions posing a dire threat was also high on the agenda. With the geopolitical situation changing every day, he said that much of what they would hear at this meeting would have seemed science fiction five years ago but was the reality they had to cope with. The Baltic Sea would be the front to withstand imperial ambitions and defend the international rules of law established after World War II. Security was a paramount concern. Already in 2022, the EU had adopted a coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure, driven by the sabotage on the Nord Stream pipeline. He underlined that security also included the fragile environment of the Baltic Sea, which could affect nations dependent on the sea. In 2025, NATO would launch the Baltic Sentry Initiative to enhance its military presence. The various, increasing acts of sabotage were usually carried out by the Russian shadow fleet. In addition, the fleet was circumventing sanctions and in such poor conditions as to pose a constant ecological threat. Monitoring was therefore vital. Mr Sinkevičius considered the Baltic Sea effectively a second theatre of the Russian war against the West. Meetings like this of the BSPC Standing Committee were vital to better understand the situation and align positions—much like the impromptu meeting of European heads of state in Paris on that same day. With more and more doubt cast on the transatlantic relationship, emboldening Russia, the Baltic Sea region would likely remain the front between imperialism and the free democratic world. Mr Sinkevičius summarised that the security situation had heightened attention paid to the region, and the countries around the Baltic Sea had to understand they were on the front line and had to ensure their future was solely in their own hands, cooperating in economy, energy independence, defence, and the environment. Secretary General Bodo Bahr emphasised the significance of these concerns, which had been at the core of BSPC discussions for more than a year. Underlining the severe risk posed by a potential oil spill from a Russian shadow fleet tanker, he recalled the critical achievements of BSPC and HELCOM in preventing large-scale environmental disasters in the Baltic Sea. Through close collaboration and concerted efforts, both organisations had successfully initiated far-reaching, legally binding international measures 25 years ago. The implementation of these regulations has, to date, effectively prevented a major tanker accident in the Baltic Sea despite a continuous increase in maritime traffic. However, he stressed that the current situation had drastically elevated the likelihood of such an accident. The risk level was now higher than ever, with a large-scale tanker disaster in the Baltic Sea becoming an increasingly real and imminent possibility. Should one of these ageing supertankers spill 100,000 litres of oil into the Baltic Sea, every litre of the Baltic Sea water would be contaminated 4,600 times. The catastrophic consequences would be almost unimaginable, with entire coastal economies facing devastation. The tourism industry in affected regions, for instance, could be completely wiped out for the next decade. He further noted that the January NATO Baltic Sea heads of state meeting had made significant progress in addressing this urgent issue. He questioned how preventive measures could be prioritised and saw the necessity of an enhanced role of the European Parliament in contributing to effective solutions. Reinforcing preventive frameworks, expanding surveillance mechanisms, and fostering deeper international cooperation were imperative to mitigating the risk of an environmental catastrophe in the region. Mr Sinkevičius replied that putting more shadow fleet ships on the sanction list was critical since that would forbid them from entering and going to port in the Baltic Sea. Preventing disasters and sabotage meant protecting communities and was cheaper than monitoring and cleaning up. In addition, the shadow fleet was evading sanctions to funnel money into Russia to fuel its war machine. Mr Sinkevičius warned that Russia’s ambitions likely extended beyond Ukraine to the Baltic States and other democratic nations in the Baltic Sea region. Presentation on How embracing the bioeconomy could benefit the Baltic Sea region by Mr Aurel Ciobanu-Dordea, Director for Circular Economy, DG ENVI, European Commission Mr Ciobanu-Dordea stated that the Bioeconomy Initiative was still being elaborated by the European Commission. He stressed that the EU had to think more competitively, as part of strengthening its resilience in the geopolitical situation. The current bioeconomy initiative from 2018 has focused mainly on research and innovation. Its successor initiative – set to be adopted at the end of 2025 – was now in the responsibility of the Commissioner for the Environment. The bioeconomy had to move from pioneering work into the mainstream, boosting its manufacturing and market benefits, much like the circular economy. With input from research, agriculture, biodiversity, and industrial policy fields as well as many economic stakeholders, the first important building block dealt with creating a sustainable source for bioeconomy production while avoiding conflicts with food and energy (biomass) production. 59 % of the biomass production in the EU was devoted to energy. So, a system of traffic lights should alleviate the permanent quarrels about the protection of nature as well as agriculture concerning biomass, establishing priority uses and rules to promote the intertwined growth of food, energy, and resource production. Mr Ciobanu-Dordea recommended using lesser-known sources, such as the municipal organic waste fraction, as well as organic wastes from agriculture and industrial processes, such as wood. Their usage would further reduce the aforementioned conflicts. The second vital building block was identifying the principal demand areas. Only packaging was presently targeted. A planned regulation could target biowaste plastics. Yet the bioeconomy was much larger and should extend beyond alternatives to hazardous chemical substances: It might yield alternatives to critical raw materials. In general, the market opportunities from a strategic perspective had to be pinpointed to offer business incentives. Mr Ciobanu-Dordea moved to the third building block as the possible incentives aside from legally mandatory requirements, the former stimulating innovation and scaling up production. The fourth building block was the global dimension of the bioeconomic policies in the EU. As one of the world’s largest interconnected markets, the EU was a coveted partner for bioeconomy champions such as Brazil, Canada, and Thailand. European policies had to reflect the EU’s domestic interests, creating a policy inspiring the EU’s trade policies as well. Finally, he noted that aquaculture and green production in the sea were also factors in scaling up production from the laboratory to the factory. Mr Staffan Eklöf remarked that genetically modified organisms might reduce said conflicts, creating additional alternatives. Most Swedish parties considered genetic modification a central tool to make the bioeconomy successful. He asked whether this was reflected in the European Commission. Mr Ciobanu-Dordea did not believe this relevant for the bioeconomy strategy but for the upcoming European Biotechnology Act. This hotly debated issue fell into the Health Commissioner’s purview. Ms Delara Burkhardt , a member of the EU Parliament Environmental Commission, underlined that coherence was vital, appreciating that Mr Ciobanu-Dordea had reflected this. To avoid the greater use of biomass in the EU having spillover effects on the global south, she stressed that the bioeconomy needed to take a comprehensive and fully sustainable approach. Mr Ciobanu-Dordea confirmed that his side was aware of this issue and were working on a coherent concept. At the end of the year, they would publish their results. Presentation on the current Commission’s ocean policy, fisheries and the Oceans Pact by Commissioner for Fisheries and Oceans, Mr Costas Kadis, European Commission EU Commissioner Mr Costas Kadis assured the Standing Committee that it was a top priority for the Commission to address the multiple challenges in the Baltic Sea. Reflection, dialogue, and understanding every aspect was critical for good policies, wherefore he would host Fisheries and Oceans Dialogues, Youth Dialogues, and Implementation Dialogues. Visiting coastal communities would provide direct feedback. This would feed into the 2040 Vision for a resilient, competitive, and sustainable fisheries and aquaculture sector, based on a wide range of studies and the EU’s own CFP evaluation. The latter would take into account economic, health, and social sustainability. The poor state of the Baltic Sea was affecting coastal communities, shrinking fish stocks – some had collapsed, e.g., cod and western herring, while others were fragile, such as Bothnian herring. System recovery would be slow and lengthy, but inaction was not an option, Mr Kadis warned. Collaboration was crucial. The existing fisheries had to be protected, and strict adherence to regulations was needed to equally protect the remaining stocks. He noted that a conference on the Baltic Sea was to be organised as soon as possible, with the remit to review the implementation progress of already taken decisions and the Baltic Sea’s multiple challenges, in particular the decline of biodiversity. Maritime security was just as important in the Baltic Sea, especially through the shadow fleet. Monitoring the marine infrastructure and environment was vital. Crucial here was the Common Information Sharing Environment for the Maritime Domain, enabling real-time information exchange between both civilian and military maritime authorities. The EU was strengthening efforts to protect undersea cables through enhanced information sharing, new detection technologies, and undersea repair capabilities. The Commission was also seeking to clear the vast dumped munitions from the Baltic Sea, providing more than 24 million euros in funding for the coastal state over the past decade to assess risks and map contaminated areas. In the spring of 2025, a new project – funded at 5.6 million euros – would develop new technologies for munition removal. In the Ocean Agenda, Mr Kadis pointed to the European Oceans Pact, envisioning a holistic and coherent ocean policy approach. The Pact’s five strategic objectives were ensuring a healthy and productive ocean with good biodiversity, boosting the EU economy, consolidating the EU Marine Framework, reinforcing international ocean governance, and developing resilience for coastal communities. Knowledge and best practice sharing were also vital. He considered awareness, commitment, and shared responsibility crucial for achieving their goals. The Pact would be announced at the 2026 Oceans Conference. The Commission’s main priorities for 2025 included the ratification of the BBNG Agreement and further shaping the international platform for ocean sustainability (IPOS). Mr Staffan Eklöf noted that the BSPC had called for lower fishing quotas in its latest resolution, asking the Commissioner about the current status. Mr Kadis conceded that misreporting on fishing was affecting the scientific advice on which the quota decisions were based. Yet scientific advice would continue to be at the heart of these decisions. Ms Sabrina Repp wished to strengthen the participation and collaboration of the regions in the Baltic Sea, noting the importance of Interreg to rural and coastal areas. Mr Kadis replied that Interreg was not in his portfolio. However, synergies with other Commissioners were being pursued to support remote coastal and island communities. This would lead to initiatives in the near future. Mr Een Eesmaa wondered about the Commission’s analysis of the Gulf Stream, here in respect to a threat to the eel population. Mr Kadis was aware of the fragility of the eel population, noting conservation efforts in some involved countries. He offered to send more information. Mr Bahr asked for concrete reflections about enhancing ocean governance to strengthen infrastructure resilience in cooperation with, e.g., NATO. He further wondered about possible changes to the law to allow interventions in critical situations. Mr Kadis said that the general approach had been announced in December 2024. Measures on security, defence, environment, and other aspects had been proposed by Commissioners. Mr Kadis had proposed increased monitoring, including undersea drones. Discussions about these proposals were ongoing internally, with the goal of a holistic approach. Presentation on HELCOM, Shipping and Response by Mr Rüdiger Strempel, Executive Secretary of the Helsinki Commission Mr Strempel began by citing the HELCOM Vision of a healthy Baltic Sea environment with diverse biological components functioning in balance, resulting in a good ecological status and supporting a wide range of sustainable and social activities. The Baltic Sea was a young but fragile ecosystem; in its current composition, it was younger than the pyramids of Giza. HELCOM estimated that there were some 50,000 ships entering or leaving the Baltic Sea annually, with at least 1,500 large vessels on the sea at any time. This made shipping of considerable concern to HELCOM. As vital as shipping was, it carried problems such as anti-fouling paint, sewage or operational discharges, airborne emissions, underwater noise, and oil discharges – deliberate or not. One of the thematic segments of the Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP) was dedicated to sea-based activities, such as shipping. Two of the eight HELCOM Working Groups, Maritime and Response, were dealing with this issue. Mr Strempel noted that, due to its international nature, shipping was primarily regulated through the IMO. Still, HELCOM was proactive in amending IMO regulations in their implementation, such as sewage and navigational safety. As such, HELCOM was the voice of the Baltic Sea countries within the IMO. Regarding response coordination, the Helsinki Convention obliged keeping the necessary equipment available and conducting regular exercises on sea and on land. There was also a HELCOM manual on response to marine pollution, detailing cooperation coordination, operational procedures, cooperation harmonisation, financial arrangements and the like that HELCOM was handling. The manual covered spills at sea, on shore as well as oiled wildlife. The most recent surveillance report had been published in August 2024, showing that the number of observed spills had steadily declined, with most of them very small. 24 % were mineral oil, 76 % other types, such as fish oil, greywater, or novel fuels. The latter were problematic as there was little knowledge on how to best combat such spills. Furthermore, HELCOM was working on risk assessments, the so-called BRISK Analysis, covering 2009-2012. The follow-up project BRISK 2 had recently been launched, with EU funding, covering 2025-2026. It was aimed at enhancing disaster prevention and preparedness, focusing on a multi-hazard approach at sea and on land. This also included the shadow fleet. On the busy Baltic Sea, with narrow shipping lanes and an increasing large number of vessels, the under-insured shadow fleet was in poor repair, the ship ownership unclear. The massive risk posed by the fleet also included the oft-neglected one of ship-to-ship transfers of e.g., oil. Respective recommendations were currently being overhauled. Mr Strempel noted that HELCOM was presently under Lithuanian chairmanship. Its first priority was to strengthen HELCOM’s role in geopolitical challenges. The shadow fleet, a product of these challenges, on the one hand undercut sanctions. That was far outside HELCOM’s remit. The massive environmental impact, on the other hand, very much was within. Mr Strempel opined that HELCOM should be better involved in the various formats dealing with the shadow fleet, in particular the NBA+ activities, since HELCOM handled preventative and remediation efforts. Finally, he noted that HELCOM’s social media presence had switched from X/Twitter to Bluesky. Presentation on Addressing the EU’s vulnerabilities to cyber and hybrid attacks, strengthening resilience, and bolstering the EU-NATO partnership by Mr Jukka Savolainen, a Director in the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats Mr Jukka Savolainen focused on the recent maritime incidents, started by the Nord Stream sabotage. Unfortunately, the facts ended with the pipeline having been cut, while a narrative blaming Ukraine had spread, even as Russia claimed the USA were responsible. These narratives were negatively affecting public opinion. In October 2023, the Balticconnector gas pipeline had been severed. The vessel in question, which had hailed from China, had been identified, thus ending conspiracy theories. In November 2024, the Yi Ping 3 had cut telecommunication cables between Finland and Germany as well as between Sweden and Lithuania. Over Christmas 2024, the Eagle S had cut several cables, including a power supply from Finland to Estonia, and was stopped by Finnish authorities in the act of severing another line. Mr Savolainen stressed that this had been the first time a ship had been impounded, allowing a thorough investigation. Since then, another ship had been temporarily impounded by Swedish authorities after attacking a cable. The countries around the Baltic Sea were vulnerable in various respects. He noted that publishing the cable locations made sense since most sea captains were keen to avoid them. Yet a single ship could cause serious harm to society, in particular in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea. As for the probability of these incidents being accidents, Mr Savolainen noted that nothing like this had happened in the past three or four decades in Finnish waters. With that, he countered so-called expert statements claiming that 40 % of severed cables were due to anchor accidents. Yet none of the circumstances of those accidents applied to the Baltic Sea, such as heavy oceanic winds or little known cable locations. In his view, these incidents were clearly deliberate. In the aftermath of the Eagle S incident, the Baltic Sea states and NATO had come together to launch a new operation, Baltic Sentry. Yet within a week, newspapers like the Washington Post were quoting unnamed European intelligence agents that all the incidents had been accidents. Mr Savolainen condemned these reports as misinformation for two reasons, the first being the high improbability and the second that the intelligence services would not undermine their governments right after Baltic Sentry having been started. The head of the Finnish intelligence service had gone on record that deliberate action could not be excluded. Mr Savolainen believed that the purpose of these attacks had been to refine the methods and to test the Western response. The actual target would be the North Sea where incidents could black out vast areas, both in electricity and gas supply. Mr Algirdas Razauskas asked if a ship entering the Baltic Sea would have to pass through national waters and could thus be boarded if suspicions had been raised. Mr Savolainen answered that this was the case. Entering from the Atlantic, a vessel would have to go through at least Danish or Swedish territorial waters. However, one of the main principles of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) was the Freedom of Navigation which guaranteed so-called transit passage through territorial waters from and to international waters. This was granted to all ships, even military vessels and aircraft. As such, there was no right to intervene in the Danish Strait. President Röblom asked if there were any initiatives to change or amend the UNCLOS to enable interventions in suspicious cases. In particular, he wondered if the BSPC could support such initiatives. Mr Savolainen was aware of such aspirations from the environmental point of view. This was worth trying, not least to curtail the Russian avoidance of sanctions. Yet he warned that any serious blockade of the shadow fleet would be interpreted as an act of war by Russia. Therefore, a single country could not enact such a blockade. Instead, it had to be coalition-wide – across the EU or NATO. Actually changing the UNCLOS would take tens of years to negotiate. Yet international law was conditional, he noted, so that justifications for stopping ships could be found by legal experts. One such clause had been applied by Finland in the case of the Eagle S , for instance, because it had been the target of the attack. Mr Strempel noted that measures of this kind were beyond HELCOM. Working Groups and Rapporteurs The president noted that the next meetings of the Working Group on Energy Security, Self-Sustainability, Resilience, and Connectivity (ESSRC) would be in Stockholm in March 2025 and in Tallinn in May 2025. Mr Staffan Eklöf said the Stockholm meeting would focus on connections, transportation, and security, with visits to the Royal Institute of Technology regarding self-driving vehicles, to a company building electric vessels, and to the Swedish Coast Guard about maritime infrastructure monitoring. At the meeting proper, presentations would deal with security, the electric grid as well as the Swedish energy agency and government. Prof Jānis Vucāns noted that the Baltic Assembly would be represented by the working group chairman, Mr Andris Kulbergs, and a representative from each Baltic country. The meeting in Tallinn was still being prepared so that the programme would be presented at the Stockholm meeting. As a new working group would be formed at the annual conference, Prof Vucāns provided more information about the proposal from the Baltic Assembly about Strengthening the Cyber and Information Resilience of the Democratic Baltic Sea Region. He remarked that digital technologies had become the backbone of their political and social systems. They provided greater connections and efficiency. However, disinformation and cyber attacks have proved a tremendous challenge, spreading mistrust that could destabilise societies. This demanded a strategic and comprehensive response, to be elaborated in this new working group, building on findings of the current working group. Another focal point would be artificial intelligence and digital rights. Furthermore, the Baltic Assembly nominated Mr Meelis Kiili from the Estonian parliament as chairman, given his extensive experience in this field. Mr Henrik Møller agreed that this context posed a severe threat to democracy and thus approved of the proposal. The meeting agreed to forward the proposal to the annual conference. BSPC Presidency after 2026/Rotation Principle President Röblom noted the preliminary approval of instituting a rotation principle by the Standing Committee in Tallinn to introduce greater stability. The Secretariat had refined the suggested schedule to avoid election cycles and international obligations. Flexibility was built so that each presidency could exchange its position with the preceding or succeeding presidency if necessary. Mr Bahr informed the meeting that the Iceland delegation was still in the process of obtaining their parliament’s approval to take over the BSPC presidency. All the delegations present agreed to the current proposal for a rotation procedure, aiming to result in a final decision by the Standing Committee at its June meeting and approval by the Annual Conference in Mariehamn. BSPC Budget and Financial Planning BSPC President Alfons Röblom laid out the key points from the 2024 budget. Expenditures slightly exceeded income, well within the approved framework, maintaining a healthy reserve of € 213,442. For 2025, the Standing Committee meetings and Working Group sessions would remain core budgetary priorities; additional resources allocated to the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum (BSPYF) and the BSPC communication strategy. Secretary General Bodo Bahr reflected on the budget’s background and details, noting that the overspend was within the approved budget flexibility, covering the travel costs of the BSPYF youth participants. The reserves would guarantee operational stability for one year, even in unforeseen circumstances. The budget management had been successfully transferred from Mecklenburg-Vorpommern to Schleswig-Holstein. The Standing Committee unanimously agreed to the financial report for 2024 and confirmed the previous agreement on the budget plan proposal for 2025. The Current Geopolitical Situation and its Impact on the Baltic Sea Region BSPC President Röblom gave a brief overview of recent developments, such as the new European Commission and Parliament terms, changes in transatlantic relations, and the ongoing shift in the threat landscape. Incentive contribution by MEP Rasa Juknevičienė Ms Rasa Juknevičienė hoped that future historians would not write about the present day like the 1930s and 1940s. Yet, one had to be prepared for the worst in order to avoid the worst. Well-founded warnings had to be heeded, like those of the eastern countries against cooperation with Russia. The most crucial action these days was uniting in support for Ukraine, even without the USA. Too much time had been wasted talking and worrying, and the situation had worsened. She noted that Putin was representing a new totalitarian ideology with ambitions far beyond Ukraine. Unfortunately, the same values had now risen to the top of the USA. Ms Juknevičienė considered this a fight between autocracies and democracies, in which she saw the democratic side failing. She highlighted President Zelenskyy’s speech at the Munich Security Conference as that of a great European leader. One question was whether NATO still existed. She stressed that it was a delusion Western states would have a secure little corner of the world amid the expansive forces of the new fascism. Mr Henrik Møller referenced the US president’s demand to purchase Greenland from Denmark and how that had affected the debate in the country. He further noted the increasing expansionist ideas from the US president, extending to Mexico, Canada, Panama, and most recently, the Gaza Strip. This debate would continue, but in dealing with the US, more cautious language might be better advised. As for the BSPC making a statement on the situation, he proposed to wait until after the elections in Greenland on 11 March to learn of their position. Ms Kristina Herbst agreed that President Zelenskyy’s speech was highly praised. Yet she wondered if there could be a path forward together in light of countries such as Hungary. Ms Juknevičienė maintained hope, such as that the far right would not win the German elections. Action was needed. She also underlined the importance of Greenland and the Arctic. She expected greater seriousness in matters of defence, pointing to a calculation that an EU citizen had only paid the equivalent of 1 ½ cups of coffee to support Ukraine. She compared it to Russia spending 10 % of its GDP on its armed forces while Europe was not even reaching 2 %. They could not wait for Hungary or Slovakia to change their minds. Action had to be taken right away to defend Europe, in every respect, also e.g., banking. Yet, without the US, Europe was very weak. She called the continent hostages of decades of US dependence. Mr Mikko Polvinen commented on US Vice President Vance’s remark that Europe and the US no longer shared values. Mr Polvinen found this quite dangerous. He also noted that Musk’s X was promoting those parties sharing the current US regime’s values. He asked about Ms Juknevičienė’s opinion regarding these value differences. Furthermore, he said that people and companies were moving away from regions bordering Russia, such as his home region. He wondered if the EU’s MFF was a tool to help in this matter. Ms Juknevičienė did not believe the Vance speech was about values. It had been only in support of the far-right AfD in Germany. He was adopting Russian narratives. In addition, the only time Article 5 of NATO had been invoked had been to help the USA. Yet the US were now threatening to cancel their solidarity with Europe. She quoted famous historian Timothy Snyder, who had written on Bluesky that everybody had been asking him to decode Vance’s speech at the Security Conference. Snyder had explained that “free speech” to Vance meant letting Musk run elections, and “democracy” meant letting Russia run elections. 2025 was about what Europeans did, not what Americans said. As for regions bordering and threatened by Russia, she said it was the European Union’s task to help these. Yet the economy was not the only thing that mattered, she warned. She remarked that in the recent European elections, the former East Germany had shown on the electoral map their strong support for the AfD. The influence of social media was an important topic. She worried that artificial intelligence would be the primary topic of upcoming elections. Prof Jānis Vucāns noted that the Baltic states had begun their decoupling from the Soviet Union in the Gorbachev era but had only completed it two weeks earlier by integrating their power grid into the European network. He further noted to ongoing transit of goods through the Baltics into Europe. That flow had to be stopped for good to ensure that Russia would receive no money. In light of the new US regime, Europe had to guarantee its autonomy. Prof Vucāns also touched upon Russia-bordering regimes and a lack of investment there, highlighting the influence there from Russian media affecting the minds and values. Economic investments meant shoring up their values as being part of Europe. Another point was financing military production, which was still being run on peacetime parameters. Solutions were needed, and the BSPC was a forum to initiate and reinforce these discussions. Preparation for the 34 th BSPC Annual Conference and Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum in Mariehamn President Röblom explained that the conference theme—“The Baltic Sea—Our Lifeline: Cooperation, Security, and Sustainability”—reflected the BSPC work of the past year. The draft programme focused on core maritime challenges, security and hybrid threats, energy security, and intergenerational dialogue. High-profile speakers had been invited. Prof Jānis Vucāns said that the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum (BSPYF) had proven a very important component. He noted a quite active representative from the Baltic delegations keen to take part in the forum. Ms Sabrina Repp explained that she had been part of the BSPYF in 2023, an experience she highly valued. Now a European parliamentarian, she very much wanted to be involved in this year’s forum. Mr Röblom noted the engagement and underlined the forum’s importance. The exact practical implementation will be discussed in the near future with the CBSS and Regeneration 2030. Other Matters In the follow-up to the 33 rd BSPC Resolution, BSPC President Alfons Röblom informed the Standing Committee that the state parliaments of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Schleswig-Holstein had formally debated and approved the resolution. The goal remained to receive the governmental statements by 15 April 2025. Ms Anita Kucharska-Dziedzic announced that the Polish region of West Pomerania was planning to apply for observer status in the BSPC. She noted that the regional parliament was already active in several supraregional organisations. Mr Himanshu Gulati lauded the representatives from the European Parliament taking part in the meeting for their interesting contributions. BSPC President Alfons Röblom thanked all distinguished speakers for their valuable contributions, the excellent support from the hosts at the European Parliament, all who have been involved in preparing this meeting for their dedicated efforts, namely Secretary General Bodo Bahr for his planning, intensive efforts and engagement in preparing and managing this meeting and all delegations for their engagement and insights and ongoing productive conversation during the further programme. —— Evening Discussions at the BSPC Standing Committee Meeting in Brussels As the formal proceedings of the BSPC Standing Committee meeting concluded, participants gathered for an evening of in-depth discussions, reflecting on the pressing themes of the day. Against the backdrop of the European Parliament’s twelfth-floor venue, offering a panoramic view of Brussels, speakers engaged in an intense exchange of ideas on geopolitical security, cooperation, and resilience in the Baltic Sea region. Vice-President of the European Parliament, Ms Christel Schaldemose , extended a warm welcome to all attendees, underlining the significance of cross-border cooperation in these unprecedented times and emphasising that collaboration among like-minded nations was now more critical than ever. She assured participants that their discussions would play an essential role in strengthening regional security and stability. Acknowledging the setting, she invited participants to appreciate the exceptional view from the venue, though she highlighted that the evening’s focus should remain on fostering a meaningful dialogue. BSPC President Alfons Röblom then took the floor, introducing Ambassador Jean-Charles Ellermann-Kingombe, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Innovation, Hybrid, and Cyber. He expressed his gratitude for the Ambassador’s presence, particularly in light of his unavailability earlier in the day due to unforeseen commitments. He underscored the relevance of the Ambassador’s expertise in NATO’s cyber and hybrid security measures, particularly as they pertain to the Baltic Sea region. Röblom reiterated the BSPC’s long-standing emphasis on enhancing regional cooperation within NATO, particularly following the accession of Finland and Sweden. He referenced the Helsingør resolution, which outlined key policy recommendations for governments regarding NATO’s role in safeguarding the region. Among these, he stressed the need for integrating maritime surveillance, strengthening regional defence mechanisms, and enhancing NATO’s presence in the Baltic Sea. He concluded by inviting Ambassador Ellermann-Kingombe to share his insights on the evolving security landscape. Addressing the gathering, Ambassador Jean-Charles Ellermann-Kingombe provided a strategic overview of NATO’s current approach to hybrid and cyber threats, emphasising that recent years had witnessed a sharp increase in hostile activities—both in frequency and intensity. He highlighted that hybrid warfare tactics had evolved significantly, encompassing acts of sabotage, cyberattacks, and disruptions to critical infrastructure. He warned against viewing such incidents in isolation, as they formed part of broader strategic efforts to destabilise NATO member states. He further noted that Russia’s military doctrine specifically incorporated hybrid threats as an early-stage tactic to weaken adversaries before escalating to more direct confrontations. The Ambassador elaborated on NATO’s forthcoming hybrid strategy, set to be unveiled at the Hague Summit in June. He underscored the need to shift from a purely defensive posture to a proactive deterrence strategy, aimed at reducing the likelihood of hybrid threats materialising in the first place. Central to this approach was the enhancement of situational awareness, with a greater emphasis on identifying patterns and trends rather than reacting to isolated incidents. NATO, he stated, was committed to intensifying its presence in the Baltic Sea through the newly launched Baltic Sentry initiative, which involved an increased deployment of naval and aerial assets for real-time surveillance and rapid response capabilities. A crucial aspect of NATO’s evolving strategy, the Ambassador explained, was the integration of asymmetric responses to hybrid threats. Given the constraints imposed by international legal frameworks and NATO’s commitment to upholding democratic values, traditional military retaliation was often not feasible. Instead, NATO sought to impose costs on adversaries through non-conventional means, such as increased military deployments, economic sanctions, and targeted cyber operations. He noted that recent incidents in the Baltic Sea, including the sabotage of undersea infrastructure, had demonstrated the urgent need for better coordination between NATO, the EU, and private sector stakeholders. Enhanced cooperation, particularly with private entities that manage critical infrastructure, would be essential in strengthening resilience against future threats. Ambassador Ellermann-Kingombe concluded by stressing that hybrid threats could not be countered solely through military means. A comprehensive, multi-faceted approach was required—one that combined cybersecurity measures, intelligence sharing, economic countermeasures, and strategic communication. He urged parliamentarians to play an active role in shaping policies that would bolster national and regional resilience, advocating for enhanced legislative frameworks to address emerging security challenges. The evening’s discussions provided an invaluable platform for an open and candid exchange of views , reinforcing the BSPC’s commitment to fostering cooperation in the face of evolving security threats. The insights shared during the session would undoubtedly inform ongoing deliberations within both NATO and the Baltic Sea parliamentary community as they worked towards a more secure and resilient region. More photos of the Standing Committee can be viewed at the following link: Standing Committee of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference – Multimedia Centre

The full report from the 33 rd Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC in Helsingør, Denmark, is now available on the BSPC website . The compilation can be downloaded her e and on the 33 rd conference webpage . The report comprehensively reviews the three-day conference, which focused on “Safety in the Baltic Sea Region.” It includes speeches and contributions from high-ranking speakers, such as the Speaker of the Danish Parliament, Søren Gade, BSPC President Henrik Møller, parliamentarians, ministers, and other regional experts. The publication is complemented by a rich collection of photographs capturing the event’s vibrant discussions and key moments. The image collection also documents the reception at Kronborg Castle , where the Danish King honoured the conference as a distinguished guest. Key topics addressed include: • Defence cooperation and strengthening regional security, • Measures for energy security and the protection of critical infrastructure, • Environmental and climate initiatives , and • Enhancing collaboration among democratic Baltic Sea countries . The report highlights the importance of the BSPC as a central platform for dialogue among parliamentarians and stakeholders across the Baltic Sea region. Explore the report to access the full content and learn more about the outcomes of this pivotal conference.

BSPC Working Group Tackles Russian Shadow Fleet and Undersea Cable Threats at Bergen Meeting The fourth meeting of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) Working Group on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, Resilience, and Connectivity (WG ESSRC) convened in Bergen, Norway, from 26–28 November 2024, drawing 35 participants from across the Baltic Sea region. Delegates from Åland Islands, Baltic Assembly, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hamburg, Latvia, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Norway, Poland, and Schleswig-Holstein joined officials and experts in addressing escalating threats to regional energy and maritime security. The working group continued discussing energy security in the Baltic Sea Region and encouraged collaboration in energy and sustainability research and innovation. The meeting occurred amidst pressing concerns about the Russian shadow oil tanker fleet operating in the Baltic Sea and the recent sabotage of critical undersea cables linking Helsinki and Rostock, as well as Lithuania and Gotland. These incidents underscore the need for enhanced maritime surveillance and robust protection of the region’s critical offshore infrastructure. Chair of the WG ESSRC, Mr Andris Kulbergs, pointed out the importance of the meeting due to concerns about the growing threat posed by the Russian shadow oil tanker fleet in the Baltic Sea, as well as the highly publicised damage to two critical undersea cables in the Baltic Sea. These incidents affecting connections between Helsinki and Rostock, and Lithuania and Gotland highlight the increasing vulnerability of the critical offshore infrastructure to sabotage and other security threats, as well as the need to act together to enhance critical infrastructure protection and strengthen the collective response of the Baltic Sea region. He also emphasised that this meeting was a kind of jubilee as, after 20 years, the BSPC was back in Bergen because the 2004 annual conference took place there. Spotlight on Infrastructure and Innovation The participants engaged in a series of site visits to critical facilities, including the Kollsnes Process Plant , the Royal Norwegian Navy , and the renewable energy company Eviny : Kollsnes Process Plant : Managed by Gassco, this facility exemplifies Norway’s role in securing energy supplies for millions of Europeans. The site plays a pivotal role in gas transport and innovation, including ongoing hydrogen and CO2 transport systems studies. During the visit to the Kollsnes Process plant, the members of the WG could learn more about Gassco and Equinor. ( Link to the presentations about Gassco & Link to the presentation about Equinor) Gassco is the integrated Norwegian gas transport system operator and is responsible for safe and efficient gas transport from the Norwegian continental shelf. Relationship Manager of Gassco, Mr Pål Rasmussen, highlighted that the role of Gassco is to ensure that everything booked is ensured to the market – freight volumes, timing, and quality. The three main projects include operatorship, which provides for physical operatorship for process plants, pipelines, and receiving terminals; gas transport from field to market; and further development of Norwegian gas infrastructure, including studies for the transport of hydrogen and CO2. The Site Manager of Kollsnes, Mr Bjarte Padøy, informed about Equinor – an international energy company committed to long-term value creation in a low-carbon future. Equinor compasses oil and gas, renewables, and low-carbon solutions, aiming to become a net-zero energy company by 2050. Royal Norwegian Navy : Delegates explored the network of maritime security collaborations involving NATO, government entities, and the private sector. Discussions included rules of engagement for suspicious vessels and strategies for safeguarding infrastructure in international waters. During the visit to the Royal Norwegian Navy, the branch of the Norwegian Armed Forces responsible for naval operations, the members learned that the maritime security network is made up of a whole-of-government maritime approach – people from the industry, NATO, governmental organisations, and international organisations gather together to discuss issues jointly regularly. It was also possible to discuss rules of engagement in case of suspicious vessels and the need to raise awareness and cooperation to have a policy for critical infrastructure in open international waters. Eviny : A leading player in renewable energy with a 100-year commitment to sustainable energy solutions, including onshore and offshore wind power, as well as hydropower, plays a vital role in the green energy transition. ( Li nk to the presentation ) Senior Adviser of Eviny, former MP and State Secretary for Energy, and a former long-standing member of the BSPC Standing Committee, Mr Per Rune Henriksen, informed that Eviny is one of the biggest renewable energy and technology companies In Norway. For 100 years, they have made solutions for sustainable production and distribution of green energy. They are also now leading the way in ensuring more energy and power in nature, such as offshore and onshore wind and hydropower. Deep Dives into Regional Threats Russian Shadow Oil Tanker Fleet Experts Professor Henrik Ringbom from the Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law and Mr Alexander Lott from the Norwegian Center for the Law of the Sea at the Arctic University of Norway (UiT) provided an overview of the complex regulatory landscape surrounding the shadow fleet, emphasising the urgent need for coordinated measures, including maritime surveillance and intelligence sharing. They informed about the multiple layers of regulation regarding such issues, including prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction in flag and coastal states. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was also assessed in the context of safeguards to ensure that coastal/port states do not abuse their powers concerning foreign ships. The discussion is tied to recent EU initiatives from November 2024 to counter sanction evasion and bolster maritime security. ( Link to the presentatio n ) The WG members deepened the topic of the threat posed by the Russian shadow oil tanker fleet in a discussion with the experts. The WG chairman, Andris Kulbergs, highlighted that this issue, which was also discussed extensively in the prior meetings in Helsinki and Greifswald, was strongly highlighted in the BSPC resolution adopted in Helsingør. The resolution urged the governments to prioritise measures such as enhancing maritime surveillance, intelligence sharing, regulatory enforcement, and international collaboration to mitigate environmental and security risks associated with these fleets. It was agreed that the timing of this discussion is particularly relevant, as both the European Parliament and the European Commission adopted significant and detailed measures on this issue on November 11 th and 14 th . These decisions focus on countering the shadow fleet, preventing sanction evasion, and addressing environmental and security risks. These developments highlight the urgency of coordinated action. Undersea Cable Sabotage The group also addressed the high-profile sabotage of undersea cables, examining legal frameworks like UNCLOS and gaps in jurisdiction. Delegates agreed on the need for strengthened regional cooperation and rapid response mechanisms, emphasising the importance of pre-emptive planning. Surveying Regional Governments A significant outcome of the meeting was the decision to launch a survey targeting national and regional governments in the Baltic Sea states. The survey, developed by the BSPC WG ESSRC, seeks to assess: Existing measures for monitoring shadow fleet activities and plans for enhancing maritime surveillance. Legal opinions and procedures in place to address undersea infrastructure sabotage. Gaps in current legal frameworks and potential initiatives for bridging these gaps. The feasibility of establishing regular high-level Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) meetings to address critical infrastructure protection. The survey aims to foster a coordinated response and will serve as a foundation for discussions at the next working group meeting in March 2025 in Stockholm. ( L ink to the survey ) Looking Ahead Chairman Andris Kulbergs closed the meeting by emphasising the urgency of building resilience across the Baltic Sea region. The WG ESSRC will continue addressing these critical challenges, ensuring the Baltic Sea remains a bastion of cooperation and sustainability.

In Tallinn, the BSPC Standing Committee gathered to discuss cooperation with partner organisations CBSS and HELCOM, threats to the Baltic Sea both in cyber security and in ecological terms as well as the circular economy. The Standing Committee furthermore discussed the work of the upcoming year as well as the budget. The participants also deliberated on how to restructure the organisation to enhance its effectiveness in the future, among others, through a rotation system for the presidency. More than 35 participants, representatives and delegations of the European Parliament, the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Estonia, the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM), experts on Circular Economy and on Cyber Security and the BSPC members from the Åland Islands, the Baltic Assembly, Denmark, Estonia, the German Bundestag, Finland, Hamburg, Latvia, Lithuania, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Norway, Poland, Schleswig-Holstein and Sweden participated in the meeting. Introduction BSPC President Alfons Röblom opened the meeting in the Estonian parliament building. As the first event of Åland’s presidency, he promised they would work tirelessly on strengthening the Baltic Sea as the region’s lifeline, as the current BSPC Strategy and Programme said. Mr Röblom had already represented the BSPC at the Baltic Assembly, the Benelux Parliament, and the Nordic Council. Presentations Mr Tõnis Nirk, Ambassador-at-Large for Baltic Sea Cooperation in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Estonia, and Chairman of the CBSS Committee of Senior Officials Mr Tõnis Nirk said that the CBSS, as a unique platform, was ideally suited to discussing foreign policy issues among the like-minded countries of the Baltic Sea region. Russian aggression, especially hybrid threats, threatened all of Europe. Estonia had been targeted several times, with damages sustained by the critical infrastructure. The June CBSS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting had been dedicated to this issue. Under the Estonian presidency, the CBSS would continue its strong support for Ukraine, Ambassador Nirk went on, focusing on civil protection, anti-trafficking, border guard cooperation, and youth protection. But they could learn from Ukraine about societal resilience in a crisis. In practical cooperation, Estonia was focused on strengthening resilience and sustainability, in particular, raising crisis awareness, developing early warning systems, effective child protection policies, and anti-trafficking. Building on the German and Finnish presidencies, Estonia would pursue establishing green corridors for shipping in the region and was preparing to create a digital twin of the Baltic Sea. Youth involvement was also high on the agenda. Cooperation with organisations like the BSPC was crucial, in particular on topics where each partner had their own strengths. Mr Mikko Polvinen asked about concrete actions by the CBSS against the Russian shadow fleet. He furthermore highlighted the Finnish programme Singing Heritage Roots as a way of bolstering culture in the region. Ambassador Nirk acknowledged the difficulties in dealing with these vessels in international waters. Voluntary inspections were one measure taken by Estonian authorities, but coordinated regional actions were still being elaborated. Regarding the mentioned Finnish programme Singing Heritage Roots, Mr Nirk referred to the Baltic Region Heritage Committee. Mr Johannes Schraps inquired on plans for a Heads of Government and the Ministerial meeting and the cooperation with the parliamentary dimension. While there were no plans for the former, Ambassador Nirk said the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting would be held on 14 – 15 May 2025 in Tallinn. He promised to look into the parliamentary cooperation. Given the increased security challenges in the Baltic Sea region and the current priority focus on security and safety, BSPC Secretary General Bodo Bahr asked about the balance between security needs and sustainability goals. Mr Nirk pointed to the CBSS’s three long-term priorities: safety and security, prosperity, and regional identity. Geopolitics had forced resources to be primarily directed towards the first priority. Mr Bodo Bahr was interested in further cooperation between the CBSS and HELCOM on sea-dumped munitions. Mr Johannes Schraps suggested that, as the environment ministers were responsible for sea-dumped munitions in most countries, a CBSS Ministerial Meeting of these departments might be helpful. He also wondered about possible focal shifts with the new heading of the CBSS Secretariat. Ambassador Nirk appreciated HELCOM’s work, which should be the focus. He underlined that HELCOM was the competent leader regarding dumped munitions while the CBSS supported their efforts through network building. The new Director General of the Secretariat was very experienced in both the CBSS and security issues, so the transition was very smooth. Ms Mayri Tiido, Circular Economy expert (Link to the presentation) Ms Mayri Tiido focused mostly on capacity building, interpreting for ministries what the circular economy would mean for them. She noted that some believed the circular economy was about sorting waste and retrieving, say, metals for reuse. But it was a wider concern. There are two principles of the circular economy: First, it had to be considered whether solutions would decrease the demand for raw materials; second, a reduction in waste generation had to be looked at. This could be achieved through measures such as the sharing economy – e.g., car sharing –, maintaining and repairing items but also refurbishing. Energy-demanding recycling should be one of the last options because reuse consumes far fewer resources. Furthermore, some products had been designed to never be disassembled or repaired. As such, for the circular economy, different designs were needed that enabled them to stay in circulation. Ms Tiido stressed her view that all companies should think about how to be less dependent on virgin raw materials and generate less waste. She mentioned examples: At the Nordic Circular Summit two weeks later, the Baltic Circular Hotspot would be launched for more cooperation between various organisations. She presented a cardboard alternative from textile waste for packaging, reusable up to twenty times. It could also be recycled. The Estonian company was aiming at luxury packaging but also e-commerce. Unfortunately, a similar strategy had failed with another product recently. Another example was related to Estonia deriving its energy primarily from oil shale: A company was working on a pilot factory to retrieve calcium carbonate and iron from oil shale ashes. This was promising because the current production of calcium carbonate was environmentally harmful, so alternatives were prized by, e.g., the paint industry. There were 600 million tonnes of such ashes available, she added. A third example was a company offering lifecycle services to other enterprises and organisations to enhance the circular use of electronic devices, among others, through repair and refurbishment. They were looking to make reused devices the first choice in many respects. Furthermore, she spoke about a Circular Economy Centre in Tallinn featuring various repair rooms, such as for bicycles or sewing machines. In cross-border cooperation, the bottle deposit system in Estonia and Latvia had been joined despite considerable challenges, as well as that of Latvia and Lithuania. Ms Kristina Herbst asked for details about the deposits. Ms Tiido confirmed that it was about collecting cans and bottles, to her understanding by unifying the barcodes. She could return an Estonian bottle in Latvia and receive her deposit back. Mr Henrik Møller pointed to the problem that some 40 % of goods coming through Antwerp harbour were cheap Chinese products that were hard to recycle or refurbish. With better cooperation not only in the Baltic Sea region but across Europe, their entry into the market should be made more difficult. Ms Tiido agreed, noting the problems of the consumer society. The circular economy was about reducing the extraction of materials and keeping those already extracted in circulation. She noted that CFC gases had been outlawed decades earlier because of their environmental harm and believed that, similarly, products that did not fit current prescriptions should be regulated rather than allowed anything in a free market. Mr Johannes Schraps appreciated the best practice examples. He asked if the EU’s Waste Framework Directive from more than a decade before was still sufficient or in what places steps forward should be taken. Ms Tiido mentioned the EU’s five-year Circular Economy Action Plan, which was in its second iteration. Its focal areas guided funding, such as in textiles or construction. She called the current linear economy a race to the bottom, always looking for the cheapest option. A circular economy would be about bringing back jobs intensive in human labour, such as repairs. According to her experience and research, the market would never regulate itself towards a circular economy. Ms Merle Maigre, Senior Cyber Security Expert at the e-Governance Academy Ms Merle Maigre said she would discuss the values of cyber capacity building, the possible threats in the Baltic Sea region, and possible responses. Through cyber capacity building, neighbouring countries such as Ukraine or Moldova could be influenced. Since 2002, the Estonian non-profit e-Governance Academy has served as an implementor of various national development projects in the digital transformation across the globe. For instance, they were advising the Ukrainian government in the digital transformation and cyber security. Ms Maigre underlined that cyber security had to be at the core of the digital transformation, from inception to delivery. The Academy advised on policy, helped draft and consulted on cyber security legislation and institution building. In technical areas, they assisted partners in building critical information infrastructure, protection, risk management; they also provided cyber security hardware, software, and licenses as well as training to build governmental cyber capacities. All of that was financed by donor money, from the EU and other international or bilateral aid agencies. Currently, her team was active in Moldova, in the Western Balkans, in Ukraine, in Georgia, and soon in Central Asia. Cyber security should not be treated as a separate issue, Ms Maigre said, but rather as an enabler of the various digital society functions. It should support and enhance other state priorities, e.g., foreign policy, security, economy, and defence. Digital dividends were only possible when the digital infrastructure was reliable. Just as important was defending the fundamental online rights and freedoms. She saw Estonia as an example of scoring highly in both respects. Information sharing was a crucial aspect, and she urged the parliamentarians to demand more briefings on cyber threats. The more this was done, the more people became aware of cyber threats. Ms Maigre clarified that fundamental online rights and freedoms, benefiting people, trust, collaborative efforts, transparencies, protection reflected the values of liberal democracies. Moving on to geopolitical threats, she acknowledged the recent rise in strategic cyber operations. China clearly posed a global risk, not least because all Chinese companies were connected to the state and party. The Chinese government had developed a growing system of hacking outlets and data brokers. The most notable recent case had been an operation that, since 2021, had penetrated information technology companies and organisations as well as attempting to access water grid companies. It had only been revealed in February 2024 that sleeper code had been deposited which could have been activated in the case of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Ms Maigre underlined that, with the globalisation of trade, attacks on US companies also affected the Baltic Sea region. Cyber espionage was another aspect of Chinese strategy. She noted an Estonian warning about Chinese technology involved in such manoeuvres; as a result, all such technology might have to be abandoned one day. One example was the Chinese monopoly on solar panels which might prove another trap in the transition from fossil fuel to renewable energies. As for the vast swathe of Russian threats, she focused on several security agencies raising the alarm on Russian contacts to organised crime. The latter were carrying out cyber attacks combined with physical surveillance and sabotage. In May of that year, Europol had arrested members of such a gang from Poland and Ukraine, the leader a Russian national who was still at large in his country. Russia’s cyber war in Ukraine had proved to be an extension of military conflict. Aside from Ukraine’s own defences, international companies like Microsoft had also played a successful role in that regard. Yet dependence on private service providers carried its own risks. Thus, Ms Maigre recommended keeping the potential drawbacks in mind when using these companies in geopolitical conflicts. As for response measures, much like personal responsibility in recycling, she underlined the importance of real-time exercises of cyber threats. Parliaments had the resources to organise such simulations to better understand the implications. The e-Governance Agency organised technical simulations as well as those targeting the administrative/legislative level. In September 2022, the Nordic foreign ministers had taken part in a discussion-based strategic exercise, testing their role and options during a cyber attack. Ms Maigre believed similar exercises to be very useful to better understand what was needed as well as possible. BSPC President Alfons Röblom wondered if the good guys might ever be stronger than the bad guys. Ms Maigre was afraid this would never happen. In security, one had to keep running to stand still. However, constantly staying up to date, training the respective staff, investing in people and money to keep systems secure gave them a fighting chance. Mr Johannes Schraps noted examples of companies hit by digital ransom attacks. With the dynamic development of the field, it often seemed overwhelming. That also applied to politics. He asked about how to reach that balance between security and personal freedom. Ms Maigre divided the possible measures into individual, organisational, and national/state measures. At the individual level, she recommended basic cyber hygiene practices, such as two-factor authentication or VPN connections. Organisations should be responsible for their own network security and have cyber security intertwined with general management. She felt that companies that had been attacked should share their findings rather than hide what had happened. That was very useful information. At the national level, it was about coordinating and encouraging private-public partnerships, having the political will to ensure that the national cyber defence was up to date as well as concrete ownership of the tasks. Mr Johannes Schraps wondered how they could be proactive rather than reactive. Ms Maigre said that pre-emptive measures – such as cyber hygiene or information exchange – were combined with responsive ones in cyber security. Mr Rüdiger Strempel, HELCOM Executive Secretary Mr Rüdiger Strempel sketched out the history and structure of HELCOM, encompassing the 10 Contracting Parties – the EU and the nine countries around the Baltic Sea – as well as the secretariat as the executive branch, the Helsinki Commission as the policymakers, and the eight working and three expert groups providing the scientific information. Over 200 recommendations – not legally binding – had been adopted over the past 50 years, some of them still in effect. The broader picture was covered by action plans, in particular the 2022 Baltic Sea Action Plan. Monitoring was implemented through thematic and holistic assessments. He pointed out that, due to Russia being one of the Contracting Parties, a so-called strategic pause had been enacted. This meant that all official meetings had been postponed, so that the remaining Contracting Parties met informally. The HELCOM vision was a good environmental status of the Baltic Sea which was still a long way off. This had been proven by the latest holistic assessment from the preceding year. In addition to eutrophication, pollution, and other factors, climate change was warming the Baltic Sea region twice as much as the rest of the world. Transformative changes across all sectors, countries, and stakeholders were needed. Despite this bleak outlook, Mr Strempel highlighted two good points: Firstly, their ecosystem knowledge and the respective policies had developed substantially. In particular, it was now clear that measures to reduce the pressure on the Baltic Sea did work – if they were implemented. These centred around the 2022 Baltic Sea Action Plan which featured 199 actions, some of which had already been put into place while others were still in that process. Ownership for each action by at least one HELCOM body was assured. Their achievement was measured by specific criteria. Mr Strempel moved on to fisheries and shipping which were part of so-called sea-based pressures. HELCOM and the IMO cooperated on shipping in the Baltic Sea region. That had brought about sharper regulations for ships entering the Baltic Sea. 69 of the Baltic Sea Action Plan’s actions dealt with maritime issues, such as sewage inlets and wastewater disposal. The Russian shadow fleet posed a new problem in this regard. He went on to speak about annual exercises to deal with oil spills, simulated by popcorn, and twice-annual aerial surveillance exercises. Due to this cooperation, there had not been major incidents in the Baltic Sea for a long time. Submerged munitions were a topic HELCOM had been dealing with since 1993. Unfortunately, the situation – and the shells – was deteriorating. With 300,000 tonnes of conventional munitions and 40,000 tonnes of chemical munitions in the German part of the Baltic Sea alone, the threat would have to be mitigated quickly. There was no time left to lose to address it. HELCOM had two related actions in its Baltic Sea Action Plan and was involved in three projects working on this issue. Although fisheries was not directly in HELCOM’s remit, they were cooperating in implementing ecosystem-based fisheries management, reducing by-catch, and other issues. Looking forward, Lithuania was currently chairing HELCOM. Its priorities were to strengthen HELCOM’s role in geopolitical challenges, balancing the Blue Economy with environmental protection, and involving the public in decision-making. Aside from taking part in the UN Ocean Decade Conference and the Our Oceans Conference, HELCOM had celebrated its 50 th anniversary in April 2024. He highlighted the conference Sustainable Agriculture for a Healthy Baltic Sea, noting that agriculture was a primary source of eutrophication. In the coming year, a Baltic Stakeholder Conference would deal with hazardous substances because these had recently been found to prove an equal threat as eutrophication. Ms Hanna Westerén asked what the parliamentarians could do about the Russian shadow fleet. Mr Strempel said that one litre of oil could contaminate 1 million litres of water. This illustrated the magnitude of the existing shipping, now exacerbated by a fleet of dubious technical states. To counter the ecological risk, it had to be assessed, and preparations were needed should an incident occur. HELCOM was not currently involved. Considering the wide range of tasks HELCOM was pursuing and the mentioned 199 actions featured in the current 2022 Baltic Sea Action Plan Mr Bodo Bahr inquired which had the highest priority to be implemented. Mr Strempel felt that all of the actions in the Baltic Sea Action Plan were vital. However, he pointed out that eutrophication was still a massive issue for the Baltic Sea and related to climate change, biodiversity, and pollution. Hazardous substances had recently been upgraded to a greater threat than had previously been understood. He added plastic pollution as an increasing problem. What mattered most, though, was a strong, iron-clad political will to tackle all of these concerns. That also included the funding for these actions, which currently was looking precarious. In the second part of the session, the Standing Committee engaged in an in-depth review of several ongoing BSPC matters. This included an assessment and follow-up of the 33 rd Annual Conference and the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum, updates on the work of the BSPC Working Group on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, and Connectivity (ESSRC), which will hold its next meeting in Bergen, Norway, from 24 to 26 November 2024, and the activities of BSPC rapporteurs. Additionally, the Committee discussed the BSPC Strategy and Work Programme for 2024-2025, initial plans for the 34 th BSPC in Mariehamn from 24-26 August 2025, and considerations for implementing a rotational system for BSPC presidencies. Further topics included advancing previous decisions about a working group to develop a future structure to ensure greater organisational independence for the BSPC and establish a long-term structural solution for the Secretariat. The Standing Committee also reviewed plans for modernising the BSPC website and made firm decisions on budgetary matters.

The Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) presents the latest report on Climate Change and Biodiversity in the Baltic Sea Region. Prepared by BSPC Rapporteur Mr Philipp da Cunha, this report offers an in-depth analysis of the ongoing efforts to address the interconnected crises of climate change, pollution, and biodiversity loss within our region. In his introduction, he points out that he was tasked with following up ‘on the respective political developments following the conclusion of the mandate of the BSPC Working Group on Climate Change and Biodiversity. This is the first report of this kind. For this reason, it is concentrated on the government statements to the BSPC working group recommendations.’ Since establishing the BSPC Working Group on Climate Change and Biodiversity in 2020, governments have made substantial progress in implementing the group’s recommendations. This report details the concrete steps taken across the democratic Baltic Sea Region, showcasing the commitment of our member states and regions to safeguarding the environment. Key Areas of Progress Include: Marine Protected Areas (MPAs): Several countries have expanded their network of MPAs, enhancing the protection of critical habitats and species. This expansion is a vital step towards achieving the region’s biodiversity targets and ensuring the long-term health of our marine ecosystems. Coastal Management Plans: The report highlights the implementation of integrated coastal management plans that balance the need for economic development with environmental conservation. These plans have been instrumental in reducing pollution and mitigating the impacts of climate change on coastal communities. Sustainable Energy Initiatives: Governments have made significant strides in transitioning to sustainable energy systems, with a focus on renewable energy sources and energy efficiency. These initiatives not only reduce greenhouse gas emissions but also contribute to the resilience of our energy infrastructure. Cross-Border Collaboration: The report underscores the importance of cross-border cooperation in tackling environmental challenges. Through joint initiatives and knowledge-sharing platforms, countries and regions in the Baltic Sea Region have strengthened their collective response to climate change and biodiversity loss. The report also provides a detailed follow-up on the implementation status of each recommendation, offering insights into the successes achieved and the challenges that remain. It serves as both a testament to the progress made and a call to action for continued efforts in the face of evolving environmental threats. The full Report can be downloaded here and on the Rapporteurs Group’s web page . We encourage all stakeholders to read it and continue supporting the vital work being done to protect our shared Baltic Sea Region. Together, we can build a sustainable and resilient future for generations to come.

BSPC Observer on HELCOM, Ms Beate Schlupp, First Vice-President of the State Parliament of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, has released her 2023-2024 Report on HELCOM-related developments and activities. The comprehensive report details the BSPC’s observer activities at the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM) during 2023-2024. This report highlights the continued dedication of the BSPC to environmental protection and sustainability in the Baltic Sea region, emphasising the strong collaboration between the BSPC and HELCOM. Over the past year, significant progress has been made in implementing key recommendations from HELCOM, with governments demonstrating a renewed commitment to addressing the pressing environmental challenges. The report notes that HELCOM’s third holistic assessment (HOLAS 3) has provided invaluable insights into the state of the Baltic Sea, revealing both areas of concern and encouraging signs of improvement where protective measures have been effectively applied. The BSPC has been an active supporter of HELCOM’s initiatives, particularly in the areas of combating marine pollution, enhancing biodiversity, and addressing the issue of sea-dumped munitions. This cooperation has been vital in ensuring that legislative actions are aligned with the environmental goals set out in the updated Baltic Sea Action Plan. As we were celebrating this year the 50 th anniversary of HELCOM, the BSPC reaffirmed its commitment to fostering a healthy and resilient Baltic Sea ecosystem. The full Report can be downloaded here and on the Rapporteur’s webpage . We invite you to read the full report and join us in supporting these critical efforts.

The second day of the BSPC conference began with addresses from international partners, reinforcing their cooperation. The BSPC Working Group’s interim report on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, and Connectivity was presented, along with reports by the BSPC Rapporteurs on Integrated Maritime Policy, Migration and Integration as well as Sea-Dumped Munitions. The fourth session dealt with climate change, assessing once more the situation and charting what had to be implemented. Finally, the presidency was transferred from Denmark to Åland. Addresses by Representatives of other Parliamentary Assemblies, International Guests, and BSPC Observer Organisations Benelux Parliaments Mr Hendrik-Jan Talsma, head of the delegation of the Netherlands Parliament, thanked the BSPC for inviting a delegation from the Benelux parliaments to this extraordinary event. He pointed to the historical ties between their nations, although they had not always been as peaceful, friendly, and cooperative as in the present. What the Baltic Sea meant for the states around its shores, the North Sea did for Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. It was an economic and strategic artery for these countries. Security played an increasingly vital role here as well, with a growing number of Russian military and scientific vessels passing coastlines, data cables, wind farms, and gas pipelines. Of course, the right of free passage – mare liberum – had to be respected. Escorting non-NATO ships had become a regular task for the North Sea states while arrangements to protect wind farms against drone deployment had been made. Yet for the necessary investments in defence, resources were needed: software for better detection and monitoring, camera surveillance, drones, and more stringent public-private security plans. This was only possible through efficient cooperation. On 25 October 2024, the Netherlands parliament would host a conference on this subject. Mr Talsma extended an invitation to a BSPC delegation. He called on his audience to stand together in the face of the increasing tensions. CBSS, Estonian Presidency Mr Tõnis Nirk, Ambassador-at-Large for Baltic Sea Cooperation, Chairman of the CBSS Committee of Senior Officials, introduced the main priorities of the Estonian presidency. They built on the achievements of their predecessors, continuing to stress the political dialogue. The recent Ministerial Meeting in Porvoo had reaffirmed support for Ukraine, noting the change in the security landscape after the Russian attack, particularly in hybrid threats from Russia and Belarus. The three long-term priorities of the CBSS remained highly topical: a safe and secure, sustainable and prosperous region, and a regional identity. The main focus of the Estonian presidency would be on strengthening resilience and sustainability. Furthermore, the support for and with Ukraine would be continued and reinforced. Thirdly, well-focused and mutually beneficial cooperation with the other regional formats – highlighting the BSPC – was crucial for the CBSS. Regarding the long-term priorities, he said that, for a safe and secure region, the CBSS would concentrate on civil protection, child protection, and anti-trafficking. For a sustainable and prosperous region, work would continue on the green corridors through the Baltic Sea. In a new Estonian initiative, the CBSS would work on creating a “digital twin” of the Baltic Sea. For regional identity, cultural heritage and several important projects were at the forefront. Youth involvement also continued its vital part in the CBSS, such as the CBSS Summer University in Tallinn in mid-July. The CBSS had appointed a new director general of the secretariat. Mr Nirk acknowledged the predecessor’s, Ambassador Poznański, tremendous work over the past four years. Dr Lindström would take over the position a few days later. In Porvoo, ministers had decided on a review of the CBSS to provide recommendations for the future. He expected results to be available by the time Poland would take over the presidency in the coming year. CBSS, Secretariat Ambassador Grzegorz Poznański, outgoing director general of the CBSS secretariat, said that Baltic Sea cooperation showed the multi-level governance of the region. Parliamentarians, governments but also regions, cities, and other organisations were playing a vital role in moving all of them forward. A good old tradition of the region was to find solutions for problems they encountered. This went back to the assemblies in the Nordic countries and Germany called thing which were forerunners of the parliaments of the present day. The Slavic precursors led to the modern word sejm and cognates. Russia had experimented with similar ideas in the Novgorod Republic in the late medieval period – but it had been literally butchered by Czar Ivan the Terrible. For the ambassador, this early end of the council concept was a likely explanation why no common ground had been found with Russia since. He had been proud to represent the Baltic Sea region for four years since it was an example to the world. Other regions seeking to establish similar cooperations were looking to the Baltic Sea as a role model, such as the countries around the Red Sea. In the multi-level governance, they turned to politicians when needed, at other times to cities or regions. Ambassador Poznański was also glad that the Baltic Sea region was doing the most to support Ukraine, on every level. Furthermore, he highlighted the close collaboration with Ukraine – sharing ideas but also learning from the country’s painful experience. Democratic values and pragmatism, awareness of threats and opportunities, cooperation – all of that had allowed the Baltic Sea region to flourish in the past and would continue to do so. Baltic Sea NGO Network Mr Jens William Grav, coordinator, reflected that the last time he had been at this venue in 2009, the Nord Stream pipeline as well as nuclear power had been discussed. Some things changed; others stayed the same. He went on to explain that the purpose of the Baltic Sea NGO Network was to bring NGOs from different countries and fields together and influence democratic decision-making in the region as well as raising awareness for the work of NGOs. People-by-people contact and human rights issues had been a focus of their efforts. While the Network had used to have platforms in every country of the region, recently, the ones in Finland and in Iceland had been shut down. Some of the platforms were coordinators for some of the EU macro strategy’s priority areas such as Sweden for education and Poland for tourism. He underlined that civil society was important for the development of the Baltic Sea region. In the Nordic tradition, democracy started in NGOs in which boards were elected. That experience was taken to other democratic institutions, such as political parties. As for the Network’s partnership with the BSPC, Mr Grav said that discussions were ongoing to establish an event like the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum to bring the whole of society into the BSPC’s discussion. He stressed that every part of society was needed in the region’s development. Status Report from the Working Group and Reports by BSPC Rapporteurs Session chair Kim Aas noted his pride on the high-level recommendations elaborated by the working group after just one year. Interim Report of the Working Group on Energy Security, Self-sustainability, and Connectivity Working group chair Andris Kulbergs believed they had achieved great success after just one year, having gathered practical experience and having learned from each other. In retrospect, Russian gas had been a sedative – so comfortable and easy for citizens and business that there had been no drive to develop renewables. None had wanted to realise that the gas had been a weapon. But since the Russian attack on Ukraine, that had become obvious – especially in the effect on inflation. Latvia had experienced 22 % inflation, forcing government to spend a great deal of money to support citizens and industry. In effect, they were paying for the mistake they had made before. This applied to other European countries as well. Now, industry was looking for alternative energy sources, such as German chemical and manufacturing enterprises. Yet Europe had shown resilience in a way Russia had not anticipated. There was much yet to do, though. At a meeting in Riga, the working group had visited a Soviet-era hydro plant which allowed Latvia to be among the greenest energy suppliers in Europe. Rail Baltica was a vital project as Soviet infrastructure had been deliberately laid out east-west, and now the north-south dimension was being developed as a project across the Baltic Sea region. Mr Kulbergs noted the military aspect as the Ukrainian railway helped the country sustain its war effort. Furthermore, Rail Baltica also served as energy and digital infrastructure, reinforcing security. In March 2024, the working group had gone to Helsinki. The hybrid threat centre opened their eyes to how poorly they had been dealing with propaganda, how slow information was versus disinformation. Politicians needed to make sure they had the truth rather than fall prey to propaganda themselves. Furthermore, the energy sector would be vulnerable in the coming winter. Mr Kulbergs related an example from January 2024 when the Nordics’ energy grid had been overtaxed when renewables had failed, stressing the need for reliable base energy and better interconnectivity among the countries. He called on his fellow politicians not to let national pride prevent such interconnections. The working group had also implemented a survey among the Baltic Sea nations on consumption, energy productivity, and connectivity plans. He believed all of them were seriously underestimating the future demand of electricity. Among other aspects, he pointed to vehicle transport and heating moving to electric power driving that increase. There was also the growth of AI: At an extracurricular meeting in Finland, at the LUMI supercomputer data centre, they learned that the centre expended 15 megawatts in the present but expected that number to balloon to 300 megawatts in five years. This made base power even more crucial. Mr Kulbergs remarked that Sweden and Poland were now heavily investing in nuclear power. These approaches had to be synchronised across the region. He called on everybody to work together, to ensure there would be no further vulnerabilities to Russian attacks. That also included protecting the crucial infrastructure in the Baltic Sea as well as digital firewalls and defending from hybrid propaganda threats. Co-chair Eka von Kalben announced that the reports of the BSPC Rapporteurs were to follow. She informed the conference that all the reports were available for download on the BSPC website, including those not orally represented in this session. Report by Mr Jörgen Pettersson, BSPC Rapporteur for Integrated Maritime Policy Mr Pettersson called the men and women at sea the unsung heroes of their time, making sure that people’s basic needs were covered. Everything needed for living was delivered by sea. Aside from unpredictable natural forces, they were facing regulation, competition, policies, and more created by humans. 15 % of global shipping occurred in the Baltic Sea, with 2000 ships constantly present. He noted that his report covered three large policy areas: The future fuels/engines and the ETS trading system – first in the world – would bring major implications across the board, affecting infrastructure, maritime spatial planning, and technologies. The Russian shadow fleet posed a significant challenge to global maritime authorities and regulators. Some 400 tankers were not registered or mis-registered and operating below the radar with ship-to-ship transfers, AIS manipulation, very complex ownership structures, alternative finance and insurances, disguised routes. They represented economic strategic aggression and geopolitical instability. The integrated maritime policy provided notions on how to tackle such matters. The goal was a sustainable and competitive future for the maritime sector because of its importance for life. As such, he was looking to further good cooperation to achieve these ambitious goals. Report by Ms Carola Veit, BSPC Rapporteur for Migration and Integration Ms Veit noted that migration and integration remained at the top of the political agenda, as evidenced by the recent European elections. Europe was still experiencing the largest refugee movement since the end of World War II. She highlighted the BSPC resolution paragraphs 4, 6, and 8, namely, integrating migrants and vulnerable groups into the labour market with regard to social sustainability and the support for Ukraine. Secondly, the challenges of migration, hybrid warfare, and border control were increasingly intermingled. The UN Refugee Agency had recorded some 6.5 million refugees from Ukraine globally by July 2024, all but half a million in Europe. Yet there had been more than 117 million refugees worldwide in 2023. EuroStat stated that, relative to their size, Chechia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia had accepted the most Ukrainian refugees. But all members of the BSPC were confronted with the task of integration. The German Institute for Employment’s research showed the labour market integration by Ukrainians, with Lithuania showing the highest employment rate at 57 %, followed by Denmark at 53 %, and Poland at 48 %. Below 20 % were Finland, Norway, and Romania. The two different approaches here were language first and work first. To some degree, they explained this variance, trading speed for sustainability. Thus, despite the currently low numbers, the study recommended Norway as a role model, offering a part-time 6-12-month program so that Ukrainians could work at the same time. A Hamburg model for underage migrants combined vocational training with language classes, with 53 % of participants moving on to further education or employment. Two policy decisions in Latvia and Estonia underlined the importance of language skills for integration: Latvia would discontinue Russian as a mandatory second language in its state education from 2026, aiming to provide a wider selection of second languages. From 2029, Estonian would be the only instruction language in that country. Ms Veit presented four policy decisions also tackling hybrid attacks and border tensions. Finland was seeking to implement pushbacks at its border to Russia, despite legal concerns. Finland and Lithuania had to deal with Russia unilaterally redrawing Baltic Sea borders to sow confusion. Sweden was implementing a “snitch” law so that contacts with undocumented workers would be reported to the authorities, over opposition from municipalities, trade unions, civil society groups. Germany had re-introduced temporary border checks as a reaction to more than 260,000 unauthorised border crossings in 2023. Refugees were increasingly reduced to an instrument of hybrid warfare by Russia. Parliamentarians had to strike a balance between fighting against hybrid threats and defending democratic values. A strong democracy was the best protection against disinformation. Yet they had to remember that their aging societies needed people. Migration should be seen as one key to the future of the Baltic Sea region and Europe. Presentation by Ms Anna Kassautzki, BSPC Rapporteur on Sea-Dumped Munitions Ms Kassautzki cautioned that, amidst the current threats, the mistakes of the past should not be forgotten. After the World Wars, some 400,000 tonnes of conventional and 40,000 tonnes of chemical warheads had been dumped onto the bottom of the Baltic Sea. She noted that the first number was likely vastly underestimated. The ammunition was corroding, its contents polluting the sea water. Since the Baltic Sea waters were more stationary than in other seas, so were the harmful substances. One well-researched example near Kiel showed mussels and 25 % of the caught fish being heavily affected. For too long, the problem beneath the sea was out of sight, out of mind. Not only the BSPC had been seeking to bring it to the surface but also the CBSS, HELCOM, and other organisations. Scientists were using AI to supplement real data so as to find munition dump sites. The EU sought to coordinate scientific action and data sharing with the Commission, the CBSS, and HELCOM. They wanted to develop tools and technologies for a campaign to clear the Baltic Sea from dumped munitions. Combined with the planned German mobile platform, this could be a gamechanger. Finding, retrieving, and destroying the munitions on the spot above the waterline would be the most efficient way without further damaging the ecosystem. Unfortunately, progress was not as fast as it should be. As such, her report from the previous year was still up to date. Yet the process had to be accelerated – Ms Kassautzki underlined that there was not much time left to implement it. She called for the close cooperation between the major entities and the strong support from the parliamentary side. In particular, the governments had to find a funding mechanism so they could clean up the mess of generations before. Fourth Session: Climate Initiatives Session chair Jarosław Wałęsa explained that the BSPC’s previous working group had dealt with Climate Change and Biodiversity, completing its work the previous year. The present session would continue to deepen understanding and discussion of this crucial topic. Presentation by Ms Eva Jensen, European Environment Agency Ms Jensen noted that security was the framework around the climate agenda in the coming policy cycle in the EU institutions, much like the BSPC conference. Her agency provided knowledge and data to policymakers. As for climate change specifically, she explained that Earth had already warmed by the 1.5 °C target specified in the Paris Agreement. That this would inevitably be exceeded spoke to the urgency of these efforts. Extrapolating current trends foresaw a rise by 7 °C at the end of the 21 st century – it was hard to see how human society could adapt to that. Fortunately, the widespread efforts would likely lower that excess warming. Her agency had published the first ever comprehensive risk assessment on climate risks in Europe in the spring of 2024. The clear message was that Europe was not ready and required much more resilience. Surprisingly to many, Europe was warming at twice the global average. 1.5 °C for the world did not mean the same number for Europe. Extreme heat, drought, wildfires, flooding were the result. In 2022, these events had cost 52 billion euros in damages. In the report, 32 major climate risks had been identified, in five categories: economy and finance, health, food, infrastructure, and info systems. Of those, 21 risks required urgent action. These included food production in southern Europe – e.g., crop failures, droughts –, houses collapsing in floods, and ocean ecosystems. The report also presented outlooks for individual regions. Baltic Sea warming, for example, accelerated oxygen depletion, creating more dead zones, as well as promoting algae blooms. Moving on to EU actions, Ms Jensen mentioned the Green Deal, underlining that it was not restricted to the current Commission but would be continued by the incoming team. The goal was to reduce greenhouse gases by 55 % in Europe through the largest policy package in the EU, via carbon pricing etc. Estimates for future emissions based on the currently enacted and planned measures predicted an overshoot of the 2030 target. Yet Ms Jensen saw them going in the right direction, although more effort was needed. The reduction achieved so far had been primarily driven by the energy transition: Renewable energies had doubled since 2005, to 23 %. Without them, there would be 17 % more emissions. However, these efforts would have to be tripled to reach the 2030 goal. Further contributors included less fossil fuel and electric vehicles. The biggest challenges to further reducing emissions were forest sinks, increased harvesting, and negative impacts from climate disturbances. In a warmer climate, more CO 2 was being emitted. She cautioned that climate change would not stop in 2030, so that politics would have to continue the process. Climate change was everywhere in the political guidelines for the coming five years, but it was wrapped up in the questions of how to be secure, competitive, and how to implement a fair and just transition. Presentation by Prof Jette Bredahl Jacobsen, Vice-Chair for the European Scientific Board on Climate Change Ms Jacobsen noted that her institute had been launched two years before. They were an independent advisory body, discussing European climate policy and providing guidance on how to reach the climate goals. One area had been the implementation of the Green Deal; the other concerned the 2030 goal as only a stepping stone to the 2050 target of being carbon neutral or even negative. Action was needed right away. In June 2023, the Board released a report on what Europe could and should contribute to the global efforts of meeting the Paris Agreement’s aim. The maximum reduction that was feasible amounted up to 95 %. The question was what a fair share for Europe amounted to, and by all the criteria they had considered, that number exceeded what was possible. Ms Jacobsen remarked that there was a range of political priorities to enact the various pathways to a 90-95 % reduction by 2040: One was demand-side – e.g., people eating a more climate-friendly diet, less energy-consuming transport patterns –, while another pathway dealt with more renewable energy, and a spread of pathways mixing these approaches. All of them, though, had to be enacted across all sectors and policy areas. Their second report detailed that all the various efforts had to be accelerated in order to hit these targets. She agreed that climate change was one of several priorities that sometimes collided with each other. The board had gone through each sector along with cross-cutting aspects, ending up with 13 recommendations sorted by urgency to achieve the 2030 targets. At the same time, this was also about preparing the path to 2050. Ms Jacobsen stressed that 2050 was not very far off. The earlier measures were implemented, the less expensive they would be – especially in light of how long it took to put policies into place. Presentation by Prof Stiig Markager, Aarhus University Prof Markager opened by saying that he had been working on the science of the Baltic Sea for the past 30 years and was, among others, in various HELCOM expert groups. The ecosystem in the western part of the Baltic Sea had totally collapsed, i.e., several major components had been reduced to such a low level that they no longer functioned. As an example, he juxtaposed two photos of the same fishing boat: In the shot from the 1980s, the deck was overflowing with caught fish, while around 2020, there were only few and small cod in a much smaller catch. The cod population in the western Baltic Sea, he underlined, had collapsed completely. As a result, all fishery – commercial and recreational – had been banned. Recreational also meant a tourist attraction and source of income that had vanished. The same applied to other major fish species, such as herring or flounders. He showed the image of a healthy sea bottom, with white sand, no mud, vegetation – the habitat for fish food as well as shelter to hide from seals and other predators. In the western Baltic Sea, the sea floor was muddy, covered by filamentous algae. This was no home for a small fish to grow and the primary reason for the population collapse. In deeper regions of the sea, elementary sulphur crystallised from the poison gas H 2 S meeting oxygen, forming a net-like structure. Below that, only H 2 S-producing microbes survived. This was caused by artificial fertiliser – a huge boon to mankind, banishing hunger and making the European population on average 30 cm taller. However, spilled into the sea, it caused an immense growth of unicellular organisms. With sufficient nitrogen available, their number could double every day. This showed the impact of nitrogen on marine life – eel grass had vanished, fish species had shrunk, clear water had turned murky. Phosphorus also contributed to that effect. In 1995, about one million tonnes per year of nitrogen had entered the Baltic Sea. For the next fifteen years, the input had gone down by 15 %. In the present day, about 860,000 tonnes were still coming into the sea each year. HELCOM’s goal was a decrease by 7 %, yet that would not be enough for the Baltic Sea to regain a good status. Much more was needed. At a reduction of 20 %, a good status would be reached after 400 years. At 50 %, the good status could be achieved after 100 years. Prof Markager acknowledged that they would not see a clean Baltic Sea in their lifetime, but that only meant they had to do as much as they could right away. Industrial agricultural practices were the source of both nitrogen and phosphorus, although the latter also washed out with wastewater. That output needed to be reduced. Presenting a picture of Danish agriculture, he remarked that nothing was left for nature; even a stream that had once meandered through the landscape was now a channel. Nutrients were carried straight into the sea. To change that, a Danish Green Deal had been achieved in June 2024, with the government, agricultural organisations, and NGOs agreeing to return 15 % of the arable land in Denmark to nature, mainly wetlands but also forests. His analysis – and that of the respective Danish advisory body – was that this number had to be at least doubled. Yet it was a good step forward. Prof Markager assumed this was the same for all the countries in the BSPC. As for sewage, he pointed to a new treatment plant nearby, with a nitrogen output of 2 milligrams/litre – 5 to 8 times less than the standard in Europe. This proved that sewage treatment could be improved significantly. A similar reduction was possible for phosphorus. The technology was there, but politicians were lagging behind. The trick, the professor noted, was having the plant underground, allowing more stable temperatures year-round. His recommendation to politicians was that in particular the nitrogen but also the phosphorus input into the Baltic Sea had to be reduced. Land in a 2-kilometre range around streams and by the coasts should not be farmed. Aside from the previously mentioned measures, fossil fuels had to be eliminated, and all other pressures – such as overfishing – had to be lessened. Debate Ms Anna Kassautzki pointed to the preceding BSPC Working Group on Climate Change and Biodiversity, noting the long involvement of the BSPC in these matters. The advantage of the BSPC was that one learned about best practices in other countries, such as the wetlands established at river estuaries in Åland, slowing down the nutrient flow. She underlined that it was known what should be done, such as ecosystem-based fishery, rewetting peatlands, or planting seagrass. It was the task not just of the Baltic Sea countries but of Europe and humanity to leave the Baltic Sea in a state that the next generation could live with. Ms Tove Elise Madland said she was the chair of the Nordic Council Committee for a Sustainable Region. She appreciated the work of the presenters. Mr Staffan Eklöf reflected on climate actions. Efficiency in carbon dioxide per euro and carbon dioxide reduction per consequences for economy and people should be more focused on. They should look for the most efficient actions. In its 2023 report The Changing Landscape of Global Emissions, the International Energy Agency wrote that China’s total output had risen to exceed that of all the advanced economies, India had surpassed the EU to become the third-largest emitter. Countries in developing Asia now accounted for half of global emissions, up from a quarter in 2000. Mr Eklöf stressed that the reality of emissions had changed, but the perception of the role of Europe had not. While this certainly did not absolve the EU from climate actions, measures had to take into account what was happening in Asia, especially China and India. He called for imaginative, outside-the-box ideas. In addition, national reviews of the effectiveness of climate measures had to look at the impact on global emissions. Mr Eklöf said decisions should be based on mathematics to succeed, not just what felt right. Mr Stanisław Kostulski from the Youth Forum remarked that at this year’s HELCOM anniversary event, it had become clear that they had all the knowledge and tools to combat climate change. Yet governments refused to act. One crisis should not be sacrificed to deal with another crisis. He called on every person, especially youths, to be involved in decision-making processes. If climate measures failed, he was blaming politics. Ms Pola Zabuska from the Youth Forum said that there was a lot of promotion and awareness raising around climate change. Yet they could not reach a significant share of society who did not see the need for climate measures. She wondered what realistic actions could be taken by the public and private sectors to convey the urgency of the climate situation to the most sceptical people. Ms Jensen appreciated the support at this conference. As for the global impact, she said that the EU regulations were based on thorough economic impact assessments, seeking an economically efficient approach to their measures. The EU also participated in global negotiations, with a strong focus on the emissions in the rest of the world. Prof Jacobsen agreed that a just transition could not succeed without public support. A first step was to thoroughly examine the consequences, crucially dispelling myths but also arranging for appropriate compensation measures. Furthermore, she confirmed that the key problem of climate change was that it was a global challenge. What mattered was what was implemented collectively. Yet the EU was an important player on the world stage and could, for one thing, show how to curtail emissions. In addition, EU and US politicians had to engage more actively in international efforts. Prof Markager struck a more positive tone after his rather dark presentation. The ecosystem in the middle of the Baltic Sea would take a very long time to recover, but the coastal regions – which people frequented heavily – could see improvements much faster, within a few decades of declining nutrient inputs. In small regions, improvements could manifest within a year and spread out from there. These could be witnessed not only within lifetimes but also within political careers. Secondly, there were so many synergies between climate change, biodiversity and eutrophication and the state of the marine environment. All of this came down to managing the landscape. Planting eel grass was no use in an oxygen-free dead zone. Reducing fishery was too late after the fish had gone. So, the landscapes had to include more nature, increasing biodiversity, improving drinking water quality, and adding recreational values. Wetlands acted as filters for nutrients while they and forests served as carbon sinks. Closing Session The conference unanimously adopted changes to the Rules of Procedure, regarding new appointments to positions in the BSPC. President Henrik Møller thanked the Drafting Committee and the delegations for their excellent work in putting together the 33 rd resolution of the BSPC to the governments of the Baltic Sea region. The conference unanimously adopted the resolution. The president hoped that the governments would implement the BSPC’s calls and contribute to a better future. He also offered his gratitude to the Youth Forum for their contributions to the resolution. He had been honoured to serve as the BSPC’s president for a year. Now, he passed the baton to Mr Alfons Röblom from Åland as his successors. New BSPC president Alfons Röblom saw it as an honour and a privilege to embark on the next chapter of the BSPC under Åland’s presidency. He outlined three central themes for the coming year. The Baltic Sea – Our Lifeline concerned the increasing strain to the region’s economies, traditions, and identities. Åland would prioritise initiatives to protect and restore the health of the Baltic Sea as well as support cross-border efforts on pollution, marine biodiversity, and sustainable fisheries. Cooperation was about strengthening the ever more important collaboration in the region, with the EU, and international bodies. Åland would foster dialogue, share best practices, and promote partnerships for innovation and resilience. In the Baltic Sea region, Security and Sustainability were always linked. Åland would focus on cybersecurity, hybrid threats, and the militarisation of maritime zones while advocating for policies on renewable energy, greenhouse gas emissions, and resilience in the communities against climate change. President Röblom thanked the Danish parliament and outgoing president Møller for their tireless efforts. He reminded the conference that the Baltic Sea was more than a geographical feature – it was a shared resource, a common heritage, and a symbol of their interconnectedness. Now, BSPC Vice President Henrik Møller thanked BSPC Secretary General Bodo Bahr and also the secretariat for their hard work in making the conference possible. The conference applauded with long standing ovations as he honoured Bodo Bahr’s highly committed work as ‘Mr BSPC’ and emphasised that it had been a pleasure to work with him. He also appreciated the contributions and support of Mr Johannes Schraps, who shared with him his experience as former BSPC President and of now-president Alfons Röblom. Furthermore, Mr Møller thanked the youths for inspiring the conference. He was also deeply grateful to the organisers and managers from the Danish Folketinget for their highly dedicated work and support, particularly Peder Pedersen and Joan Ólavsdóttir. He closed the conference by citing the last words of Hamlet: “And the rest is silence.”

On the afternoon of the first day of the BSPC’s annual conference, the recommendations from the BSPC’s Parliamentary Youth Forum were presented. After that, the conference dealt with the security of the energy supply, engaging in a vibrant discussion with Sweden’s Minister for Civil Defence and a researcher from the Royal Danish Defence College. Topics included the Nordic Total Defence concept, hybrid attacks, and European autonomous energy production. In its session on safety in the Baltic Sea, the Danish Ministers of Defence and of Foreign Affairs spoke about the geopolitical and military challenges of the present day, pointing among other things to the Russian shadow fleet of oil tankers and the need to reinforce European defence capabilities. Second Session: Recommendations from the BSPC Parliamentary Youth Forum Chair Carola Veit welcomed the guests to this important session which would also feature the recommendations of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum. Co-chair Himanshu Gulati highlighted the value of young people’s involvement, especially in the pressing matters of the day: Energy Security and Resilience; Sustainable Energy Independence; and Youth Engagement in Energy Policy. They had developed recommendations on each which their representatives would introduce to the conference. On Energy Security and Resilience: Ms Nagham Jaghoub, Chair of the Vestfold Youth Council from Norway Ms Jaghoub said that their first recommendation was to enhance the resilience and security of the energy in research and development of outdated systems hand in hand with the private sector as well as partners supplementing the existing NATO initiatives. Secondly, the resilience of maritime crucial infrastructure should be strengthened by identifying the most vulnerable areas through comprehensive mapping, including joint risk assessments, coordinated trading, and real-time information sharing between public and private sectors for rapid, effective threat response. On Sustainable Energy Independence: Ms Justina Ramonaitytė-Jemeljanovaitė, former board member of ReGeneration2030, from Lithuania living in Denmark Ms Ramonaitytė-Jemeljanovaitė noted the importance of having young people’s voice heard, being at the adults’ rather than the kids’ table. Their first proposal regarded regional energy consumption, suggesting accelerating the full phase-out of fossil fuels, starting with non-EU sources, especially the Russian Federation; allocate resources towards sustainable energy; rethink the regional power grid, prioritising its modernisation and smart optimisation in storage and distribution. Secondly, they called to prioritise a just transition by working together to lower energy prices, build trust in institutions, and support fragile communities. Additionally, it was crucial to provide strong support for those whose jobs might be at risk due to the green transition by reskilling them, ensuring that no-one was left behind on the path to a more sustainable future. On Youth Engagement in Energy Policy: Ms Sarah Vestergaard, Danish Youth Council Ms Vestergaard noted that this topic was very close to the heart of the young people. She added that 76 % of Danish youths had been politically engaged in 2023, compared to 72 % of the rest of the population. Yet democratic confidence was lower among young people. On the other hand, those active in youth organisations had a higher confidence level – highlighting the value of democratic engagement and volunteer work. Thus, the forum asked decisionmakers to support youth organisations, giving young people the opportunity to voice their opinions, educate them, and provide opportunities to learn from industry. Firstly, they called for youth perspectives to be integrated into regional energy policies. Youth organisations should be given a permanent place in decision-making processes in the Baltic Sea region, e.g., by establishing formal structures. Secondly, access to green education should be promoted, and energy companies should be encouraged to provide opportunities for young people, e.g., by integrating sustainable energy topics into existing programmes, enabling exchange programmes, and fostering lifelong learning on relevant topics. Ms Vestergaard went on to thank the BSPC for giving the young people this opportunity to take part. Considering how diligently the previous year’s recommendations had been incorporated into the BSPC’s resolution, she further thanked them for not just listening but acting. Debate Mr Johannes Schraps regretted that the processes in the BSPC and its member parliaments prevented the recommendations from being integrated into the present year’s resolution. Even though it would take a year from these recommendations entering the 2025 resolution, he underlined that they would be brought to the governments with the pressure of 20 national and regional parliaments and parliamentary organisations. He urged his colleagues and the youths to review the governmental responses to the resolutions, always delivered in spring, to see what progress had been made. Energy Supply Security Session chair Andris Kulbergs noted that he was also the chairman of the BSPC’s current working group on this very important topic. He reflected how much it had been neglected in recent years – such as relying on cheap Russian gas for too long. The lesson was that gas had served as a weapon and using it had delayed investments into green energy. Moreover, it had driven a wedge into society, and it had played a significant role in inflation. Consequently, energy supply security had been recognised as vital and of strategic importance. Co-chair Staffan Eklöf introduced the first speaker: Mr Carl-Oskar Bohlin, Swedish Minister for Civil Defence. With a background in law, he had worked extensively on issues of public safety and national security. Presentation by Mr Carl-Oskar Bohlin, Swedish Minister for Civil Defence Mr Bohlin began by interrogating resilience in a broader light. The Baltic Sea region did not only share geography but also the same political outlook. As they were now all part of NATO, they could together tackle the most dire security situation since the end of World War II. To prepare for armed conflict, an all-society approach to resilience was necessary to handle new threat vectors that could reach directly into civil society. In that respect, he spoke of Sweden currently revitalising its Total Defence concept, originally devised during the Cold War on how the entire society should resist in the case of an armed attack. Resilience and robustness had to be implemented in every societal sector, so that defence could be supported by all of society. A role model was Ukraine which had met Total War with Total Resistance. Fundamentally, all of Ukrainian society had been put on a war footing. In a modern society, security of supply in general had become pivotal. The minister noted as an example that energy supply lines had been weaponised by Russia. For Sweden, the first line of defence was not to be critically dependent on countries with a different security outlook, on their adversaries. This had to apply for the EU as a whole. Secondly, he called for more agility in the industrial base of every country. During the pandemic, whole sectors had been taken out, while direly needed medical equipment had grown scarce. Then, industries had organically shifted their production to fill those gaps. Sweden was establishing better public-private cooperation to more quickly facilitate this transformation. Thirdly, stockpiles in critical sectors – e.g., raw materials – as well as more robustness and redundancy were necessary. The autumn of 2022 had shown how fragile the European energy system was – a thankfully mild winter prevented a disaster. Yet, Mr Bohlin underlined, hope was not a strategy. Sweden was reinforcing its energy system’s robustness. Investing in the security of supply was a contribution to security in a more and more multipolar world. In Sweden’s view, this was an integral part of the country’s defence posture and thus their contribution to NATO deterrence. Mr Kulbergs remarked that one lesson was that by running away from the Russian bear, one should not run into the claws of the Chinese tiger. He went on to introduce a leading researcher at the Royal Danish Defence College, Mr Rasmus Dahlberg. His area of expertise was disaster management and civil protection, particularly in the context of the Nordic countries. Presentation by Mr Rasmus Dahlberg, Researcher, Royal Danish Defence College Mr Dahlberg stressed that he was not speaking as a representative of his college. There had not been a tradition of research in societal defence in Denmark. But the country was forging ahead and was expected to establish a ministry of preparedness in the near future. His research project Resector was exploring the processes and effects of the COVID pandemic which some described as the great dress rehearsal. Their systems had been tested under severe stress – but not to the point of breakdown. Resector was looking at the principle of sectorial responsibility. The idea was particularly strong in the Nordic countries, namely that the responsibility in peace time remained with the companies in crisis or war times. Quoting a Danish professor, Mr Dahlberg spoke of the “crisis society” – it had become the new normal. Crisis management and preparedness had to be reconceived as did policies and organisations. He saw steps taken in this field, such as Sweden’s Total Defence concept, the EU’s efforts for increased resilience and information security, and NATO’s renewed interest in resilience as deterrence. The latter had been a strong focus in the 1950s, that the military could not fight well without strong, whole societies supporting them. Even so, the national state was still the primary crisis manager, as COVID had shown that the EU was too slow to react at appropriate speed. His project was considering sector responsibility as an example of how the whole society could and should adapt to preparedness and crisis management. Energy supply and security fit very well. With regard to pipelines, seabed security had become a hot topic within NATO. For instance, an average pipeline passed through six or seven utterly different legal regimes from one end to the other. In the last three decades, efficiency and cost-effectiveness had been the goals rather than including security. Yet hybrid threats were deliberately targeting overlaps, gaps, and uncertainties – oftentimes, these were questions of who was responsible. Mr Dahlberg admitted that this kept him awake at night. While he did not know who had blown up the Nord Stream pipeline, it was surely no coincidence it had happened in the legal nightmare zone right outside Danish and Swedish territorial waters, namely, the EEC. Sector responsibility had to be revised to ensure it did not become responsibility avoidance. New policies, new administrative structures were needed – along with supernational superstructures. Most importantly, nation states had to learn from each experience and adapt. Mr Kulbergs remarked that he had attended an OECD meeting. There, he had learned that after effectively switching away from Russian gas, new dependencies had arisen. 82 % of windmill parts came from China and 98 % of solar panels. 78 % of electric mobility depended on China. As such, he wondered if they were now leaping into the claws of the Chinese tiger, especially with the energy transition. Furthermore, even if all this equipment was in place, there were still the cables. One estimate mentioned 28,000 kilometres of cables that would have to be installed. Yet only 6,000 were available as they had relied on Russia – now sanctioned – and Ukraine – now bombed. Minister Bohlin compared the situation to a diver with an oxygen hose. The dependency was the same, as gas and oxygen could be turned off overnight. That was the most critical of all energy dependencies. The dependency on components was like the diver relying on the manufacturer of the hose – it was critical but not as much of a vulnerability. On the other hand, he agreed that this could not be maintained long-term since that dependency could be exploited as a bargaining chip. Thus, reliable energy chains had to be established for Europe in the long term. He underlined that they all supported the energy transition, but it had to be implemented in a sustainable matter – not only in terms of how resources were used but also from a security point of view. More plannable energy production, with greater control of the supply chain, was needed. Therefore, Sweden was welcoming every new green and carbon-neutral energy source. This expressly included nuclear power plants. To his knowledge, Sweden had seventeen out of thirty listed critical rare earth materials, putting on them the responsibility of making these available not only to themselves but also to their partners. Mr Dahlberg agreed. It did not make sense to exchange one weaponised dependency for another. The problem in his view was that people still deeply believed in globalisation and did not want to wake up to the harsh reality that they were playing an entirely different ball game now. One outcome of the COVID crisis was the critical supply agency established in Denmark in the autumn of 2022. As good advice as they provided, they did not have a mandate. This led him back to the superstructure he’d spoken about earlier – less about cooperation and more about command. A mandate had to be given to someone to determine if an action, for instance, went against the short-term economic interest but was of great importance in the long run. Mr Marc Timmer from Schleswig-Holstein appreciated Denmark in taking the right action after the oil crisis of the 1970s by fostering renewable energy not only in the electricity but also the heating sector. By comparison, the last energy crisis had cost the German economy some 5 – 7 % of GDP. As such, it was very important to implement a new energy system, as Germany was seeking to do. By nature, renewable energies were volatile, so that a reserve baseline power source was needed. He expected that to be hydrogen by 2040 or 2045. Mr Dahlberg in turn appreciated Denmark being praised. He added that the country, under pressure from NATO after the 1956 Suez crisis, had implemented oil supply security. The companies were told they could either come up with a plan of their own, or the government would legislate this into existence. Industry complied, and that structure was still in place. Mr Dahlberg argued that they should look for best practice examples from the Cold War period when all of society had been included. Since the Fall of the Iron Curtain, privatisation had been the rule. Many of the important entities that had used to be government-owned were now in private hands, some even owned by foreign entities. Mr Elias Arndt from the youth forum said that Germany was especially good in making up new words. “Krisenmodus” – crisis mode – meant that people, especially youths, were tired of the constant crisis. He asked how the experts thought the public could be brought along in developing good solutions for the future. Minister Bohlin agreed that the engagement of the whole society was the one X factor in crisis management. He took Ukraine as an example, noting that few people had taken the people’s enormous willingness to resist into account. In the days after the Russian attack on 24 February 2022, many had expected Ukraine to fall quickly. The Ukrainians, though, had a newfound confidence in their institutions and leadership reinforced by strategic communication from the top. Mr Bohlin saw this as resonating with threats further down the severity scale. Forums dispelling disinformation and polarisation were one vital approach, as was the direct communication to the populace on their obligations in the crisis. People rose to the occasion if they clearly understood what was to do. This was what Sweden was seeking to do – communicating their Total Defence duties to every citizen between 16 and 70. A special information campaign was targeting those about to turn 16 to bring them up to date. At the same time, a brochure was sent to every Swedish household, providing an overview of how to take care of oneself and how to contribute in the event of a crisis. This kind of transparency made people reflect on what was possible. Mr Dahlberg commented that Denmark was only implementing part of Sweden’s efforts and that six years late. Their version of the brochure had become available in June of the present year, rather than being distributed. The narrative before had been that Denmark was so different from Sweden or Norway that no lessons from there could be applied. However, he agreed that it was immensely important to get the population onboard. Surveys had shown an increase in interest as well as good will from the citizens towards these measures. The majority of the people wanted to be part of the Total Defence concept because it provided agency. He expected the next step to be the integration of the private sector into the new social defence 2.0 concept in Denmark. After that, civil society organisations would be considered. Ms Bryndis Haraldsdóttir, President of the Nordic Council, said that the Council was very eager in more cooperation in defence and security. She wondered if the experts thought that the Nordic nations were sufficient in screening investments in critical infrastructure or if they should harmonise their policies among each other. In light of being at the BSPC, she added if that should be expanded to the whole region. Minister Bohlin could not argue for other nations, but Sweden had moved the goalposts by belatedly introducing a screening mechanism in the preceding autumn. A holistic approach to security and a better control of infrastructure necessitated such a mechanism. Mr Dahlberg commented that he had attended a discussion on that very topic a few weeks earlier in Norway. The Nordic countries had a good history of cooperation, such as HELCOM and now NATO. He further called for more investment in societal research. Mr Marius Nilsson saw fossil energy still dominating 85 % of the energy supply. Despite billions of euros being spent, there was little change. In his view, all energy transition policies had weaknesses. On the one hand, the European research institute claimed that the German economy was crumbling over energy prices while in Norway, Germany was being hailed as the frontrunner in climate policies. His question was whether the experts saw a reality check and reorientation of the policies. Mr Bohlin did not wish to step on anyone’s feet, but he felt that the full realisation had not yet hit. In his view, one could not be carbon-neutral and energy-independent without nuclear power. He saw the matter as this easy. Otherwise, LNG would be dominant, and these often came from countries they wanted to be less dependent upon. Furthermore, LNG still produced greenhouse gas emissions. Betting on hydrogen was dubious since there was an energy loss of about 50 – 60 % in the process. Using hydrogen as a decarboniser in industrial processes would always be a more efficient choice than as an intermittent energy storage. The price and inefficiency made hydrogen unrealistic. Mr Johannes Schraps commented that there were quite diverse points of view on energy sources among the member states of the BSPC. This debate kept coming up in the Standing Committee and the working groups. Moving on, he focused on the statement about a constant crisis. Older people in his constituency kept reminding him that there had been crisis upon crisis in the past as well, such as the 1980s. As such, Mr Schraps wondered if the heavily interconnected world made the current situation seem more extraordinary. Coming back to energy supply security, he noted that this was a sensitive topic. At the Standing Committee in the preceding autumn, Tobias Liebetrau, a scientist from the University of Copenhagen, had spoken about the increasing necessity of protecting critical infrastructure. On the one hand, security work had to be confidential to a degree, but on the other hand, the public needed to be kept informed. As an example, he spoke about German weapons deliveries to Ukraine. At first, only authorized members of parliament could learn about these. But, as it had seemed to the public that the country was not delivering anything, the government started to release the lists. Yet that, in turn, allowed the Russians to see the inventories transferred to Ukraine and prepare for those. Mr Dahlberg picked up on the “crisis society” term, noting that this idea had to be combatted. He likened this to terrorism at the start of the 2000s. If they had all stayed at home rather than going to concerts or taking the train, the terrorists would not have killed anybody – but they would still have won. They had to fight hybrid threats with the core values of liberal democracies and not securitise everything. They must not create divisions in society and use scapegoats. But people asked why the same hybrid attacks were not directed against the adversaries. The answer, Mr Dahlberg noted, was that they would not work as well against autocratic states as against open democratic societies. Their openness was a vulnerability, yet that was what they had to use in their defence. This led to paradoxes in transparency. In the long period of peace, they had grown used to publishing high-resolution maps of infrastructure so that fishermen did not accidentally drop their anchors on it. Historically, navigational charts had been classified until the mid-19 th century. All of this, he placed on a spectrum from “Doing nothing” at one end and “Doing way too much” on the other. In a constant conversation in their open democratic forums, they had to seek the middle ground. Minister Bohlin said that in the perceived constant crisis, it was useful to look at the frame of reference. No Western country was sending their young men to the front, no Western European country was being bombed every day. Most of Europe had not experienced a real crisis in more than 70 years. The rules-based democracy had created an unprecedented era of peace and calm. This had not been the norm before. If they wanted to keep things from getting worse, they had to stand with Ukraine, they had to fight against those who were seeking to dismantle the liberal rules-based world order. Mr Kulbergs spoke about a new EU policy to support each other in civil defence and how each state was coordinating measures in case of natural disasters, and the like. Ukraine needed many fighters, medical support, food and water deliveries. Yet the respective EU policy did not provide for a potential war. One of the aspects was refugee flows; he pointed to the Suwałki corridor that could be shut down quickly. As such, he suggested that the BSPC should develop a concept for how they could cooperate in the case of war, since the EU did not have such a policy. Minister Bohlin replied that Finland had already brought forth a motion on this topic, supported by Sweden and other countries. Specifically, this was about ramping up the EU’s capabilities in working through civil crises more profoundly than before. This included revamping civil protection mechanisms to better cope with long-term crises. He added that one of the deliverables from the NATO Washington summit concerned incorporating and better aligning civil and military planning. Mr Dahlberg remarked that translating the Finnish security concept to the EU would be a good development. He was currently writing a report on NATO resilience requirements and objectives vis-à-vis the EU directives; cooperation – also at staff level – was rapidly increasing. So, Europe-wide provisions were likely forthcoming, yet he underlined that the national states would continue to be the practical crisis managers. Mr Jens Schneider had read that up to this point, several Russian vessels had delivered LNG to Spain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands in the EU as well as to Turkey, China, and Taiwan. His constituents had complained that supposedly, no business was done with Russia on gas. He wondered how he could explain the situation. Mr Bohlin could not speak for the countries in question but urged everyone to stop their critical dependency on Russia – not just in gas but also, for instance, fertilisers. The gas and oil dependency had, for a large part, been dissolved, although some still had to be severed. Mr Dahlberg conceded that there would always be loopholes and actors willing to exploit these. Again, he underlined that open democratic debate was needed to counter attempts to divide the Western population. Good common frameworks had to be in place and acted upon. Furthermore, exploiting such loopholes could also be driven by malicious foreign actors; this new agenda also had to be opposed. Mr Eklöf saw current society structured around peacetime, with economic efficiency as the leading goal. Gearing that structure to the new situation would cost money. That might be easy at this time, but people quickly forgot. Also keeping in mind that popular support was crucial in implementing these changes, he asked how that could be assured in the long term. Mr Bohlin stressed that this was the most difficult concern, bar none. All of them had enjoyed the peace dividend; here he pointed to Francis Fukuyama’s book on The End of History from 1992. He found it ironic that he, as a member of that “forever peace” generation, had to rebuild what the Cold War generation had dismantled after the fall of the Soviet Union. The minister underlined that they had to look at the long-term horizon. They would not see the world return to what it had been before 2022, before 2014, or before 2008. The paradox of defence spending was that the more was spent, the more people complained about the high costs, and the more politicians were willing to determine their deterrence good enough. Often enough, reality would show this was not the case. Minister Bohlin quoted Ukraine President Zelenskyy at the Munich Security Conference telling the audience that they needed to get ready because they were not. There was no looking away from this issue. Mr Dahlberg pointed to the preparedness paradox in research. This problem arose because the return on investment was often invisible. The things that did not happen were difficult to campaign on. As such, he believed that the narrative had to change from preparedness as cost to preparedness as investment – as an insurance policy. It was a fundamental element of societal security. Societal cohesion was vital. He cautioned that preparedness as a cost could not compete with other positions because of the invisible benefits. Mr Eklöf commented that an exciting project in Sweden dealt with producing fertiliser domestically. Yet agriculture also faced the problem that its machines could not be run efficiently on electricity. Biogas produced on the farm might be a solution. All in all, he did not think fossil fuels could be replaced in agriculture in the next 20 years. Mr Dahlberg reiterated that a strategy for the whole of society had to be in place; otherwise, one could always defer responsibility to somebody else. During the Cold War, NATO civil wartime agencies focused heavily on food production. Afterwards, it had diluted into the market’s responsibility. Now, they had the huge task of regaining control, defining responsibilities and mandates. But that had to be done: A plan had to be drawn up for every part of society. Mr Bohlin agreed that food production was vital for resilience and the ability to resist. The key factor was to ensure that the agricultural sector was already competitive in peacetime. Thus, it was important not to swamp farmers with unnecessary regulations trying to drive them into the energy transition – and thus driving some of them out of business. He conceded that this was a very fine balance to strike. As for specifically the fuel question, he saw bio diesel as part of this, as was biogas and electrification. Yet fossil fuels should indeed not be ruled out too early to keep agriculture competitive and powerful for when it would be badly needed. Third Session: Safety in the Baltic Sea Session chair Bryndís Haraldsdóttir said that the Baltic Sea was not just a crucial artery of communication and commerce but also of geopolitical importance. Russia’s unprovoked attack and environmental threats had underlined the need for cooperative planning. She introduced the first speaker, Mr Troels Poulsen, as having been instrumental in shaping Denmark’s defence strategy amidst the evolving security landscape of the Baltic region. Presentation by Mr Troels Lund Poulsen, Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Denmark Mr Poulsen noted Denmark’s particular responsibility for the Baltic Sea security. He highlighted the historic bond with the Baltic nations. Furthermore, he appreciated the BSPC’s role in strengthening the ties between the Baltic Sea countries. The threat from Russia was real, and he promised it would not be neglected. Finland and Sweden joining NATO had sent a clear signal to Russia, with all democratic Baltic Sea countries now part of the military alliance. He further pointed to NATO’s strong military deterrence in the Baltic states and all eastern allies. Denmark would be posting a permanent troop placement in Latvia the following autumn. The Danish intelligence service stated Russia would deter NATO member states from military activities close to the latter’s borders. Furthermore, they expected Russian challenges to NATO countries below the Article 5 threshold, such as Russian harassment in addition to the hybrid threats from the country. This made it necessary to support the defence in the present and also invest in the future. Denmark was now meeting the NATO 2 % goal on an enduring basis, after a long debate. A spring investment plan included fast-track plans for a heavy brigade, ground-based air defence systems, and anti-submarine capabilities. Military support to Ukraine had been stepped up. Along with the other Baltic Sea countries, Minister Poulsen had also signed a letter of intent to assist the Baltic States with sea mines. In defence, all of them had to do even more in the coming years. Ms Haraldsdóttir introduced Mr Lars Løkke Rasmussen, the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, known for being a strong advocate for Denmark’s active role in global diplomacy, particularly within the Nordic and Baltic regions. Presentation by Mr Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Denmark Mr Rasmussen said that all their nations shared a geographical similarity, i.e., bordering on the Baltic Sea. Rising geopolitical tensions made cooperation more vital than ever. For the first time in 500 years, all the Nordic countries were now part of the same defence alliance. But it was the first time in history that this applied to all the democratic Baltic Sea countries – a true milestone. He applauded the parliamentarians who had worked tirelessly to achieve this. With hybrid attacks, Russia was testing the West’s threshold and its response. Effective defence required strong alliances and measures as Russia would continue to adjust its tactics. He assured his audience that none of that would deter them from their support for Ukraine. The British historian Mark Galleoti had recently said that the Cold War had been more stable than the current period. The rules had been somewhat clear while the present day felt more like the uncertain time right after the end of World War II when the rules had not been well defined. Mr Rasmussen saw the same uncertainty, noting the resulting security risks. The Baltic Sea region would see major investments in the near future, including offshore wind farms, new pipeline connections, and nuclear power plants. Their interconnected energy grid would improve the security of supply but also widen the region’s vulnerability to attacks, in particular hybrid assaults. Another risk was the Russian shadow fleet of oil tankers seeking to circumvent the price cap on Russian oil, to finance the Russian war machine. An accident with just one fully loaded tanker could cause severe pollution to the seas and the coastlines. In opposing this fleet, Denmark was cooperating with all European partners. He was pleased by EU sanctions against 27 ships, limiting their ability to operate. The partners had to remain vigilant, ensuring that any further measures could be implemented and remain legally sound. The overall target of all of these attacks was to undermine state authority, creating uncertainty in the population. This raised questions such as how to respond to power failures without causing fear, whether they were resilient enough, or whether they were ready to defend their nations. In all that, they could learn from the Baltic States. In closing, he underlined that he wanted a clean and safe Baltic Sea for his grandchildren. While they had long looked to the USA for security, it was now time for Europeans to contribute more to trans-Atlantic safety. Debate Mr Saku Nikkanen also underlined the necessity of standing together in these trying times. He was gravely concerned about the Russian shadow fleet and welcomed Denmark’s efforts to curtail the Russian oil tankers. The ships’ average age was more than thirty years, and they were in a poor state, posing a significant threat to the Baltic Sea environment. He called on the BSPC to take a unified stance on banning the Russian shadow tankers from the Baltic Sea. Mr Pauli Aalto-Setälä saw Russia’s war of aggression as having fundamentally changed the security situation in all dimensions. Finland’s foreign committee had covered, among others, Russian attempts to redefine the zones in the Gulf of Finland, damage to underwater infrastructure, and GPS interference in Finland and surrounding areas. Additional measures were still needed to secure the area. Vigilance was needed along with preparedness to counter the unrestrained aggression of the Russian Federation. Their cooperation had to be deepened and reinforced. In particular, they had to focus on supply chain security. For Finland, a safe and secure sea transport was crucial and thus central to their resilience. Finally, he pointed out that environmental cooperation with Russia had diminished since the outbreak of the war, also pointing to the shadow fleet. This had to be addressed, not only for their security but also the environmental health of the Baltic State. He tagged on that they should all support Ukraine. Mr Himanshu Gulati described the BSPC – and the Baltic Sea – as binding nations together. Unfortunately, in history, the region had been the meeting point of democratic nations and those with other intents. The invasion of Ukraine had reminded them that the sea of opportunities could also bring challenges. Representing Norway, he noted that their ample energy production facilities in the North Sea had seen suspicious activity recently. Considering these and other hybrid threats, he asked the ministers if they believed the measures in the Baltic Sea were sufficient. Ms Oddný G. Harðardóttir said their countries had to be on the alert in security and defence. Yet they had to do anything to negotiate peace in conflicts. She asked Mr Rasmussen what he considered the best path forward and to prevent war. Mr Kaarel Taimla, Estonia, from the youth forum commented that during the Cold War, dissenters could find themselves sent to a gulag. Yet even the US put tens of thousands of their citizens of Japanese descent into internment camps after the attack on Pearl Harbor. History taught that democracies could overreact. But in the present, they could not afford to either over- or underreact. This applied to ethnic Russians living especially in the Baltic states. In that regard, he also pointed to pro-Russian demonstrations all over Europe. He wondered how to deal with people of severely different opinions. He asked everybody to deal not only with the physical threats but also the disinformation spread among the people. Mr Tobias Olling Mørup, Denmark, from the youth forum highlighted that the former Belgian minister of foreign affairs, Mr Mark Eyskens, had described Europe in 1991 as an economic giant, political dwarf, and literary worm. In the present, Mr Mörup thought that Europe had failed politically to prevent the war and was militarily not able to end the war. He asked if the politicians shared the same view as Mr Eyskens and how to secure the Baltic Sea and Europe fast enough from the Russian threat. Mr Johannes Schraps remarked that the countries around the North Sea had entered a cooperation for the protection of their infrastructure. The BSPC resolution of this conference would call for a closer security cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. He asked for the ministers’ input. Furthermore, as outgoing vice-president of the BSPC, he appreciated the ministers taking part in this session as well as that the CBSS had taken the parliamentary dimension of the Baltic Sea cooperation into account. Ms Claudia Müller referred to Minister Rasmussen’s comment about rules being established after World War II. Back then, the world was split up into spheres of influence, without the people having a say in the matter. Those living in the unfree countries saw the Baltic Sea as a border – dividing them – yet also as a beacon of hope. She wondered how they could make sure that the Baltic Sea would never again be a sea of division but would always unite them. Minister Poulsen viewed it as vital for the democratic countries of Europe to stick together in their support of Ukraine in the long run. He noted Denmark’s donation of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. Secondly, they had to help Ukraine establish a strong defence industry of their own. Thus, he called on countries to invest more in Ukrainian defence companies. That would also speed up the military provisions. Thirdly, a more long-lasting plan was needed for the defence of the Baltic countries. Furthermore, there should be more joint exercises. He additionally called for democratic European countries to jointly purchase military equipment. Rather than focusing on their own need, nations could do more for the joint defence. Here, he underlined that they should show wisdom in what to spend their money on. At the same time, they should share best practices on how to fight against hybrid warfare. Fourthly, regarding disinformation and public awareness, there had to be an open and direct discussion with the voters on the possible outcome of Russia gaining more territory – namely, highlighting the dangers this would inherently create for the rest of Europe. Minister Rasmussen replied to Mr Gulati’s question if the current defence measures were enough with a clear “No”. The good thing, though, was that now the BSPC countries were now together in their goals, not least with all of them having joined NATO. He also stressed the importance of dialogue on all levels, which expressly included the parliamentary dimension noted by Mr Schraps. Reflecting Ms Harðardóttir’s question on how to prevent war, he believed they should learn a lesson from history. That lesson was to continue to stick together and be steadfast in their support for Ukraine. He stressed that they were in a crucial period of history. He was proud that Denmark was the top supporter of Ukraine per capita and fourth in total numbers. The latter, though, was worrying, given that Denmark was such a small country. He called on everybody to step up. They could not afford to allow Putin to win the war and create uncertainty for generations to come. Picking up on Mr Mörup quoting the former Belgian minister, Mr Rasmussen saw value in that statement. Whoever would move into the White House, Europe had to do more to stand on their own feet. They had to build a European pillar in the NATO framework and increase their defence industry’s capacity. In that, he appreciated Ms von der Leyen’s re-election as head of the European Commission. He assured his audience that Denmark in their presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2025 would continue this agenda for a more competitive Europe, a stronger bridge between NATO and Europe. In conclusion, cooperation was the only way forward.

Safety in the Baltic Sea Region was the central theme of this year’s Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference under the Danish Presidency. More than 150 participants attended this year’s annual conference in Helsingør. Standing together for defence was the core issue to be deepened in the first session. The BSPC’s annual conference opened with introductions on the region’s history and the BSPC’s activities in the past year. The first session dealt intensively with defence matters, arguing for greater coordination and integration in the physical, cyber, and cognitive domains to fend off hybrid attacks. Russian disinformation and sabotage, as well as their efforts to pull African countries into their influence, were also considered. Introduction BSPC President Henrik Møller said it was a privilege to welcome the participants to the 33 rd Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference in Helsingør – or Elsinore, as the locals said. He declared the conference open. Opening Speech by Mr Søren Gade, Speaker of the Danish Parliament Mr Gade, in his turn, welcomed the participants of both the conference and the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum, pointing out the central location of Helsingør in the Baltic Sea region. He reflected on the Øresund Strait’s history, from fierce battles to a major rescue operation of Jewish refugees in 1943. In the present day, Russia’s brutal attack on Ukraine had proved a turning point for Europe, breaking all principles in a rules-based international order. The BSPC had terminated its cooperation with the Russian side. Mr Gade underlined his condemnation against the Russian aggression over the past two and a half years. The democratic nations had to stand shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine because their fight was the other nations’ fight as well. After Russia’s withdrawal from Baltic Sea institutions, it was all the more important for the remaining neighbours to cooperate even more closely, such as in the BSPC but also in the EU and NATO. He was pleased that Finland and Sweden had now joined the military alliance, reinforcing the deterrence. The theme of this year’s BSPC conference was Safety and Security in the Baltic Sea Region, noting its timeliness with regard to recent incidents destabilising the energy supply. Sabotage and cyber attacks on the power grid, Internet cables, and digital systems never seemed to end. Although the damage had been fixed, the attacks had achieved their goal of increasing uncertainty in the population and provoke division in the West’s relationship with Russia. The Baltic Sea region was key in Europe, in terms of climate change amelioration, maritime ecosystem restoration as well as energy and safety. Democracy was under attack in the digital space. It was crucial to learn from each other. That particularly included the young people from the Youth Forum. Mr Gade wished the participants a successful conference, highlighting the BSPC’s great value for the parliaments of the region. Opening Speech by BSPC President Henrik Møller President Møller said that this conference represented the culmination of one year of hard work, cooperation, and continuation of vital traditions underlining their commitment to the prosperity, security, and sustainability of the democratic Baltic Sea region. In a complex landscape, they had navigated challenges and opportunities. They had engaged in critical dialogue. In key meetings in the autumn of 2023, they had set the outline of the year ahead in their collective action. In particular, he highlighted their participation in the Conference of Presidents of Parliament in Europe with important conversations, especially with the president of the Ukrainian parliament. During the Nordic Council and Baltic Assembly sessions, commonalities had been deepened, but contacts beyond the region – for instance with the Scottish parliament – had been forged. That reflected the growing importance of regional cooperation. In June 2024, the BSPC had taken part in the meeting of the Benelux countries, engaging in deep conversations about port security. Progress had been charted in environmental protection, energy security, and regional defence cooperation. The president stressed that the democratic Baltic Sea region was a leader in addressing some of the most pressing issues of the time. Visits of the Rail Baltica and Fehmarnbelt Tunnel construction sites had granted a deep, practical look at the region’s most significant infrastructure projects in the east and west. A study visit to the Finnish eastern border had provided insight into the situation. President Møller highlighted the exemplary work of the BSPC Working Group on Energy Supply, Security, and Resilience. They had fostered dialogue and proposed innovative solutions to ensure the resilience, sustainability, and security of the energy infrastructure. The Standing Committee meetings had dealt intensively with critical infrastructure and deepened their links with the EU Commission, HELCOM, and the CBSS regarding climate, security, and environmental protection. He noted this year’s Conference Resolution would focus on improving infrastructure, enhancing military mobility, and increasing cooperation among democratic Baltic Sea countries. He outlined the line-up of the conference, from defence, energy supply security over safety in the Baltic Sea region to climate initiatives. Mr Møller welcomed the young representatives of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Youth Forum, highlighting their participation in the BSPC’s work. The BSPC president reflected that the need for unity, courage, and an unwavering commitment to the values was as powerful as it had been when he had mentioned it at the last conference. As much as had been achieved over the past twelve months, more had yet to be accomplished. First Session: Defence Cooperation Co-chair Johannes Schraps opened the first political debate by pointing out how much the political landscape had undergone significant changes in recent years, largely driven by external factors, especially Russia’s increasing military activities. He introduced the first speaker, the former Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Pekka Haavisto, underlining his unparalleled expertise in foreign policy, crisis management, and environmental issues. Speech by Mr Pekka Haavisto, former Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Haavisto explained that his country had a 1,300-kilometer border with Russia. This had led Finland to develop a concept of “total defence,” enveloping civil society and private companies in their planning. In his view, this concept should be enhanced and expanded. Yet he conceded that recent thinking about warfare may have been mistaken – namely that battles of the kind that had characterised World War II were no longer realistic. Instead, cyber wars, information wars, or hybrid wars would take their place. Now, they were coming to realise that these were actually new layers stacked on top of the conventional layers of conflict. This meant that the democratic security had to be constructed based on all these types of risks. Furthermore, Baltic Sea security had to build on the local institutions – particularly the EU and NATO. Mr Haavisto conceded that Finland was disappointed in the joint security responses not being planned and exercised by the EU. He hoped that the upcoming EU Commission would take these efforts more seriously. Those calling the Baltic Sea now a “NATO lake,” he cautioned that Russia retained considerable influence. Both sides were dependent on Baltic Sea traffic and could exert heavy pressure on their opposition. He further saw serious shortcomings in the defence industry, as highlighted by efforts to train Ukrainian soldiers in modern equipment. Interoperability, standardisation, and harmonisation were missing. These had to be implemented – raising the urgent question of doing so in the EU, adding e.g., the UK and Norway, or should this be handled in the trans-Atlantic context. Moreover, politicians had to be aware of the population’s willingness to continue supporting these investments – what kind of military equipment and where to slash the budget. Maritime surveillance was critical, in light of the Nord Stream and Balticconnector incidents. Here, Finland and Sweden – with its high-tech submarine fleet – could be vital. Finally, Mr Haavisto addressed environmental concerns – ranging from dumped ammunitions and gas pipelines to shipborne transport of gas and other hazardous substances. In that respect, the energy transition was equally crucial. He saw much to do in the Baltic context. BSPC Vice-President Schraps introduced the next speaker, Mr Jarosław Wałęsa, currently member of the Polish parliament, previously in the European parliament, working on fisheries, environmental issues, international trade and the broader concerns of the Baltic Sea region. He had also been the head of the Polish delegation to the BSPC until recently. Speech by Mr Jarosław Wałęsa, MP Polish parliament Mr Wałęsa referenced Mr Haavisto’s disappointment over the response of the European Union. Mr Wałęsa himself was disappointed in the European inability to form a united response since the Balkans in the 1990s. There was a long road yet ahead of them to forge a fruitful coalition that was meaningful and cost-effective. Since the Russian attack on Ukraine, the conversation had changed fundamentally from what had been spoken about but five years earlier. He hoped the new understanding would transform into that meaningful coalition. For Poland, the Baltic Sea was their immediate neighbourhood and thus vitally important. Its geostrategic importance had increased dramatically, making regional cooperation essential. Mr Wałęsa hoped that this would also transform the way politicians spoke to their constituents, to relate to them why it was important to pay their money to fund a war in Ukraine. Peace was nowhere in sight, and it would be a long, costly process. He was convinced that with democratic support, Ukraine would stand. Yet the recent gap in US support had underlined the dependency on these supplies, making it all the more urgent that the support be upheld. At the same time, Mr Wałęsa warned his listeners not to ignore the presence of other Russian assets in the region, pointing to Kaliningrad and the country’s maritime activities. Russia could still threaten any of the Baltic Sea countries at short notice. It could target critical infrastructure, such as undersea pipelines. He further pointed to a wave of Russian hybrid attacks, disrupting GPS signals, deliberately violating airspace, sabotage, artificially created migration flows as well as cyber attacks. However, Russia had – very inadvertently – managed to convince Finland and Sweden to join NATO. Mr Wałęsa noted that these country’s accession also reinforced the positions in the high north as well as the Euro-Atlantic region. Yet the Baltic Sea becoming a NATO-dominated basin was not just an opportunity but also a challenge as Russia sought to destabilise the entire region. Poland welcomed the recent initiative of the Finnish presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States to better coordinate the common positions and responses. He called on NATO to stay focused on its collective security. It had to continue to deny any aggression, be it hybrid or military, from the territory of Russia, Belarus, or elsewhere. A persistent presence of allied forces on the eastern flank was crucial. Sustainable peace in Europe was only possible by supporting Ukraine and eventually bringing it into NATO. He cautioned that Russia sought to build a new security order at the expense of Europe. This meant that all of their nations had to implement a new strategic approach against Russia. Mr Wałęsa underlined that, beyond the immediate conflict, they shared values as democracies, they respected the rules of international law. He was concerned that worries in the population would make the upcoming months difficult. Yet it was urgent to decide matters, such as what types of ammunition and weapons to manufacture and where to do so. BSPC President Møller presented Mr Flemming Splidsboel, a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) working in particular on international security in Eastern Europe and Russia. Speech by Mr Flemming Splidsboel, senior researcher, Danish Institute for Inter­national Studies (DIIS) Mr Splidsboel started by stating two uncomfortable truths: One was that the conflict with Russia would continue for a long time. The other was that, unless something new was introduced, they would have to accept that Ukraine might lose this war. This had to be kept in mind in discussions about public spending to support the country. In the latter stages of the summer, Ukraine had been given freer reign to act, such as on Russian territory. Mr Splidsboel stressed that this was one such new element. The war – conflict with the West – had become the raison d’être of the Russian regime, infusing every aspect of Russian society. Everything in the country was politicised, down to such aspects as music festivals. He underlined the massive change since the start of the war, having become semi-totalitarian and perhaps fully fascist. The meta-narrative of the past two decades blamed all of Russia’s problems on the West. That narrative had mushroomed across the entire society in the last two years, so much so that Mr Splidsboel doubted Putin’s regime would survive without that conflict. Since 2014 and even more so since 2022, Russia had expanded its interests, for instance, in the high north. They have also needled the West with such actions as moving missiles – possibly carrying nuclear warheads – into the Kaliningrad oblast and withdrawing them, raising questions about what such signals meant. Aside from the focus on direct military threats, hybrid warfare also had to be addressed. To Mr Splidsboel as a researcher, hybrid warfare meant the deliberate mix of kinetic and non-kinetic effects. Here, he mentioned the physical domain – usually the arena of kinetic effects –, the cyber domain, and the cognitive domain – such as disinformation. Russians were quite creative in making use of these domains and exploiting Western vulnerabilities. Thus, the West also had to cooperate in defending against these non-kinetic threats. In that, he noted that the Danish government was establishing a new ministry to bring together all of these domains together on the national level. With respect to earlier criticism of the European Union, Mr Splidsboel said that the EU had established several rather effective standards against some non-kinetic attacks. In his view, the West should turn to the EU for these and to NATO for the kinetic assaults. Something else that had to be prepared for was how to deal with Russia once the war would end. The situation might be akin to the Cold War in addressing a dysfunctional regime. He predicted that the last European empire – Russia – would collapse at some point in the near future, with tremendous consequences for everybody. He was aware that this discussion might seem premature, yet they had to be ready for that eventuality. Political Debate Ms Lene Westgard Halle said that she was grateful every morning looking into her young daughter’s eyes, as well as for the peace they enjoyed. Her grandparents had not been so lucky. Their region had lived longer with war than it had with peace. Conflict, war, and hard work had marked the Baltic Sea region’s history. Peace was not a given. It was easy to hate, but the countries represented at this conference had chosen not to. They had decided to stand together. Yet peace had to be fought for, just as democracy had to be defended. Therefore, different ideologies had to be put aside to cooperate ever more closely in that defence. The West was at war on two fronts – one, in the east, was against a mangy and shabby bear flexing its ancient muscles invading another nation. Rather than strength, this showed weakness and insecurity. The other battle was to preserve democracy, ensuring that their children would enjoy the rights of the present. The Internet, the Russian troll factories, the fake profiles, the manufactured conflicts on social media – all of that happened right at this time within the West’s national borders. They had to wake up. As such, she called on the political right and left not to be polarised. Democracies had to embrace diversity and accept that not everyone was the same, yet they had to continue talking to each other. If they stood together, Putin’s strategy of Divide and Conquer would fail. All of them shared values, despite other differences. As a conservative Christian, she appreciated diversity which provided different perspectives. Cooperation had to be deepened ever further. They had to lock arms to ensure that Europe was not going to go back, to show that it was stronger. Mr Andris Kulbergs noted that he had worked with Russia, representing a Dutch company, since 2013, until the day of the invasion. In 2014, right after the annexation of Crimea, walking through Moscow, he had realised that this would end very badly. He had witnessed the change in society, epitomised by returning Stalin – who had slaughtered so many Russians – as a legend to revere. They should have realised back then what was happening, and they should have acted back then. The comforts of normality, of trade, of relations, had been deceiving. The Baltic States had always cautioned their western partners and now could proclaim, “We told you so.” Now, though, they were advising on how to act in the future. Mr Kulbergs did not see how there could be a return to normal after what was happening in Ukraine. Another mistake was not giving all-out support to Ukraine in the first year of the war to win quickly. Over time, the bigger foe was gaining the advantage, and there was indeed a possibility that Ukraine could lose the war. He warned that dragging out the war even further would mean that eventually, the Ukrainians would no longer be the ones fighting but the citizens of Western nations. Mr Kulbergs noted that he was a newcomer to politics and at first had been unsure of the role of the BSPC. But the war had proven how vital this forum was in relaying information and urgency to the parliaments. As chair of the BSPC working group on energy security, he knew that all of them understood they were in this together. Yet the working group had also been shown the shortcomings, such as the lack of a hub of information to inform all the involved countries but more importantly the lack of a policy how to deal with hybrid attacks. In that, he mentioned the attack on the Balticconnector by a Chinese supposed merchant vessel dragging its anchor across the undersea cables. Not having a policy to respond directly was dangerous, Mr Kulbergs cautioned. Furthermore, the working group had learned that the upcoming winter would be the most vulnerable to a cyber attack against energy. He reminded his colleagues that the Baltic Sea countries – especially the Baltics, Poland, and Finland – were the border nations to Russia. They had to support each other in their defence efforts. To allow the Italians and French to safely enjoy their croissants, the border would have to be defended. That was not a national concern but one of the EU as a whole. Mr Kulbergs mentioned an Estonian calculation that Ukraine could win the war if every European provided seven euros. Mr Lars Christian Brask understood Mr Haavisto and Mr Wałęsa to have said that the EU had failed. He asked them how exactly this should be ameliorated. Of Mr Splidsboel, he asked how the threat of nuclear war could be addressed. Ms Claudia Müller zeroed in on the cognitive domain mentioned by Mr Splidsboel. Society’s acceptance of security measures was crucial to both their security and whether they would succeed in helping Ukraine win the war, i.e., to retain their integrity. Yet she was aware of the elephant in the room, namely how Germany had acted prior to 2022. She endorsed the changes to the country’s policy since then, highlighting the Bundeswehr battalion now stationed in Lithuania. This was part of Germany’s commitment to ensure their neighbours’ security. Returning to the cognitive domain, she worried that they did not fully understand what this meant. First of all, they had to understand the long-term work that Russia had conducted on the West’s people and societies, spreading misinformation – lies – undermining the acceptance of their institutions, their way of life, and diversity. As an example, she pointed to a Russian decree making immigration easier for those who shared Russian values and beliefs – in other words, rejecting Western and/or democratic values. Russia painted itself as the antithesis to modern society, claiming that democracies would fall. This had to be fought. Secondly, people did not understand the interdependencies. Regarding energy, regarding security, these were not just national concerns. To be secure, the neighbours had to be secure. Ms Müller believed that this had to be said more often, to make people understand it better. Without European security, even large countries would be destabilised. The lies that had been spread were a fundamental danger; democracies had to rely on the truth. Mr Splidsboel first addressed the question about nuclear war. They had to be mentally prepared for that eventuality. He himself did not fear it, even though the Russian side liked to wield the threat of nuclear war as a cudgel. The USA had prepared for that – both tactical and strategic warheads – and communicated to Russia that their use would lead to a US response. A plan for the EU would have to be drawn up, even if it should rest in a drawer somewhere. He also quoted President Zelenskyy from his recent speech on Ukraine’s Day of Independence that there were no more red lines. Putin had fooled the West long enough that there were red lines that must not be crossed. As for the cognitive domain, he agreed that it was not yet quite understood. Moreover, they needed to comprehend that even if there was peace in Ukraine, the conflict with the West would continue. Russia would continue its disinformation campaigns. That was the new normal, he underlined. Aside from Russia, disinformation also came increasingly from China, from the Islamic State, and other actors. A dynamic approach to these challenges was required. Mr Wałęsa underlined that he was a strong believer in the European project. He saw the need for greater integration, that the EU was an ever-changing entity. One crisis followed the other, and they were learning from each crisis. After all, nobody had ever tried a project like the EU, so it was obvious that mistakes would be made. However, greater integration needed institutional and treaty changes – a very difficult task few member states appreciated. Yet without these changes, the EU was not set up to respond to these crises. He welcomed the European Commission’s proposal of a European Defence position. On the whole though, Mr Wałęsa remained pessimistic about accomplishing in the current institutional framework what would be possible otherwise. Their efforts clearly had to be coordinated to get as much bang from their euro as possible. In that, he suggested – not for the first time – a distribution of production types since not every country had to manufacture ammunition. It would be cost-effective to have specialisations. But there was one thing that could be done, even though it would be a tall order for the Ukrainians. Even though the country was caught up in a brutal war, their democratic institutions had to be fortified as well as their anti-corruption courts. With the military and financial support, the West had to insist on these measures as well. The endgame had to be a democratic sovereign Ukraine within the European Union. Returning to his pessimistic outlook, he picked the idea of a European army as an example. Time and time again, the topic was raised, never to gain any traction. To his regret, he did not believe it would happen during his lifetime. Nonetheless, they should strive for a powerful European defence force, yet for a long time, they would be dependent on the US through NATO. That, in turn, raised the question of what would happen in the USA in November with the presidential elections. Mr Wałęsa then insisted that he still believed they would emerge victorious from the present crisis. Mr Haavisto commented that his grandfather had left school at 17 to help the region of Karelia and its people gain their freedom. When returning, he said that he had been more eager to bring freedom than the locals were to achieve it. Considering the long history of the Baltic Sea region and Russia, they had to keep this in mind. Next, he noted that Ms Müller’s contribution had made him think of Russia’s relation with developing countries, such as Burkina Faso or Chad. The West had used to have very good relations with these countries in northern Africa, but now they were switching their allegiance. More generally, he cautioned to be more critical of incoming information. For instance, people tended to believe every bad thing claimed about Russia because it fit their idea of the country. Notably, most of that was even true, yet it was received uncritically. Understanding the big picture was vital, especially in wartime. Finally, as for improving European defence, he saw a Commissioner for Defence as a step in the right direction. Mr Haavisto underlined that he did not entirely condemn the EU’s response: After all, the European Union had been the first to aid Ukraine. Yet he called for exercises to train for the eventuality that one of their member countries was under attack. NATO was running such exercises, but the EU was not. Prof Jānis Vucāns said he was taking the floor because of Mr Wałęsa calling for the opinion of the Baltic States. He noted that the matter of defence and security had been on the BSPC’s agenda since at least 2014, just after the Russian occupation of Crimea. The discussion had been very difficult because the Russian state duma and several regional parliaments had also been full members of the BSPC. Belarus had applied for observer status to the BSPC. What had changed in the present was that all BSPC member states were also part of NATO. Discussions in the Baltic Assembly had yielded that, in addition to NATO, a regional approach was also necessary. He further noted the Baltic countries’ gratitude to NATO, especially to the UK, to Canada, to Germany, for their multinational forward presence battle groups stationed in the Baltics. This provided stability, enhancing the people’s trust in NATO. He commented further that the Standing Committee had discussed establishing a rotational principle for the BSPC presidency. The morning of this day, Prof Vucāns had read a proposal by BSPC Secretary General Bodo Bahr that, from 2026, the BSPC presidency could be held by the country holding the CBSS presidency. He saw a connection to the kinetic and non-kinetic activities as the former were mainly implemented by governments, but the non-kinetic – the non-physical – effort had to be implemented by people, by parliaments. He pointed to the debates about the Baltic countries reaching the 2 % budget goal for defence set by NATO; acceptance had come only once the people realised that it was better to pay and have NATO troops in place in case their big bad neighbour would attack. Prof Vucāns went on to note the importance of the topics discussed by the BSPC and included in their resolution. Given his long history with the organisation, he knew that they could influence their governments to closer cooperation. And that was their task. Mr Wałęsa felt strength from the discussion today. Every speaker had said that they were unified and had to stay together. They had to spend more on their defence and improve their coordination efforts. Yet he admitted some discomfort when there was no disagreement. He was sure there were differences of opinion – and that was part of their job: Butting heads until they came up with better solutions to benefit all of them. His concluding message was a heartfelt thank-you to everyone for understanding the situation. Mr Splidsboel repeated that the Russian empire would collapse, presenting the Baltic Sea region with tremendous challenges but also opportunities. They would be uniquely positioned to play a positive role. For example, Belarus would inevitably change after this collapse. They had to be prepared for that, yet he took comfort in knowing that the Baltic Sea region already was quite ready. Mr Haavisto did not wish to sound too pessimistic, but history taught that all empires would collapse one day. He was concerned over the developments in Belarus, considering their many democratic activists, and yet the country had floated into Russian control. He remembered a 2019 visit to Belarus during which the ruler Lukashenko had said that his country wanted to be one of the Nordic states. Yet at a suggestion to increase democracy, Lukashenko replied that they did not wish to be that Nordic. Still, to Mr Haavisto, the episode underlined that the Belarusian people were close to the Baltic Sea region. Therefore, even during this conflict, they should maintain contact with the country and help it into a brighter future.